White v. Hodge et al
Filing
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ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 42 ). No claims remain, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants Hodge and Tredway and against Plaintiff White. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 2/2/17. (rah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
VANCE WHITE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARC HODGE
and BETH TREDWAY,
Defendants.
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Case No. 14-cv-0092-MJR-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
Recently released from prison, Vance White (Plaintiff) filed the above-captioned
suit in this Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, while in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC). The complaint alleged that the warden and the assistant warden
of programs at Lawrence Correctional Center (Marc Hodge and Beth Tredway,
respectively) violated Plaintiff’s federally-secured constitutional right to equal
protection.
More specifically, Plaintiff alleged that his rights were violated by
Lawrence’s policy prohibiting jobs from being assigned to inmates classified as
“vulnerable” and by denying him access to the courts. Only the first of these (the equal
protection claim) survived threshold review under 28 U.S.C. 1915A.
The case comes now before the Court on the joint motion for summary judgment
and supporting brief filed by Defendants Hodge and Tredway (Docs. 42-43). Plaintiff
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filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. 46), and Defendants replied (Doc. 47).
As described below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
II.
SUMMARY OF KEY FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim arises from events which occurred while he was
confined at Lawrence Correctional Center. Plaintiff was housed at Lawrence from
approximately March 2013 until July 2014 (Doc. 43-1, p. 2). Plaintiff’s complaint alleges
that his equal protection rights were violated because Defendants denied his job requests
due to his “vulnerable” inmate status. In his deposition taken in connection with this
case, Plaintiff testified that inmates with vulnerable status were those who prison
authorities deemed needed special consideration regarding housing and interactions
with other inmates, because they were susceptible to sexual violence and assault (Doc.
43-1, p. 4).
Plaintiff testified that he was designated “vulnerable” in 2007 while
incarcerated
at
Shawnee
Correctional
Center,
after
someone
touched
him
inappropriately while he was sleeping, he reported that (and the fact he was gay) to
prison authorities, and they moved him and classified him as “vulnerable” (Id. at p. 4, 6).
Plaintiff concedes that not every gay inmate is classified as vulnerable, and that
when an inmate was asked whether he had been sexually assaulted by another
individual, the answer to that question could form the basis of a vulnerable status
designation (Id. at p. 4-5). Plaintiff further testified that inmates who were openly gay,
inmates who identified themselves as gay to the administration, and transgender
inmates were classified as vulnerable (Id. at p. 5). In an affidavit submitted with his
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response to the pending motion, Plaintiff testified that the majority of inmates who are
considered vulnerable are openly gay or transgender (Doc. 46, p. 13).
While at Lawrence Correctional Center in 2013, Plaintiff applied for a job as a
teacher’s clerk (Doc. 43-1, p. 6, 7). He also applied for a job as a housing unit porter or
janitor (Id. at p. 6; 43-1, p. 20). His job requests were denied, because he was not eligible
based on his vulnerable designation (Doc. 43-1, p. 18, 19-20, 7).
These positions
required that Plaintiff not have a vulnerable status (Doc. 43-1, p. 29-31, 7-8). Plaintiff
had jobs at other institutions, and “vulnerables” at other institutions could hold some
jobs, whereas all of the jobs offered at Lawrence require that an inmate not be labeled as
vulnerable (Id. at p. 8, 13, 29-31). Plaintiff asserts that he was denied jobs at Lawrence
based on his vulnerable status. He testified that although his claim “stems from” his
sexual orientation, it focuses on his classification as a vulnerable inmate, not his
orientation (Doc. 43-1, p. 13). The record reflects that Defendants and other staff at
Lawrence refused to approve Plaintiff for a job due to his vulnerable status (Id., p. 18).
According to Russell Goins, Assistant Warden of Operations at Lawrence, mental
health professionals make the determination whether an inmate receives a status of
vulnerable (Doc. 43-1, p. 33). Inmates receive this status when they are deemed an
increased risk for being physically or sexually assaulted (Id.). Inmate job assignments
require that an inmate move more freely (sometimes out of sight of correctional staff)
and have more contact with other inmates, so inmates holding jobs face an increased risk
of assault from other inmates (Id. at p. 33-34). Because of this increased risk, says Goins,
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Lawrence prevents inmates with vulnerable status from receiving job assignments in
order to protect them from possible assault (Id. at p. 34). Likewise, inmates with a
predator status are prevented from receiving job assignments, to decrease the risk of a
predator inmate from assaulting another inmate (Id.). Plaintiff argues, however, that
not all inmate jobs allow free movement, and even inmates without jobs are out of the
direct sight and supervision of staff at various times throughout the day (Doc. 46, p. 3).
