Jumper v. Watson et al

Filing 8

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. COUNTS 2, 3, and 4 are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.IT IS OR DERED that the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Defendants WATSON, McLAURIN, and TRICE are DISMISSED without prejudice from this action. IT IS FU RTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint within 35 days of the entry of this order. Failure to file an amended complaint that conforms with this Order shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. (Amended Pleadings due by 1/16/2014). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 12/11/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHERMAN JUMPER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICK WATSON, MAJOR McLAURIN,
and THOMAS TRICE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-01022-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Sherman Jumper, a pretrial detainee at St. Clair County Jail (“Jail”),
brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346, 2671-2680 (Doc. 1).

Plaintiff sues three St. Clair County Sheriff’s Department

officials, including Rick Watson (sheriff), Major McLaurin (superintendent), and Thomas Trice
(captain), for claims arising from the conditions of his confinement at the Jail (Doc. 1, pp. 5-8).
He seeks compensatory and punitive damages (Doc. 1, p. 8).
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen
prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This statute
applies with equal force to complaints filed by pretrial detainees. Id. Under § 1915A(b), the
Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant
who by law is immune from such relief. After fully considering the allegations in the complaint,
the Court concludes that it fails to state any cognizable claim and shall be dismissed.

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The Complaint
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was exposed to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement during his pretrial detention at the Jail from March 15th - June 4th, 2012, and
from June 25th - August 6th, 2013 (Doc. 1, p. 5). For two months, he was forced to sleep on the
Jail’s gymnasium floor with forty other detainees. There, they endured unsanitary conditions,
excessive heat, and excessive noise levels. A single toilet served forty detainees. They had
problems sleeping because of mice and bugs, persistent noise, and no air conditioning. As
temperatures soared above 100 degrees Fahrenheit, five pretrial detainees passed out. Plaintiff
complained about these conditions. However, “the defendant’s [sic] failed to do anything” about
the conditions. Plaintiff requested placement in a cell block, but his request was denied.
On or around July 20, 2013, Plaintiff was assigned to work in the Jail’s kitchen
(Doc. 1, p. 6). There, he observed mold on the kitchen’s ceiling and walls. He observed mice
and roaches running on and around food as it was being prepared. He also observed standing
water containing dead roaches and mice droppings on the kitchen floor. Plaintiff complained
directly to Defendants McLaurin and Trice about the conditions in the kitchen, but Defendants
failed to correct the problems.
Soon after complaining about these conditions, Plaintiff was summoned to the
gymnasium’s stairwell (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). There, four unknown correctional officers beat Plaintiff
(Doc. 1, p. 6). They pushed his head into a brick wall five times. They punched him in the ribs
and stomach. In the process, one officer pointed a taser gun in Plaintiff’s face and threatened to
use it if Plaintiff spoke or moved. The officers then threatened to beat Plaintiff again, if he
complained about the conditions. Plaintiff did not name any of these unknown officers as
defendants in this action.

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Plaintiff now sues Defendants Watson, McLaurin, and Trice in their official
capacities under § 1983 and the FTCA (Doc. 1). He seeks monetary damages (Doc. 1, p. 8).
DISCUSSION
The Court finds it convenient to divide the complaint into four counts. The
parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1: FTCA claim against Defendants Watson, McLaurin, and Trice.
Count 2: Conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Watson, McLaurin, and
Trice.
Count 3: Excessive force claim against unknown correctional officers.
Count 4: Retaliation claim against unknown correctional officers.
Count 1 – FTCA Claim
Plaintiff’s FTCA claim (Count 1) fails. The FTCA provides jurisdiction for suits
against the United States regarding torts committed by federal officials, not state officials. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. The complaint names three defendants. All three are state
officials.

Because Plaintiff cannot bring an FTCA claim against them, Count 1 shall be

dismissed.
Count 2 – Conditions of Confinement Claim
Similarly, Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim (Count 2) must be
dismissed.

Claims that relate to the conditions of confinement, such as the allegations in

Plaintiff’s complaint, fall under the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Although claims brought pursuant to § 1983, when involving detainees, arise
under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment, see Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d

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1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit has “found it convenient and entirely appropriate
to apply the same standard to claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment (detainees) and
Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) ‘without differentiation.’” Board v. Farnham, 394
F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 n. 2 (7th Cir.
1999)). Thus, for “cruel and unusual punishment” claims brought by a detainee, the plaintiff
must show that the jail officials knew that the plaintiff was at risk of serious harm, and that they
disregarded that risk by failing to reasonably discharge it. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763,
771-72 (7th Cir. 2008).
All Eighth Amendment claims have an objective and a subjective component.
McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302
(1991). The objective component focuses on the nature of the acts or practices alleged to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1992).
The objective analysis examines whether the conditions of confinement exceeded contemporary
bounds of decency of a mature civilized society. Id. The condition must result in unquestioned
and serious deprivations of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); accord JamisonBey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416
(7th Cir. 1987).
As pleaded, Plaintiff’s claims regarding health and sanitation—such as exposure
to mold, too few toilets, lack of air conditioning, mice and roaches, and food contamination,
etc.—are actionable claims. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 205-06 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (holding that conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation in combination, even if each might not suffice alone; this would occur

