Taylor v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The Commissioner's final decision denying plaintiff's application for benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 10/8/2014. (klm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LISA M. TAYLOR,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

Civil No. 13-cv-968-CJP 1

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Lisa M. Taylor, represented
by counsel, seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying her
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for benefits in May, 2011, alleging disability beginning on
February 9, 2011. (Tr. 13). After holding an evidentiary hearing, ALJ
Randolph E. Schum denied the application for benefits in a decision dated July
30, 2012. (Tr. 13-22). The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the
ALJ became the final agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been
exhausted and a timely complaint was filed in this Court.
1

This case was referred to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 12.

1

Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following points:
1. The ALJ failed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s mental impairments.
2. The ALJ’s credibility determination was not supported by substantial
evidence.
3. The RFC is conclusory and is not supported by substantial evidence.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB or SSI, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning
of the applicable statutes. 2 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3).

“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing

significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
2

The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42
U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. The statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. As is relevant to this case,
the DIB and SSI statutes are identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 detailing medical
considerations relevant to an SSI claim, relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the DIB regulations.
Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations out of convenience.

2

Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are
considered conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals
one of the listed impairments, then the applicant is considered
disabled; if the impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, then the evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses
an applicant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage
in past relevant work. If an applicant can engage in past relevant
work, he is not disabled. The fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC,
as well as his age, education, and work experience to determine
whether the applicant can engage in other work. If the applicant can
engage in other work, he is not disabled.

Weatherbee v. Astrue , 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or
combination of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or
equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4)
whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the
claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy, given his or her
age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue ,
573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th Cir. 2009); Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391,
393 (7th Cir. 1992).
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will automatically

3

be found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at
step three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and
cannot perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job.

Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). See also, Zurawski
v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the five-step evaluation, an
“affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding
that the claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the burden shifts to
the ALJ to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In reviewing for “substantial

4

evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into consideration, but this
Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility,
or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d
1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while judicial review is deferential, it is
not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See,

Parker v. Astrue , 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Schum followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
date of her application. He found plaintiff had severe impairments of obesity,
residuals of hernia surgeries, and degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine.
The ALJ determined these impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform work at the light level, with some limitations. Based on the testimony of a
vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found the plaintiff was able to perform her past
work as a clerk in an insurance office, a cashier, and an office manager.
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the points raised by plaintiff.
1. Agency Forms

5

Plaintiff was born on September 4, 1964. She is insured for DIB through
December 31, 2014.3 She completed the twelfth grade in school and had no other
formal education or training. (Tr. 195).
According to plaintiff she had a number of health problems that made her
unable to work including chronic pain, residuals of recurrent hernia with surgical
complications, chronic severe abdominal pain and immobility, irritable bowel
syndrome, anxiety disorder, depression, and chronic fatigue. (Tr. 149).
Plaintiff previously worked as an insurance agent assistant, cashier,
“keyholder”, office manager, and a sorter. (Tr. 151).
In a Function Report submitted in May, 2011, plaintiff stated her sleep was
disrupted almost daily because of pain and discomfort. She was no longer able to
do all of the housework without assistance nor was she able to help with lawn
care. (Tr. 173). She was able to make breakfast, run errands, straighten up the
kitchen, do laundry, and make dinner. (Tr. 172). She had difficulty bending and
shaving her legs was particularly difficult. (Tr. 173). She regularly cleaned the
house but needed encouragement as she was frustrated and anxious often due to
pain. (Tr. 174). She could only drive short distances. (Tr. 175). She enjoyed
movies, scrapbooking, watching television, baking, and going on float trips. When
she participated in these activities she had to frequently change position. (Tr.
176). Plaintiff stated she needed to have restrooms in close proximity at all times
due to her bowel issues. (Tr. 178-79).

The date last insured is relevant to the claim for DIB, but not the claim for SSI. See, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(c) &
1382(a).

3

6

2. Evidentiary Hearing
Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the evidentiary hearing on July
5, 2012. (Tr. 27). She was a 47-year-old high school graduate at the time of the
hearing but had no additional education or training. (Tr. 29). Plaintiff was 5’6”,
220 pounds, and smoked one pack of cigarettes per day. (Tr. 32).
She previously worked as a cashier at a drugstore, a package sorter at UPS,
a cashier at a White Castle, a “keyholder” at a Dirt Cheap Cigarettes store, an
agent’s assistant for American Family Insurance, and an administrative assistant
at Bell and Osborn, an auto body shop. (Tr. 29-31). She was let go from her job at
Bell and Osborn because her performance was no longer adequate. (Tr. 31-32).
After she was fired from Bell and Osborn, plaintiff applied for and received
unemployment. (Tr. 32).
She testified to taking six Vicodin pills a day for pain in her back and
abdomen. (Tr. 33-35). She needed assistance in the restroom and had difficulty
shaving her legs, tying her shoes, and washing her hair. (Tr. 37). She had to use a
scooter when grocery shopping and she was given a disabled parking sticker. (Tr.
38). Driving more than a few miles was difficult for plaintiff because pushing the
gas and brake pedals caused pain. (Tr. 39). She testified to having continuous
bowel problems and needed to be near restrooms to avoid having accidents. (Tr.
40-41). Plaintiff felt that resting was one of the few things that made her
symptoms feel better. (Tr. 40).

