Miller v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 12/9/2014. (jmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TINA M. MILLER,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
Civil No. 13-cv-898-CJP 1
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Tina M. Miller seeks judicial
review of the final agency decision denying her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI in February, 2010, alleging disability
beginning on February 25, 2007. (Tr. 12). After holding an evidentiary hearing,
ALJ Mary Ann Poulose denied the application in a written decision dated April 11,
2012. (Tr. 12-27). The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the
ALJ became the final agency decision.
(Tr. 1).
Administrative remedies have
been exhausted and a timely complaint was filed in this Court.
1
This matter was referred to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 21.
1
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment at Doc. 26.
Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following points:
1.
The ALJ failed to include all limitations supported by the evidence in
her assessment of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
2.
The ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s credibility.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB or SSI, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of
the applicable statutes. 2 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3).
“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
With regard to plaintiff’s application for DIB, plaintiff must establish that she
2
The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42 U.S.C. §
423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. The statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are found at 42 U.S.C. §§
1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. As is relevant to this case, the DIB and SSI statutes are
identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 detailing medical considerations relevant to an SSI claim,
relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the DIB regulations. Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations
out of convenience.
2
was disabled as of her date last insured. Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151,
1154 (7th Cir. 1997). It is not sufficient to show that the impairment was present
as of the date last insured; rather plaintiff must show that the impairment was
severe enough to be disabling as of the relevant date. Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d
693, 699 (7th Cir. 2011).
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the
listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the
evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If
an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The
fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education,
and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in
other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not
disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination
of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of
the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work
3
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th
Cir. 2009.
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will automatically be
found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at step
three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and cannot
perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Rhoderick v.
Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Zurawski v. Halter, 245
F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the five-step evaluation, an “affirmative
answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the
claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the burden shifts to the ALJ to
establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether Ms. Miller was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has defined “substantial evidence” as “such relevant
4
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971). In reviewing for “substantial
evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into consideration, but this
Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility,
or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d
1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is not
abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See,
Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Poulose followed the five-step analytical framework described above.
She determined that plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date. The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments
of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine and myofascial
pain/fibromyalgia. She further determined that these impairments do not meet or
equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform work at the light exertional level, with some physical and mental
limitations. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that
plaintiff was not able to do her past relevant work. She was, however, not disabled
because she was able to do other jobs which exist in significant numbers in the local
and national economies.
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
5
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the points raised by plaintiff and is confined to the relevant time
period.
1.
Agency Forms
Plaintiff was born in 1971, and was 36 years old on the alleged onset date of
February 25, 2007. She was insured for DIB through December 31, 2011. (Tr.
199). 3
Plaintiff had previously worked as a laborer in a factory. (Tr. 192).
In April, 2010, plaintiff filed an Activities of Daily Living Report. She said
she lived with her family. She took her daughter to school in the morning and
picked her up in the afternoon. Her mother prepared meals and did most of the
shopping. Plaintiff said she did no housework or yard work. She said she could
lift no more than 20 pounds and could walk for 15 minutes before needing to rest.
She could pay attention as long as she was not in excruciating pain. Bending was
painful and she could only stand “for so long.” Sitting caused her back pain to
increase. She suffered from depression, and was taking medicine for anxiety and
depression. (Tr. 239-250).
In September, 2010, plaintiff reported that she could lift less than 20 pounds
and could walk for only 2 blocks. She said that she had difficulty with standing,
sitting, walking, and reaching. (Tr. 261-272). She said she could sit for about an
hour. On a bad day, she was in bed all day. (Tr. 272).
In a later report, plaintiff said that her depression and anxiety were getting
3
The date last insured is relevant only to the claim for DIB.
6
worse. She could not sit or stand for more than half an hour. She “lay in bed
most days” because of depression. (Tr. 289-292).
2.
Evidentiary Hearing
Ms. Miller was represented by an attorney at the evidentiary hearing in
January, 2012. (Tr. 36). She testified that she lived with her parents and her
daughter, who was 10. On some days, she was unable to get out of bed to take her
daughter to school.