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when they have “a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise”)). Nevertheless, the complaint has
other problems.
The subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim implicates the intent
with which the acts or practices constituting the alleged punishment are inflicted. Jackson, 955
F.2d at 22. The subjective component requires that a prison official had a sufficiently culpable
state of mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also McNeil, 16 F.3d at 124. In conditions of
confinement cases, the relevant state of mind is deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety;
the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he also must draw the inference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976);
Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1994).
As pleaded, it is not clear that the allegations in the complaint satisfy the
subjective prong as to any particular defendant. No allegations address Defendant Watson’s
alleged deliberate indifference to the unconstitutional conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement.
Merely naming a defendant in the caption is insufficient to state a claim. See Collins v. Kibort,
143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). The allegations addressing Defendants McLaurin and Trice’s
deliberate indifference are sketchy at best, providing little detail about Plaintiff’s actual
complaint(s) and each defendant’s response(s) (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7).
The complaint is flawed for other reasons as well. Plaintiff has sued Defendants
Watson, McLaurin, and Trice in their official capacities for monetary damages. While it is
possible to raise an official capacity claim for purposes of requesting injunctive relief, Plaintiff
has not done so in the complaint. See Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2001)

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(warden could be liable for injunctive relief relative to a prison policy imposing an
unconstitutional condition of confinement). According to the complaint, Plaintiff does not seek
injunctive relief. He seeks monetary damages. However, the Eleventh Amendment bars official
capacity claims for monetary damages. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 917-18 (7th Cir. 2005).
Consequently, no official capacity claim has been stated against Defendant Watson, or any other
defendant for that matter. Further, Plaintiff has not named any defendants in their individual
capacities. Accordingly, Count 2 fails and shall be dismissed.
Count 3 – Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff does not explicitly set forth an excessive force claim (Count 3).
However, the complaint describes an incident in which Plaintiff was beaten by several
correctional officers. Because it appears that he may have been attempting to raise such a claim,
the Court will address it in this Order.
Excessive force claims are analyzed under the same Eighth Amendment rubric set
forth in Count 2. In the prison context, the Eighth Amendment is violated where there is an
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Force
is considered excessive where it is not utilized in “a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline,” but instead is applied “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm. Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
The complaint describes an incident in which four unknown correctional officers
used force against Plaintiff, after Plaintiff complained about the conditions of his confinement.
The officers beat Plaintiff and threatened further harm. However, the complaint does not name
these officers as defendants in this action or designate the officers as defendants using fictitious
names. See Maclin v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83, 87 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that Bivens v. Six

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Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), impliedly
recognized that plaintiffs can designate defendants through the use of fictitious names). It is
therefore unclear whether Plaintiff intended to bring a claim against these officers. Plaintiff’s
failure to explicitly raise an excessive force claim against them, address any elements of the
claim, or name the correctional officers as defendants (through actual or fictitious names) in the
complaint warrants dismissal of this claim. Accordingly, Count 3 shall be dismissed.
Count 4 – Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff’s potential retaliation claim (Count 4) shall also be dismissed for the
same reasons that Count 3 is being dismissed. The complaint does not mention “retaliation” or
specifically raise this claim. However, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff was beaten and
threatened, after he complained about the conditions of his confinement.

The correctional

officers who committed these acts are neither named as defendants, nor identified as such
through the use of fictitious names.
In the prison context, an inmate must identify the reasons that retaliation has been
taken, as well as “the act or acts claimed to have constituted retaliation,” so as to put those
charged with the retaliation on notice of the claim(s). Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th
Cir. 2002). The inmate need not plead facts to establish the claim beyond doubt, but need only
provide the bare essentials of the claim, and in a claim for retaliation the reason for the retaliation
and the acts taken in an effort to retaliate suffice. Id. Because the complaint does not explicitly
raise a retaliation claim or name the officers as defendants (using real of fictitious names), this
claim shall be dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal.
Rather than dismiss the entire action, however, the Court shall allow Plaintiff one opportunity to

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submit an amended complaint in order to correct the deficiencies in his pleading. Plaintiff is
advised that as he prepares his amended complaint, he should follow the instructions on the
Court’s civil rights complaint form. That form directs Plaintiff to state “when, where, how, and
by whom” his rights were violated (Doc. 1, p. 5). Put simply, Plaintiff should state the facts that
support his claim, including who violated his constitutional rights and what actions resulted in
the violation. It is acceptable at this stage to refer to unknown defendants in generic terms, e.g.,
“John/Jane Doe.” However, in order to pursue his claims, Plaintiff must refer to some defendant
who personally participated in a constitutional deprivation and set forth those actions that
constituted personal participation. With this in mind, Plaintiff shall be granted one opportunity
to amend his complaint in this action.
DISPOSITION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 1 is DISMISSED with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. COUNTS 2, 3, and 4 are DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Defendants WATSON, McLAURIN, and TRICE
are DISMISSED without prejudice from this action.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case,
Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint within 35 days of the entry of this order (on or
before January 16, 2014).

The First Amended Complaint shall state the facts supporting

Plaintiff’s claim regarding conditions of confinement at St. Clair County Jail, and shall name the
individual defendants directly responsible for the alleged constitutional deprivations. Plaintiff

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must refer to some defendant who personally participated in a constitutional deprivation and set
forth those actions that constituted personal participation. As explained above, it is acceptable at
this stage to refer to unknown defendants in generic terms, e.g., “John/Jane Doe.”
Plaintiff is ADVISED that an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the
original complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus.
Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal
amendments to the original complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its
own, without reference to any other pleading.

Failure to file an amended complaint that

conforms with this Order shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. Such a
dismissal shall count as one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
No service shall be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court completes its
§ 1915A review of the First Amended Complaint.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the

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Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to
plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 11, 2013
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge

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