III.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Summary Judgment Motions
Summary judgment is proper only if the admissible evidence considered as a
whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d
506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011), citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of showing -- based on the pleadings, affidavits,
and/or information obtained via discovery -- the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After a properly supported
motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986), quoting FED R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).
A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248; Ballance v. City of Springfield, Ill. Police Dep’t, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th
Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A
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genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
“A mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.”
Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
On summary judgment, the district court construes the facts and draws the
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party – here, Plaintiff. Cole v. Board
of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, 838 F.3d 888, 895 (7th Cir. 2016). However,
the court does not draw every conceivable inference from the record, “and mere
speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.”
Rockwell
Automation, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 544 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added), quoting McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2003).
B.
Equal Protection Claims
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that a state shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV. This clause protects persons
from disparate treatment based on membership in a protected class. Greer v. Amesqua,
212 F.3d 358, 370 (7th Cir. 2000).
When a regulation (or policy or law) draws a
distinction that is based on an individual’s membership in a suspect class (like race or
national origin) or denies a fundamental right (like freedom of speech or religion), then
“the government’s justification for the regulation must satisfy the strict scrutiny test.”
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Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009), citing Martin v.
Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 2002); Vision Church v. Village
of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 940 (2007).
In the absence of a fundamental right or a suspect class, the standard is, instead,
rational basis. Id., citing Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 1000-01. As the Seventh Circuit
summarized recently in the prison context:
Where disparate treatment is not based on a suspect class and does not
affect a fundamental right, prison administrators may treat inmates
differently as long as the unequal treatment is rationally related to a
legitimate penological interest. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–42, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Johnson
v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc); May v. Sheahan, 226
F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir.
2000). Prison classifications are presumed to be rational and will be upheld
if any justification for them can be conceived. See Ind. Petroleum Marketers &
Convenience Store Ass'n v. Cook, 808 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 2015); Johnson,
339 F.3d at 586.
Flynn v. Thatcher, 819 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 2016).1
The Equal Protection Clause protects against discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 2015), citing Baskin v. Bogan,
766 F.3d 648, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2014).
But here (judging from Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony, affidavit, and other material in the record), Plaintiff’s claim is best construed
as an equal protection claim based on the denial of jobs to a class of inmates designated
as “vulnerable.” Many in that class are gay, but Plaintiff is not presenting a claim that
1
Prisoners are not a suspect class. See Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585–
86 (7th Cir.2003) (en banc); United States v. Vahovick, 160 F.3d 395, 398 (7th
Cir.1998).
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he was discriminated against just because he is gay. Rather, he contends that the policy of
denying jobs to vulnerable-designated inmates contravenes the Equal Protection Clause.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, a plaintiff must show that he “is a member of a protected class,” that he “is
otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class,” and that he “was
treated differently from members of the unprotected class.” McNabola v. Chicago
Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513 (7th Cir. 1993), quoting McMillian v. Svetanoff, 878 F.2d
186, 189 (7th Cir. 1989). As applied to prisoners, the Equal Protection Clause “requires
inmates to be treated equally, unless unequal treatment bears a rational relation to a
legitimate penal interest.” May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000), citing
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984), and Williams v. Lane, 851 F.2d 867, 881 (7th
Cir. 1988).
Again, assuming a difference in treatment is not based on a suspect class and does
not impinge a fundamental right, prison administrators can treat inmates differently, as
long as the unequal treatment is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.
Indeed, a presumption of rationality applies, and the classification will be set aside only
if no ground can be conceived to justify it.
See Ind. Petroleum Marketers &
Convenience Store Ass’n v. Cook, 808 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 2015); Johnson, 339 F.3d at
586. So, for instance, a rewards program for inmates with an infraction-free record
(affording inmates accepted into the “Honor Program” certain privileges) did not violate
equal protection, since there are “many rational reasons” to extend preferential
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treatment to inmates with a history of good behavior (e.g., it encourages rehabilitation,
institutional security, and the safety of staff and visitors). Flynn, 819 F.3d at 991-92.
