Williams v. Watson et al

Filing 26

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams, denying 2 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Kevin Williams, 3 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis filed by Kevin Williams. See attached order for details. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 7/7/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KEVIN WILLIAMS,
ALAN DAVIS,
JOSHUA JURCICH,
CHRISTOPHER VAN BITTER,
JEREMY MOSBY,
DEMETRIUS GOLLIDAY,
BRENT FAUCETT,
DEONTRE SAMUELS,
MICHAEL E. BAUM,
MONTRELL COOPER,
JOSEPH BAUM,
ERIC TUCKER,
CARLOS LUNA,
BRANDON SERES,
TREVONTE NICHOLSON,
ZACH HILL,
JACOB ESPARZA,
DELCHEVA HARRIS,
and ANTONIO COZART,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RICHARD WATSON
and ST. CLAIR COUNTY JAIL
(Specific Guards),
Defendants.

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Case No. 13-cv-1340-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court for case management. This pro se action was filed
by lead Plaintiff Kevin Williams and 28 other detainees at the St. Clair County Jail (“the Jail”),
to challenge the Defendants’ strip-search practices. On May 2, 2014 (Doc. 18), nine of the
Plaintiffs were dismissed from the action, and one Plaintiff’s claim (Christopher Alexander) was

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severed into a separate case at his request. 1 This left 19 Plaintiffs remaining in the action, as
reflected in the caption above.
Of these remaining Plaintiffs, Delcheva Harris had complied with the Court’s
previous order to file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), and his motion has
since been granted (Doc. 19). Lead Plaintiff Kevin Williams had filed his IFP motion when the
action was filed, but did not submit the required prisoner trust fund statement. He was ordered to
provide that information to the Court no later than May 16, 2014, or face dismissal of his claims
(Doc. 18). Similarly, the other 17 Plaintiffs who had chosen to remain in the litigation (Davis,
Jurcich, Van Bitter, Mosby, Golliday, Faucett, Samuels, Michael E. Baum, Cooper, Joseph
Baum, Tucker, Luna, Seres, Nicholson, Hill, Esparza, and Cozart) were each ordered to submit a
motion for leave to proceed IFP and a prisoner trust fund statement by May 16, 2014, or face
dismissal from the action.
Only one of these Plaintiffs, Jeremy Mosby, complied with the Court’s order; his
motion for leave to proceed IFP has been granted (Doc. 22). The envelopes containing the
Court’s order at Doc. 18 were returned to the Clerk of Court as undeliverable for all the Plaintiffs
except Williams, Mosby, Cooper, and Hill (Docs. 20, 23, 24).
I. Dismissal of Non-Compliant Plaintiffs
All the Plaintiffs were notified earlier in this litigation of their obligation to
inform the Court of any change of address, and all non-lead Plaintiffs have had the opportunity
to withdraw from the group action if they did not wish to incur a filing fee. Accordingly, those
Plaintiffs who have failed to prosecute this action shall be dismissed at this time.
Lead Plaintiff Kevin Williams was ordered in January 2014 to provide his
prisoner trust fund statement to the Court or have his claim dismissed (Doc. 4). In the most
1

That case is proceeding as Alexander v. Watson, et al., Case No. 14-cv-507-NJR-DGW.
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recent order, he was directed to submit the statement or otherwise show cause why he should not
be dismissed from the action (Doc. 18). Williams has failed to provide the document and has not
responded to the show cause order.

Accordingly, Plaintiff KEVIN WILLIAMS is

DISMISSED from this action without prejudice, for failure to comply with orders of this Court.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Further, his motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 2) is
DENIED AS MOOT, and his motion for leave to proceed IFP (Doc. 3) is DENIED for failure
to provide the required prisoner trust fund statement.
Plaintiff Williams’ obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at
the time the action was filed, thus his filing fee of $400.00 2 remains due and payable. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A separate order
shall issue directing the institutional trust fund officer to deduct payments from Williams’
prisoner trust fund account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
Similarly, Plaintiffs Alan Davis, Joshua Jurcich, Christopher Van Bitter,
Demetrius Golliday, Brent Faucett, Deontre Samuels, Michael E. Baum, Montrell Cooper,
Joseph Baum, Eric Tucker, Carlos Luna, Brandon Seres, Trevonte Nicholson, Zach Hill, Jacob
Esparza, and Antonio Cozart have all failed to respond to the Court’s orders that they submit a
motion for leave to proceed IFP, and early in the action, they were advised of their obligation to
keep the Court informed of their address. They were warned of the consequences of failing to
prosecute this case.

