United States of America et al v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Eastern Community Colleges

Filing 56

ORDER GRANTING Motion to Dismiss filed by Phillip E Edmondson 53 . This action is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Board of Trustees of Illinois Eastern Community Colleges 48 is DENIED as MOOT. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 2/17/2016. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, each ex rel.
PHILLIP E. EDMONDSON,

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN COMMUNITY COLLEGES,

Case No. 13-CV-875-SMY-PMF

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Phillip E. Edmondson, a former miner who was employed as an instructor by the
Illinois Eastern Community Colleges Workforce Education program, brought this action under
the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq., and the Illinois False Claims Act, 740
ILCS 175/1 et seq., alleging Defendant the Board of Trustees of Illinois Eastern Community
Colleges (“IECC”) employed a number of fraudulent schemes to obtain funding to which it was
not entitled from the United States and the State of Illinois. The Complaint was filed under seal
on August 23, 2013 (Doc. 2). The seal was repeatedly extended while the Government and the
State of Illinois decided whether to intervene in this matter. On April 7, 2015, both declined to
intervene (Doc. 29). On November 9, 2015, IECC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim (Doc. 48). On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a voluntary dismissal
without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 53) to
which IECC filed a response in opposition (Doc. 55). For the following reasons, the Court

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GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss over IECC’s objections and DENIES as MOOT IECC’s
motion to dismiss.
The dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is within
the district court’s sound discretion. See Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th
Cir.1980). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss, a court may look at a
variety of factors, including: (1) a defendant's effort and resources already expended in preparing
for trial; (2) excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff in prosecuting the
action; (3) insufficient explanation for the need of a dismissal; and (4) whether a summary
judgment motion has been filed by defendant. Tyco Labs., 627 F.2d at 56. There is no mandate
that each and every factor be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is
appropriate. The factors are merely a guide for the court, in whom the discretion ultimately
rests. Id.
Here, IECC opposes a dismissal without prejudice because it claims that Plaintiff lacked
diligence in bringing his motion. IECC further argues that it has expended time and resources in
defending this case and will be prejudiced by a voluntary dismissal unless the dismissal is with
prejudice. In support, IECC relies upon several easily distinguishable cases, Tolle v. Carroll
Touch, Inc., 23 F.3d 174, 178 (7th Cir.1994) and Fluker v. County of Kanakee, 741 F.3d 787,
794-95 (7th Cir.2013).
In Tolle, an ERISA action, the plaintiff sought dismissal of a four-year-old suit after the
discovery deadline had elapsed, the parties had filed motions for summary judgment, and the
district court had ruled unfavorably on plaintiff's pre-trial motion. Tolle, 23 F.3d at 178. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss because “unfavorable rulings

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by the district court [are] not an acceptable basis to grant Tolle's voluntary dismissal or to
facilitate the search for a perceivably more favorable state judicial climate.” Id.
In Fluker, a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs moved for voluntary
dismissal following the close of discovery and while the defendants motion for summary
judgment on the issue of the plaintiffs’ clear failure to exhaust administrative remedies was
pending before the district court. Fluker, 741 F.3d at 794-95. Describing the time spent
throughout the duration of the case and discovery, among other delays, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for voluntary dismissal.
In this case, unlike in Tolle and Fluker, the relevant factors weigh in favor of voluntary
dismissal. This litigation, although pending since August 2013, is not at an advanced stage
procedurally. The case was only recently unsealed. Most of the litigation to date has involved
the United States and State of Illinois’ investigation and determination whether or not to
intervene. The Scheduling Order, entered on January 8, 2016, sets the discovery cutoff and
summary judgment motion deadlines in November and December 2016, respectively. The jury
trial is not scheduled until March 2017.
Although Defendant has certainly expended effort complying with the Government’s
investigation, the Court does not believe IECC’s efforts outweigh Plaintiff’s right to seek
dismissal of his case. There has not been excessive delay or lack of diligence on Plaintiff in
prosecuting this action. Plaintiff seeks dismissal early in the litigation, before either the close of
discovery or the filing of motions for summary judgment. Additionally, unlike the movants in
Tolle and Fluker, Plaintiff’s purported reason for dismissal is eminently reasonable. Plaintiff
asserts the Government’s investigation reveals that the vast bulk of payments received directly
from the fraudulent scheme come from the State of Illinois and arise under the Illinois False

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Claims Act, 720 ILCS 175/1, et seq. Plaintiff requests dismissal in order to refile his claims in
state court. Based on the foregoing facts and circumstances, voluntary dismissal is warranted.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) (Doc. 53) is
GRANTED.

This matter is DISMISSED without prejudice. IECC’s motion to dismiss (Doc.

48) is DENIED as MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 17, 2016
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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