Adams v. Harrington
Filing
135
ORDER GRANTING IN PART and DENYING IN PART 110 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Richard Harrington. The Motion is GRANTED as to the portion of the deliberate indifference claim against Harrington in his official capacity. It is also GRANTED as to the portion alleging Harrington was deliberately indifferent to the medical care Plaintiff received for his diabetes. It is DENIED as to as to the portion alleging Harrington was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's burn ed feet. This matter shall now proceed to trial on Count 1 alleging deliberate indifference against Defendant Harrington as to Plaintiff's burned feet and on Count 2 alleging excessive force against Defendant Bradley Stirnaman. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 1/31/17. (klh2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BYRON E. ADAMS,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD HARRINGTON and
BRADLEY J. STIRNAMAN,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:14-CV-366-NJR-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Currently pending before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
filed by Defendant Richard Harrington on August 29, 2016 (Doc. 110). For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Byron Adams is an inmate in the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who was formerly incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. He alleges that
he suffered second degree burns on the bottoms of his feet from the floor of his cell,
which was dangerously hot because of deteriorating steam pipes that ran underneath
the floor. Adams asserted claims against Richard Harrington, the former warden at
Menard, for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and for unconstitutional
conditions of confinement (Doc. 34). Adams sued Warden Harrington in both his
individual and official capacities (Doc. 34).
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The conditions of confinement claim was later dismissed because Adams failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit (Doc. 78). Warden Harrington has
now moved for summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim (Doc. 110).
Adams concedes that summary judgment should be granted on the portion of the claim
directed at Warden Harrington in his official capacity, because any claim for money
damages is barred by sovereign immunity, and the request for injunctive relief is moot
(Doc. 115, p. 2, n.1). Thus the only issue before the Court is whether summary judgment
is appropriate on the deliberate indifference claim against Warden Harrington in his
individual capacity.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed except where noted. Byron Adams was
incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center from January 9, 2013 to June 11, 2014 (Doc.
111-1). For most of that time period, Defendant Richard Harrington was the warden
(Doc. 111-2). 1
Menard uses a steam heating system to heat the prison in the winter (Doc. 115-1).
Some of the pipes that carry the steam run underneath the concrete floors of the South
Lowers Cell House at Menard (Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1). Those pipes have deteriorated,
which allows steam to escape (Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1). Because there is no insulation in the
floors of the South Lowers, the steam makes the floors hot during the winter months,
particularly in gallery one, where Adams was housed (Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1; Doc. 115-2).
According to Adams, the floor of his cell were extremely hot—“hot enough to cook a pot
1
Harrington retired on April 16, 2014 (Doc. 111; Doc. 111-2). He was replaced by Kimberly Butler.
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of beans on” or to heat water (Doc. 111-1). In evidence previously submitted to the
Court, another inmate named Ronald Turner corroborated Adams’s statements
(Doc. 111-1; Doc. 54-3). Mr. Turner also stated that inmates in gallery one had to put their
food in bags and hang them on the wall along with their laundry bags so that their
belongings were not damaged (Doc. 54-3). He also stated that officers in charge of
gallery one previously distributed fans, to help the inmates cope with the heat, and
blankets, so the inmates could move around their cells and prop up their property boxes
to prevent their belongings from being ruined (Id.). Finally, he stated that other inmates
have been burned by the floors and have filed grievances about the temperature of the
floors (Id.). Prison officials deny knowledge of these claims (Doc. 111-3; Doc. 115-2).
In November 2013, the Chief Stationary Engineer at Menard began to consider a
large scale maintenance project to replace the plumbing and porcelain fixtures in the
South Lowers and to fully repair the condensate piping (Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1). Given the
scope of the project and the estimated cost—$5.7 million—the warden’s approval was
required for the project (Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1). The project was expected to begin in
October 2014, but was put on hold because of the Illinois budget crisis (Doc. 115;
Doc. 115-1). Instead, as a temporary fix, the Chief Stationary Engineer shut off the steam
flowing through the condensate piping in late 2014 or early 2015, which remains off to
this day (Doc. 115; Doc. 115-1).
That fix, however, came too late for Adams. Sometime in January 2014, Adams
was transferred to cell 118 of the South Lowers (Doc. 111-1). Unfortunately, Adams has
diabetes and suffers from various medical complications as a result of that disease,
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including diabetic neuropathy (Doc. 111-1). 2 Because of the neuropathy, Adams was
unable to feel the temperature of the floor through his feet (Id.). On January 27th, while
watching TV in his cell, Adams noticed blood and pus in his socks (Id.). The next
morning when he took his sock off, Adams saw “a big blister on the bottom of my foot
and the skin was hanging off” (Id.). His cellmate called for help, a medtech and a
lieutenant responded, and they immediately took Adams to the Health Care Unit (Id.).
