Gills v. Funk et al

Filing 126

ORDER ADOPTING 107 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/15/15. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JARYAN GILLS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARTHUR FUNK, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-CV-791-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United
States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson entered on May 20, 2015 (Doc. 107).
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson recommends that the undersigned deny Plaintiff Jaryan
Gills’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 90). Plaintiff filed a timely objection on
May 29, 2015 (Doc. 109). For the reasons set forth below, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s
Report and Recommendation is adopted in its entirety.
Background
Plaintiff Jaryan Gills, an inmate currently housed at Stateville Correctional
Center (“Stateville”), brought this action alleging deprivations of his constitutional
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials
and medical personnel at Stateville, Menard Correctional Center, and Lawrence
Correctional Center have failed to adequately treat his inguinal hernia and four bullet
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fragments lodged in his body since his incarceration began in 2011.
On March 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion (Doc. 90) seeking a preliminary
injunction compelling Defendants to send him to an outside specialist for surgery to
repair his inguinal hernia and remove the bullet fragments from his body. Plaintiff
asserts that he is in chronic pain and that his medical conditions severely restrict his
daily activities.
On May 6, 2015, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson held an evidentiary hearing on
Plaintiff’s Motion. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified regarding the limitations on his
daily activities caused by his medical conditions. Defendants elicited testimony from
Dr. Obaisi, the Medical Director at Stateville, who testified that surgical repair for a
hernia is an elective procedure and is only necessary if there are attendant
complications – none of which are present with respect to Plaintiff’s hernia. Regarding
the bullet fragments, Dr. Obaisi testified that they are stable and superficial.
Conclusions of the Report and Recommendation
Based on the evidence before the Court, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson found that
Plaintiff failed to establish the elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction.
Magistrate Judge Wilkerson was mindful of the discomfort associated with Plaintiff’s
inguinal hernia and lodged bullet fragments. However, the extensive medical records
detailing the care Plaintiff has received since 2011, as well as the testimony elicited at
the hearing, indicated that Plaintiff’s likelihood of success did not warrant injunctive
relief. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Wilkerson held that the evidence did not support a
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finding that Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
needs given that Plaintiff has received regular treatment for his medical conditions.
Discussion
The undersigned must undertake a de novo review of the Report and
Recommendation because a timely objection was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C);
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); SDIL-LR 73.1(b); Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 824 F. Supp. 786,
788 (N.D. Ill. 1993); see also Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). De novo
review requires the district judge to “give fresh consideration to those issues to which
specific objections have been made” and make a decision “based on an independent
review of the evidence and arguments without giving any presumptive weight to the
magistrate judge’s conclusion.” Harper, 824 F.Supp. at 788 (citing 12 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3076.8, at p. 55 (1st ed. 1973) (1992 Pocket
Part)); Mendez v. Republic Bank, 725 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court “may accept,
reject or modify the magistrate judge’s recommended decision.” Harper, 824 F. Supp. at
788.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), however, where neither timely nor specific

objections to the Report and Recommendation are made, this Court need not conduct a
de novo review of the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985).
A. Legal Standard for Obtaining a Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
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persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997). The purpose of such an
injunction is to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate resolution of
the lawsuit.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988). In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his claim; (2) he has no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Planned Parenthood of Indiana,
Inc. v. Comm‘r of Indiana State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 972 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Am.
Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 589–90 (7th Cir. 2012).
In the context of prisoner litigation, the scope of the Court’s authority to enter an
injunction is circumscribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Westefer v.
Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2012). Under the PLRA, preliminary injunction relief
“must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the
court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683 (noting
the PLRA “enforces a point repeatedly made by the Supreme Court in cases challenging
prison conditions: prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary
authority over the institutions they manage”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
B. Plaintiff’s Factual Account Challenge
Plaintiff makes a number of objections disputing Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s
factual findings in the Report and Recommendation regarding the care Plaintiff has
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received for his medical conditions. Specifically, Plaintiff objects that he was not first
examined by a physician at Lawrence in April 2011 and that he refused sick calls (Doc.
109). While the Court has taken note of Plaintiff’s objections, it does not factor into the
Court’s consideration of the Report and Recommendation because the particular facts to
which Plaintiff objects were rather inconsequential to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s
ultimate conclusion.

Additionally, although Plaintiff lodges a plethora of general

objections, his objections do not identify the nature of Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s
alleged errors. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s objections contained no citation to the record or
case law, and were devoid of analysis as to why Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s erred in
his recommendation.
After thoroughly reviewing Plaintiff’s factual objections and the record, the
Court is not persuaded that Magistrate Judge Wilkerson misapplied or failed to
consider the relevant evidence before making his recommendation.

The factual

accounting in the Report and Recommendation is both thorough and accurate.
Accordingly, the Court accepts Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s factual findings in their
entirety.
C. Plaintiff is Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits
To establish an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need, there are “two high hurdles, which every inmate-plaintiff must clear.”
Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively, sufficiently
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serious.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005), citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a state official acted with a sufficiently
capable state of mind. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. A prisoner also must demonstrate that
the prison official “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the innate and disregarded the
risk.” Id.
Plaintiff generally objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s conclusion that he is
unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim for deliberate indifference. At the crux of
Plaintiff’s objections, he believes his current treatment is inadequate, and therefore, he
believes he will likely succeed on the merits of his deliberate indifference claim. The
Court is mindful that Plaintiff suffers from discomfort associated with his inguinal
hernia and bullet fragments – medical conditions which are sufficiently serious. Having
considered Plaintiff’s objections, however, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson that Plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim because there is
no indication in the record that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff has received, and continues to receive, medical care
for his conditions. Furthermore, the record reflects that Plaintiff was recently referred
to an outside specialist for a surgical evaluation. Regarding the bullet fragments, the
evidence establishes that the condition is stable. While Plaintiff believes surgery is
necessary, the Eighth Amendment does not confer a constitutional right on inmates to
demand specific care. Kendrik v. Frank, 310 F.App’x 34, 38 (7th Cir. 2009).
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Plaintiff’s assertion that his conditions necessitate different treatment boils down
to an unsubstantiated disagreement with Defendants’ professional judgment. It is wellestablished that an inmate’s mere disagreement with the course of his medical
treatment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference.
Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court finds there is no basis for a
conclusion that the treatment Plaintiff currently receives is so far afield of accepted
professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not actually based on a
medical judgment.

Therefore, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s

conclusion that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits of his deliberate indifference claim.
D. Plaintiff is Not Likely to Suffer Irreparable Harm
Additionally, Plaintiff generally objects to Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s finding
that he is unlikely to suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Having considered
Plaintiff’s objections, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Wilkerson that the
evidence before the Court does not support Plaintiff’s allegations of irreparable harm.
The record demonstrates that although Plaintiff’s hernia has increased over time, this
increase is typical and does not indicate that surgery is medically necessary.
Importantly, Plaintiff’s hernia is not incarcerated, strangulated, or irreducible. Other
than his own assertions, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to the contrary. Again, it is
well established that preliminary injunctions are an “extraordinary and drastic remedy”
requiring the movant to demonstrate its justification by a clear showing. Mazurek, 520
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U.S. at 972. The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Wilkerson’s analysis that Plaintiff
has failed to reach his threshold burden for injunctive relief.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge
Wilkerson’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 107). Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. 90) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 15, 2015
/s/Nancy J. Rosenstengel
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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