Therefore, Plaintiffs ALAN DAVIS, JOSHUA JURCICH,

CHRISTOPHER VAN BITTER, DEMETRIUS GOLLIDAY, BRENT FAUCETT,

Effective May 1, 2013, the filing fee for a civil case was increased to $400.00, by the addition of a new
$50.00 administrative fee for filing a civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court. See Judical
Conference Schedule of Fees - District Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, 28 U.S.C. § 1914, No. 14. A
litigant who is granted IFP status, however, is exempt from paying the new $50.00 fee and must pay a
total fee of $350.00.
2

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DEONTRE SAMUELS, MICHAEL E. BAUM, MONTRELL COOPER, JOSEPH BAUM,
ERIC TUCKER, CARLOS LUNA, BRANDON SERES, TREVONTE NICHOLSON,
ZACH HILL, JACOB ESPARZA, and ANTONIO COZART are DISMISSED from this
action without prejudice, for failure to comply with orders of this Court. See FED. R. CIV. P.
41(b).
Each of these dismissed Plaintiffs incurred the obligation to pay a separate filing
fee for this action when they declined the opportunity to voluntarily withdraw from the case
(Docs. 4, 18).

Thus, each owes a filing fee of $400.00, as none of them applied for leave to

proceed IFP in this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467
(7th Cir. 1998). A separate order shall issue directing the institutional trust fund officer to deduct
payments from each Plaintiff’s prisoner trust fund account in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b).
II. Remaining Plaintiffs Harris and Mosby
Co-Plaintiffs Delcheva Harris and Jeremy Mosby have both complied with the
Court’s orders, and both signed the original complaint (Doc. 1). However, the last documents
mailed to Plaintiff Harris were returned to the Clerk of Court as undeliverable (Docs. 20, 24). If
Harris does not submit an updated address to the Court, his claims shall also be subject to
dismissal. The Court shall now turn to the merits of the complaint, which is summarized below.
III. The Complaint (Doc. 1)
The complaint was signed by both remaining Plaintiffs, as well as by most of the
now-dismissed co-Plaintiffs. In it, they allege that on multiple occasions, they and other fellow
detainees were made to line up together in view of each other, remove their clothing, spread their
buttocks, lift their genitals, and open their mouths for visual inspection (Doc. 1, p. 3). The strip

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searches were conducted in the view of “multiple officers” walking past the group of detainees.
Plaintiffs allege there was no reasonable suspicion that any detainee possessed contraband, and
none was found as a result of the searches.
Although the complaint asserts that a number of specific correctional officers
conducted these strip searches, these individuals are not identified. Plaintiffs state that they are
“moving to name all” officers who took part in the allegedly unconstitutional searches.
Defendant Richard Watson (the St. Clair County Sheriff) is not said to have personally
participated in the searches, but is named in his supervisory capacity (Doc. 1, p. 2).
Plaintiffs argue that the searches were unconstitutional because the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion that the detainees were hiding contraband. Further, the Jail’s practices
violated 725 Illinois Compiled Statutes 5/103-1(d), (e), and (h).
The complaint seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to stop the
illegal searches, and compensatory and punitive damages (Doc. 1, p. 4).
IV. Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Court finds that they have articulated
a colorable federal cause of action against the unnamed (John Doe) Defendant St. Clair County
Jail Guards for subjecting them to unconstitutional strip searches in violation of their rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count 1). Further, at this stage Plaintiffs may proceed
with a claim (Count 2) against Defendant Watson in his official capacity, for promulgating the
official strip-search policy and practice at the Jail which led to the alleged constitutional

