Mitchell v. Baker et al

Filing 157

ORDER: For the reasons stated in the attached memorandum and order, Defendants Godinez and Butler's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 151 ) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. To the extent the motion for summary judgment argues that Plainti ff's request for a permanent injunction is moot, the motion is DENIED. However, the Court finds that Defendant Butler is no longer a proper party to this case, and GRANTS summary judgment as to her. The current Director of the Illinois Departm ent of Corrections, John R. Baldwin, will remain in the case in his official capacity for purposes of responding to injunctive orders, and to that end the CLERK is DIRECTED to substitute John R. Baldwin for former Department of Corrections Director Salvador Godinez. See attached memorandum and order for details. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 2/2/2016. (wtw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CALVIN MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEPHEN BAKER, KIMBERLY BUTLER,
and SALVADOR GODINEZ,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-860-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief District Judge:
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro so Plaintiff Calvin Mitchell, currently housed at
Stateville Correctional Center, filed this complaint alleging that Defendant Stephen
Baker subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants Kimberly Butler
and Salvador Godinez were added to the case in their official capacity for purposes of
responding to injunctive orders.

This matter is before the Court on a motion for

summary judgment filed by Defendants Butler and Godinez (Doc. 151 and 152).
Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 156). Based on the following, the Court GRANTS
IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially filed his complaint as a motion for a preliminary injunction; the
Court denied that early motion and directed Plaintiff to file a complaint in order to
secure the Court’s jurisdiction (Doc. 1 and 4). Plaintiff filed his complaint on September
9, 2013, and the Court then conducted a threshold review (Doc. 6 and 26). As narrowed

by the threshold order, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that in February 2004 Defendant
Baker wrote a fabricated disciplinary report against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was
subsequently transferred from Menard. However, Plaintiff was returned to Menard in
2013, and on June 28, 2013, Baker approached Plaintiff and threatened to either beat
Plaintiff or have him assaulted by other inmates (Doc. 26, p. 3). Subsequently, on July 3,
2013, Baker visited Plaintiff’s cell and pointed a shotgun at Plaintiff, threatening to kill
him (Id.). Plaintiff alleged that Baker was continually harassing him and sought a
transfer from Menard Correctional Center and an award of monetary damages.
Specifically, Plaintiff sought a prompt transfer from Menard “for his safety and security”
to be safe from Baker “or other potential threats” (Doc. 6, p. 10, 14).
As Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, the warden of Menard Correctional Center
was added to the case for the purpose of enforcing any injunction (Doc. 26). Kimberly
Butler was later substituted as the current warden of Menard Correctional Center (Docs.
86 and 86). Plaintiff filed numerous requests for emergency relief and preliminary
injunction, seeking a transfer from Menard Correctional Center (Docs. 22, 23, 24, 25, 29,
45, 64, 67, 126, 127, and 128). After numerous hearings and briefings on the matter, the
Court eventually granted Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 64) and
ordered that Plaintiff be transferred from Menard Correctional Center (Doc. 130). As
Warden Butler lacked authority to order Plaintiff’s transfer, the Court added Godinez to
the case in order to effectuate the transfer of Plaintiff (Docs 131 and 132). Plaintiff was
transferred to Stateville Correctional Center on February 4, 2015 (Docs. 134 and 137).
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Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Butler
and Godinez (Doc. 151 and 152). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief is now moot because he has been transferred from Menard and because Defendant
Baker no longer works at Menard. Plaintiff had requested a permanent injunction
requiring that he be kept away from Menard Correctional Center. An affidavit from Jill
Wehrheim, human resources representative at Menard Correctional Center, indicates
that Baker was terminated from his employment at Menard as of June 18, 2015 (Doc.
152-1). As Plaintiff is no longer housed at Menard Correctional Center and the danger
presented by a re-transfer is no longer present, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s
injunctive relief is moot and, as such, they should be dismissed from the case.
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion (Doc. 156).
Plaintiff first argued that the summary judgment motion was untimely as Defendants
filed their motion after the dispositive motion deadline. That argument is incorrect as
Defendants were granted an extension of time and filed the motion within the extension
time period (Doc. 145). Plaintiff also argued that his request for injunctive relief was
still viable as Plaintiff alleged he was threatened and assaulted by staff acting on behalf
of Baker, and that threat is still present and ongoing at Menard.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper only “if the admissible evidence considered as a
whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dynegy Marketing & Trade v. Multiut Corp.,
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648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). A fact is material if it is
outcome determinative under applicable law, and a genuine issue of material fact exists
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The

party

seeking

summary

judgment

bears

the

initial

burden

of

demonstrating—based on the pleadings, affidavits, and the other information
submitted—the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse
party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). A mere scintilla of evidence
in support of the nonmovant’s petition is insufficient; a party will be successful in
opposing the motion when it presents definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.
Szymanski v. Rite-Way Lawn Maintenance Co., Inc., 231 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000).
On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-movant and adopts reasonable inferences and resolves doubts in the
non-movant’s favor. Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). Even if the
material facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the
information before the Court reveals that “alternate inferences can be drawn from the
available evidence.” Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004), abrogated on
other grounds by Spiegla II, 481 F.3d at 966 (7th Cir. 2007).

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks permanent injunctive relief in the form of a transfer away from
Menard Correctional Center. This Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction and ordered that Plaintiff be transferred out of Menard for the
pendency of this suit (Doc. 130). Plaintiff is currently housed at Stateville Correctional
Center. The Court previously stated that at the end of the case the injunction would
either become permanent, should Plaintiff prevail in his case and show that he has a
continued, serious threat to his safety at Menard, or expire if Plaintiff loses his case or
fails to show a continuing risk of harm (Doc. 130, p. 17).

