Kamartzis v. Gates et al
Filing
76
MEMORANDUM and ORDER, The Court ADOPTS the R & R (Doc. 68 ) and DENIESKarmartzis motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 33 ). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 7/15/2014. (jdh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THOMAS KARMARTZIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 13-cv-1021-JPG-PMF
SANDRA FUNK, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (Doc.
68) of Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier recommending this Court deny Karmartzis’ motion for
any extraordinary remedies and for an injunction (Doc. 33). Karmartzis filed an objection (Doc.
71) to the R & R. For the following reasons, the Court adopts the R & R and denies Karmartzis’
motion.
1. R & R Standard
The Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations of the magistrate judge in a report and recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3). The Court must review de novo the portions of the report to which objections are
made. The Court has discretion to conduct a new hearing and may consider the record before the
magistrate judge anew or receive any further evidence deemed necessary. Id. “If no objection or
only partial objection is made, the district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear
error.” Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). Because Karmartzis filed
an objection to the R & R, the Court will undertake a de novo review.
2. Background
Karmartzis, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”),
is currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). In his
complaint relevant to the instant case, Karmartzis alleges that Funk, an IDOC transfer
coordinator, transferred him from Graham Correctional Center to Pinckneyville in retaliation for
filing civil rights cases. After his transfer to Pinckneyville, Karmartzis requested another
transfer that was denied. He alleges Funk was responsible for the denial of his transfer request,
and her denial of his transfer request was motivated by his civil rights case filings. He now seeks
injunctive relief. His motion only cites to ongoing retaliation by medical personnel at
Pinckneyville. His objection to the R & R focuses on the alleged retaliation by Funk.
3. Analysis
A court may order injunctive relief in a civil action regarding prison conditions. 18
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than
necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be
the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the
principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief.
Id. Preliminary injunctive relief is designed “to minimize the hardship to the parties pending the
ultimate resolution of the lawsuit.” Platinum Home Mortgage Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group
Inc., 149 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1998). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must make a
threshold showing that (1) it has some likelihood of success on the merits, (2) no adequate
remedy at law exists, and (3) it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.
Ferrell v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 186 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 1999). If
the moving party is able to establish these three factors, the Court must then balance the harms to
2
both parties using a “sliding scale” analysis, also taking into consideration the effect that
granting or denying the injunction will have on the public. Id. “[T]he greater the moving party’s
likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the less strongly it must show that the balance of harms
weighs in its favor.” Id. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Chicago Dist.
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. K & I Constr., Inc., 270 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)); accord Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
Magistrate Judge Frazier’s R & R recommends that this Court deny Karmartzis’ motion
for injunctive relief because Karmartzis cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits
and fails to identify any ongoing retaliation by Funk. Rather, Karmartzis’ motion complains of
the actions of medical staff. In his objection, Karmartzis alleges that the denial of his motion to
transfer out of Pinckneyville is sufficient to show Funk’s retaliatory motive.
First, the Court will consider whether Karmartzis has carried his burden in establishing he
has some likelihood of success on the merits. A prison official violates a prisoner’s
constitutional rights if she takes an action in retaliation for the prisoner’s exercise of a
constitutionally protected right. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977)). While an inmate
does not have a due process interest in a transfer, he “does have a constitutional interest or
expectation in not being punished for the exercise of activity protected under the constitution.”
McCalvin v. Fairman, 603 F. Supp. 342, 346 (C.D. Ill 1985). To succeed on a retaliation claim,
a plaintiff “must establish that (1) [he] engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, (2)
[he] suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and (3)
3
the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to
take retaliatory action.” Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Gomez
v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012).
Here, there is no dispute that Karmartzis’ previous filing of civil rights cases is a
protected activity. Also, for the purposes of this order the Court will assume a transfer would
deter an inmate from filing future civil rights cases. Karmartzis, however, has failed to carry his
burden in showing his civil rights cases were at least a motivating factor behind his transfer or
the denial of his transfer request. First, he has provided no evidence that Funk was responsible
for denying his transfer request. Even if she was responsible, Karmartzis has provided nothing
more than his own assertion that Kamartzis’ civil rights cases were at least a motivating factor in
Funk’s decision to transfer him to Pinckneyville or deny his subsequent transfer request. Thus,
Karmartzis has not established that he is likely to succeed in showing Funk took or is taking
actions in retaliation for filing previous civil rights cases. As such, Karmartzis has failed to carry
his burden in showing he has a likelihood of success on the merits and is not entitled to
injunctive relief.
4. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R & R (Doc. 68) and DENIES
Karmartzis’ motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 33).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 15, 2014
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?