Smith v. Oakley et al

Filing 82

ORDER: Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 64) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against plaintiff Paul Smith and in favor of defendants David Johnson and Timothy Veath. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 8/10/15. (cmh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PAUL SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
LORI OAKLEY, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-876-SMY-PMF

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Before the Court is defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 64). Plaintiff
Paul Smith is proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a claim that he was deprived of a fair and
impartial prison disciplinary hearing in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural
due process. Smith claims that, after fighting with another inmate at Menard Correctional Center,
he was found guilty of assaulting any person, dangerous disturbances, fighting, and disobeying a
direct order. He claims that disciplinary sanctions, including a lengthy term of segregation, were
imposed without opportunities to enter a plea, present testimony from a witness or a witness
statement, or present his version of the events. Defendants David Johnson and Timothy Veath
seek judgment in their favor, arguing that Smith did not have a liberty interest in avoiding his
one-year segregation term, that he received all process due, and that they are entitled to qualified
immunity (Doc. No. 65). The motion is opposed by Smith, who maintains that genuine issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment, and that the defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity (Doc. Nos. 72, 78).

I.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment will be entered if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The facts and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of Smith, the nonmoving party.
Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2011).

II.

Background

Viewing the facts in accordance with the summary judgment standard, Smith was confined
at Menard Correctional Center in October, 2012. On October 13, 2012, a disciplinary report was
prepared, charging Smith with four disciplinary rule violations: assaulting any person, dangerous
disturbances, fighting, and disobeying a direct order. He was notified of the charges and appeared
before the prison’s adjustment committee on October 18, 2012, but was not provided with a fair
and impartial hearing. In particular, he did not receive an opportunity to enter a plea or present his
version of the events. He was informed that he was being found guilty of assault and was told that
he could leave. On the same day, a final report was prepared and signed by defendants Veath and
Johnson, finding that Smith committed all four disciplinary offenses and recommending that
sanctions, including one year of segregation, be imposed. The report falsely indicated that
Anthony Price, the inmate whom Smith had requested as a witness, had been interviewed by
Rebecca Cowan and had said during that interview that he didn’t know what happened, “All I seen
was them two fighting.” (Doc. No. 65-3, p. 1). The recommended sanctions were approved
without deletion of the three charges Smith would have challenged had he received the opportunity
to do so (assaulting any person, dangerous disturbances, disobeying a direct order). Smith served
a little less than one year (335 days) in segregation at Menard, Pontiac, and Stateville. All three
were maximum security facilities.

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III.

Liberty Interest

Smith’s liberty interest in avoiding segregated confinement in prison is limited. Hardaway
v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013); Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693,
697 (7th Cir. 2009). A protected liberty interest arises only if the confinement imposed an
“atypical and significant hardship” on Smith in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The baseline for the comparison is between the
conditions Smith experienced in disciplinary segregation and the conditions in nondisciplinary
segregation.

Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997).

When determining

whether a liberty interest has arisen, the Court considers the combined impact of the duration of
the period of segregated confinement and the conditions endured. Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98.
Although Smith was separated from inmates housed in the general prison population for
almost an entire year, he was not held in solitary confinement. Rather, he served his segregation
time with a number of cellmates. He received opportunities to leave his cell in order to exercise in
the yard approximately 3 to 5 hours per week, unless access to the yard was interrupted by a
lockdown. He received opportunities to leave his cell to shower approximately one or two times
per week. The cells in Menard’s segregation unit are smaller than the cells in Menard’s general
population units, and provide no shelves, no desk or stool, and no room to walk. Smith had
opportunities to leave his cell for visits to the prison’s health care unit, for attorney visits, and for
one or two regular visits per month. He could not leave his cell to take his meals in the dining hall
or to attend religious services. At Menard, he could not leave his cell to visit the law library. At
Pontiac, he could leave his cell to visit a separate location on the gallery which served as a satellite
law library, once per week. Smith’s clothing was restricted to a jumpsuit and one pair of gym
shoes. His personal property was initially restricted to legal and writing supplies, cosmetic items,

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and reading material. After 60 days of good conduct, he was allowed to add a radio and
television.
The restrictive conditions Smith experienced in segregation did not cause or aggravate any
medical ailment. Similarly, there is no indication that Smith lost the ability to maintain basic
hygiene by using water from the sink in his cell to cleanse his body when he was unable to shower.
There is also no evidence that the nourishment Smith received from the meals delivered to his cell
was deficient, that he was exposed to excessive violence from hostile inmates, or that he suffered
psychological harm as a result of the restrictions imposed. Similarly, there is no evidence that the
cells Smith occupied were particularly oppressive, or that he was subjected to long periods of
isolation, sensory deprivation, light deprivation, or temperature extremes.
The Court has considered Smith’s position that the deprivation of a liberty interest issue
was assessed and resolved early in this case, during threshold review. A careful reading of Judge
Gilbert’s screening order (Doc. No. 9) reveals that the question of whether Smith was deprived of
a protected liberty interest was not resolved at that time, but deferred for factual development.
The Court has also considered Smith’s opinion that the conditions he experienced in
segregation at Menard, Pontiac, and Stateville were “deplorable.” Unfortunately, this conclusion
is not well-supported by specific factual information (Doc. No. 72-1, p. 22). The Court has been
unable to locate evidence demonstrating that Smith experienced conditions substantially worse
than those experienced by inmates assigned to administrative segregation.
Considering all available facts in Smith’s favor, the Court is not persuaded that Smith’s
335-day segregation term created an atypical and significant hardship giving rise to a liberty
interest.

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IV.

Qualified Immunity

In considering whether these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Smith’s due
process claim, the Court considers (1) whether the defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional
rights and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity “protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id.
Here, the Court focuses on the second part of the qualified immunity equation. Smith
suggests that the defendants knew the applicable law and knew that their actions were unlawful.
He points to a discovery response admitting that the defendants were familiar with prison policies
and procedures regarding adjustment committee functions (Doc. No. 72-1, p. 14). This position
does not take into account the developing Constitutional law regarding prisoner liberty interests in
avoiding assorted periods of segregated confinement. The Court is not aware of any case decided
prior to October 18, 2012, establishing that the disciplinary sanction of 335 days in segregated
confinement in a maximum security facility in Illinois imposes an atypical and significant
hardship. Instead, the case law suggests that a protected interest may arise and requires scrutiny.
Absent a clear legal parameter on the question of Smith’s protected liberty interest, the defendants
are immune from an award of damages.
In view of the conclusions reached from the above analysis, the Court does not reach
Defendants’ argument that the procedural protections provided to Smith were adequate to satisfy
the Constitutional due process standard.

V.

Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 64) is

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GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against plaintiff Paul Smith and in favor of
defendants David Johnson and Timothy Veath.
If plaintiff wishes to appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the Clerk
enters judgment. A notice of appeal is timely if it is deposited in the institution’s internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. If plaintiff wishes to file a motion asking the Court to
alter or amend the judgment, that motion is due within 28 days, and there is an exception from the
general rule for extending time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, 6; Fed. R. App. P. 4, 12.
DATED: August 11, 2015.
s/Staci M. Yandle
Staci M. Yandle
District Judge

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