Taylor v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al

Filing 157

ORDER: The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants John Coe and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Doc. 127 ) is DENIED, and the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Phil Martin (Doc. 131 ) is DENIED. Magistrate Judge Wilkerson is DIRECTED to recruit counsel for Plaintiff Douglas Taylor for trial only. A trial date will be set by separate order. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 9/18/2017. (mlp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DOUGLAS W. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
PHIL MARTIN, and DR. JOHN COE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:14-cv-122-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Now pending before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants John Coe and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. on January 9, 2017 (Doc. 127), and
the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Phil Martin on January 13, 2017 (Doc.
131). Plaintiff Douglas Taylor filed a combined response to both motions on April 11, 2017
(Doc. 148). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.
INTRODUCTION
Douglas Taylor (“Taylor”), an inmate currently housed at Big Muddy River
Correctional Center is proceeding on a third amended complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 on June 17, 2016. He alleges four claims (Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6) related to the eye care
he received while incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center beginning on or about June
7, 2012 (Doc. 101). These claims are:
Count 3:

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., for maintaining unconstitutional
practices or policies with respect to staffing the optometrist
position and procedures for requesting medical care.

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Count 4:

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
Defendant Dr. John Coe for failing to treat Plaintiff’s eye
condition from June 7, 2012, to the present.

Count 5:

Failure to intervene against Defendant Dr. Coe for failing to
prevent harm related to his eye condition caused by Dr.
Hohenbary’s deliberate indifference.

Count 6:

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
Defendant Phil Martin for failing to treat Plaintiff’s eye
condition and/or by delaying treatment.1

The remaining Defendants now seek summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Taylor first sought eye care in June 2012 when he began experiencing sensitivity to
light and pain in his eyes. (Doc. 148-1, p. 7; Doc. 148-4, p. 12-13). In his deposition, Taylor
testified that he requested nurse sick call in June 2012 for his eye problems by placing the
request in the healthcare unit box. Taylor asserts he made more than thirty such requests
between June 2012 and June 2013 (Doc. 148-4, p. 13-14). Ten to twenty such requests were
specifically addressed to Defendant Martin, the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”)
(Doc. 148-1, p. 11). Taylor’s medical records, however, do not reflect any treatment for eye
pain in 2012 or early 2013 (Doc. 128-1, pp. 2-6). On April 20, 2013, Taylor complained of
migraines and was referred to the doctor (Doc. 128-2, p. 1).
Taylor was seen by Dr. Coe on June 4, 2013. He described migraine pain behind and
in his eye and that it felt like his eyes would “explode” (Doc. 148-1, p. 7). He reported he may
need glasses and was referred to optometry (Doc. 128-2, p. 2).2 Dr. Coe also prescribed

Count 1, which alleged a deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Joshua Hohenbary, was dismissed by
stipulation on September 19, 2016 (Doc. 121). Count 2 was dismissed on February 26, 2014, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A (Doc. 5).
2
On July 1, 2013, Taylor complained to his counselor that he requested to see the optometrist, but his requests
went unanswered since his transfer to Lawrence in December 2011 (Doc. 148-1, p. 3-4). In a grievance dated
1

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Imitrex (a migraine drug)3 and Indocin for a 6-month period (although the Imitrex was
discontinued 10 days later in favor of the Indocin, which Dr. Coe stated “may work” (Doc.
128-2, p. 3, 5)).4
Taylor again was seen by Dr. Coe on September 19, 2013. Taylor reported that the
Indocin was working and that when he “popped his neck” his headaches sometimes went
away (Doc. 128-2, p. 5). Dr. Coe increased the Indocin dosage (from 25 mg to 50 mg), noted
that Taylor was scheduled to see an optometrist, and said that Taylor should return if the
headaches did not improve after his vision was checked (Id.). During this visit, Taylor told
Dr. Coe that he believed he was losing vision and that the medication and “popping” his
neck did nothing to resolve the eye pain (Doc. 148-1, p. 8). Dr. Coe told Taylor that the
optometrist was busy and that Taylor may be confusing migraines for eye problems, which
Taylor did not believe was accurate (Doc. 148-1, p. 8).
From October 3 to October 7, 2013, Taylor sent daily request slips, addressed to Dr.
Coe and HCUA Martin, expressing concerns about not receiving eye care and about the pain
he was experiencing because of the delay (Doc. 148-1, p. 8). On October 22, 2013, the
optometrist (Dr. Hohenbary) indicated that Taylor’s appointment needed to be rescheduled
because he “ran out of time” and that Taylor’s appointment should be rescheduled “ASAP”
(Doc. 128-2, p. 8). When Taylor saw Dr. Coe again on November 5, 2013, he again sought to

