Brown v. Unknown Party

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER severing case no. 13-659-JPG. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 8/5/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOHN D. BROWN, # B-34351,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT of
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-659-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Vandalia Correctional Center (“Vandalia”), has
brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a sevenyear sentence for burglary. He raises several claims stemming from a nurse’s alleged denial of
medical care, which led to acts of retaliation after Plaintiff filed a grievance against the nurse.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff sought emergency treatment on January 31, 2012,
from Defendant Nurse Paula Gephart, for a painfully swollen ankle (Doc. 1, p. 7). Defendant
Paula Gephart refused to give Plaintiff pain pills until he signed a payment voucher. Plaintiff
protested that he was exempt from making any co-payment for emergency medical care, but in
the end, he signed the voucher and was given the medication. The medicine relieved Plaintiff’s
pain, but he filed a grievance against Defendant Paula Gephart over the incident, which was
initially reviewed by Defendant Magnus (health care administrator). It was later rejected by
Defendants Harter (counselor) and Dozier (warden).
On March 15, 2012, funds were improperly taken from Plaintiff’s trust account (Doc. 1,
p. 19). Although Plaintiff does not explain this fully, it appears that he is referring to the coPage 1 of 15

payment for his medical visit. Plaintiff also complains that other co-payments were collected for
emergency health and dental care (Doc. 1, p. 23). His grievances over this issue were rejected as
well, and the disposition of the grievances was approved by Defendant Godinez (IDOC Director)
(Doc. 1, p. 21).
During the night of March 30, 2012, after Plaintiff got an unsatisfactory response to his
grievance, he was awakened and harassed by Defendant Ethan Gephart (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9). Ethan
Gephart is a correctional officer, and the husband of Defendant Paula Gephart. Defendant Ethan
Gephart seized some of Plaintiff’s property, and directed another officer to write Plaintiff a
disciplinary ticket. These actions were taken in retaliation for Plaintiff having pursued a
grievance against Nurse Gephart. Plaintiff also asserts that he was treated more harshly during
this shakedown because of his race (African-American). His white cellmate was also awakened,
but, unlike Plaintiff, was given a chance to put away his property and was not issued a ticket
(Doc. 1, p. 9). Plaintiff filed a grievance over this incident, which was rejected by Defendants
Waltz, Harter, and Dozier.
Plaintiff was called to a hearing on April 4, 2012, on the disciplinary report made at the
behest of Defendant Ethan Gephart (Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff had not been given a copy of the
charges prior to this hearing, nor did he have the opportunity to prepare a defense or call any
witnesses. Defendant Wells proceeded with the hearing anyway, and recommended disciplinary
action against Plaintiff (he does not specify what punishment he received). Plaintiff’s grievance
over the conduct of the hearing was rejected.
On September 8, 2012, Defendant Ethan Gephart again woke Plaintiff in the middle of
the night, took and destroyed Plaintiff’s coffee mug, and ordered another officer to issue Plaintiff
a disciplinary ticket. This ticket was unjustified, because it had to do with a laundry bag which

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did not even belong to Plaintiff (Doc. 1, p. 12). Plaintiff contends that these actions were in
retaliation for Plaintiff’s grievances against Defendant Ethan Gephart and his wife. As before,
Plaintiff’s grievance was rejected.
On October 10, 2012, all of Plaintiff’s personal property was seized and confiscated by
Defendants Wilkinson and Brown, after they falsely stated it was contraband (Doc. 1, p. 13).
The property was later destroyed, lost, or stolen. Plaintiff filed grievances, but was unable to get
any compensation for his loss (Doc. 1, p. 15).
Defendant Ethan Gephart again woke Plaintiff during the night on January 10, 2013, to
verbally harass him, implying that he had something to do with the above-described missing
property. Plaintiff contends this action was a continuation of the retaliation for his prior
grievances.
Plaintiff received another disciplinary report on January 14, 2013, while he was in
segregation. He complains that the adjustment committee, made up of Defendants Teverbaugh
and Osborne, refused his request for an extension of time to prepare a defense and to call
witnesses (Doc. 1, p. 16). Plaintiff does not explain the nature of this disciplinary charge or the
punishment he received. His grievance over this episode was also denied. He describes a similar
occurrence after receiving another disciplinary report on March 26, 2013; again Defendants
Teverbaugh and Osborne denied his requests for more time, staff assistance, and witnesses (Doc.
1, p. 22).
Finally, Plaintiff claims that unnamed mailroom staff deliberately interfered with his
outgoing mail, consisting of grievances, in an attempt to deny him access to the courts, and in
retaliation for his acts of writing grievances (Doc. 1, p. 24).