Plaintiff said she was able to cook small things, but was
unable to make a whole meal. She could not wash dishes. She needed help to do
laundry. She could go grocery shopping, but walking around the store caused her
back pain. She could not lift a 16 pound bag of cat food. She could lift a gallon of
milk with difficulty.
She could sit in a regular chair for about half an hour.
Sitting caused her whole back to ache. (Tr. 42-47). She had no problems with
her arms. (Tr. 50).
On a typical day, she took her daughter to school, then went back to bed with
a heating pad for about 3 hours. She would then lay in bed with her feet propped
up until it was time to pick her daughter up.
She helped her daughter with
homework. (Tr. 48-49).
She was taking Topiramate for migraine headaches. She had a headache
every day. She also took Klonopin to help her sleep. Her psychiatrist prescribed
Zyprexa, Effexor and Wellbutrin. She had no side effects from her medications.
Plaintiff testified that she cried at everything and got mad really quickly.
(Tr.
50-53). She had tried shots in her back and physical therapy, but they did not
help. (Tr. 54).
7
With regard to headaches, Ms. Miller testified that, if she did not take
Excedrin Migraine, her headache would progress into a full-blown migraine
accompanied by nausea and light sensitivity. She would have to lie down in a dark
room. This might last for days, and she would have to go to the hospital and get a
shot. (Tr. 55-56).
Ms. Miller testified that she had fibromyalgia, which flared up when she got
overly excited or mad. After one of these attacks, she could not get out of bed.
(Tr. 59-60).
A vocational expert (VE) testified that plaintiff’s past relevant work as a
factory laborer was heavy and at the low end of semi-skilled. The ALJ asked her to
assume a person who was able to do work at the light exertional level, limited to
only occasional climbing, crouching, crawling, stooping and kneeling, at the
unskilled level, with a sit/stand option. The VE testified that this person could not
do any of plaintiff’s past work, but there were other jobs in the economy which she
could do. Examples of such jobs are label coder, mail clerk and cleaner-polisher.
(Tr. 62-63).
3.
Medical Treatment
Ms. Miller was working as a cashier in a convenience store in February,
2007. She fell while mopping a floor at work on February 27, 2007. Dr. Sandra
Tate examined her on June 28, 2007, at the request of the workers compensation
insurance company. Dr. Tate reviewed medical records which indicated that Ms.
Miller had been diagnosed with a bulging disc at L4-5 in 1995. Surgery had been
recommended, but was not done because she was pregnant. About 6 weeks after
8
she had her baby, her back problems were resolved and she returned to her factory
job. She had been seen in the emergency room for headache in 2002. A CT scan
of the brain was normal.
Her past medical history included depression and
anxiety. The records from her primary care physician at Brush Creek Medical
Center indicated that she presented with discomfort in the low back and legs on
March 30, 2007. An MRI showed a small broad-based central protrusion at L4-5
with no thecal sac encroachment or foraminal narrowing, and a broad central
protrusion at L5-S1 with some extension to the right neural foramina. Her primary
care physician treated her with muscle relaxers, anti-inflammatory medication and
prednisone. She was also treated by a chiropractor.
On exam, Dr. Tate found
tenderness in the lumbosacral spine. Straight leg raising was negative. Sensation
was intact in the upper and lower extremities.
Muscle strength was full
throughout. She had no tenderness or instability of the lower extremities. Gait
and ambulation were normal. She had right SI joint dysfunction. Dr. Tate noted
that there was no evidence of symptom magnification. She concluded that plaintiff
could work with restrictions of no lifting greater than 30 pounds and no bending or
twisting at the waist more than 4 times per hour. She anticipated that plaintiff
would reach maximum medical improvement within 4 weeks with appropriate
physical therapy. (Tr. 438-443).
Plaintiff had several epidural steroid injections in her lumbar spine
beginning in October, 2007. (Tr. 405-408). She had a medial branch block at
L3-L5 in July, 2008, which gave her some relief for about 2 months. In October,
2008, her pain had reoccurred.
Dr. Reynaldo Pardo recommended that she
9
undergo radiofrequency neurotomies.
(Tr. 390-391).
Dr. Pardo performed
radiofrequency neurotomies at medial branches at L2-5 on November 14, 2008.
(Tr. 380-381).