September 11, 2013, Taylor stated he had been requesting eye care for 17 months (Doc. 148-3, p. 2). In a
November 7, 2013 grievance, Taylor makes the same statement and complains that he only was placed in line to
see the optometrist after he wrote a grievance (but that he still had not seen an optometrist) (Doc. 132-2, p. 6).
3 Physician’s Desk Reference 1474 (63rd ed. 2009).
4 Dr. Coe states that the Indocin (or Indomethacin) was prescribed for migraine headaches. This drug is an
anti-inflammatory typically used to treat pain from osteoarthritis and other arthritic conditions. Id. at 2024;
MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a681027.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2017). A search
reveals it can also be used to treat “physical stress or exertional headache” and migraines. See NATIONAL
HEADACHE FOUNDATION, http://www.headaches.org/2007/10/25/indocin-indomethacin/ (last visited Aug.
31, 2017).

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see the optometrist. Taylor was told nothing could be done and he needed to write a
grievance (Doc. 148-1, p. 8). On this visit, it was noted that Indocin was effective for the
migraines (Doc. 128-2, p. 9). On November 20, 2013, Taylor again sought care for headaches
“around the eyes” with blurry vision and “put in” to see the eye doctor. (Id. at p. 10).
On February 20, 2014, Taylor again saw Dr. Coe and explained that his conditioned
had worsened; his eyes were now so sensitive to light that he could not open them outside
(Doc. 148-1, p. 9). Dr. Coe prescribed some additional medications including Topamax for
what appears to be a 4-week plus 4-day period (Doc. 128-2, p. 11).5 Dr. Coe conducted a
chart review twice in April 2014.6 (Id. at pp. 11-12).
Taylor was finally seen by an optometrist, Dr. Kehoe, on May 16, 2014. Dr. Kehoe
ordered glasses for Taylor and told Taylor his eye pressure was three times the normal
amount (Doc. 148-1, p. 9; Doc. 128-3, p. 1). The records appear to reveal astigmatism and
possible glaucoma (Id.). A second examination on June 8, 2014, resulted in orders for further
diagnostic testing, including a baseline Pachymetry and visual field test (used to test for
glaucoma), scheduled for July 17, 2014 (Doc. 128-2, p. 14). Taylor went to an outside clinic for
the tests (see Doc. 128-3, p. 4) and was told thereafter that he had an “absolute nasal quadrant
defect spreading past the horizontal/midline” (Doc. 148-1, p. 9). Taylor was diagnosed with
hypertension glaucoma and told that he had 25% vision loss in his right eye (Doc. 148-1, p.
9). 7 Various medications were prescribed (Doc. 129-3, p. 6) and an “urgent” MRI was

It seems that the Topamax was given in dosages that increased over time although the records are not clear to
the Court.
6 There is no indication the Topamax prescription was continued.
7 According to Wexford Health Source’s Ophthalmology Guidelines, most persons with glaucoma are
asymptomatic until there is vision loss (Doc. 148-4, p. 31). But symptoms can include “intense pain (that may
mimic headaches), nausea/vomiting, photophobia, lacrimation and visual halos seen around light sources”
(Id.).
5

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requested on July 20, 2014 (Doc. 128-3, p. 7). Dr. Coe reviewed the MRI results with Taylor,
which showed no abnormalities (Doc. 128-4, p. 5).8 According to Taylor, the eye drops
prescribed for his glaucoma has lessened his eye pain considerably (Doc. 148-1, p. 9).
Dr. Coe continued treating Taylor’s migraine headaches and re-prescribed Topamax
on August 11, 2014 (Doc. 128-2, p. 16).9 At this appointment, Taylor told Dr. Coe that the
drug “hurt my eyes.” Dr. Coe told Taylor not to worry; the drug causes a little pain that he
would have to live with (Doc. 148-1, p. 10). Dr. Coe subsequently told Taylor, on December
1, 2014, to stop taking Topamax (Id. 11; Doc. 132-2, p. 61). Three days later, Taylor
experienced uncontrollable shaking and falling to the ground, severe pain in his head,
episodes of unconsciousness, and uncontrollable bowel movements and urination (Doc.
148-1, p. 11). Taylor sought medical care for these issues but never was called to the
healthcare unit (Id.). Taylor believes that the symptoms were the result of stopping Topamax
suddenly. Dr. Coe saw Taylor again in June 2015 and noted that he only had a “mild
headache” at the time (Doc. 132-2, p. 70).
During the relevant time period, Defendant Martin was the Health Care Unit
Administrator at Lawrence. Martin does not have a medical degree and does not manage the
health care that is provided to inmates. Rather, he ensures that “offenders were generally
receiving medical care in accordance with all administrative directives” (Doc. 148-4, p. 2).
Martin attested that he has no authority to “direct an offender’s medical care,” nor did he
direct the work of the optometrist or “manage any waiting list of patients to see the

