Jones v. Madison County Jail

Filing 5

ORDER: The complaint (Doc. 1 ) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant MADISON COUNTY JAIL is DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. Defendant MADISON COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL STAFF a re DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff shall file his First Amended Complaint within 35 days of the entry of this order. Failure to file an amended complaint that conforms with this Order shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. (Amended Pleadings due by 12/23/2013). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 11/18/2013. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOSHUA JARED JONES, #63582,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MADISON COUNTY JAIL,
Medical staff,
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-01164-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Joshua Jones, who is currently being held at Madison County Jail (“the Jail”),
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). In the complaint, Plaintiff claims that
the Jail and its medical staff denied Plaintiff treatment for a brain hemorrhage. Plaintiff now
sues the Jail and its medical staff for compensatory damages.
The Complaint
Prior to his detention at the Jail, Plaintiff sustained unspecified, severe head injuries
(Doc. 1, p. 4). In late August 2013, he was diagnosed with a brain hemorrhage at Barnes-Jewish
Hospital. Hospital medical staff recommended treatment. Plaintiff became scared after hearing
details about the recommended procedure and left the hospital. He did so against the advice of
his care providers. Since that time, Plaintiff has been “spaced out” (Doc. 1, p. 4).
On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff was sentenced to two years of imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. He was ordered to report for this commitment on October 21, 2013.
When he failed to do so, Plaintiff was arrested on October 22, 2013. He has since been held on
escape charges at the Jail.

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Plaintiff immediately made Jail staff aware of his medical condition and his need for
prompt treatment. Jail medical staff ordered Plaintiff’s medical records from Barnes-Jewish and
confirmed Plaintiff’s claim. Even so, they failed to take any steps to treat him. They did not
schedule an appointment for Plaintiff with a Jail doctor. They ignored Plaintiff’s daily sick call
requests for treatment. Plaintiff’s informal and formal grievances were ignored. As of the date
Plaintiff filed this complaint, he had already endured seventeen days without treatment during his
detention at the Jail, while suffering from pain and pressure in his brain.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff “should have been rushed to the hospital with a
hemroging [sic] brain” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Barnes-Jewish personnel continue to call Plaintiff’s house
and urge his family to have Plaintiff treated. They have warned Plaintiff’s family that permanent
brain damage or even death is possible. Plaintiff now seeks compensatory damages from the
Jail’s medical staff for their failure to treat his condition.
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to carefully review a complaint filed
by a plaintiff who seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or
portion thereof, if the plaintiff has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. Conversely, a

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complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual
allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
Plaintiff now asserts a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Jail and its
medical staff for failing to treat his brain hemorrhage. After fully considering the allegations in
the complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A to summarily
dismiss the complaint.

However, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint shall be without

prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint correcting the defects set forth below.
1.

Suable Defendant(s)
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon

fault; thus, “to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810
(7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Without tying an individual defendant to specific acts, the
complaint fails to establish a constitutional violation on the part of any particular defendant.

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Plaintiff names Madison County Jail as one of two defendants in this action. However,
governmental entities cannot be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of employees, unless
those acts are carried out pursuant to an official policy or custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The complaint does not allege that any official policy or custom
resulted in a constitutional deprivation. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Therefore, the complaint fails to articulate a colorable claim against
Madison County Jail. This defendant shall be dismissed from the action with prejudice.
Further, although the complaint names the Jail’s medical staff, in its entirety, as a
defendant, the allegations do not identify any particular defendant, even in generic terms
(e.g., “John/Jane Doe”), who deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs are

required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on
notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not included a
specific defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately
put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. See Collins v.
Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Jail medical staff shall be dismissed
from this action without prejudice.
2.

Applicable Legal Standard
In addition, the complaint does not set forth sufficient allegations to determine the

applicable legal standard for Plaintiff’s medical claim.

Different legal standards apply to

medical claims of an arrestee (Fourth Amendment), pretrial detainee (Fourteenth Amendment),
and prisoner (Eighth Amendment).
Plaintiff’s status.