7

A vocational expert (VE) also testified. The ALJ asked the VE to assume a
person who was able to lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds
frequently, and stand, walk or sit for six hours out of eight. The person would be
limited to occasionally climbing stairs and ramps, stooping, kneeling, and
crouching. The person could never climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds and was to
avoid concentrated exposure to hazards of unprotected heights and vibration. (Tr.
43). The VE testified that this person could perform plaintiff’s past work as an
insurance office clerk, office manager, and a cashier. (Tr. 43-44). When the ALJ
added an option to sit, stand, and change position at will and lift less than ten
pounds, all the jobs remained. (Tr. 45).
The VE also testified that if the hypothetical person was limited to
occasional reaching, or needed to lie down during the workday outside of normal
breaks, plaintiff’s former work would be eliminated. (Tr. 45-46).
3. Medical Treatment
In 2004, plaintiff underwent her first surgery to repair a ventral hernia with
mesh. (Tr. 367-68). Plaintiff continued to have pain post operatively. In April
2007 plaintiff returned to her surgeon, Dr. Troop, for an examination. (Tr. 392).
Plaintiff had seen another surgeon who told her she had an additional hernia that
was not part of her previous hernia repair. The mesh that was previously installed
was seemingly problematic. Dr. Troop explained he could remove the mesh, but it
would be a rather large surgery and may not help with her current pain. (Tr. 391).

8

In May, 2007, plaintiff returned to the doctor and it was noted the
previously installed mesh was recalled. After a CT scan was performed, it was
apparent the mesh was defective. After further examination the mesh appeared to
be intertwined with plaintiff’s bowels. (Tr. 361). In November 2011, plaintiff had a
second surgery to repair her hernia. (Tr. 434). Plaintiff continued to have pain,
however, and a CT scan in 2009 revealed two separate ventral incisional hernias
along her abdomen. (Tr. 474-75). Plaintiff underwent her third hernia surgery in
August 2009. She had several adhesions and the previous mesh was unable to be
removed. (Tr. 508-510).
Plaintiff saw specialists at Pain Management Services for a number of years
as her pain continued. (Tr. 276-285, 468-473, 495-500). In 2010, plaintiff visited
one of her regular physicians there, Dr. Allen, and he advised her that any
additional surgeries on her abdomen were not a good idea. (Tr. 276). Plaintiff
was regularly prescribed narcotics before and after her several surgeries and Dr.
Allen continually adjusted these medications to provide relief. Dr. Allen also gave
Plaintiff a disabled placard for her license plate. (Tr. 282).
In 2011 plaintiff regularly saw a professor of surgery at Washington
University, Dr. Matthews, to evaluate her chronic abdominal pain. (Tr. 255-69).
He had a lengthy conversation with plaintiff regarding her options for her future,
including an additional surgery. He discussed the extensive risks and that fact
that an additional surgery may not provide relief. (Tr. 259). Plaintiff then
consulted with Dr. Allen who advised against an additional surgical procedure.

9

(Tr. 285). In 2012 Dr. Smith, another doctor plaintiff regularly saw at Pain
Management Services, noted plaintiff was not a candidate for additional surgery.
(Tr. 496). Plaintiff elected to conservatively treat her hernias with medication. (Tr.
259, 285, 484). Dr. Smith attempted to start plaintiff on Methadone in order for
plaintiff to no longer rely on hydrocodone. The Methadone made plaintiff ill and
she thereafter resumed taking up to six hydrocodone pills a day for pain. (Tr.
499). Plaintiff also saw Dr. Redel, a family physician, throughout 2011. He helped
plaintiff with her pain medications and referred her to the specialists she
continually visited. (Tr. 244-254).
Since 2005 plaintiff was also regularly prescribed medications for anxiety
and depression by several different treating physicians. (Tr. 401-409, 468-474).
Additionally, in 2012 plaintiff had an MRI that showed disk bulging at T11-12,
T12-L1, and L1-L2. She had mild right femoral stenosis and mild facet
osteoarthropathy. (Tr. 501-502).
4. Disability Determination Services
In June 2011, plaintiff had a psychiatric review technique performed by
Robert Cottone, PhD. He noted plaintiff had not had any mental health
intervention other than through her primary care physicians. He stated there was
no mental condition and the medications she received were related to pain and
discomfort from her hernia surgeries. (Tr. 304). Dr. Cottone concluded plaintiff
had no medically determinable impairment. (Tr. 294).