The MRI was recommended by Dr. Kehoe, an optometrist. The medical records provided by Defendants do
not contain the MRI results.
9 Again, it appears that the Topamax was given in dosages that increased over time for a 3-month plus 2-week
period. Neither the medical records nor the prescription records provided by Taylor are entirely clear (Doc.
148-2).
8

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optometrist” (Id). He had the authority to review offender grievances and medical records,
however, and would “request staff to schedule” an offender to see a medical professional
(Id. at p. 3). In particular: “if it appears [from a grievance or through some notification
process] that the offender was not being seen by medical staff altogether, I contacted staff to
determine why an offender had not been scheduled, and, in such a case, I requested staff to
schedule them accordingly” (Id.). The person who actually scheduled inmates was Ms.
Padgett, who is not a defendant in this action (Id.).
Martin did not review any medical request slips, letters, or “kites” that were either
addressed to the healthcare unit or to him directly. Rather, they would be reviewed by
“nursing staff.” (Id. at pp. 3-4). Martin did, however, “receive and review offender request
slips that specifically related to my job duties” (Id. at p. 4). Martin does not recall receiving
any correspondence from Taylor related to vision problems or reviewing any grievances,
prior to the filing of this lawsuit, that were submitted by Taylor (Id. at p. 4).
During the relevant time period, Lawrence’s “institutional directive” provided that
inmates may request health care through a sick call request form to be placed “in the box
located in the housing unit for that purpose” (Doc. 148-5, pp. 24-25). These requests were to
be screened by health care staff within 24 hours of receipt, and the inmate was to be
scheduled to be treated immediately or scheduled to see a nurse within three days,
depending on the severity of the problem. Additional treatment by a doctor would follow
thereafter (Id. at pp. 26-27). Inmates were directed to address their complaints in writing to
the HCUA or the Assistant Warden of Programs (Id. at p. 28). In its contract with the Illinois
Department of Corrections, Wexford generally agreed to provide optometry and
ophthalmology care in a “safe, adequate, and cost-effective manner” (Doc. 148-6, p. 8).
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LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986); Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir.
2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836
(7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are
in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against
the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); Lawrence v. Kenosha
County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).
A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving
party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with
respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “[A] complete failure
of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that summary judgment is “the
put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that
would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events.” Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d
1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th
Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order to prevail on such a claim, a
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plaintiff must show first that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and second
that the “prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 652-653 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The following circumstances could constitute a serious medical need: “The existence
of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of
comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373
(7th Cir. 1997)); see also Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 512-513 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.”).
Second, a prisoner must show that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind, namely, deliberate indifference. “Deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “The infliction of suffering on
prisoners can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is either
deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law sense.” Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53
(7th Cir. 1985). Negligence, gross negligence, or even “recklessness” as that term is used in
tort cases, is not enough. Id. at 653; Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987). Put
another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the officials were “aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and that
the officials actually drew that inference. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. “Whether a prison official
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had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to
demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, . . . and
a fact finder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact
that the risk was obvious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (citations omitted).
A plaintiff does not have to prove that his complaints of pain were “literally
ignored,” but only that “the defendants’ responses to it were so plainly inappropriate as to
permit the inference that the defendants intentionally or recklessly disregarded his needs.”
Hayes 546 F.3d at 524 (quoting Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)). “Even if a
defendant recognizes the substantial risk, he is free from liability if he ‘responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.’” Gayton v. McCoy, 593
F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843).
Here, Defendants have not alleged that Taylor’s eye condition did not constitute a
serious medical need. Accordingly, the Court only considers whether Taylor has made a
sufficient showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical
need.
I.

