Suggs v. Watson et al

Filing 5

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 3/4/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DEANDRE SUGGS, # 449749,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICK WATSON,
THOMAS TRICE,
PHIL MCLAURIN, and
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SABO,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-00136-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Deandre Suggs, currently incarcerated at the St. Clair County Jail, has brought
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act,
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers

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to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. at 557.

At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff claims that in December 2013 he was strip searched in a public, humiliating
fashion by Correctional Officer Sabo. He subsequently told Major Phil McLaurin and Captain
Thomas Trice, but they did nothing—which Plaintiff characterizes as “deliberate indifference.”
Plaintiff further alleges that Sheriff Rick Watson, in his official capacity, was “deliberately
indifferent” and “negligent,” in failing to properly train Jail staff regarding strip search
procedures and failing to respond to complaints of constitutional violations by his staff. Plaintiff
also complains about the conditions of his confinement. He was confined in a cold cell for four
and a half days with no mattress or blanket. When Plaintiff complained to Correctional Officer
Sabo, Sabo did nothing but threaten Plaintiff about complaining.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into four counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Count 1: Correctional Officer Sabo strip searched Plaintiff in a fashion that
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;

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The

Count 2: Major Phil McLaurin and Captain Thomas Trice were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s complaints about the strip
search itself and the strip search policy, in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments;
Count 3: Sheriff Rick Watson, in his official capacity, was negligent and
deliberately indifferent by failing to properly train Jail employees
regarding strip searches, and by failing to act in response to
complaints of constitutional violations, in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments; and
Count 4: Correctional Officer Sabo was deliberately indifferent when he left
Plaintiff in a cold cell without a mattress and blanket, in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Discussion
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has brought suit under both 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680.
Section 1983 allows constitutional torts against state actors to be pursued in federal court. In
contrast, the FTCA allows tort claims against the United States and its agents. The federal
corollary to a Section 1983 claims is an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Even if Plaintiff was in the custody of the U.S. Marshal and merely housed
in the St. Clair County Jail, a housing contract between the Marshals Service and a county jail
does not automatically federalize the jail employees. See Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726
F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2013). Therefore, any and all FTCA claims must be dismissed with
prejudice. This action shall proceed under Section 1983.
Insofar as “negligence” is mentioned relative to Count 3, Section 1983 creates a cause of
action for constitutional deprivations. See Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th
Cir. 2005). Therefore, all claims of “negligence” must be dismissed because the Constitution
does not protect against negligence. See Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d
188, 191 (7th Cir. 2013).
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The constitutional standards applicable to Plaintiff’s claims are determined based on
whether he was an arrestee, detainee or convict. The complaint does not indicate Plaintiff’s
status at the time of the alleged incidents. The Court will presume Plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits conditions of

confinement for pretrial detainees that amount to punishment. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469,
477 (7th Cir. 2005).

Therefore, his claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). Eighth
Amendment case law can also generally be used in evaluating such Fourteenth Amendment
claims; for all relevant purposes, the standards are interchangeable. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr.
Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012); Forest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739, 744-45 (7th Cir.
2010).
Count 1
Protracted, gratuitous and humiliating strip searches can violate the Eighth Amendment.
See Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). Therefore Count 1 states a colorable
constitutional claim against Correctional Officer Sabo. Count 1 shall proceed.
Count 2
Count 2 alleges that, three days after he was strip searched in a public, humiliating
fashion, Plaintiff complained to Major Phil McLaurin and Captain Thomas Trice that his
constitutional rights had been violated “by the systemic nature of the Jail[’]s strip search policie
[sic] and/or official custom” (Doc. 1, p. 7). Plaintiff contends that McLaurin and Trice were
deliberately indifferent because they failed to act upon Plaintiff’s complaints.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon
fault; thus, “to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or

