Buitron v. Holder et al

Filing 27

ORDER denying 25 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 3/14/14. (klh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GABRIEL BUITRON,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC HOLDER and
JAMES CROSS,
Respondents.

Civil No. 13-0974-DRH

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Now before the Court is Buitron’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 25).
Specifically, Buitron moves the Court to reconsider its February 10, 2014 order
granting respondents’ motion to dismiss and denying Buitron’s habeas corpus
petition (Doc. 23).

Respondents oppose the motion (Doc. 26).

Based on the

following, the Court denies the motion.
There are two ways in which a Court may analyze a motion filed after
judgment has been entered either under Rule 59(e) or under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Where a substantive motion is filed within
twenty-eight days of entry of judgment or order, the Court will generally construe
it as a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e); later motions will be construed as pursuant
to Rule 60(b). Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir.1994); United States v.
Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.1992). Although both Rules 59(e) and 60(b)
have similar goals of erasing the finality of a judgment and permitting further
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proceedings, Rule 59(e) generally requires a lower threshold of proof than does
Rule 60(b). See Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th
Cir.1995); see also Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.1993)
(distinguishing the “exacting standard” of Rule 60(b) from the “more liberal
standard” of Rule 59(e)). Instead of the exceptional circumstances required to
prevail under Rule 60(b), Rule 59(e) requires that the moving party clearly
establish a manifest error of law or an intervening change in the controlling law or
present newly discovered evidence. See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729,
732 (7th Cir. 1998). However, where “the only arguable basis for relief presented
in the motion ... is ‘excusable neglect,’ “ the court should apply the standards
governing a motion under Rule 60(b). Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d
542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006).
Buitron contends that the Court erred when it did not permit him to amend
his petition and by re-characterizing his petition to one which the Court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction. After reviewing the record again, the Court finds
that Buitron neither presented newly discovered evidence nor identified a
manifest error of law or fact. His motion merely takes umbrage with the Court’s
previous ruling and rehashes old arguments that have been addressed by the
Court. Buitron’s arguments attacked the Transfer Treaty Determination’s
imposition of a term of supervised release following Buitron’s incarceration. This
is an issue which the Court lacks jurisdiction to address. In rendering this Order
and the Memorandum and Order dismissing Buitron’s habeas corpus petition,

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the Court examined the evidence and case law submitted by the parties and
remains convinced of the correctness of its position.
Order is clear and needs no clarification.

The Memorandum and

Accordingly, the Court DENIES

Buitron’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 25).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 14, 2014

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2014.03.14
08:27:28 -05'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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