Adams was diagnosed with second degree burns (Doc. 130). Adams testified that he told
a nurse in the Health Care Unit that the “floors burnt my feet” (Doc. 111-1). He spent a
total of thirty-seven days in the Health Care Unit being treated for his burns (Doc. 130).
Adams was discharged from the Health Care Unit on March 5, 2014, and taken
back to the South Lowers and placed in cell 114 (Doc. 111-1). He claims the floor in cell
114 was as hot as the floor in his previous cell (Doc. 111-1). Within a couple of days, he
had again burned his feet on the floor (Id.). He returned to the Health Care Unit for
treatment on March 11th and remained there until he was transferred out of Menard in
June 2014 (Id.).
Following the January incident, an incident report was filled out indicating that
Adams was taken to the Health Care Unit with burns on his feet (Doc. 111-2). Warden
Harrington admitted that he signed the incident report (Id.). Warden Harrington claims
the incident report did not mention Adams’s claim that the burns came from the floor of
Adams’s medical condition was fully set forth in this Court’s previous Order on Defendant Samuel
Nwaobasi’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 130).
2
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his cell (Doc. 111, pp. 4, 7). 3 Regardless, Adams testified that a day or two after he was
admitted to the Health Care Unit, an Internal Affairs officer came to speak to him about
his injury, which Warden Harrington does not dispute (see Doc. 111). Adams testified
that he told the officer that he burned his feet on the floor of his cell, and the officer then
went to the cell to check the floor himself (Id.). Adams said the officer returned to the
Health Care Unit and confirmed that the floor was, in fact, very hot (Id.)
Adams also testified that following the January incident he wrote three or four
letters to Warden Harrington (Doc. 111, p. 4 ¶28; Doc. 111-1, p. 48). In these letters,
Adams talked about the burns to his feet and the incident involving Defendant Bradley
Stirnaman (Doc. 111-1, p. 49). He also mentioned that he was diabetic (Id.). Warden
Harrington, of course, denied seeing these letters (Doc. 111-2).
Adams also submitted an emergency grievance on March 18, 2014 (Doc. 1-1, p. 3;
Doc. 111, p. 5 ¶30; Doc. 115, p. 6 ¶21). Under the IDOC’s grievance procedures, an
emergency grievance is supposed to go straight to the warden (Doc. 111-2). The
grievance states that he burned his feet on the hot floor in cell 118 on January 27, 2014,
that he is a diabetic and has neuropathy, and that he burned his feet again in cell 114 on
March 5, 2014 (Doc. 1-1, pp. 3-4). Adams requested “a special shoe to wear” and to be
taken to an outside hospital so that “my feet can be treated right” (Id.). Again, Warden
Harrington denied seeing this grievance (Doc. 111-2).
3
For some reason, the incident report was not submitted to the Court, even though it undoubtedly
exists— a copy of it was presented to Warden Harrington at his deposition (see Doc. 111-2, p. 20).
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DISCUSSION
The standard applied to summary judgment motions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 is well-settled and has been succinctly stated as follows:
Summary judgment is appropriate where the admissible evidence shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A “material fact“ is one
identified by the substantive law as affecting the outcome of the suit. A
“genuine issue” exists with respect to any such material fact . . . when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” On the other hand, where the factual record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is nothing for a jury to do. In determining whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists, we view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.
Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
Before discussing whether Adams can survive summary judgment on his
deliberate indifference claim, the Court will first discuss the relationship between this
claim and the conditions of confinement claim, which again, has already been dismissed.
The Court believes this discussion will be helpful, because it was a bit challenging to
discern the line between Adams’s conditions of confinement claim and his deliberate
indifference claim, given that they both involve (to some degree) the dangerously hot
floor in Adams’s cell.
As the Court sees it, the conditions of confinement claim against Warden
Harrington is based on the allegations that Adams was subjected to an excessively hot
floor in his cell, which the warden knew about but failed to address—even though the
risk of physical harm from the hot floor was obvious (particularly for an inmate who
suffered from diabetic neuropathy in his feet). This claim could have been asserted by
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any inmate housed in gallery one of the South Lowers. The deliberate indifference claim
is a spin-off of the conditions of confinement claim and arose after Adams burned his
feet on the hot floor as a result of his diabetic neuropathy. The deliberate indifference
claim is unique to Adams. Adams alleges that the burns, along with his diabetes and
corresponding neuropathy, constitute serious medical conditions. Adams further alleges
that the warden knew about his medical conditions but was deliberately indifferent to
them when he failed to ensure that Adams was not returned to a cell with a hot floor,
failed to ensure Adams was receiving adequate medical care, and failed to refer Adams
to an outside physician.