C.
Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields government
officials from liability for civil damages where their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). The defense applies
only to government officials who occupy positions with discretionary or policymaking
authority and who are acting in their official capacities.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818;
Denius, 209 F.3d at 950.
In other words:
“Qualified immunity safeguards “federal and state officials
from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated
a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the
time of the challenged conduct.” Canen v. Chapman, -- F.3d --, 2017 WL 382329 (7th Cir.
Jan. 27, 2017), quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). The doctrine
protects an official from suit “when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally
deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she
confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). “Put simply, qualified
immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.’” Allin v. City of Springfield, -- F.3d --, 2017 WL 108035, at *3 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2017),
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quoting Mullenix v. Luna, -- U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986).
In examining a qualified immunity claim, a court must consider two questions:
“(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a
violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.” Allin, 2017 WL 108035, at *3, quoting
Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2014), and Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d
749, 759 (7th Cir. 2013). For the right to be clearly established, “existing precedent must
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” That is, “any
reasonable official would understand that his or her actions violate that right.” Allin,
2017 WL 108035, at *3; Canen, 2017 WL 382329, at *3.2 While it is often beneficial to first
decide whether the plaintiff has shown a constitutional violation, a court has discretion
to address the second question first in light of the circumstances of the case. Pearson,
555 U.S. at 236.
IV.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff first urges the Court to strike Defendants’ motion, arguing that
Defendants misled the Court by asserting in an earlier filing herein (a response to
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment) that there were justifications other than
Plaintiff’s vulnerable designation for Plaintiff not receiving a job.
In their own
Cleary established law should not be defined at a high level of generality.
The clearly established law must be “particularized” to the facts of the individual
case before the court. White v. Pauly, -- U.S. --, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017).
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summary judgment motion, Defendants now assert that Plaintiff was denied a job based
solely on his vulnerable status.
Plaintiff believes Defendants should be equitably
estopped from presenting this argument. The Court is not persuaded. Defendants
have not improperly changed their position as Plaintiff argues. Defendants’ motion
focuses on whether denial of a job based on Plaintiff’s status alone is constitutionally
permissible, and they are allowed to choose what arguments they want to emphasize in
their dispositive motion. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike.
Next, the Court recognizes some confusion as to the precise basis of Plaintiff’s
claims.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was discriminated against because his
status as “vulnerable” and as homosexual/gay.
He alleges that the majority of
vulnerables are gay, so the denial of jobs to vulnerables discriminates against gay
inmates. However, in Plaintiff’s deposition, he testified that he was designated as
“vulnerable” because he reported being sexually assaulted by his cellmate in 2008 (not
because he is gay). He also testified that his concern is not that all people classified as
“vulnerable” are gay. Instead, he testified, the fact that his vulnerable designation
makes him ineligible for jobs at Lawrence is unfair, because inmates deemed vulnerable
at prisons other than Lawrence are allowed to hold jobs. In an affidavit, Plaintiff says
he was discriminated against based on his “vulnerable” status and the fact that he was
gay.
Thus, it is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff is alleging that his equal protection
rights were violated because he is gay or because of his “vulnerable” status or both.
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The best the Court can glean after careful review of the record, Plaintiff’s claim is that his
equal protection rights were violated by the denial of a job assignment based on
Lawrence’s policy prohibiting work assignments for inmates classified as or designated
“vulnerable” (not that his rights were violated simply because he is gay).
Turning first to the claim that Plaintiff was denied a job improperly due to his
“vulnerable” status, based on Plaintiff’s testimony in his deposition and the exhibits
presented in the record, the Court finds Defendants entitled to summary judgment,
because there is a rational basis for the policy preventing inmates classified as vulnerable
from holding jobs at Lawrence Correctional Center.
