Phelps v. U.S. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 12/23/2014. (jmt)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LISA PHELPS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.
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Case No. 13-cv-1211-CJP 1
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Lisa Phelps, represented by
counsel, seeks judicial review of the final agency decision denying her Disability
Insurance Benefits (DIB) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Ms. Phelps applied for DIB in August, 2010, alleging disability beginning on
September 1, 2009. (Tr. 13). After holding an evidentiary hearing, ALJ Michael
Scurry denied the application for benefits in a decision dated September 4, 2012.
(Tr. 13-26).
The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision of the ALJ
became the final agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been
exhausted and a timely complaint was filed in this Court.
1
This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 19.
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Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following points:
1.
The ALJ’s credibility analysis was erroneous in that he erred in
assessing the side effects of plaintiff’s medications and
mischaracterized other evidence.
3.
The ALJ erred in weighing the opinions of two of her treating
physicians, Drs. Robson and Schenewerk.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the
applicable statutes. For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3).
“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing
significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
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The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are considered
conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals one of the
listed impairments, then the applicant is considered disabled; if the
impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the
evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses an applicant's residual
functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage in past relevant work. If
an applicant can engage in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The
fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education,
and work experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in
other work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not
disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or combination
of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or equal one of
the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4) whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of
performing any work within the economy, given his or her age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th
Cir. 2009); Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992).
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will automatically be
found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at step
three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and cannot
perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the Commissioner at
step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job. Rhoderick v.
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Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Zurawski v. Halter, 245
F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the five-step evaluation, an “affirmative
answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the
claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the burden shifts to the ALJ to
establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national
economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether Ms. Phelps was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but
whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir.
1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)). This Court uses
the Supreme Court’s definition of substantial evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is
taken into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve
conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of
the ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However,
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while judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a
rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921
(7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Scurry followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined that Ms. Phelps had worked since the alleged onset date, but this work
did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity. She was insured for DIB only
through December 31, 2009. He found that plaintiff had severe impairments of
Parkinson’s disease, Crohn’s disease, asthma, obesity, degenerative disc disease of
the lumbar spine, fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus type II, with peripheral
neuropathy, anxiety disorder, and depression. He further determined that these
impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that Ms. Phelps had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform work at the light exertional level, with some physical and mental
limitations. Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that
plaintiff was not able to do her past work as bartender or department manager.
However, she was not disabled because she was able to do other jobs which exist in
significant numbers in the national and regional economy.
The Evidentiary Record
The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
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is directed to the points raised by plaintiff and is limited to the relevant time period.
1.
Prior Denial
Ms. Phelps filed a prior application for DIB in June, 2005.
After an
evidentiary hearing, an ALJ denied the application in a written decision dated
August 27, 2009. Plaintiff did not appeal. (Tr. 102-111, 172).
That decision is res judicata and stands as a finding that plaintiff was not
disabled as of August 27, 2009. Thus, while the Court may consider medical
evidence which predates August 27, 2009, it must accept the Commissioner’s
decision that Ms. Phelps was not disabled as of that date. See, Groves v. Apfel,
148 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 1998); 20 C.F.R. § 404.988.
2.
Agency Forms
Plaintiff was born in 1966. She was 43 years old on the alleged onset date of
September 1, 2009. She was insured for DIB through December 31, 2009. (Tr.
172).
In August, 2010, plaintiff was 5’ 6” tall and weighed 235 pounds. She said
she stopped working on December 21, 2004, because of her condition.
175-176).
(Tr.
She had worked as a cook and bartender, and as a manager of a farm
store. She had completed two years of college. (Tr. 177).
In September, 2010, Ms. Phelps stated in a Function Report that she was
unable to concentrate and became confused and disoriented.
Her tremors
worsened when she was anxious. She was always short of breath. She alleged
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pain in her legs, back, feet and arms, and moderate to extreme muscle and joint
paint. She could not walk well and had trouble with her hands. Crowds, new
tasks and new people brought on anxiety.
She was fatigued.
She was easily
angered and agitated, and did not adapt to change. During the day, she watched
TV, napped and walked to relieve her chronic pain. She did not do housework or
fix meals. She rarely left home because of panic and anxiety. She was taking
Ambien, Flexeril, Xanax, Lasix, and Remeron. She alleged that all of these drugs,
except for Lasix, caused her drowsiness. (Tr. 191-200).
2.
Evidentiary Hearing
Ms. Phelps was represented by an attorney at the evidentiary hearing on July
26, 2012. (Tr. 70).
Plaintiff was 46 years old. Her husband, whom she had married in 2000,
had been disabled since 1993. He had been a coal miner, and had suffered back
injuries and a heart attack.
Her 21 year old daughter lived with them.
(Tr.
74-76).