The Court acknowledges that the portion of the deliberate indifference claim
regarding Adams’s return to a cell with a hot floor could be characterized as a conditions
of confinement claim. That is, the hot floor posed an unsafe condition of confinement,
which was made even more unsafe because Adams suffered from diabetic neuropathy
and was still recovering from the burns he had already sustained when he was returned
to a cell with a hot floor. Given the circumstances of this case and the interplay between
his medical conditions and the condition of his cell, however, the Court believes this
portion of the claim can also be appropriately framed as a claim for deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need.
Now on to the merits of the deliberate indifference claim. In order to prevail on a
claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, there are “two high hurdles,
which every inmate-plaintiff must clear.” Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago Cnty., 165
F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical
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condition was “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-653
(7th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the “prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,”
that is, they were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition. Greeno, 414 F.3d at
653.
Warden Harrington does not dispute that Adams’s diabetes and the burns to his
feet constituted serious medical conditions (see Doc. 111). Thus the only question for the
Court is whether Warden Harrington acted with deliberate indifference with respect to
these conditions. Deliberate indifference “requires more than negligence and it
approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063,
1073 (7th Cir. 2012); accord Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Deliberate
indifference is intentional or reckless conduct, not mere negligence.”); McGowan v.
Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[N]egligence, even gross negligence, does not
violate the Constitution.”). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference if he knows
of a serious risk to the prisoner’s health and consciously disregards that risk. Holloway,
700 F.3d at 1073. Put differently, the prison official “must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and
“must also draw the inference.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (citation omitted).
Non-medical staff at the prison, such as Warden Harrington, are “entitled to defer
to the judgment of jail health professionals so long as [they] did not ignore [the
prisoner].” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (alterations in original)
(quoting Berry, 604 F.3d at 440). Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011)
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(“Non-medical defendants cannot simply ignore an inmate’s plight.”); see also Greeno, 414
F.3d at 656 (stating that “[p]erhaps it would be a different matter if [the non-medical
defendant] had ignored Greeno’s complaints entirely, but we can see no deliberate
indifference given that he investigated the complaints and referred them to the medical
providers who could be expected to address Greeno’s concerns.”). “The only exception
to this rule is that nonmedical officers may be found deliberately indifferent if ‘they have
a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.’” King, 680 F.3d at 1018 (citing Hayes v. Snyder,
546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Warden Harrington argues that he cannot be found deliberately indifferent
because he “was not sufficiently aware of Plaintiff’s medical ailments” (Doc. 11, p. 8).
However, the incident report signed by Warden Harrington demonstrates he knew
about Adams’s burns. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir. 2016). There is also
evidence from which a rational jury could conclude Warden Harrington knew about
Adams’s diabetes and neuropathy. Adams testified that he sent a number of letters to
Warden Harrington after he burned his feet in January 2014 that indicated, in part, that
he was diabetic (Doc. 111, p. 4 ¶21; Doc. 111-2). Adams also submitted an emergency
grievance, which would have gone directly to Warden Harrington, after he burned his
feet for the second time in March 2014 (Doc. 1-1, pp. 3–4). He explicitly says in the
grievance that he is “a diabetic with NEUROPATHY to my feet with no feeling” (Doc.
1-1, p. 3; Doc. 111-1). Warden Harrington claims he never received any of Adams’s
letters or the grievance, but a jury is entitled to disbelieve that claim.
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Even if it was true that Warden Harrington never saw Adams’s letters or his
grievance, a jury could still infer that he was aware of Adams’s diabetes and neuropathy.
Warden Harrington indisputably knew about Adams’s burns given that he signed an
incident report describing them. One would think that after being notified an inmate
was found in his cell with second degree burns the warden would want to know how such
an injury could have possibly occurred in his facility. It is simply not believable that the
warden shrugged it off and did not make any attempt to investigate. In turn, it is
patently evident that even the most cursory investigation would include asking why
Adams was the only inmate on gallery one who sustained burn injuries from the hot
floor and/or why on earth his injury was so severe. The answer to both of those
questions is because he suffered from diabetic neuropathy. Simply put, it would not be
difficult for a jury to conclude that Warden Harrington must have known about
Adams’s diabetic neuropathy.
Warden Harrington next argues that he was not deliberately indifferent when
Adams was discharged from the Health Care Unit back to the South Lowers because the
warden was not aware that the cell floors were allegedly hot, and there is no evidence
that they actually were hot (Doc. 111, pp. 3, 9). First, there is plenty of evidence that the
floors were hot; there is Adams’s testimony, Ronald Turner’s testimony, and the Chief
Stationary Engineer’s testimony. Second, no rational jury would believe that Warden
Harrington was unaware of the hot floors. There was the pending repair project. Adams
also told an Internal Affairs officer that the burns on his feet were from the floor of his
cell, and the officer admitted the floors were hot after checking them himself (Doc.