Defendants now seek

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief because, they argue, any
injunctive relief is moot now that Plaintiff has been transferred out of Menard and
Defendant Brooks is no longer employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections.
A request for injunctive relief concerning one prison may become moot if an
inmate is transferred to another prison facility—if “a prisoner is transferred to another
prison, his request for injunctive relief against officials of the first prison is moot unless
he can demonstrate that he is likely to be retransferred.” Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d
807, 812 (7th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a likely retransfer may not be based on mere
speculation or conjecture. Id. Thus, in order for an inmate to demonstrate that the
illegal conduct is capable of repetition, he must show “that he will again be subject to
alleged illegality,” which is only found in “exceptional circumstances.” Id.
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is still viable.
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Defendants argue that his request is now moot because he has been transferred to
Stateville Correctional Center and cannot show that he will be subjected to the same
constitutional violations if he was transferred back to Menard, as Defendant Baker is no
longer employed there. Defendants attach an affidavit to their motion which indicates
that Stephen Baker was terminated from his employment at Menard Correctional Center
on June 18, 2015, and no longer works at any Department of Corrections facility (Doc.
152-1). Defendants argue that as Baker is no longer at Menard, Plaintiff will not be
subject to any further harassment or assaults by him if he is transferred back to Menard.
However, Plaintiff’s complaint sought an injunction requiring his transfer from
Menard not just because of the actions of Defendant Baker, but because of the actions of
numerous other staff at Menard. Although Plaintiff’s complaint only brought claims
against Baker and the Warden of Menard, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that other staff
have harassed him on behalf of Baker. He alleges that he was constantly harassed at
Menard by “Baker and [his] friends” (Doc. 6, p. 14). Plaintiff sought a permanent
injunction of a transfer to another Illinois Department of Corrections facility so that he
would be “safe from C/O Baker or other potential threats from this administration”
(Doc. 6, p. 14). His allegations are backed by testimony of witnesses presented at the
hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. At that hearing, inmate Deon
Davis testified that Officer Ryan Davis sprayed Plaintiff in the face with pepper spray
after stating something to Plaintiff about his lawsuit against Baker (Doc. 130, p. 7). This
Court found that testimony, along with Ryan Davis’ conflicting testimony that he did
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not know Plaintiff but that he never sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray, supported a
finding that Plaintiff faced a continued, serious threat of harm by being housed at
Menard. Thus, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief to be
mooted by Baker’s termination as there were other threats at Menard which Plaintiff
sought a transfer for in his complaint, and there is evidence demonstrating those threats.
Further, the Court finds that there is a strong likelihood of retransfer to Menard
Correctional Center. As testified to by Defendant’s witness Vicki Payne, Plaintiff is
only eligible to be housed at two prisons due to the nature and length of his offense (See
Doc. 130, p. 6). Those two prisons are Menard and Stateville. While Defendants make
much of the fact that Plaintiff has since been transferred to Stateville Correctional Center,
that transfer was only done on the order of this Court when it granted Plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 130). At that time, the Court ordered that Plaintiff be
transferred out of Menard for the pendency of this case (Id. at p. 17). Thus, there is a
real likelihood that Plaintiff could be transferred back to Menard after this case is
concluded given the requirements in the Court’s order and the fact that Plaintiff can only
be housed either at Menard or Stateville. As Plaintiff points out, inmates are constantly
being transferred from Menard to Stateville and vice versa due to the overcrowding
issue in Illinois prisons (Doc. 156, p. 2). The Court finds this argument to be credible
given the Court’s knowledge and experience with Illinois prisons.
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown more than
mere speculation that the violations he alleges in his complaint are capable of repetition.
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There is evidence in the record that Plaintiff is likely to be transferred back to Menard
given that his transfer was only for the pendency of this suit and he can only be housed
at one of two Illinois prisons (one being Menard Correctional Center). Further, Plaintiff
has shown that he is likely to suffer the same harm that led him to file his complaint, and
Plaintiff has offered evidence that other staff have harassed and attacked Plaintiff at the
behest of Baker—a risk that is likely to recur even if Baker no longer works at Menard.
Thus, the Court cannot dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief at this time.
The Court does note, however, that the only proper defendant for injunctive
purposes in this case is the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Warden
Butler previously informed the Court that she has no authority to transfer an inmate and
as Plaintiff is not currently housed at Menard Correctional Center there is no injunctive
relief that Butler would be required to implement.

Thus, the Court will dismiss

Warden Butler from the case as her presence is no longer necessary for purposes of
implementing injunctive relief. However, the Department Director will remain in the
case in his official capacity for injunctive purposes. While Godinez was originally
named as a Defendant, he is no longer the Department Director. The current director is
John R. Baldwin, so Baldwin will be substituted for Godinez as the proper defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. To the extent that Defendants’
argue that a request for permanent injunction is moot, the Court DENIES Defendants’
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motion. However, as it is clear from the record that only the Director has the power to
transfer an inmate, the Court finds that Defendant Butler is no longer a proper party and
GRANTS summary judgment as to her. The current Department Director, John R.
Baldwin, will remain in the case in his official capacity for purposes of responding to
injunctive orders, and to that end the CLERK is DIRECTED to substitute Director John
R. Baldwin for former Department of Corrections Director Salvador Godinez.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 2, 2016
/s/ Michael J. Reagan
Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan
United States District Court

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