The allegations in the complaint shed little light on

The complaint does not mention the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth

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Amendment. Although Plaintiff is not required to plead legal theories at this stage in litigation,
his amended complaint should include information that, at a minimum, assists the Court in
applying the proper legal standard. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir.
2011); Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010); Aaron v. Mahl, 550
F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 2008). This information includes: (1) whether Plaintiff’s arrest on
October 22, 2013, was pursuant to a warrant; (2) whether Plaintiff attended a probable cause
hearing following a warrantless arrest; and/or (3) when Plaintiff began serving his two-year
prison sentence.
The Fourth Amendment “governs the period of confinement between arrest without a
warrant and the [probable cause determination].” Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992)). An “objectively
reasonable” standard applies to medical care claims brought by arrestees who have not yet had a
probable cause hearing. Id. (citations omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment applies to medical claims brought by a detainee, as opposed
to an arrestee or a prisoner. See Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000). The
Eighth Amendment applies to medical claims brought by prisoners. The Seventh Circuit has
“found it convenient and entirely appropriate to apply the same standard to claims arising under
the Fourteenth Amendment (detainees) and Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners) ‘without
differentiation.’” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Henderson v.
Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999)).
To state a medical claim, a detainee or prisoner must show that (1) he suffered from an
objectively serious condition which created a substantial risk of harm, and (2) the defendants

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were aware of that risk and intentionally disregarded it. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831
(7th Cir. 2010); Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2002).
At this early stage in litigation, the complaint satisfies the objective prong of this test. A
medical need is objectively “serious” if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s unresolved brain hemorrhage was diagnosed by a physician as needing treatment in
August 2013. Plaintiff alleges that the condition was not treated, and symptoms persist. Even a
lay person could recognize the need for treatment.
The complaint does not satisfy the subjective component of this test. To establish
deliberate indifference, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that prison officials acted with a
“‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). Officials must “know of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate health” by being “‘aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno,
414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834). Plaintiff is not required to
establish that the officials “intended or desired the harm that transpired,” but to instead show that
they “knew of a substantial risk of harm . . . and disregarded it.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. The
complaint identifies no specific defendant who was aware of Plaintiff’s need for medical
treatment and denied it.
3.

Amended Complaint
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal. However,

the Court considers the claim to be very serious and potentially life-threatening. The Court is

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mindful of the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. His pleading gaffes do not
warrant dismissal of his medical claim with prejudice at this juncture. Rather than dismiss the
entire action, the Court shall allow Plaintiff one opportunity to submit an amended complaint in
order to correct the deficiencies in his pleading.
Plaintiff is advised that as he prepares his amended complaint, he should follow the
instructions on the Court’s civil rights complaint form. That form directs Plaintiff to state
“when, where, how, and by whom” his rights were violated” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Put simply, Plaintiff
should state the facts that support his claim, including who specifically violated his constitutional
rights and the particular actions of the individual that resulted in the violation. As explained
above, it is acceptable at this stage to refer to unknown defendants in generic terms,
e.g., “John/Jane Doe.” It is also acceptable to include copies of sick call requests or grievance
forms as exhibits to the complaint. However, in order to pursue his claims, Plaintiff must refer to
some defendant who personally participated in a constitutional deprivation and set forth those
actions that constituted personal participation.

Further, Plaintiff should include allegations

addressing: (1) whether his arrest on October 22, 2013, was pursuant to a warrant; (2) whether he
attended a probable cause hearing following a warrantless arrest; and/or (3) when he began
serving his two-year prison sentence.

With this in mind, Plaintiff shall be granted one

opportunity to amend his complaint in this action.
Disposition
The complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Defendant MADISON COUNTY JAIL is DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
Defendant MADISON COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL STAFF are DISMISSED from this action

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without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, should he wish to proceed with this case, Plaintiff
shall file his First Amended Complaint within 35 days of the entry of this order (on or before
December 23, 2013). The First Amended Complaint shall state the facts supporting Plaintiff’s
medical claim with specificity and shall name the individual defendants directly responsible for
the alleged constitutional deprivations.

Further, he should state: (1) whether his arrest on

October 22, 2013, was pursuant to a warrant; (2) whether he attended a probable cause hearing
following a warrantless arrest; and/or (3) when he began serving his two-year prison sentence.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original
complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of
Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to
the original complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without
reference to any other pleading. Failure to file an amended complaint that conforms with this
Order shall result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. Such a dismissal shall count as
one of Plaintiff’s three allotted “strikes” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
No service shall be ordered on any Defendant until after the Court completes its § 1915A
review of the First Amended Complaint.
In order to assist Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint, the Clerk is DIRECTED
to mail Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint form.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for

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leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 18, 2013
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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