Greenleaf v. Atlas Copco Compressors, L.L.C. et al

Filing 132

ORDER granting 35 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 49 Motion to Dismiss; granting 50 Motion to Dismiss; granting 51 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 69 Motion to Dismiss; granting 12 Mo tion for More Definite Statement; granting 115 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 129 Motion to Dismiss; granting 22 Motion to Dismiss; granting 28 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 5/20/14. (amv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KENNETH R. GREENLEAF,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ATLAS COPCO COMPRESSORS, LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-51-SCW-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
On May 16, 2014, the Court held a hearing on all of the pending motions in this case. The
following memorializes the Court’s findings and rulings at that hearing:
A.

Motions to Dismiss and/or for More Definite Statement
The Court GRANTS Defendant Ingersoll Rand Co.’s Motion to Dismiss Count V of

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 12); Foster Wheeler’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V
(Doc. 22); Pneumo Abex Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V (Doc. 28); John Crane Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim as to Plaintiff’s Counts IV and V (Doc. 35); Warren
Pumps LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 49); Imo Industries
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V (Doc. 50); Buffalo Pumps Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Counts
IV and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 51); GE Co.’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
as to Counts IV and V (Doc. 115); and CBS Corp.’s Motion to Dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint (Doc. 129). Crane Co.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 69) is GRANTED in
part as to Counts IV and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and DENIED in part as to all other counts.
As it relates to the issue of negligent spoliation, Plaintiff has not alleged enough facts as to the

Defendants in this case. Specifically, the Complaint does not do enough to allege a particular duty
based on knowledge of an impending lawsuit. If the Plaintiff can develop evidence in the course of
discovery that defendants could anticipate lawsuits and that they should have preserved evidence, it
may be appropriate to file a motion for leave to amend in order to reinstate the claim. As to the
claims for willful and wanton spoliation, Illinois law has never recognized this claim. The Court will
dismiss all willful and wanton counts without prejudice. Should the Illinois Supreme Court recognize
the claim during the pendency of the case or should Plaintiff present evidence that would place the
claim squarely in a forum that does recognize the claim, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend. Both
counts dismissed without prejudice.
As to the other counts in the Complaint, these are plausible counts that satisfy notice pleading
standards. Discovery will be allowed to proceed as to these counts. The Motions to dismiss the
negligent counts as to counts other than spoliation are DENIED. Motion for more definite
statement also DENIED. The Court finds that there are sufficiently definite statements of the
claims in the Complaint.
B.

Institution of Denials and/or Motions to have all Counterclaims Deemed Filed
The Court noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(c)(1)(B) allows, in an action

involving an unusually large number of defendants, for replies to crossclaims, counterclaims, and
affirmative defenses to be treated as denied by all other parties. As such, in this case, the Court will
DEEM all crossclaims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses as DENIED by all other parties and,
thus, the parties need not file answers to such claims. However, Rule 5 does not speak to the
treatment of the counterclaims, crossclaims, and affirmative defenses themselves, which Defendants
further seek to be deemed filed. The Court noted that, to the extent the parties want to simplify their
filings and the docket, they could agree to a stock submission as to these claims. Thus, the Court
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DIRECTED the parties to meet and confer as to a stock submission regarding crossclaims,
counterclaims, and affirmative defenses and submit the stock order to the Court’s proposed order’s
email, [e-mail], for the Court’s review. If all parties agree to the stock order, the
Court will then file the order with the understanding that everyone has signed on to the order. To the
extent that certain parties do not agree to certain parts or to the stock order as a whole, those concerns
need to be addressed in the email to the Court. Further, to the extent that some Defendants have
already filed crossclaims, the Court deems those operative but are also deemed denied under Rule
5(c)(1)(B). If a party wishes to respond to a crossclaim beyond a simple denial of the claims, then they
must specifically file an Answer or sign on to the stock order. The Court also extends the time limit
for filing crossclaims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses until the stock order issue is decided.
C.

Discovery Related to Trust Claim Forms
This matter has been briefed in writing in Greenleaf v. Atlas Copco Compressors, LLC, et al., No.

14-51, Docs. 73 & 84. As an initial matter, the Court finds that trust claims documents are
discoverable. It appears to the Court that the parties are in agreement over the release of the amounts
of settlements. Said amounts will be redacted by agreement. Plaintiff shall provide releases so that
defendants may subpoena the relevant information. The release shall direct that the subpoenaed
information not contain settlement numbers. Information produced pursuant to subpoenas shall go
to Plaintiff’s counsel to confirm that the settlement numbers have been redacted. Plaintiff’s counsel
shall have ten (10) days after receipt of such information to get the information to the defendants.
Plaintiffs shall also produce any documents submitted to bankruptcy trustees that are properly
requested through requests to produce.
D.

Deposition Issues
Lastly, the Court took up a new issue regarding deposition time limits for Plaintiff. Counsel
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for Plaintiff had previously indicated to Defendants his intention to enforce Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(d)(1) which sets a limit on a deposition to one day of seven hours. Defendants
expressed concerns about this limitation due to the amount of Defendants in this case and the current
health of Plaintiff. Counsel for Plaintiff anticipates that Plaintiff, given his decline in health, will not
be able to participate in a full seven hour deposition in a single day and agrees that a deposition should
be taken on a day to day basis and, in return, is willing to accommodate a longer deposition time limit
for Defendants. Accordingly, the Court DIRECTED that the deposition of the Plaintiff would be
extended to twelve (12) hours on a day to day basis to complete the full deposition time (in anticipation
that Plaintiff would not be able to complete the full amount of time in one day). Each Defendant will
be allowed time to ask questions of the Plaintiff at the deposition and the Court reminded the parties
that they need to work together to ensure that this is accomplished within the time limit set by the
Court. The Court will also entertain further extensions of the deposition time on a case by case basis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 20, 2014.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

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