Dr. Pardo prescribed physical therapy for right perithoracic/parascapular
pain in December, 2008. Plaintiff told the physical therapist that her low back
pain was gone, but she was noticing pain in her upper back, between her shoulders.
She told the physical therapist that she was able to do her activities of daily living,
but constant or repetitive movement of her arms caused her upper back pain to
increase. On exam, she was able to perform upper extremity movements “within
functional limits bilaterally.” She was to receive physical therapy 3 times a week
for 4 weeks, and was given a home exercise program. (Tr. 551-554).
Ms. Miller returned to Dr. Pardo in January, 2009. She reported that she
had “near complete relief of her paralumbar pain” since the radiofrequency
neurotomies, and she had good improvement in her ability to stand and ambulate.
However, she had a new complaint of right paracervical pain with right upper
extremity numbness and subjective weakness.
On exam, she had minimal
tenderness in the back, with no trigger points in the parascapular area.
She had
a full range of motion of the arms, and sensory exam was intact to pinprick from C5
to T1. (Tr. 539). An MRI of the cervical spine showed diffuse cervical desiccation.
There was no disc herniation and no central spinal canal stenosis or foraminal
narrowing.
(Tr. 425).
She underwent intra-articular facet injections and
epidural steroid injections in the cervical spine. (Tr. 514, 521).
Ms. Miller returned to Dr. Pardo in June, 2009. She reported that she had
10
“complete relief of her neck and shoulder pain.” However, her lower thoracic and
upper lumbar pain had returned. She denied radicular symptoms in her lower
extremities. Dr. Pardo recommended physical therapy. (Tr. 511).
Ms. Miller was evaluated for physical therapy on June 11, 2009. Four goals
were identified. She was to be seen 2 to 3 times a week for 4 weeks. She attended
only 6 sessions. She was discharged on July 22, 2009, having met 3 of her 4 goals.
(Tr. 504-509).
On July 16, 2009, plaintiff reported to Dr. Pardo that she had fallen about 2
weeks earlier, and she was having pain in the mid-sacrum.
Dr. Pardo
recommended the use of ice compresses and anti-inflammatories. (Tr. 501).
In February, 2010, Ms. Miller began seeing Dr. Ghalambor, who practiced
with Dr. Pardo. She complained of pain in the lumbar and lower thoracic regions.
On exam, she had tenderness in the bilateral paravertebral and lower thoracic
regions.
Straight leg raising and Patrick’s sign were negative.
A recent nerve
conduction study was negative for neuropathy or radiculopathy in the lower
extremities. Dr. Ghalambor recommended a diagnostic medial branch block and
radiofrequency lesioning. (Tr. 488-489). The medial branch block was done on
February 11, 2010, and resulted in 70% relief of her low back pain. (Tr. 471-472).
Radiofrequency lesioning of the medial branches was done in February and March,
2010. (Tr. 447-449, 459-461).
Plaintiff began seeing primary care physician Shadi Altwal, M.D., in May,
2010. He diagnosed narcotics addiction and advised her to stop all medications
and to follow-up with a chronic pain management clinic. (Tr. 824). A lumbar
11
spine MRI done on May 24, 2010, showed a mild posterior disc bulge at L4-5 with a
central posterior annular tear, and a mild diffuse posterior bulge at L5-S1. (Tr.
873-874).
On June 22, 2010, Dr. Vittal Chapa performed a consultative physical
examination. He found that Ms. Miller had a normal gait. She had no motor
weakness or muscle atrophy.
Sensory examination was normal.
Her reflexes
were symmetric. There was no redness, heat, swelling or thickening of any joints.
She had no paravertebral muscle spasms. Plaintiff’s handgrip was normal on both
sides, and she could do both fine and gross manipulations with both hands.
Straight leg raising was negative and the range of motion of all joints was full. Dr.
Chapa observed that there was “no evidence of lumbar radiculopathy.”
(Tr.
837-840).
A nurse practitioner in Dr. Altwal’s office saw her in July, 2010. Ms. Miller
said she was out of pain pills, but the nurse noted that she should have at least 40
pills left. (Tr. 880).
In August, 2010, Ms. Miller complained to Dr. Ghalambor of worsening back
pain and a feeling of weakness. He noted that prior nerve conduction studies of
the lower extremities were normal.