Ms. Phelps testified that she suffered from a number of physical and mental
conditions at the time of the hearing. She said she did not do any household
chores and her house was a “disaster” and “filthy.” (Tr. 87-88). Her Crohn’s
disease and tremors had gotten worse over the years. The tremors had been at
pretty much the same level for the past two to three years. (Tr. 90-91).
A vocational expert (VE) also testified.
The ALJ asked him several
hypothetical questions. In one questions, the ALJ asked him to assume a person
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who could do work at the light exertional level, with no exposure to fumes, odors,
and similar irritants, limited to work involving simple, repetitive tasks with no
more than average productions standards, no contact with the public, and only
occasional contact with supervisors and coworkers. The VE testified that this
person could not do plaintiff’s past work, but could do other jobs such as
housekeeper and hand packer. (Tr. 93-94).
4.
Relevant Medical Treatment
Plaintiff was treated by Dr. David Robson at St. Louis Spine Care Alliance in
2009 and 2010. On July 15, 2009, she complained of low back pain radiating into
her right leg.
On exam, her gait was normal.
She had no muscle spasms.
Straight leg raising was positive at 80 degrees. Neurologic exam including motor,
sensory and deep tendon reflexes was normal in both lower extremities. An MRI
showed multilevel degenerative changes and mild spondylolisthesis at L4.
He
recommended an epidural steroid injection. (Tr. 348). On August 11, 2009, Dr.
Robson noted that she had done “extremely well” following the injection, and she
was continuing to improve. Straight leg raising was negative. She had no muscle
spasms. Her gait was normal. Neurologic exam was normal. (Tr. 347). She
returned to Dr. Robson in 2010, after the date last insured for DIB, complaining of
neck pain. He noted that she had undergone a cervical fusion about three years
prior. (Tr. 750).
On October 30, 2009, an arterial Doppler study of Ms. Phelps’ legs was
normal. (Tr. 306).
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Plaintiff received mental health treatment from Community Counselling
Center. She saw Dr. Khot there on September 15, 2009. She reported that she
was stressed because her “SSD” application had been turned down.
medications reduced her symptoms
Her
but did not “improve occupational
functioning.” She had “no other side effects of meds.” She was to continue taking
Cymbalta, and to take Xanax and Vistaril as needed for anxiety and Ambien as
needed for insomnia. (Tr. 417). On December 10, 2009, she was again “stressed
over SSD.”
effects.
Her symptoms had improved on medications.
Her medicines were continued.
(Tr. 416).
She had no side
Dr. Khot prescribed
Remeron. (Tr. 415). In March, 2010, Dr. Khot noted that Remeron was helping
her sleep and she needed less Ambien. He again noted that she had no side effects
from her medications. He advised her to discontinue Ambien because Remeron
was helping her sleep. (Tr. 414). In July, 2010, Dr. Khot noted that she was
doing well. Her affect and mood were cheerful. She had no side effects from her
medications. (Tr. 412).
Christopher Schenewerk, M.D., was plaintiff’s primary care physician in
2009. His office notes are located at Tr. 478-619. He used a form to record the
notes of office visits. The narrative remarks in the notes are brief. In May, 2009,
Dr. Schenewerk prescribed Neurontin for pain in her legs. (Tr. 532). On June 1,
2009, plaintiff complained of numbness in her right leg and shooting pain in her
thigh. Dr. Schenewerk noted that her pain was better with Neurontin. (Tr. 528).
In July, 2009, she was having lumbar pain and was to see an orthopedic specialist.
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(Tr. 521). On July 30, 2009, Dr. Schenewerk saw her to review lab work. He
circled the phrases “no complaint” and “tolerating meds” on the form. (Tr. 519).
On September 3, 2009, Neurontin was discontinued and she was started on Lyrica
because Neurontin was causing memory loss and slow speech. (Tr. 518).
When Dr. Schenewerk saw her on October 15, 2009, she again complained of
leg pain and numbness. He recommended that she increase her Lyrica. He wrote
“referral Neuro.” (Tr. 517). In November, 2009, Dr. Schenewerk noted that her
leg pain was decreased with Lyrica, but her diabetes was uncontrolled. He again
circled “tolerating meds.” (Tr. 513-514).
Ms. Phelps was admitted to Red Bud Regional Hospital through the
emergency room on November 18, 2009, for evaluation of chest pain. Cardiac
work-up indicated that she did not have a heart attack. She was discharged to
home the next day. (Tr. 363-386).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Schenewerk on November 30, 2009. She complained of
chest and thoracic pain, which the doctor attributed to her large breasts. She
wanted breast reduction surgery.
He again circled “tolerating meds.”
(Tr.
511-512). Ms. Phelps had consulted with a surgeon, Dr. Linda Camp, about a
month prior. Dr. Camp recommended breast reduction surgery. (Tr. 611). In
February, 2010, her blood sugars were running high.
