Jordan v. Donahoe

Filing 27

ORDER, denying 24 MOTION for Reconsideration re 22 Clerk's Judgment filed by Carlos Jordan, and denying as moot 23 MOTION for Recruitment of Counsel filed by Carlos Jordan.Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 7/10/2014. (mtm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CARLOS JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 14-0009-DRH

PATRICK DONAHOE, Postmaster General,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Now before the Court is Jordan’s May 16, 2014 notice to request for
reconsideration of judgment (Doc. 24). Jordan moves the Court to vacate the May
5, 2014 Memorandum and Order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant (Doc. 21) and the May 5, 2014 judgment reflecting the same (Doc. 22).
Defendant opposes the motion (Doc. 25). Based on the following, the Court denies
the motion.
There are two ways in which a Court may analyze a motion filed after judgment
has been entered either under Rule 59(e) or under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Where a substantive motion is filed within twenty-eight days of
entry of judgment or order, the Court will generally construe it as a motion
pursuant to Rule 59(e); later motions will be construed as pursuant to Rule
60(b). Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Deutsch,981

F.2d

299,

301

(7th

Cir.

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1992). Although

both

59(e) and 60(b) have similar goals of erasing the finality of a judgment and
permitting further proceedings, Rule 59(e) generally requires a lower threshold of
proof than does Rule 60(b). See Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163,
1166 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.
1993)(distinguishing the “exacting standard” of Rule 60(b) from the “more liberal
standard” of Rule 59(e)). Instead of the exceptional circumstances required to
prevail under Rule 60(b), Rule 59(e) requires that the moving party clearly
establish a manifest error of law or an intervening change in the controlling law or
present newly discovered evidence. See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729,
732 (7th Cir. 1998). However, where “the only arguable basis for relief presented in
the motion ... is ‘excusable neglect,’” the court should apply the standards governing
a motion under Rule 60(b). Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546
(7th Cir. 2006).
After reviewing the record again, the Court finds that Jordon neither
presented newly discovered evidence nor identified a manifest error of law or fact.
Further, the Court does not find excusable neglect.

He does not present an

argument that compels this Court to re-open this action. He maintains that he did
not receive a questionnaire. He is correct. A questionnaire was not sent to him.
However, the record reflects that a notice, pursuant to Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d
281, 285 (7th Cir. 1992), was sent to him (Doc. 18). 1

Defendant’s response

1 The Timms Notice provided by the government informed Jordan that he needed to respond to the
summary judgment motion with counter affidavits and documentary evidence and that he may not

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bolsters this fact as defendant submitted a declaration stating that that the Timms
notice was sent to Jordon along with documents 15, 16 & 17 which Jordan admits
he received (Doc. 25-1).

Clearly, he has not established excusable neglect.

Moreover, in his motion for reconsideration, Jordon does not advance any
arguments, facts or case law to refute the arguments raised in the motion for
summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to request reconsideration of
judgment (Doc. 24) and DENIES as moot the motion for recruitment of counsel
(Doc. 23).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2014.07.10
14:32:54 -05'00'

Signed this 10th day of July, 2014.

Chief Judge
United States District Court

rest upon the allegations contained in his complaint.

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