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participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810
(7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). “[S]upervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it,
approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in other
words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference.” Backes v. Village of Peoria
Heights, Illinois, 662 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers,
Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2002) (allegations that an agency’s senior officials were
personally responsible for creating the policies, practices and customs that caused the
constitutional deprivations suffice to demonstrate personal involvement). See also Doyle v.
Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2002) (allegations that an agency’s
senior officials were personally responsible for creating the policies, practices and customs that
caused the constitutional deprivations suffice to demonstrate personal involvement).
Plaintiff does not allege that McLaurin and Trice had anything to do with the strip search
or making the strip search policy and/or custom. Rather, it is alleged that when Plaintiff
complained to them, McLaurin and Trice did nothing. In fact, it is alleged that Trice told
Plaintiff that his only rights were those listed in the Jail Rule Book.
Furthermore, prison grievance procedures—and thus more generalized complaints like
Plaintiff made to McLaurin and Trice—are not constitutionally mandated and, therefore, do not
implicate the Due Process Clause. As such, the alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons
who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772
n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81
F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996).

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For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a colorable constitutional claim against
Major Phil McLaurin and Captain Thomas Trice. Count 2, Trice and McLaurin will all be
dismissed with prejudice.
Count 3
Count 3 is lodged against Sheriff Rick Watson in his official capacity.

Allegedly,

Watson was “deliberately indifferent” and “negligent,” in failing to properly train Jail staff
regarding strip search procedures and failing to respond to complaints of constitutional violations
by his staff.
Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
municipalities—such as St. Clair County—may be held directly liable under Section 1983 for
official policies or customs that result in constitutional deprivations. “Actions against individual
defendants in their official capacities are treated as suits brought against the government entity
itself.” Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21,
25 (1991)); see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n. 55. Consequently, this Court considers Sheriff
Watson, in his official capacity, to be a proper defendant in a Monell claim.
For purposes of liability under Monell, “[a]n official policy or custom may be established
by means of an express policy, a widespread practice which, although unwritten, is so entrenched
and well-known as to carry the force of policy, or through the actions of an individual who
possesses the authority to make final policy decisions on behalf of the municipality or
corporation.” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir.
2012); see also Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). The failure to
adequately train employees also may be a basis for imposing liability on a municipality, if the
failure to train reflects a conscious choice among alternatives that evinces a deliberate

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indifference to the rights of the individuals with whom those employees will interact. Rice ex rel.
Rice, 675 F.3d at 675. Therefore, given the general allegations against Sheriff Watson, and
considering the reference to the Jail Rule Book, Count 3 states a colorable claim of municipal
liability regarding a an unconstitutional strip search policy or custom, and a failure to train in
relation to strip searches.
Insofar as Count 3 also alleges that Watson failed to act in response to complaints of
constitutional violations by staff, this claim will be construed as a policy, practice or custom
claim, even though it reads somewhat more like a personal involvement claim.

Again, the

reference to the Jail Rule Book, provides the slim reed supporting this claim.
Count 4
Count 4 alleges that Plaintiff was confined in a cold cell for four and a half days with no
mattress or blanket. When Plaintiff complained to Correctional Officer Sabo, Sabo did nothing
but threaten Plaintiff about complaining.
Jail officials violate the Eighth Amendment (and Fourteenth Amendment) if they are
deliberately indifferent to adverse conditions that deny “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1994). Prisoners cannot expect the
“amenities, conveniences, and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232,
1235 (7th Cir.1988).

However, “[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth

Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they
have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human
need such as food, warmth, or exercise―for example, a low cell temperature at night combined
with a failure to issue blankets.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
The complaint adequately states a claim that Correctional Officer Sabo was deliberately

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indifferent to the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement, which at this stage appear to fall below
the constitutional minimum. Count 4 against Correctional Officer Sabo shall proceed.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, any and all Federal Tort Claim
Act claims must be DISMISSED with prejudice and this action shall proceed under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; accordingly, all claims of “negligence” are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 2, PHIL MCLAURIN and THOMAS
TRICE are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 3 and 4 against Defendants RICK
WATSON and CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SABO shall PROCEED.
The

Clerk

of

Court

shall

prepare

for

Defendants

RICK WATSON and

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER SABO: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address

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shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding that
his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.

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Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 4, 2014
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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