10

Plaintiff also had a physical RFC completed in June 2011 by Nola Townley.
No medical consultant’s code was listed and the record does not state Ms.
Townley is a medical professional. Ms. Townley performed the RFC based on the
record and felt plaintiff was able to occasionally lift twenty pounds, frequently lift
ten pounds, stand, walk, or sit for six hours with normal breaks, pushing or
pulling was limited in her lower extremities. (Tr. 307). Plaintiff could occasionally
stoop, kneel, crawl, climb a ramp or stairs, frequently balance or crouch, and
never climb a ladder, rope, or scaffold. (Tr. 308).
5. Records Not Before the ALJ
After the ALJ issued his decision, plaintiff submitted additional medical
records to the Appeals Council in connection with her request for review. See, AC
Exhibits List, Tr. 5. Thus, the medical records at Tr. 537-54, designated by the
Appeals Council as Exhibits 21F and 22F, were not before the ALJ.
The medical records at Tr. 537-54 cannot be considered by this Court in
determining whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Records “submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council, though technically a
part of the administrative record, cannot be used as a basis for a finding of
reversible error.” Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 1994). See also,

Getch v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 2008); Rice v. Barnhart , 384
F.3d 363, 366, n. 2 (7th Cir. 2004).
Analysis

11

The Court agrees with plaintiff’s contention the ALJ failed to properly
assess plaintiff’s RFC.
First, the ALJ improperly weighed the treating physicians’ opinions. The
ALJ never explained how much weight, if any, he chose to give plaintiff’s treating
physicians’ opinions. “An ALJ who chooses to reject a treating physician's opinion
must provide a sound explanation for the rejection.” Jelinek v. Astrue , 662 F.3d
805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). The ALJ is required to consider a number of factors
in weighing a treating doctor’s opinion. The applicable regulation refers to a
treating healthcare provider as a “treating source.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)(2)
states:
Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating
sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical
professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of
your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to
the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective
medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations,
such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations. If we find
that a treating source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and
severity of your impairment(s) is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record,
we will give it controlling weight. [Emphasis added]
Very little of the ALJ’s opinion even mentions plaintiff’s treating physicians.
In one paragraph, the ALJ felt the treating physicians did not offer opinions
plaintiff was disabled nor did they provide recommendations that plaintiff was
unable to work. The ALJ referred to a five day work excuse from one of plaintiff’s
treating physicians as evidence plaintiff was capable of returning to work. (Tr.

12

19). The ALJ used no other portion of plaintiff’s extensive medical records to
support his belief that the treating physicians felt plaintiff was not disabled.
Plaintiff saw doctors at Pain Management Services thirteen times from 2008
through 2012. (Tr. 276-94, 468-500). Drs. Allen and Smith had extensive history
with plaintiff and the ALJ never discussed how their opinions factored into his
RFC. Plaintiff also saw a primary care physician and multiple surgeons regularly.
(Tr. 228-76, 361-467). Again, the ALJ failed to mention how this treatment
history weighed in his decision making process. The ALJ is not required to give
their opinions controlling weight, but he is required to evaluate every medical
opinion he receives. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c)
The only other portion of the ALJ’s opinion that references a treating
physician’s opinion is in reference to plaintiff’s refusal to undergo an additional
surgery. (Tr. 18). One of plaintiff’s treating physicians presented a fourth surgery
as an option for plaintiff’s pain treatment. (Tr. 475-484). The ALJ relies on
plaintiff’s refusal to undergo surgery to indicate a lack of pain consistent with her
complaints. (Tr. 18). However, Plaintiff was told by two of her other treating
doctors not to undergo an additional surgery after her previous three had failed.
(Tr. 276, 285, 497).
The ALJ felt plaintiff’s refusal to stop smoking was the cause of her refusal
to undergo an additional procedure even though he acknowledged plaintiff could
not afford an additional surgery and that the doctor stated the procedure was not
guaranteed to provide relief. (Tr. 18). The record does show plaintiff was advised