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Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has articulated a
colorable federal cause of action against Defendant Ethan Gephart for retaliation (Count 1), and
for racial discrimination/denial of equal protection (Count 2). In addition, the complaint states a
retaliation claim (Count 3) against the unknown mailroom staff. However, Count 3 shall be
severed into a separate lawsuit.
In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, “not only to prevent the
sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to ensure that prisoners
pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. George, 507 F.3d at 607,
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g)). Plaintiff’s complaint contains unrelated claims against
different defendants: retaliation and equal protection claims against Ethan Gephart, and a
separate retaliation claim against the unknown mailroom staff.
Consistent with the George decision and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the Court
shall sever Count 3 of Plaintiff’s complaint, and shall open a new case with a newly-assigned
case number for that claim. However, Plaintiff shall have an opportunity to voluntarily dismiss
the newly severed case if he does not wish to proceed on that claim or incur the additional filing
fee.
Plaintiff’s remaining allegations fail to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may
be granted, and shall be dismissed as explained below.

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Dismissal of Count 4 – Co-Payment for Medical Care
Although Plaintiff characterizes this claim as a “denial” of pain treatment by Defendant
Paula Gephart, he admits that he received the pain medication and obtained relief once he signed
the payment voucher. As such, his only remaining complaint is that he was wrongfully required
to pay for emergency care when it should have been provided free of charge. While Plaintiff
may be correct, this problem does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. An inmate’s
constitutional rights are not violated by the collection of a fee for prison medical or dental
services. Whether or not a statutory exemption (such as for emergency care) should apply to the
co-payment rule is a question of state law, not cognizable in a § 1983 action. Poole v. Isaacs,
703 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2012) (“the imposition of a modest fee for medical services,
standing alone, does not violate the Constitution”). Therefore, should Plaintiff wish to pursue
this matter further, he must do so in state court. This civil rights claim shall be dismissed with
prejudice.
Dismissal of Count 5 – False Disciplinary Charges
While Plaintiff may proceed on his retaliation and equal protection claims against
Defendant Ethan Gephart, he does not state a separate constitutional claim based on the allegedly
false disciplinary charges.
In Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit held
that the filing of false disciplinary charges by a correctional officer does not state a Fourteenth
Amendment claim when the accused inmate is given a subsequent hearing on those charges in
which the inmate is afforded the procedural protections outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) (advance written notice of the charge, right to appear before the hearing panel, the
right to call witnesses if prison security allows, and a written statement of the reasons for the

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discipline imposed). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that prisoners have a right “to be free from
arbitrary actions of prison officials,” Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140, but determined that the
procedural protections outlined in Wolff provided the appropriate protection against arbitrary
actions taken by a correctional officer such as issuing the inmate a fabricated conduct violation.
In the instant complaint, Plaintiff states that he was falsely accused of two conduct
violations as a result of his run-ins with Defendant Ethan Gephart. Defendant Wells conducted
the hearing on the first charge; it is not clear who presided over the second. Later, Plaintiff faced
two other disciplinary hearings presided over by Defendants Teverbaugh and Osborne. Plaintiff
gives no further information about the nature of the charges, but he points to flaws in each case
where he was not afforded all of the procedural protections described in Wolff.
If Plaintiff had been given a properly conducted hearing, yet was found guilty of a false
charge, he would not have a constitutional claim so long as the decision of the disciplinary
hearing board was supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir.
1994). On the other hand, even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied some of the
procedural protections in Wolff, he still may not have an actionable claim.
When a plaintiff brings an action under § 1983 for procedural due process violations, he
must show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or
property” without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). A liberty
interest may arise only if the disciplinary punishment included a period of segregation. An
inmate has a due process liberty interest in being in the general prison population only if the
conditions of his or her disciplinary confinement impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] . . .
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
For prisoners whose punishment includes being put in disciplinary segregation, under Sandin,