She had been on oral
medication, but was to begin using injections. (Tr. 507-508).
Pandurange Kini, M.D., a neurologist, saw plaintiff on September 8, 2010.
She presented with a number of complaints, including trouble swallowing, loss of
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facial expression, extreme sweating, and neck and back pain. Her neurological
exam was unremarkable except for some decreased pinprick in the feet and the left
calf. Dr. Kini wrote a letter to Dr. Schenewerk detailing his findings. He wrote, “I
do not find anything wrong with her to explain her symptoms.” (Tr. 592-593).
5.
Opinions of Treating Doctors
Dr. Schenewerk wrote an undated letter stating that Ms. Phelps “is permantly
[sic] disabled due to her history of chronic leg pain, secondary to her peripheral
neuropathy.” He stated that her medications caused her fatigue and sleepiness.
(Tr. 613).
In December, 2010, Dr. Robson completed a form assessing plaintiff’s
physical ability to do work-related activities. He indicated that plaintiff could lift
only 5 pounds. She could stand/walk for 30 minutes at a time and a total of 2
hours a day. She could sit for 30 minutes at a time and a total of 2 hours a day.
She could never climb, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel or crawl. She was not limited
in her ability to reach or push/pull, but was limited in ability to handle, feel, see,
hear and speak. She should avoid temperature extremes, but could be exposed to
workplace hazards and environmental irritants. The doctor initially wrote that
these limitations began on December 29, 2010. He wrote a line through that date,
and wrote in September 17, 2007. (Tr. 743-745).
In January, 2011, Dr. Schenewerk completed a similar form. He indicated
that plaintiff could frequently lift 10 pounds. She could stand/walk for 15 minutes
at a time and a total of 1 hour a day. She could sit for 30 minutes at a time and a
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total of 3 hours a day. She could never climb, balance, kneel or crawl, and could
stoop and crouch only occasionally.
handle, feel, push and pull.
environmental irritants.
She was limited in her ability to reach,
She should avoid workplace hazards and
The doctor indicated that these limitations began in
2004. (Tr. 759-761).
Analysis
In a DIB case, a claimant must establish that she was disabled as of her date
last insured. Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1997).
It is
not sufficient to simply show that the impairment was present as of the date last
insured; rather plaintiff must show that the impairment was severe enough to be
disabling as of the relevant date. Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir.
2011).
In general, plaintiff’s arguments ignore the fact that only a small window of
time is relevant here. The final decision denying her prior application stands as a
finding that plaintiff was not disabled as of August 27, 2009, and she was insured
only through December 31, 2009. Therefore, the relevant time period is from
August 27, 2009, through December 31, 2009. This is not to say that medical
treatment rendered after the date last insured cannot be considered; it can, so long
as it helps to illuminate her condition during the insured period. However, later
medical evidence is of little relevance where it shows that the plaintiff’s condition
worsened after the date last insured. See, Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 642
(7th Cir. 2012). Here, the ALJ did, in fact, discuss medical records from after the
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date last insured. Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ failed to consider relevant
records.
Plaintiff attacks the ALJ’s credibility analysis on narrow grounds. She first
argues that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider her claims of side effects from her
medications.
The ALJ noted that plaintiff claimed to have side effects from her
medications, but she told Dr. Khot that she had no side effects in August, 2010.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ incorrectly perceived this as a contradiction. She argues
that Dr. Khot was concerned only with her psychiatric medications. However,
plaintiff alleged that she had side effects from her psychiatric medications. See,
Tr. 199, 223. Her statement to Dr. Khot conflicts with that allegation. She also
argues that Dr. Khot’s records confirm that Ambien and Remeron were causing the
“side effect” of drowsiness. This argument is nonsensical. Dr. Khot prescribed
Ambien and Remeron to help her sleep. (Tr. 414). Drowsiness is the intended
effect, not a side effect.
Plaintiff cites to a number of her statements made in forms submitted to the
agency and in her testimony about alleged side effects. She argues that the case
should be remanded for consideration of the effect of her medications on her RFC.
The problem with this argument is that the statements were made after her date last
insured, and none of those statements are directed to the period from August 27,
2009, through December 31, 2009.
Ms. Phelps argues that the ALJ placed too much emphasis on the fact that
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she took trips to Hawaii and Las Vegas during the time she claims she was disabled.
She is incorrect. SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider a number of factors in
assessing the claimant’s credibility, including the objective medical evidence, the
claimant’s daily activities, medication for the relief of pain, and “any other factors
concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or
other symptoms.” SSR 96-7p, at *3. “[D]iscrepancies between objective evidence
and self-reports may suggest symptom exaggeration.” Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d
473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008).
ALJ Scurry was entitled to consider the fact that
plaintiff’s decision to travel to Hawaii and Las Vegas contradicted her allegations of
very limited ability to do much of anything, including leaving her house and going to
new places.