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violations.
Courts have recognized that arbitrary or blanket strip searches of pretrial
detainees may violate the Constitution. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979) (search
of pretrial detainees after contact visits with outsiders was reasonable); Calvin v. Sheriff of Will
Cnty., 405 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938-940 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that “Bell did not validate a blanket
policy of strip searching pretrial detainees”). Bell instructs that in balancing the detainees’
constitutional rights with the security concerns of the institution, courts must consider the scope
of the intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
Although civil rights claims brought by detainees arise under the Fourteenth
Amendment and not the Eighth Amendment, see Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
2000), the Seventh Circuit has “found it convenient and entirely appropriate to apply the same
standard to claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment (detainees) and Eighth Amendment
(convicted prisoners) ‘without differentiation.’” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir.
2005) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Strip searches of prisoners that are not related to legitimate security needs, or are
conducted in a harassing manner in order to humiliate and inflict psychological pain, may be
found unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634,
(7th Cir. 2013) (group of inmates were strip searched together, gratuitously exposing prisoners’
nude bodies to each other, while guards uttered demeaning comments); Calhoun v. DeTella, 319
F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (a strip search conducted in a harassing manner intended to
humiliate and inflict psychological pain could violate the Eighth Amendment); see also
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987) (allegation of calculated harassment by

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strip searches stated Eighth Amendment claim), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987).
Plaintiffs allege that there was no legitimate security reason for the strip searches.
Further, the public manner in which the group searches were conducted, as well as the repeated
searches, may have been intended to humiliate him.

At this stage, Plaintiffs have stated

constitutional claims for the strip searches that are not subject to dismissal under § 1915A.
Violation of Illinois Statute
Plaintiffs also claim the strip searches violated the Illinois statute which sets forth
an individual’s rights upon arrest. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-1(c) - (f). It prohibits the strip
search of a person arrested for “a traffic, regulatory or misdemeanor offense, except in cases
involving weapons or a controlled substance, . . . unless there is reasonable belief that the
individual is concealing a weapon or controlled substance.” 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-1(c).
The statute further provides that if an arrested person is strip searched, the search must be
performed where it cannot be observed by others. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-1(e). A violation
of the statute may be criminally prosecuted as official misconduct. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1031(h). However, none of the provisions in subsections (c) through (h) apply if the person is in
custody pursuant to a court order. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-1(j). Thus, a person arrested as a
result of an outstanding warrant does not come under the statute’s protection. People v. Mitchell,
819 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Ill. App. 2004).
Whether or not this statute is applicable to either Plaintiff, a violation of this state
law does not give rise to a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted. As a general
proposition, “[t]he federal government is not the enforcer of state law.” Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty.
Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847
F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). Further, the

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Seventh Circuit has specifically held that Illinois’ enactment of this strip-search statute did not
create a federally protected liberty interest. Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir.
1995). Therefore, even a purported violation of the statute cannot be pursued as a federal claim.
Id. at 1047-49.
The complaint does not assert a distinct state law claim arising from the strip
searches, focusing instead on the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional rights. As
such, the case shall proceed only on Counts 1 and 2 as described above.
V. Disposition
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to each of the 17 dismissed
Plaintiffs listed in the caption, as well as to remaining Plaintiffs Mosby and Harris.
This action shall now be captioned:

Jeremy Mosby and Delcheva Harris,

Plaintiffs, vs. Richard Watson and St. Clair County Jail (Specific Guards), Defendants.
Plaintiffs are reminded that any motion or pleading submitted in this joint action
on behalf of both Plaintiffs must be signed by both of them; a pro se litigant may not sign
documents on behalf of another party. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). If Plaintiffs are unable to
communicate effectively with one another in order to jointly prosecute this action, the Court will
entertain a motion to sever their claims into separate cases.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant
WATSON (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and
(2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the Defendant’s place of employment
as identified by Plaintiff. If the Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of
Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall

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take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Service shall not be made on the Unknown (John Doe) Defendant Guards until
such time as Plaintiffs have identified them by name in a properly filed amended complaint.
Plaintiffs are ADVISED that it is their responsibility to provide the Court with the names and
service addresses for these individuals.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if the Defendant cannot be found at the work
address provided by Plaintiffs, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current
work address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be
used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any
documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall serve upon Defendant (or
upon defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other
document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiffs shall include with the original
paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document
was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge
that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be
disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States

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Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all
parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiffs, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiffs will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that their applications to proceed in forma pauperis have been granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiffs are ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, each applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered
into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the
Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff(s) and remit the balance to
Plaintiff(s). Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, each Plaintiff is REMINDED that he is under a continuing obligation to
keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the
Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this
order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of
this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 7, 2014
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge

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