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“the key comparison is between disciplinary segregation and non-disciplinary segregation rather
than between disciplinary segregation and the general prison population.” Wagner v. Hanks, 128
F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit has recently elaborated two elements for
determining whether disciplinary segregation conditions impose atypical and significant
hardships: “the combined import of the duration of the segregative confinement and the
conditions endured by the prisoner during that period.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559
F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original).
The instant complaint falls short of stating a claim for deprivation of any liberty interest
as a result of the disciplinary actions against Plaintiff. He mentions being placed in segregation,
but he never states whether this placement was the result of a guilty finding on any of the
charges, or whether he was in segregation for investigative or administrative reasons. If he was
put in segregation as punishment, he does not reveal how long he was there or whether the
conditions were any more onerous than they were in general population. As such, the complaint
does not include sufficient factual allegations to indicate that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated by any of the problematic disciplinary actions. Count 5, against Defendants Gephart,
Wells, Teverbaugh, and Osborne, shall therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
Dismissal of Count 6 – Destruction of Personal Property
Apart from Counts 1 and 2 against Defendant Ethan Gephart, Plaintiff has no
constitutional claim for the deprivation/destruction of his property. This applies both to the
property items lost as a result of Defendant Ethan Gephart’s actions, and to the later incident in
which all of Plaintiff’s property was taken by Defendants Wilkinson and Brown. 1
Plaintiff never asserts that Defendant Wilkinson or Brown had any retaliatory motive when they took his
property on October 10, 2012. He states that they acted improperly, deliberately mishandled his
belongings, and were recklessly negligent in allowing or causing the property to be disposed of (Doc. 1,
pp. 13-14).
1

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The only constitutional right that might be implicated by the taking of Plaintiff’s personal
property items is Plaintiff’s right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from deprivations
of his property by state actors without due process of law. To state a claim under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law; if the state provides an adequate remedy, Plaintiff has no civil rights
claim. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984) (availability of damages remedy in state
claims court is an adequate, post-deprivation remedy). The Seventh Circuit has found that
Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois
Court of Claims. Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); Stewart v.
McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8 (1995).
Because Plaintiff may avail himself of a state court action to seek compensation for his
loss, he cannot maintain a constitutional claim. The civil rights claim in Count 6 shall therefore
be dismissed with prejudice.
Dismissal of Count 7 – Denial of Grievances
Plaintiff complains at length about the failure of Defendants Harter, Magnus, Dozier,
Waltz, and Godinez to redress his grievances over the medical co-payments, retaliation,
destruction/loss of property, improper disciplinary charges, and failure to follow hearing
procedures on those charges. However, the rejection or improper handling of inmate grievance
complaints will not give rise to a constitutional claim.
Plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies by using the prison grievance
process may be relevant in the event that a Defendant raises a challenge to Plaintiff’s right to
maintain a § 1983 suit over the substantive matters raised in the grievances. Nonetheless, a
Defendant’s action or inaction in handling Plaintiff’s grievances does not support an independent

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constitutional claim. “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1996). The Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of state prison officials
to follow their own procedures does not, of itself, violate the Constitution. Maust v. Headley,
959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982).
Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants (Harter, Magnus, Dozier,
Waltz, and Godinez) who either gave an unsatisfactory response to his grievances or failed to
properly handle them were involved personally in any of the misconduct that gave rise to those
grievances. The Seventh Circuit instructs that the alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons
who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772
n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli, 81 F.3d at
1430. Plaintiff states only that these Defendants failed to sustain or properly respond to his
grievances – grievances that he filed to complain about the misconduct of others.
Further, a Defendant cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional actions committed by a
subordinate employee, merely on the basis of that supervisory role (for example, Defendant
Waltz was allegedly the supervisor of Defendant Ethan Gephart, Doc. 1, p. 10). In a civil rights
action, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d
724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). In order to be held individually liable, a defendant
must be ‘personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.’” Id. (quoting
Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)).
For these reasons, Count 7 against Defendants Harter, Magnus, Dozier, Waltz, and
Godinez shall be dismissed with prejudice.

