Watts v. 84 Lumber Company et al

Filing 472

ORDER DENYING 465 Motion to Alter Judgment Or Amend Order Denying Excelsior's Motion for Summary Judgment Based On Plaintiff's Newly Filed Rule 26(a)(3) Disclosures filed by Excelsior Packing & Gaskets. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 2/1/2016. (mah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STEVEN WATTS,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
84 LUMBER COMPANY et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 14-CV-327-SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Steven Watts brings this action alleging he sustained injuries as a result of exposure
to asbestos-containing products attributable to Excelsior Packing & Gasket Company (“Excelsior”)
and various other defendants. On January 28, 2016, this Court entered an order denying Excelsior’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 445). Now pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to
Alter Judgment Or Amend Order Denying Excelsior's Motion for Summary Judgment Based On
Plaintiff's Newly Filed Rule 26(a)(3) Disclosures (Doc. 465), which this Court construes as a motion
for reconsideration. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
At the outset, the Court must determine whether it can properly reconsider its order under
Rule 59(e) as requested. Rule 59(e) expressly provides for reconsideration of final judgments. See
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 59(e) (emphasis added).

The order denying Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment was not a final judgment, but interlocutory. Accordingly, Rule 59(e) is inapplicable.
However, district courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reconsideration is
committed to the court’s sound discretion.

See Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 704 (7th

Cir.1985); Harrisonville Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1074 (S.D.
Ill. 2006).

1

Reconsideration of an interlocutory order is proper where “the court has patently misunderstood a
party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties, or
has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to reconsider
would be a controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to
the court.” Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., No. 93–1143, 1996 WL 627616, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Oct.25, 1996)
(quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990)).
Generally, motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are discouraged. Wilson v. Cahokia
Sch. Dist. # 187, 470 F.Supp.2d 897, 913 (S.D.Ill.2007). This is because true manifest errors of law
and fact “rarely arise” and, consequently, “the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.” Neal,
1996 WL 627616, at *3 (quoting Bank of Waunakee, 906 F.2d at 1191).
Here, Excelsior seeks to alter or amend this Court’s order denying its motion for summary
judgment based on Plaintiff’s recent Rule 26(a)(3) disclosures. Specifically, Excelsior asserts that
Plaintiff’s disclosures fail to identify any evidence or witness to show that the Excelsior gaskets
Plaintiff claims he worked with or around actually contained asbestos. 1 Excelsior then restates the
same arguments made in its summary judgment motion. The motion does not identify a significant
change in facts warranting reconsideration. As such, Excelsior’s arguments fall short of the
extraordinary grounds needed for reconsideration. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 1, 2016
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

1

The Court previously found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of this fact to defeat summary
judgment. See Doc. 445.

2