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s reliance on a statement in the records
that she had been a caretaker for her disabled spouse and her statement to a doctor
that her daughter did the household chores.
This is nit-picking.
Plaintiff’s
argument fails to confront the ALJ’s credibility analysis as a whole, and it therefore
is not persuasive.
The credibility findings of the ALJ are to be accorded deference, particularly
in view of the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the witness. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d
431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). Social Security regulations and Seventh Circuit cases
“taken together, require an ALJ to articulate specific reasons for discounting a
claimant's testimony as being less than credible, and preclude an ALJ from ‘merely
ignoring’ the testimony or relying solely on a conflict between the objective medical
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evidence and the claimant's testimony as a basis for a negative credibility finding.”
Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746-747 (7th Cir. 2005), and cases cited
therein.
Further, “an ALJ's credibility findings need not specify which statements
were not credible.” Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 2012).
ALJ Scurry gave a number of reasons for his credibility findings. He noted
that she had a sporadic work history, that the objective medical evidence did not
support her claim of disability, that she made several inconsistent statements, and
that she engaged in daily activities that conflicted with her reported level of
functioning.
The ALJ’s credibility assessment need not be “flawless;” it passes muster as
long as it is not “patently wrong.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 517 (7th Cir.
2009). Here, the ALJ’s analysis is far from patently wrong. It is evident that he
considered the appropriate factors and built the required logical bridge from the
evidence to his conclusions about plaintiff’s testimony. Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d
923, 929 (7th Cir. 2010).
That leaves only the argument that the ALJ erred in not giving more weight to
the opinions of Drs. Robson and Schenewerk. The ALJ gave a number of reasons
for discounting these opinions. He rejected Dr. Schenewerk’s opinion because his
opinion was rendered after the date last insured, touched on an issue reserved to
the Commissioner, and it was not consistent with his own records or other medical
records in the file. ALJ Scurry rejected Dr. Robson’s opinion for similar reasons.
See, Tr. 23.
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Plaintiff’s only criticism of the ALJ’s analysis is that he cited the fact that the
opinions were rendered after the date last insured.
A treating doctor’s medical opinion is not automatically entitled to
controlling weight. Rather, it is to be afforded controlling weight only where it is
supported by medical findings and is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2000); Zurawski v.
Halter, 245 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
“[W]hile the treating physician’s opinion is important, it is not the final word
on a claimant’s disability.”
Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir.
1996)(internal citation omitted).
If is the function of the ALJ to weigh the medical
evidence, applying the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. §404.1527. Supportability
and consistency are two important factors to be considered in weighing medical
opinions. See, 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c). In a nutshell, “[t]he regulations state that
an ALJ must give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight if two conditions
are met: (1) the opinion is supported by ‘medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques[,]’ and (2) it is ‘not inconsistent’ with substantial
evidence in the record.” Schaaf v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir. 2010), citing
§404.1527(d).
Thus, the ALJ can properly give less weight to a treating doctor’s medical
opinion if it is inconsistent with the opinion of a consulting physician, internally
inconsistent, or inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Henke v. Astrue,
498 Fed.Appx. 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2012); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 842 (7th
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Cir. 2007). Further, in light of the deferential standard of judicial review, the ALJ
is required only to “minimally articulate” his reasons for accepting or rejecting
evidence, a standard which the Seventh Circuit has characterized as “lax.” Berger
v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th
Cir. 2008).
Here, ALJ Scurry easily met and exceeded the “minimal articulation”
standard. Plaintiff takes issue only with his consideration of the dates on which
the opinions were rendered. She does not argue that the ALJ was incorrect about
the dates on which the opinions were rendered; she complains only that the ALJ
should only have considered that both doctors said that the limitations they
identified were present before the date last insured.
Drs. Schenewerk and Robson did, in fact, render their opinions long after
plaintiff’s date last insured. Plaintiff offers no support for her suggestion that the
ALJ was not allowed to consider that fact. She does not take issue with the other
reasons given by the ALJ for the weight he assigned to the opinions. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that she has not demonstrated any error committed by the
ALJ.
In short, none of plaintiff’s arguments are persuasive. Even if reasonable
minds could differ as to whether Ms. Phelps was disabled at the relevant time, the
ALJ’s decision must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence, and the
Court cannot make its own credibility determination or substitute its judgment for
that of the ALJ in reviewing for substantial evidence. Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d
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306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
Conclusion
After careful review of the record as a whole, the Court is convinced that ALJ
Scurry committed no errors of law, and that his findings are supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying Lisa Phelps’ application for disability benefits is AFFIRMED.
The clerk of court shall enter judgment in favor of defendant.
IT IS SO ORDRED.
DATE:
December 23, 2014.
s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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