Hayes v. Casteel

Filing 5

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's retaliation claims against Defendants Johnson and Harrington (COUNTS 4 and 5), which are unrelated to the retaliation claim against Defendant Casteel in Count 1, are SEVERED into a new case. See attached order for details. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/17/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LARRY C. HAYES, JR., # K-73159,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLEN MARTIN, MUSTSINGER,
REEDER, C/O HARRINGTON,
THEREASE CASTEEL,
and C/O JOHNSON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-229-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), has
brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a six-year
sentence for burglary. Plaintiff claims that some Defendants fabricated disciplinary charges
against him, causing him to lose his prison job and be withdrawn from a class. He was not
permitted to make copies of documents, and his grievances were not handled properly.
Plaintiff describes his claims only in very general terms in the complaint itself
(Doc. 1, p. 5). However, he attaches copies of several disciplinary reports, summaries of the
results of those disciplinary charges, grievances, and records from his sessions with a mental
health professional, which contain some more specific factual information (Doc. 1-1, pp. 8-21,
22-25; Doc. 1-2, pp. 1-9, 14-15, 18-19).
He claims that Defendant Casteel (law librarian) refused to allow him to make
copies of grievances and case law. He filed a grievance against her over this dispute on July 18,
2012 (Doc. 1-2, pp. 14-15). She then retaliated against him by writing him a “made up” ticket
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that caused him to lose library privileges for two and one-half months (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff
does not indicate the date of this ticket or include a copy, but it is mentioned in his mental health
notes of May 22, 2013 (Doc. 1-2, p. 15). As a result of Defendant Casteel’s action, he was
delayed in filing a court motion, and had some paperwork stolen when he gave it to a law clerk
to help with his case. 1 Plaintiff’s exhibits include several printouts indicating that he had lost
library privileges for several dates in June, July, and August of 2013 (Doc. 1-2, pp. 10-11).
Next, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Martin (Shawnee Warden) refused to
respond to his letter about staff conduct, and allowed the conduct to continue. Plaintiff does not
describe what conduct he objected to in this letter.
He further asserts that Defendants Harrington and Johnson (correctional officers)
harassed and retaliated against him by writing fabricated disciplinary report(s) (Doc. 1, p. 5).
This caused Plaintiff to lose his prison job, and to be withdrawn from his auto mechanics class
when he was put on disciplinary room restriction. He claims that the room restriction was not an
appropriate punishment for the offense of which he was found guilty.

Plaintiff’s exhibits

disclose this chronology:
On February 19, 2013, Defendant Harrington charged Plaintiff with a violation of
308-Contraband/Unauthorized property, after discovering a jar of jalapeno peppers in Plaintiff’s
cell (Doc. 1-1, p. 22-23). Plaintiff admitted the conduct, and was punished with a 15-day room
restriction and a change in job assignment from the kitchen, along with other sanctions.
Plaintiff’s mental health notes reflect that he discussed harassment and destructive
cell searches by Defendant Johnson on April 25, 2013 (Doc. 1-2, p. 17); unspecified problems
with him on May 8, 2013; and an incident where Defendant Johnson forced Plaintiff to leave his
Plaintiff includes an affidavit from the law clerk, which states that he was assisting Plaintiff with a
motion under 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1401(F) (Doc. 1-1, p. 6). In his grievance against Defendant
Casteel, Plaintiff says he was working on a case to get back a day of missed credit (Doc. 1-2, p. 14-15).
1