As stated above, Lawrence has a policy of keeping inmates deemed “vulnerable”
from obtaining jobs at Lawrence. These inmates have been assessed by mental health
professionals and found to be at an increased risk of being physically and sexually
assaulted by other inmates, based on, according to Plaintiff, their prior experiences in the
prison. Additionally, as attested in the sworn declaration provided by Lawrence’s
Assistant Warden of Operations, Russell Goins (Doc. 43-1), the jobs at Lawrence place
inmates in positions where they are more likely to have contact with other inmates and
limited supervision by staff.
Placing vulnerable inmates in jobs where they have increased contact with other
inmates and have less supervision by staff puts those vulnerable inmates at additional
risk of being physically and sexually assaulted, according to Goins. Thus, Lawrence
prevents “vulnerable” inmates from having jobs in order to protect those inmates from
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additional risk of assault.
Such safety and security concerns plainly constitute a
rational basis for the different treatment of those inmates labeled “vulnerable” at
Lawrence.
In deciding to exclude this group of inmates from job eligibility, correctional
officials at Lawrence could have rationally concluded that the exclusion was necessary to
protect vulnerable inmates and prevent assaults. A prison policy need not fit perfectly
with the valid objective. “Prison classifications are presumed to be rational and will be
upheld if any justification for them can be conceived.”
Flynn, 819 F.3d 991.
Lawrence’s policy (under which Plaintiff was treated differently from inmates not
designated “vulnerable”) was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest and
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
While Plaintiff’s complaint and deposition suggest that he believes he is being
treated differently due to his “vulnerable” status, there is some indication that Plaintiff
claims he is being treated different based on his sexual orientation. If Plaintiff’s claim is
construed that way (i.e., he was improperly denied a job based on the fact that he is gay),
the Court finds that Defendants also are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. As Defendants point out, there is no case law clearly establishing a
constitutional violation when prison administrators deny an inmate a job based on his
designation as vulnerable. And, as the Court explained in the threshold review Order
herein (Doc. 7), the state of equal protection based on sexual orientation was not clearly set
out at the time Plaintiff’s claims arose. No cases at that time established vulnerable
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inmates as a protected class subject to something other than rational basis scrutiny.
It is not even clear now whether disparate treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation outside of the prison setting would receive heightened scrutiny as a suspect
class or simply require a rational basis to be upheld. The Supreme Court has not
specifically set forth the standard of review to apply to equal protection claims based on
sexual orientation. See United States v. Windsor, --U.S.--, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). And
the Seventh Circuit has not yet expressly addressed which level of scrutiny applies to
discrimination based on sexual orientation.3
While it appears from more recent circuit and district court opinions that
classifications based on sexual orientation may be subject to some form of heightened
scrutiny, see, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 654 (2014 case declining to decide whether such
claims are subject to heightened scrutiny, as the Court found that the state’s basis of
discrimination irrational); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471,
481-83 (9th Cir. 2014) (statutes that discriminate based on sexual orientation are
subject to “heightened scrutiny”); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. June
6, 2014) (J., Crabb), what form that would take is not clear. Nor can this Court find that
the standard or right was “clearly established” at the time of Plaintiff’s alleged violation
3
Earlier Seventh Circuit cases indicate that sexual orientation
discrimination is not entitled to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Schroeder v.
Hamilton School District, 282 F.3d 946, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002) (“homosexuals do
not enjoy any heightened protection under the Constitution”); Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (discrimination based on sexual orientation,
as opposed to gender, is subject to only rational basis review). Those
statements appear to be dicta or were in the military context, and those cases were
decided before Windsor, but that was the law at the time of the challenged
conduct herein.
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(i.e., at the time of the challenged conduct).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
to the extent that Plaintiff was discriminated on the basis of his sexual orientation.
Finally, Plaintiff’s complaint seeks injunctive relief – relief which is excluded from
the reach of the qualified immunity defense. Moss v. Martin, 614 F.3d 707, 712-13 (7th
Cir. 2010) (“qualified immunity defense protects government defendants from an
action for money damages, but not from a suit on injunctive relief”); Hannemann v.
Southern Door County School Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 758 (7th Cir. 2012).
However,
Plaintiff now has been released from state custody, so his request for injunctive relief is
moot. Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807,
812 (7th Cir. 1996), citing Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir. 1988).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 42) No claims remain, and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in
favor of Defendants Hodge and Tredway and against Plaintiff White.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 2, 2017.
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge
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