Count 3: Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., for maintaining unconstitutional practices or policies with respect to
staffing the optometrist position and procedures for requesting medical care.
Wexford does not address this count specifically except to argue there was no delay

in Taylor’s eye care. Wexford contends that Dr. Hohenbary, who initially cancelled Taylor’s
October 2013 appointment, was not a Wexford employee. Unfortunately, however, Wexford
does not support this statement with any citations to the record. Finally, Wexford notes that
there was a spike in optometry requests in 2013 (Doc. 128-9, p. 1). Such a spike does not
inform the Court of Wexford’s policies or whether the optometrist position was sufficiently
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staffed. The Court thus declines to address this count given the limited argument presented
by Defendant Wexford.
II.

Count 4: Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Dr.
John Coe for failing to treat Taylor’s eye condition from June 7, 2012, to the
present.
As Taylor points out in his brief, he is not “suing defendants for any delay in treating

his headaches . . . . all counts in this action pertain to eyecare” (Doc. 148, p. 18). Thus, Dr.
Coe’s treatment of Taylor’s migraines is not in dispute. Rather, Taylor claims Dr. Coe failed
to take steps to ensure that his eye condition was being treated properly and that he
improperly prescribed Topamax, which is contra-indicated for those with glaucoma.
There is no evidence that Dr. Coe was aware of Taylor’s eye complaints until he
examined Taylor on June 4, 2013. At that time, Dr. Coe referred Taylor to the optometrist. At
his September 2013 examination, Dr. Coe noted that Taylor was set to see the optometrist,
but by his October 9th examination, Taylor’s eyes still had not been examined. Thereafter,
Dr. Coe was aware, either through Taylor directly or a review of his medical records, that
Taylor did not actually see the optometrist until May 2014—even though his eye condition
was progressively worsening. There is no indication in the medical records or otherwise that
Dr. Coe did anything to follow up on his referral to the optometrist or otherwise inquire
about Taylor’s appointment with the optometrist. From October 2013 through May 2014, it
seems Dr. Coe ignored Taylor’s request for eye care and actively told Taylor that there was
nothing he could do.
While Taylor need not show that he was literally ignored, he must show that Dr.
Coe’s response to his complaints was “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional
mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate his condition.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quotation
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marks omitted). Furthermore, a delay in access to medical care can show deliberate
indifference. See Arnett v Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011). “The length of delay that
is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the ease of providing
treatment.” Mcgowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).
Here, Dr. Coe initially referred Taylor to an optometrist when, in June 2013, Taylor
said it felt like his eyes would explode. Dr. Coe then did nothing more to ensure he was
actually examined and treated, despite Taylor’s continued requests for care and the
worsening of Taylor’s eye condition. Moreover, when Taylor told Dr. Coe the pain
medication was doing nothing to alleviate his eye pain, Dr. Coe did nothing and told Taylor
to live with the pain. Based on this evidence, a jury could find that Dr. Coe was deliberately
indifferent to Taylor’s eye condition. 10 Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751 (noting that deliberate
indifference is evidenced by “[a] professional’s subjective response [that] was so inadequate
that it demonstrated an absence of professional judgment, that is, that no minimally
competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.”).
III.

Count 5: Failure to intervene against Defendant Dr. Coe for failing to prevent
harm related to his eye condition caused by Dr. Hohenbary’s deliberate
indifference.
A prison official “can be held liable under § 1983 if [he] (1) had reason to know that a

fellow officer was . . . committing a constitutional violation, and (2) had a realistic
opportunity to intervene to prevent the act from occurring.” Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467,
472 (7th Cir. 2009). Dr. Coe argues that “[t]here was no reason for Dr. Coe to believe that
plaintiff had an urgent or emergent need to see the optometrist. As such, there is no evidence
to support the argument that Wexford or Dr. Coe should have known of a purported need to
Dr. Coe does not address Taylor’s contention that the Topamax was abruptly, and improperly, discontinued
and that it caused additional negative symptoms.

10

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intervene, let alone failed to intervene, and there was no clear need to intervene, or were
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need” (Doc. 128- pp. 15-16). Dr. Coe also argues
that he did not maintain the eye doctor waiting list. These arguments are not well taken.
As stated above, Dr. Coe believed Taylor’s eye condition was sufficiently serious to
warrant a referral to an optometrist, but then did nothing more despite Taylor’s continued
complaints. A simple review of Taylor’s medical records revealed that no eye care was
scheduled for months after Dr. Coe’s referral. A reasonable jury could find that Dr. Coe had
the opportunity to intervene because he aware of Taylor’s increased complaints, as well as
Dr. Hohenbary’s failure to schedule Taylor for an examination, and failed to take any action.
And, while Dr. Coe may not maintain the optometry waiting list, he certainly could have
taken steps to ensure Taylor was examined in a timely manner. Dr. Coe is not entitled to
summary judgment on this count.
IV.