On exam, motor strength was 4+/5 and
symmetric. Sensory examination was normal. (Tr. 868).
Dr. Ghalambor prescribed another round of physical therapy in response to
plaintiff’s complaints of low back pain in February, 2011. His exam showed that
flexion and extension were slightly limited and straight leg raising was negative.
Sensory exam was symmetric and motor strength was 4+/5.
12
(Tr. 961-962).
Upon initial evaluation, the physical therapist noted that Ms. Miller was limited to
lifting 15 to 20 pounds. She was discharged from therapy in April, 2011, having
met all her goals. The goals included decreased complaints of pain to between 0
and 2 on a scale of 1 to 10. (954-959).
Plaintiff went to the emergency room in June, 2011, complaining of
persistent headache, back pain and chest pain. Recent cardiac work-up had been
negative, and a recent MRI of the brain was unremarkable. She was ambulatory
with a steady gait. On exam, her back and neck were non-tender and she had a
normal range of motion. She was discharged to home in improved condition with
a small narcotic prescription for the weekend. (Tr. 923-937).
Plaintiff received mental health care from Dr. Linda Hungerford.
On
December 15, 2011, Dr. Hungerford completed a report assessing her mental
limitations. She indicated that Ms. Miller had no work-related mental limitations.
(Tr. 1099-1101).
In August, 2011, Ms. Miller was seen by a nurse practitioner from the Spine
Institute. She complained of pain in the low back with associated numbness and
tingling. On exam, she had tenderness in the low back and straight leg raising
increased her back pain. She could squat and arise, but could not toe or heel
walk. Forward and backward bending were very limited. The assessment was
cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease. Surgery was not recommended.
(Tr. 1085-1086). She returned to the Spine Institute in January, 2012, for further
treatment of her back pain. She indicated that she had been seen by a neurologist
for neck pain and headaches, but the transcript does not contain records of a
13
neurological consultation. She was given one prescription for Hydrocodone and
told that she would have to go elsewhere for management of her chronic pain. (Tr.
1130).
Analysis
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in assessing her RFC because she
should have included additional limitations that are supported by her testimony
and by the medical records. Many of the medical records she cites are notations of
her subjective complaints. As this argument relies heavily on the credibility of her
own statements, the Court will first consider her argument regarding the ALJ’s
credibility analysis.
It is well-established that the credibility findings of the ALJ are to be
accorded deference, particularly in view of the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the
witness. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). “Applicants for
disability benefits have an incentive to exaggerate their symptoms, and an
administrative law judge is free to discount the applicant’s testimony on the basis of
the other evidence in the case.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 804, 805 (7th Cir.
2006).
SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider a number of factors in assessing the
claimant’s credibility, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s daily
activities, medication for the relief of pain, and “any other factors concerning the
individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.”
SSR 96-7p, at *3. Social Security regulations and Seventh Circuit cases “taken
together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for discounting a claimant's
14
testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from ‘merely ignoring’
the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical evidence
and the claimant's testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.” Schmidt
v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746-747 (7th Cir. 2005), and cases cited therein.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ based her credibility determination on the lack
of objective support in the medical records, but, according to plaintiff, the medical
records document “severe cervical and lumbar impairments which can reasonably
be expected to produce the pain” she alleged. Doc. 27, p. 16. Notably, plaintiff
does not argue that the medical records support her claims of severe migraines or
mental limitations. Plaintiff’s argument ignores the many reasons the ALJ gave for
her credibility determination.
The ALJ is required to give “specific reasons” for her credibility findings and
to analyze the evidence rather than simply describe the plaintiff’s testimony.
Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). See also, Terry v. Astrue,
580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009)(The ALJ “must justify the credibility finding with
specific reasons supported by the record.”) The ALJ may rely on conflicts between
plaintiff’s testimony and the objective record, as “discrepancies between objective
evidence and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration.” Getch v. Astrue,
539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008).
However, if the adverse credibility finding is
premised on inconsistencies between plaintiff’s statements and other evidence in
the record, the ALJ must identify and explain those inconsistencies. Zurawski v.
Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff’s argument is short on specifics and ignores the fact that ALJ
15
Poulose gave specific reasons for her conclusion that plaintiff’s allegations were not
credible.
First, she explained that plaintiff’s allegations are not supported by
objective medical evidence.
Plaintiff stresses the fact that MRI studies of her
cervical and lumbar spines showed degenerative disc disease and bulging discs at
L4-5 and L5-S1. The ALJ obviously acknowledged the results of these studies.
The flaw in plaintiff’s argument is that she points to no medical evidence
establishing that the MRI results translate into more serious limitations than those
assessed by the ALJ. As the ALJ noted, the limitations placed on Ms. Miller by her
healthcare providers would allow her to perform work at the light level. Further,
plaintiff ignores the fact that not all of the objective evidence supported her
allegations. In particular, as the ALJ pointed out, the EMG and nerve conduction
study showed no evidence of radiculopathy.
Further, the ALJ gave a number of other reasons for her conclusion that Ms.
Miller’s allegations were not credible. Plaintiff claims to have been totally disabled
since February 25, 2007. However, when Dr. Tate examined her in June, 2007,
she concluded that plaintiff could work with restrictions of no lifting greater than 30
pounds and no bending or twisting at the waist more than 4 times per hour. At her
initial physical therapy evaluation, she reported that she was able to perform
activities of daily living and the examination showed that she had a normal gait and
her range of motion was within functional limits. The physical therapy records
reflect that she made progress and met most of the goals of therapy. When she was
discharged from therapy in April, 2011, she had met all goals and had a weight
limit of 15 to 20 pounds. As the ALJ pointed out, this weight limit would permit
16
her to perform light work. Further, Dr. Chapa’s consultative examination was
essentially normal.
It is clear that the ALJ considered the relevant factors. Plaintiff does not
take issue with the validity of any of the reasons given by the ALJ.
The ALJ’s credibility assessment need not be “flawless;” it passes muster as
long as it is not “patently wrong.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir.
2009).
The analysis is deemed to be patently wrong “only when the ALJ's
determination lacks any explanation or support.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408,
413-414 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, the analysis is far from patently wrong.
An ALJ’s credibility analysis will be upheld “if the ALJ provided specific
reasons for discrediting the claimant's testimony.”
Ronning v. Colvin, 555
Fed.Appx. 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ gave specific reasons. It is
evident that ALJ Poulose considered the appropriate factors and built the required
logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusions about plaintiff’s testimony.
Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2010).
Therefore, her credibility
determination stands.
Plaintiff’s only other point can be swiftly disposed of. She argues that the
ALJ failed to include all of her limitations in the assessment of her RFC.
RFC is “the most you can still do despite your limitations.”
20 C.F.R.
§1545(a). In assessing RFC, the ALJ is required to consider all of the claimant’s
“medically determinable impairments and all relevant evidence in the record.”
Ibid. Obviously, the ALJ cannot be faulted for omitting alleged limitations that are
not supported by the record.
17
With regard to the medical records, plaintiff cites mostly to notes recording
her subjective complaints.
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ was not
required to credit these subjective complaints, and her analysis of plaintiff’s
credibility is not erroneous. In addition, she cites the results of her lumbar and
cervical MRI studies.
However, as was explained above, there is no medical
evidence in the record to support the inference that the MRI results translate into
additional functional limitations, and the Court cannot make such an assumption.
“The medical expertise of the Social Security Administration is reflected in
regulations; it is not the birthright of the lawyers who apply them. Common sense
can mislead; lay intuitions about medical phenomena are often wrong.” Schmidt
v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir. 1990).
In the final analysis, plaintiff’s arguments are a plea to the Court to reweigh
the evidence, which is far beyond this Court’s proper role. The most that can be
said is that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Ms. Miller was disabled
during the relevant time period. In that circumstance, the ALJ’s decision must be
affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. And, the Court cannot make its
own credibility determination or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ in
reviewing for substantial evidence. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir.
2012); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
Conclusion
After careful review of the record as a whole, the Court is convinced that ALJ
Poulose committed no errors of law, and that her findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgement
18
(Doc. 26) is DENIED. The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Tina M. Miller’s application for disability benefits is AFFIRMED.
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE:
December 9, 2014.
s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?