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counselor’s office where he was discussing the disposition of his grievances on July 3, 2013
(Doc. 1-2, pp. 13, 16).
On October 10, 2013, Defendant Harrington charged Plaintiff with violations of
305-Theft, and 308-Contraband/Unauthorized property, after finding a bag of tortillas in
Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff pled guilty and was punished with 1 month of C-grade and recreation
restriction (Doc. 1-1, p. 25). Plaintiff’s mental health records show he complained that after he
got this ticket, Defendant Johnson refused to let him out to go to work, and then called another
officer to get Plaintiff fired from the kitchen job (Doc. 1-1, p. 9).
On October 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendants Johnson and
Harrington, complaining that since he had filed earlier grievances against them, they have
harassed him by refusing to allow him to go to work on time and targeting him for cell
shakedowns (Doc. 1-2, pp. 5-6).
On November 21, 2013, Defendant Harrington charged Plaintiff with a violation
of 308-Contraband/Unauthorized property, after finding seven razors in Plaintiff’s property box
in his cell. Plaintiff denied having the razors, but was found guilty and punished with 1 month of
C-Grade and recreation restriction (Doc. 1-1, p. 24).
On December 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed two grievances. One complained that his
punishment with a 15-day room restriction 2 was contrary to the Illinois Administrative Code for
the offense, and was imposed on him by Defendant Harrington in retaliation for prior grievances
he had filed, so that he would be prevented from going to his school assignment and would lose
his place in the class (Doc. 1-2, pp. 1-2). The second complained that on the day he got the
Plaintiff’s attached mental health records show that he complained of being on a 15-day room restriction
in November 2013 following the razor offense (Doc. 1-1, p. 8). This was not a documented component of
the punishment imposed by the Adjustment Committee when Plaintiff was found guilty of possessing the
razors (Doc. 1-1, p. 24).
2

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ticket for possessing the seven razors, Defendant Harrington had shaken down his cell in
retaliation for earlier grievances Plaintiff had filed against him and Defendant Johnson (Doc. 1-2,
pp. 3-4). Defendant Harrington knew Plaintiff was going to start school again, and did the cell
search in an attempt to interfere with Plaintiff going to the auto mechanics class. Plaintiff
suggests that Defendant Harrington did not actually find the items in his box, but also says “all
but three razors was not mind [sic].” Id.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Mustsinger and Reeder delayed his
grievance process by failing to return grievances, some of which were mailed to them and others
hand-delivered to them by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the violations of his constitutional rights.
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide
the pro se action into the following counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations
in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
The designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Count 1: Retaliation claim against Defendant Casteel, for filing a false disciplinary
charge that caused him to lose library privileges after he filed a grievance against her;
Count 2: Claim against Defendant Casteel for denial of access to the courts, when
Plaintiff’s motion was delayed and documents were stolen during the time he had no library
privileges;
Count 3: Claims for failure to respond to grievances and complaints, against Defendants
Martin, Mustsinger, and Reeder;
Count 4: Retaliation claim against Defendant Johnson, for targeting Plaintiff for cell
shakedowns, interfering with his counselor visit and job and classroom attendance, and causing
Plaintiff to be fired, after Plaintiff filed grievances against him;
Count 5: Retaliation claim against Defendant Harrington, for targeting Plaintiff for cell
shakedowns and interfering with his job and classroom attendance, after Plaintiff filed
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grievances against him.
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
articulated colorable federal claims in Counts 1, 4, and 5, which shall receive further review.
Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances or otherwise complaining
about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir.
2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002).

An inmate may maintain a

retaliation claim that a prison official issued him a fabricated disciplinary ticket after he engaged
in protected First Amendment activity, so long as his punishment did not include a loss of good
time. Antoine v. Ramos, 497 F. App’x 631, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2012).
Although Plaintiff may proceed on his claims in Counts 1, 4, and 5, he may not
pursue these claims together in one action. In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the
Seventh Circuit emphasized that unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate
lawsuits, “not only to prevent the sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits
“but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act. George, 507 F.3d at 607, (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g)). While Plaintiff complains of
retaliation in each of these counts, it is apparent from his factual allegations that Defendant
Casteel’s conduct in Count 1 was entirely unrelated to the retaliatory actions of Defendants
Johnson and Harrington which the Court has labeled as Counts 4 and 5. (On the other hand, the
claims against Johnson and Harrington are related, as they appear to have often acted in concert.)
Consistent with the George decision and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the