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111-2). And Dr. Samuel Nwaobasi testified that he was “sure” the warden was made
aware that Adams burned his feet on the cell floor because Dr. Nwaobasi or one of the
other doctors in the Health Care Unit “must have” reported it (Doc. 116-5, p. 27). But
even without those things, a jury could still infer that Warden Harrington knew about
the hot cell floors because the warden can realistically be expected to know about major
infrastructure problems at his facility. See Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1008 (7th Cir.
2016) (holding jury could infer that warden was aware of pest infestations at the prison);
Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1999) (“defendants such as the Sheriff and
the Director of the Jail can realistically be expected to know about or participate in
creating systematic jail conditions” such as “inadequate hygiene”).
A jury that credits Adams’s evidence and believes that Warden Harrington knew
about the hot floors, knew about Adams’s burns, and knew about Adams’s diabetic
neuropathy could also find that the warden was deliberately indifferent. Specifically, a
rational jury could conclude that after Adams burned his feet the first time, Warden
Harrington should have been compelled to ensure that Adams was not returned to a cell
with a hot floor after he was discharged from the Health Care Unit. But there is no
evidence that Warden Harrington took any action whatsoever. A rational jury could also
conclude that after Adams burned his feet a second time and submitted his emergency
grievance, Warden Harrington should have been compelled to verify that Adams was in
fact removed from the South Lowers and was receiving medical care. But again, there is
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no evidence that Warden Harrington took any action whatsoever. 4 Consequently, the
Court believes Adams has demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether Warden
Harrington was deliberately indifferent with respect to Adams’s burn injuries.
The Court finds the opposite is true, however, with respect to the treatment of
Adams’s diabetes. There is no dispute that Warden Harrington generally has no
knowledge about diabetes or diabetes care and that he defers to the judgment of the
medical staff at Menard. And there is nothing from which a rational jury could conclude
that Warden Harrington had reason to question that judgment. In particular, when
Adams testified about the contents of the letters he wrote to the warden, he in no way
suggested that his diabetes was not being treated appropriately (see Doc. 111-1). There is
no indication that the incident report mentioned anything about the treatment Adams
was receiving for his diabetes. And the March 2014 emergency grievance also was
insufficient to inform the warden that intervention as to the treatment of Adams’s
diabetes was warranted. The grievance is all about Adams’s burns and the care he was,
or was not, receiving for his feet. While the grievance mentioned that Adams was
diabetic, it was merely to inform the warden that his medical condition makes him
susceptible to burns. It did not state that the care Adams was receiving for his diabetes
was inadequate. Nor did it suggest that the inadequate medical care for his diabetes is
what led to the burns. Accordingly, none of the communications to Warden Harrington
This conclusion, of course, could only be reached if a jury believed that Adams in fact informed the
warden of his condition—that his grievance was received and read by the warden. There is no evidence
that Adams actually spoke to Warden Harrington about any of his concerns.
4
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could have informed him that there was a risk of harm related to the medical care that
Adams was receiving for his diabetes.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Warden Harrington is entitled to
summary judgment on the portion of Count 1 related to the medical treatment of
Adams’s diabetes, but not on the portion related to Adams’s burn wounds. In light of
this conclusion, the Court must address Warden Harrington’s argument that he is
protected by qualified immunity (Doc. 111, pp. 9–11).
“Generally, qualified immunity protects government agents from liability when
their actions do not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’” Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 634
F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Purvis v. Oest, 614 F.3d 713, 720 (7th Cir. 2010)). “It
protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”
Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 249 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the
Court must ask two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
Hernandez, 634 F.3d at 914 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 202 (2001)).
As set forth above, Adams has set forth enough facts for a jury to find that
Warden Harrington violated his constitutional rights. And, as further set forth above, it
has long been held that jail personnel cannot simply ignore an inmate’s complaints about
inadequate medical care. King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012); Greeno v.
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Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Warden Harrington is not entitled
to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendant
Richard Harrington (Doc. 110) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion
is GRANTED as to the portion of the deliberate indifference claim against Harrington in
his official capacity. It is also GRANTED as to the portion alleging Harrington was
deliberately indifferent to the medical care Adams received for his diabetes. It is
DENIED as to as to the portion alleging Harrington was deliberately indifferent to
Adams’s burned feet.
This matter shall now proceed to trial on Count 1 alleging deliberate indifference
against Defendant Harrington as to Adams’s burned feet and on Count 2 alleging
excessive force against Defendant Bradley Stirnaman.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 31, 2017
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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