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Dismissal of Count 8 – Access to Courts
As noted above, Plaintiff may pursue a retaliation claim (Count 3) against the mailroom
staff who interfered with his attempts to mail out his grievances for administrative review
(providing that he is able to identify those individuals by name). However, his allegations do not
support a separate constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts.
Prisoners have a fundamental right of meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817 (1977). Violations of that right may be vindicated in federal court, e.g., in a civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, an inmate has no constitutional claim
unless he can demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim has been frustrated or impeded. Lewis
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1996).
In the instant case, Plaintiff succeeded in filing his complaint with this Court, and his
pleading does not describe any actual or potential limitation on his access to the courts. Actual
or threatened detriment is an essential element of a § 1983 action for denial of access to the
courts. Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1987); Hossman v. Sprandlin, 812
F.2d 1019, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1987). Even a delay caused by prison staff is not necessarily a
detriment that would support a constitutional claim. See Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 603 (7th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1062 (1993). Regardless of the length of an alleged delay, a
prisoner must show actual substantial prejudice to specific litigation. Kincaid, 969 F.2d at 603.
Plaintiff’s allegations make no such showing. Accordingly, Count 8 shall be dismissed with
prejudice.
Dismissal of Defendants Illinois Department of Corrections and Vandalia Correctional
Center
Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, neither the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) nor Vandalia Correctional Center is a “municipal corporation.” The IDOC is a
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government agency of the State of Illinois, and Vandalia is a division of the IDOC.
The Supreme Court has held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment
bars suits against states in federal court for money damages); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56
F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of
Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same);
Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 219, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).
As a state government agency, the IDOC is not considered a “person” within the meaning
of the Civil Rights Act. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Neither the IDOC nor the Vandalia
Correctional Center can be subject to a § 1983 suit for damages. For these reasons, Defendants
Illinois Department of Corrections and Vandalia Correctional Center shall be dismissed from this
action with prejudice.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3) shall be referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Frazier for further consideration.
Disposition
COUNT 5 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. COUNTS 4, 6, 7, and 8 are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants WELLS, TEVERBAUGH,
OSBORNE, WILKINSON, and BROWN are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.
Defendants ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, VANDALIA
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, GODINEZ, DOZIER, WALTZ, PAULA GEPHART,

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MAGNUS, and HARTER are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against the unknown
mailroom staff (COUNT 3), which is unrelated to the claims in Counts 1 and 2, is SEVERED
into a new case. That new case shall be: Retaliation claim against UNKNOWN VANDALIA
MAILROOM STAFF DEFENDANTS.
The new case SHALL BE ASSIGNED to the undersigned District Judge for further
proceedings. In the new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:
(1)
(2)
(3)

This Memorandum and Order
The Original Complaint (Doc. 1)
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4)

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if, for any reason, he does not wish to proceed with the newlyopened case, he must notify the Court in writing within 35 days (on or before September 9,
2013). Unless Plaintiff notifies the Court that he does not wish to pursue the newly opened
action, he will be responsible for an additional $350.00 filing fee in the new case. No service
shall be ordered in the severed case until after the deadline for Plaintiff’s response. Further, that
case cannot proceed until Plaintiff identifies the defendant mailroom staff by name in an
amended complaint, which he must file in that new case if he decides to pursue that claim. The
Clerk shall notify Plaintiff of the case number for the new severed case as soon as it is opened.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing an amended complaint in the severed case, the
Clerk is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form. Plaintiff is
ADVISED that should he choose to proceed on the severed retaliation claim against the
mailroom staff, his amended complaint in that case shall contain ONLY the claims designated in
this Order as Count 3, and shall name ONLY those Defendants directly and personally
responsible for those allegedly unconstitutional acts of retaliation. An amended complaint

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supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See
Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court
will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original complaint. Thus, an amended complaint
must stand on its own, without reference to any previous pleading, and Plaintiff must re-file any
exhibits he wishes the Court to consider along with his amended complaint in the severed case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claims remaining in this action are
COUNT 1 and COUNT 2 against Defendant Ethan Gephart, for retaliation and denial of equal
protection. This case shall now be captioned as: JOHN D. BROWN, Plaintiff, vs. ETHAN
GEPHART, Defendant.
As to COUNTS 1 and 2, which remain in the instant case, the Clerk of Court shall
prepare for Defendant ETHAN GEPHART (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return
the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the
Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall
furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s
last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above
or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the
Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Clerk.

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Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the
Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on
which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper
received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails
to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial proceedings, which shall include a determination on
the pending motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3).
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge
Frazier for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties
consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).

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Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 5, 2013
s/ J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge

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