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Court shall sever Counts 4 and 5 of Plaintiff’s complaint, and shall open a single new case with a
newly-assigned case number for those claims. However, Plaintiff shall have an opportunity to
voluntarily dismiss the newly severed case if he does not wish to proceed on those claims or
incur the additional filing fee.
Turning to the claims in Counts 2 and 3, the Court concludes that they fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. These counts shall be dismissed pursuant to
§ 1915A.
Dismissal of Count 2 – Denial of Access to the Courts
“[T]he mere denial of access to a prison law library or to other legal materials is
not itself a violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right is to access the courts, and only if the
defendants’ conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious challenge to the prisoner’s conviction,
sentence, or conditions of confinement has this right been infringed.” Marshall v. Knight, 445
F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner’s complaint must “spell out, in minimal detail, the
connection between the alleged denial of access to legal materials and an inability to pursue a
legitimate challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions.” Id.
Plaintiff’s loss of access to the law library, in and of itself, did not violate his
constitutional rights. But Plaintiff also claims his loss of library privileges caused a delay in
filing a motion, apparently to seek credit against his sentence, and led to the theft of paperwork
he entrusted to a law clerk on that matter. In order to state a constitutional claim for that delay,
Plaintiff must be able to show “some quantum of detriment” to his ability to pursue a meritorious
legal claim. See Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009); Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d
862, 868 (7th Cir. 2004); Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1994). A delay in
pursuing a claim is not necessarily a detriment of constitutional significance. Kincaid v. Vail,

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969 F.2d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1062 (1993). Regardless of the length
of an alleged delay, a prisoner must show actual substantial prejudice to specific litigation.
Kincaid, 969 F.2d at 603. The complaint herein does not suggest that Plaintiff lost the ability to
pursue his claim, or experienced any detriment to that action, as a result of the delay caused by
Defendant Casteel. Likewise, he does not allege that the loss of his legal documents prejudiced
his case in any way other than some inconvenience. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted for denial of access to the courts. Count 2 shall be dismissed
without prejudice.
Dismissal of Count 3 – Failure to Respond to Grievances and Complaints
Defendant Martin’s refusal to respond to Plaintiff’s letter, and the repeated failure
of Defendants Mustsinger and Reeder to answer Plaintiff’s grievances, does not violate his
constitutional rights. “[A] state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1996). The Constitution requires no procedure at all, and the failure of state prison officials
to follow their own procedures does not, of itself, violate the Constitution. Maust v. Headley,
959 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1992); Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100-01 (7th Cir. 1982); see
also Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (mishandling of grievances “by
persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim”).
Plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies by using the prison
grievance process may be relevant in the event that a Defendant raises a challenge to Plaintiff’s
right to maintain a § 1983 suit over the substantive matters raised in the grievances. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008).

Nonetheless, a

Defendant’s action or inaction in handling Plaintiff’s grievances does not support an independent

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constitutional claim. Accordingly, Count 3, and Defendants Martin, Mustsinger, and Reeder,
shall be dismissed with prejudice.
Disposition
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. COUNT 3 is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.

Defendants MARTIN, MUSTSINGER, and

REEDER are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against
Defendants Johnson and Harrington (COUNTS 4 and 5), which are unrelated to the retaliation
claim against Defendant Casteel in Count 1, are SEVERED into a new case.
The new case SHALL BE ASSIGNED to the undersigned District Judge for
further proceedings. In the new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:
(1)
(2)
(3)

This Memorandum and Order
The Original Complaint and Exhibits (Doc. 1 and attachments)
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2)

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if, for any reason, he does not wish to proceed with the
newly-opened case, he must notify the Court in writing within 35 days (on or before April 21,
2014). Unless Plaintiff notifies the Court that he does not wish to pursue the newly opened
action, he will be responsible for an additional $350.00 filing fee in the new case. Service
shall not be ordered on Defendants Harrington and Johnson until after the deadline for Plaintiff’s
response.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claim remaining in this action is
COUNT 1, against Defendant Casteel. This case shall now be captioned as: LARRY C.
HAYES, JR., Plaintiff, vs. THEREASE CASTEEL, Defendant.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants HARRINGTON and
JOHNSON are TERMINATED from this action with prejudice.
As to COUNT 1, which remains in the instant case, the Clerk of Court shall
prepare for Defendant CASTEEL (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return
the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the
Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor
disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance
is entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by
the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date
on which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any
paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or
that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

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Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to the United States Magistrate
Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties
consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the
Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to
Plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action

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for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 17, 2014
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge

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