Friend et al v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Filing
27
ORDER GRANTING 15 Motion to Remand to State Court filed by the plaintiffs. And Further, DENYING 21 Request for Oral Argument filed by Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and DENYING 7 Motion to Sever filed by Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, St. Louis City, Missouri, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 1/23/2014. (dsw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
______________________________________________________________________________
IN RE PRADAXA
)
MDL No. 2385
(DABIGATRAN ETEXILATE) )
3:12-md-02385-DRH-SCW
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
)
Judge David R. Herndon
LITIGATION
)
______________________________________________________________________________
This Document Relates to:
Billie Jean Friend, et al. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. et al.,
No. 3:13-cv-60041-DRH-SCW
ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs’ motion to remand this action to the Circuit Court for the
Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, St. Louis City, Missouri, for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction (Doc. 15) is presently before the Court. The defendant,
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“BIPI”) is opposed (Doc. 18). 1 BIPI
has also filed a motion to sever (Doc. 7) to which the plaintiffs’ are opposed (Doc.
14). BIPI filed an additional brief regarding their motion to sever (Doc. 19) and
has filed a motion for oral argument (Doc. 21). The plaintiffs indicated during a
recent status conference that they do not feel oral argument is necessary.
1
The plaintiffs have also filed a reply in support of their motion to remand (Doc.
22).
I.
BACKGROUND
This is a multi-plaintiff action originally brought in Missouri State Court
against Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“BIPI”) (a citizen of Delaware
and Connecticut) and Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH (“BII”) (a citizen
of the foreign state of Germany) (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-13). The plaintiffs are citizens of
Missouri, Indiana, New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, California, and Colorado
(Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 9-20), The plaintiffs have no connection with one another – each
received medication prescribed by different doctors, dispensed by different
pharmacies, at different times, and in different locations. Further, the plaintiffs
who are citizens of states other than Missouri do not appear to have any
connection with the forum.
BIPI removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri. BIPI contends that removal is appropriate because the
plaintiffs have been misjoined. BIPI contends that the Connecticut plaintiff has
been “improperly and/or fraudulently misjoined” and that her citizenship should
be disregarded (Doc. 1 ¶ 15). The plaintiffs contend joinder is proper, arguing
that what BIPI knew, what it disclosed to the plaintiffs’ prescribing physicians, the
contents of the marketing materials and the contents of warnings “makes up a
common universe of facts underlying Plaintiffs’ claims” (Doc. 16 p. 3). BIPI has
also filed a motion to sever. BIPI contends that that the Court should deny
remand, then the Court should either sever the only non-diverse plaintiff (the
Connecticut citizen) from the action and remand her case to Missouri state court
or, alternatively, drop the Connecticut citizen from the case.
The action was transferred to this Court in December 2012 with the parties’
motions for remand, severance, and oral argument pending.
III.
LAW AND APPLICATION
Under the removal statute, defendants may remove an action from state
court if it originally could have been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“[F]ederal courts should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any
doubts in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum in state court.” Schur v. L.A.
Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009). The party seeking
removal bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction. Doe
v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993). BIPI bases removal on
diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete diversity of citizenship between
plaintiffs and defendants and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00. 28
U.S.C. § 1332.
The monetary threshold is undisputed. However, to summarize this dispute
in the simplest of terms, on the face of the complaint we have a single plaintiff
and a defendant, BIPI, who are both citizens of Connecticut. BIPI’s solution to this
jurisdictional blockade is to sever and remand the claims of the Connecticut
citizen, while retaining jurisdiction over the claims of the remaining plaintiffs.
BIPI relies upon the doctrine of “procedural misjoinder,” also knows as
“fraudulent misjoinder,” first recognized in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77
F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996), and since rejected by this Court in Sabo v.
Dennis Techs., LLC, 2007 WL 1958591 (S.D. Ill. July 2, 2007) (Herndon, J.) and
In re Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices and Products
Liability Litigation, 779 F. Supp. 2d 846, 853 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (Herndon, C.J.),
and also by several other District Judges in this District. See e.g. Rutherford v.
Merck Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 851 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (Murphy, J.); Aranda v.
Walgreen Co., 2011 WL 3793648 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011) (Gilbert, J.).
Fraudulent joinder, which the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “occurs
either when there is no possibility that a plaintiff can state a cause of action
against nondiverse defendants in state court, or where there has been outright
fraud in the pleading.” See Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d 323, 327 (7th
Cir. 1993). “In determining whether there is diversity of citizenship, fraudulently
joined parties are disregarded.” Id.
In contrast, procedural misjoinder, which the Seventh Circuit has not had
occasion to discuss, typically invokes a defendant’s argument that a plaintiff’s
complaint has egregiously misjoined unrelated, non-fraudulent claims of nondiverse plaintiffs, in an attempt to avoid federal court. See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at
1360. Thus, the doctrine of procedural misjoinder requires a court to evaluate the
applicable permissive joinder rules.
This Court has extensively discussed its reasoning in respectfully declining
to recognize the doctrine of procedural misjoinder. See Sabo, 2007 WL 1958591
at *6-8; In re Yasmin, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 853-857. To summarize, this Court
feels that recognition of such a doctrine acts as an improper expansion of subject
matter jurisdiction, as misjoinder under the applicable permissive joinder rules is
a matter to be resolved first at the state level. Joinder of non-fraudulent claims
does not appear to this Court to implicate subject matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, the need for clear and precise jurisdictional rules weighs against this
Court’s recognition of procedural misjoinder. See id. 2
Notably, this Court shares BIPI’s frustrations concerning plaintiffs’ joinder
of seemingly unrelated claims in an apparent attempt to avoid the MDL
procedure. Due to this Court’s extensive MDL experience, it fully appreciates the
efficiency and benefits associated with the MDL. However, BIPI has not met its
burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction exists. This Court follows the
reasoning of its previous orders and once again declines to recognize the doctrine
of procedural misjoinder until such time as it is endorsed by the Seventh Circuit
or Supreme Court.
2
With regard to BIPI’s request for the Court to use Rule 21 to sever or drop a
party, the Court notes that severance under this Rule is typically applied in cases
originally brought in federal court. It is questionable whether Rule 21 may be
used when a case is removed or if it can be used to “create” federal jurisdiction.
Arguably, using Rule 21 in this manner would contravene Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 82 (warning against construing the Federal Rules of civil Procedure in
a manner that extends or limits the jurisdiction of the district courts). The
Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue but at least one Seventh Circuit
decision militates against the arguments proffered by BIPI. See Garbie v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Even if the [nondiverse parties] were added to prevent removal, that is their privilege; plaintiffs as
masters of the complaint may include (or omit) claims or parties in order to
determine the forum. Neither § 1332 nor any case of which we are aware provides
that defendants may discard plaintiffs in order to make controversies removable.
It is enough that the claims be real, that the parties not be nominal.”).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is
GRANTED (Doc. 15). This case is hereby REMANDED to the Twenty-Second
Judicial Circuit, St. Louis City, Missouri, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
BIPI’s motions for oral argument (Doc. 21) and for severance (Doc. 7) are
DENIED.
SO ORDERED:
Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2014.01.23
16:20:43 -06'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court
Date: January 23, 2014
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