13

she would have to stop smoking if she chose to have another surgery and that she
understood. (Tr. 484). The record does not establish that the doctors felt
plaintiff’s smoking was the reason she chose to not undergo surgery nor did
plaintiff state this as a reason. Additionally, the ALJ failed to acknowledge the
multiple instances in the record where plaintiff was explicitly advised against
surgery. (Tr. 276, 285, 497).
He also fails to mention plaintiff had three previously unsuccessful
surgeries for the same issue. (Tr. 367-68, 434, 508-10). The ALJ actually fails to
mention plaintiff’s three previous surgeries anywhere in his opinion other than in
his determination that plaintiff’s depression was not a medically determinable
impairment. (Tr. 17). Inferring that plaintiff’s unwillingness to quit smoking was
the reason for her decision not to undergo another surgery, in conjunction with
his refusal to acknowledge the treating doctors’ opinions and plaintiff’s prior
surgical history, was error.
The ALJ did state the amount of weight he gave to three opinions of nontreating sources. He gave Ms. Townley’s RFC opinion some weight while admitting
it was not clear if she was an acceptable medical source. He gave Dr. Cottone’s
psychiatric review technique great weight as he felt it was supported by the
record. Finally, he did not give significant weight to plaintiff’s sister’s report as
she was not a disinterested third party. (Tr. 19). While the ALJ is correct in giving
weight to these opinions, he is not permitted to “cherry-pick” the evidence,
ignoring the parts that conflict with his conclusion. Myles v. Astrue , 582 F.3d

14

672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009). He is not required to mention every piece of evidence,
but “he must at least minimally discuss a claimant's evidence that contradicts the
Commissioner's position.” Godbey v. Apfel , 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff correctly points out that the ALJ failed to discuss how the medical
evidence supports his RFC findings.
The ALJ then looked at plaintiff’s daily activities and determined she was
capable of work. (Tr. 18). The 7th Circuit has repeatedly held it is appropriate to
consider these activities but it should be done with caution. The ability to perform
daily tasks “does not necessarily translate into an ability to work full-time.”

Roddy v. Astrue , 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s daily activities
can all be done with significant limitations and do not indicate she can complete
an entire workday or workweek. Additionally, the ALJ failed to explain how her
daily activities translated into her working capabilities. The 7th Circuit has held
the ALJ must build a logical bridge to his conclusions in these instances. See

Hamilton v. Colvin. 525 Fed. Appx. 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2013)(establishing an
ALJ must do more than merely mention activities a claimant undertakes to
establish the ability to work).
The ALJ stated plaintiff had never been fired or laid off because of
problems with authority figures or getting along with other people. He felt this fact
provided evidence of plaintiff’s ability to work. (Tr. 19). However, he fails to
acknowledge she was fired for her inability to perform work at an adequate level
due to her disabilities. (Tr. 31-32, 36). The ALJ needed to acknowledge this fact

15

and show how plaintiff’s record established she was capable of returning to this
work.
ALJ Schum also relied upon the fact that plaintiff received unemployment
benefits during the period at issue to determine she was not disabled. The 7th
Circuit has held that when an ALJ chooses to consider this he must analyze the
surrounding facts. Scrogham v. Colvin , 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16517, at 3435 (7th Cir 2014). Similarly to Scrogham, the ALJ here failed to take into
consideration the potentially progressive nature of plaintiff’s disabilities as she
has degenerative back problems and continuous hernia issues.
Additionally, the record shows plaintiff did not have the monetary
resources to visit the doctor frequently or pursue a fourth surgery. (Tr. 33, 276).
The 7th Circuit has established that a “desperate person might force herself to
work-or in this case, certify that she is able to work- but that does not necessarily
mean she is not disabled. See Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th
Cir.2005); Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d
914, 918 (7th Cir.2003).” Richards v. Astrue, 370 Fed. Appx. 727, 732 (7th Cir.
2010). In Richards, the claimant testified that she sought unemployment benefits
because she had no other source of income. Ibid. While plaintiff here did not
testify to having the same situation, the ALJ failed to question her as to this fact.
He inferred her ability to work by her application for benefits and sought no
further explanation.
The ALJ is “required to build a logical bridge from the evidence to his

16

conclusions.” Simila v. Astrue , 573 F.3d 503, 516 (7th Cir. 2009).

ALJ

Schum simply failed to do so here. He did not adequately address evidence in
opposition to his opinion, misstated the record, and failed to explain his
conclusions on multiple instances. “If a decision ‘lacks evidentiary support or is
so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is required.”

Kastner v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Steele v.
Barnhart , 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
It is not necessary to address plaintiff’s other points at this time. The Court
wishes to stress that this Memorandum and Order should not be construed as an
indication that the Court believes that plaintiff is disabled or that he should be
awarded benefits. On the contrary, the Court has not formed any opinions in that
regard, and leaves those issues to be determined by the Commissioner after
further proceedings.
Conclusion
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Lisa M. Taylor’s application for
social security disability benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the
Commissioner for rehearing and reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: October 8, 2014.
17

s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18