Martinez v. Martin

Filing 3

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 4/8/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
GUADALUPE MARTINEZ, # B74030,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 14-cv-341-DRH

ALLEN MARTIN,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Petitioner Guadalupe Martinez, who is currently incarcerated in Shawnee
Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1).

He is serving twenty-five years for manufacturing

and/or delivering a controlled substance. In the petition, he claims that the trial
court erroneously allowed testimony suggesting that he was in custody prior to his
criminal trial (Doc. 1, pp. 6-9). The testimony allegedly violated the trial court’s
ruling on a motion in limine and deprived petitioner of his due process rights.
Petitioner seeks a new trial (Doc. 1, p. 11).
This matter is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the petition
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District
Courts. Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district court
judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” After carefully reviewing the
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petition and exhibits, the Court concludes that petitioner is clearly not entitled to
relief, and the petition must be dismissed.
Background
In January 2010, petitioner was charged with three crimes related to
cocaine distribution. See State of Illinois v. Martinez, 2012 WL 7018046, *1 (Ill.
App. 4 Dist.). His first trial ended in a mistrial, after a witness for the State
mentioned petitioner’s status as a parolee.

Id.

Following a second jury trial,

petitioner was found guilty of one count of unlawful delivery of less than fifteen
grams of a substance containing cocaine. Id. The trial court sentenced him to
twenty-five years of imprisonment on June 2, 2011 (Doc. 1, p. 1).
Petitioner appealed his conviction on June 23, 2011 (Doc. 1, p. 2). In the
appeal, petitioner primarily argued that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt because its key witness lacked credibility (Doc. 1, p. 2). See
also State of Illinois v. Martinez, 2012 WL 7018046, *1 (Ill. App. 4 Dist.).
Petitioner also argued that the inconsistent verdicts on the three charges resulted,
in part, from improper questioning of a State witness, which raised the inference
that petitioner was in custody prior to trial.

Id. at *6.

The appellate court

affirmed the trial court’s judgment on November 27, 2012. Id. at *7.
According to the petition, petitioner then filed a motion for rehearing with
the appellate court (Doc. 1, p. 3). However, the “paperwork was sent home,” and
the case was dismissed. Petitioner sought review of the appellate court’s decision
in the Illinois Supreme Court. The petition for leave to appeal (“PLA”) was denied

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on September 25, 2013. People v. Martinez, 996 N.E.2d 20 (Ill. 2013) (Table)
(Doc. 1, p. 3).
The Habeas Petition
In his habeas petition, petitioner claims that his due process rights were
violated at trial when the State’s attorney inquired into the number of “visits” one
of the State’s witnesses made to see petitioner (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7, 11). After the trial
court granted a motion in limine prohibiting testimony about petitioner’s custody
status, the State’s attorney allegedly asked a witness, “You visited him about 130
times over the last year, isn’t that true?” Petitioner maintains that this question
raised the inference that he was in prison and amounted to a violation of the trial
court’s order.
He asserts that the trial judge should have held a separate hearing to
determine whether prejudice resulted from the question. Petitioner argues that
he also should have been allowed to violate the motion in limine by introducing
evidence of conversations he had while in custody (Doc. 1, p. 8). According to the
petition, this question resulted in a violation of petitioner’s due process rights and
warrants a new trial (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8).
Discussion
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a
federal court may grant habeas relief only when a petitioner first shows that “he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). When a state court has ruled on the merits of a habeas

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claim, the petitioner must also show that his detention was the result of a state
court decision that was (1) “contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States;” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

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U.S.C. § 2254(d). As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the AEDPA’s
complicated and highly deferential standard is “difficult to meet.” Harrington v.
Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011).
Even at this early stage, the petition fails to meet the standard and shall be
dismissed. The petition challenges the trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine
and the uniform application of that ruling to the parties at trial. The admissibility
of evidence falls squarely within the purview of state law. Federal courts do no sit
in review of a state court’s application of its own state law. See, e.g., Swarthout
v. Cooke, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (“We have stated many times that
federal

habeas

corpus

relief

does

not

lie

for

errors

of

state

law.”)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “That means that the erroneous
admission under state rules of evidence is no concern . . . unless it is so
egregiously prejudicial as to implicate constitutional principles.” Richardson v.
Lemke, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 931112, *14 (7th Cir. 2014).
Petitioner’s attempt to couch his claim in due process terms fails. As the
Seventh Circuit recently reiterated, “[s]tate court evidentiary rulings only implicate
the Due Process Clause when evidence ‘is so extremely unfair that its admission

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violates fundamental conceptions of justice[.]’”

Id. at *14 (citing Perry v. New

Hampshire, --- U.S. ---, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012) (quoting Dowling v. United
States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). “This fundamental limitation on the habeas
corpus jurisdiction may not be got round by the facile equation of state
procedural error to due process denial.” Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169, 170
(citing Jones v. Thieret, 846 F.2d 457, 459-61 (7th Cir. 1988)).
The petition does not suggest that the alleged error in allowing the State’s
attorney to inquire into “visits” with petitioner was of a character or magnitude
cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus.

The reference to this question is

ambiguous and does not establish that there was any error at all--let alone an
error that was so highly prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. Petitioner only
suggests that some prejudice may have resulted from the question. Regardless,
he suggests that both parties should have been allowed to offer testimony about
events that occurred while he was in custody1 (Doc. 1, p. 8). When distilled to its
essence, the petition challenges the Court’s evidentiary ruling, not a constitutional
violation. The Court rejects petitioner’s attempt to cast this claim as one rooted
in federal law. Based on the foregoing discussion, the habeas petition (Doc. 1)
shall be dismissed.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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The petition states, “Had the judge conducted this type of hearing, he may have rescinded the
original order of the Motion in Limine and then this defendant could have brought forth all the
telephone conversations of Ms. Coon when she came and visited the defendant, which would have
shown what was being discussed at the time” (Doc. 1, p. 8).

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DISMISSED on the merits with prejudice.
If petitioner wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal
with this court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”) should set forth the issues
petitioner plans to present on appeal.

See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C).

If

petitioner does choose to appeal and is allowed to proceed IFP, he will be
required to pay a portion of the $505.00 appellate filing fee in order to pursue his
appeal (the amount to be determined based on his prison trust fund account
records for the past six months) irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See
FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724,
725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999);
Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A timely motion filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal
deadline.
Should petitioner desire to appeal this Court’s ruling dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, he must first secure a certificate of
appealability, either from this Court or from the court of appeals. See FED. R.
APP. P. 22(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a certificate
of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.”
This requirement has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that
an applicant must show that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

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assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner need not show that his appeal will succeed,
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003), but petitioner must show
“something more than the absence of frivolity” or the existence of mere “good
faith” on his part. Id. at 338 (citation omitted). If the district court denies the
request, a petitioner may request that a circuit judge issue the certificate. FED. R.
APP. P. 22(b)(1)-(3).
For the reasons detailed above, the Court has determined that petitioner is
not entitled to relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Furthermore, the Court finds
no basis for a determination that its decision is debatable or incorrect. Petitioner
has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that a certificate of appealability shall NOT
be issued.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

David R.
Herndon
2014.04.08
12:13:45 -05'00'

DATED: April 8, 2014

Chief Judge
United States District Court

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