Count 6: Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Defendant Phil
Martin for failing to treat Plaintiff’s eye condition and/or by delaying treatment.
Crediting Taylor’s evidence, as the Court must do at this stage of the proceedings,

Taylor put in more than thirty requests to receive medical care for his eye pain from June
2012 to May 2014. Ten to twenty of those requests were addressed to Martin. Martin washes
his hands of any culpability by arguing that he is not a health professional and could not
provide medical care, that he is not responsible for scheduling patients, and that he
otherwise had no knowledge of Taylor and his condition. Thus, he argues, he had no
personal involvement in any deprivation; he is merely a supervisor, and there is no
respondeat superior liability in § 1983 litigation. See Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th
Cir. 2015); Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the officials

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were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists” and that the officials actually drew that inference).
After reviewing the evidence, the Court finds Martin’s hands were not so clean.
Martin was responsible for ensuring that administrative directives were being followed,
directives that required an inmate to be seen by a nurse within three days of making a nurse
sick call request. Inmates also were directed to address their complaints to Martin, which
Taylor did. That Martin elected to ignore mail directed to him is not an example of
delegating responsibility to others, i.e., the “nursing staff.” Rather, it is an example of Martin
turning a blind eye to the plight of an inmate who was being denied medical care.
Non-medical defendants, like Martin, can rely on the medical judgment of medical
personnel. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 655-656. However, they “cannot simply ignore an inmate’s
plight.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d
435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010); Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2016). If Taylor’s
communication to Martin “in its content and manner of transmission, gave the prison official
sufficient notice to alert him or her to ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,’” he can
be found to be deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff’s serious needs. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d
987, 993 (7th Cir. 1996 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. 837).
While Martin argues that Taylor “cannot provide evidence showing that Phil Martin
was aware of any delay” in receiving medical care, Taylor did provide such evidence. In his
affidavit, Taylor avers that he sent correspondence to Martin in October 2013 “expressing
my concerns about not receiving any eye care, and the pain and suffering caused because of
the delay.” See Whitaker v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health Servs., 849 F.3d 681, 685-686 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“[W]e have taken pains to reject the misconception that evidence presented in a self-serving
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affidavit is never sufficient to thwart a summary judgment motion.” (quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Taylor also submitted two grievances in 2013 regarding the lack of eye
care, and he complained to his counselor in July 2013.
Moreover, Martin had the authority to review offender grievances and to “request
staff to schedule” an offender to see a medical professional (Doc. 148-4, p. 2). If it appeared
from a grievance that the offender was not being seen by medical staff, he would contact
said staff to find out why and to request staff to schedule the inmate for an examination (Id.).
Here, Taylor complained directly to Martin for nearly two years about not being scheduled
to see an optometrist. His complaints were ignored, contrary to prison directives. Based on
this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Taylor’s letters to Martin sufficiently alerted
him to the risk to Taylor’s health, yet Martin turned a blind eye to his complaints.
Martin finally argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. In determining
whether Martin is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions.
First, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts
alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” and, second, was “the
right clearly established?” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 2012). With respect
to the second question, the inquiry is specific to the circumstances of the case. “The relevant
dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. A plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a constitutional right is
clearly established. Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000). While a plaintiff need
not present a “case directly on point,” he must show that “existing precedent must have
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placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
335, 341 (1986).
As set forth above, Taylor has established enough facts for a jury to find that
Defendant Martin violated his constitutional rights. And, as the above cases demonstrate, it
is clearly established that a prison official may not ignore correspondence seeking adequate
medical care. See Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1999); Vance, 97 F.3d at 993.
Accordingly, Martin is not entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants John Coe and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. on January 9, 2017 (Doc. 127) is
DENIED, and the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Phil Martin on January
13, 2017 (Doc. 131) is DENIED. Magistrate Judge Wilkerson is DIRECTED to recruit counsel
for Plaintiff Douglas Taylor for trial only. A trial date will be set by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 18, 2017
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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