Williams v. Compton

Filing 1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER severing case no. 14-298-MJR. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 3/26/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BYRON C. WILLIAMS,
No. B88932,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS TRICE, and
C/O COMPTON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-00298-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Byron C. Williams, an inmate in Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this
action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on
incidents that occurred at the St. Clair County Jail while Plaintiff was, presumably a pretrial
detainee. 1
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

1

The checkbox on the complaint form for a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,
2671-2680 was also selected marked. Because the FTCA is applicable only if action by a federal agent is at issue,
no FTCA claims have been recognized. Any such claims may be considered dismissed with prejudice.
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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. at 557.

At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
According to the complaint, in November 2012, Captain Thomas Trice verbally abused
Plaintiff and slapped the back of Plaintiff’s head without penological justification, causing
Plaintiff to hit his head on a rail. Plaintiff was in excruciating pain, but he remained silent. Trice
then used a K-9 dog to threaten and intimidate Plaintiff, to the point Plaintiff began to cry and he
urinated on himself.

Plaintiff later noticed that during the course of events his face was

scratched. Plaintiff describes subsequently asking for, but not receiving, medical care, but he
does not identify to whom the request was made.
The complaint describes a second incident that occurred in April 2013. Plaintiff refused
to sign acknowledging receipt of a disciplinary violation report issued by C/O Compton.
Compton then handcuffed Plaintiff, punched him in the kidneys, slammed him to the ground and
kicked Plaintiff twice in the head. Compton then placed a door key between his fingers and
started punching Plaintiff in the stomach and ribs. C/O Compton then grabbed Plaintiff by the
collar and pulled him up so the men were face-to-face. Compton stated that the assault was to be

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a lesson, and that Plaintiff was lucky that Compton had not taken him to the laundry room and
beaten him bloody, “like the old days.” Compton then kicked Plaintiff in the crotch, un-cuffed
him, and left him lying on the cell floor.
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro
se action into two counts. The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future
pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.

The

designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as to their merit.
Count 1: In November 2012, Captain Thomas Trice used excessive force
against Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and
Count 2: In April 2013, C/O Compton used excessive force against Plaintiff
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
No claim has been recognized relative to the denial of medical care after Captain Trice
assaulted Plaintiff because those allegations, read in context, are chronologically separate and not
linked to Trice. Any such claim should be considered dismissed without prejudice, as it has not
been adequately pleaded under the Twombly standard.
Discussion
The constitutional standards applicable to Plaintiff’s claims are determined based on
whether he was an arrestee, detainee or convict. Based on the allegations in the complaint, it is
assumed that Plaintiff Williams was a pretrial detainee at all relevant times. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees
that amount to punishment. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008).

Although the Fourteenth

Amendment offers broader protection, Eighth Amendment case law can generally be used in
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evaluating such Fourteenth Amendment claims; for all relevant purposes, the standards are
interchangeable. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __F.3d__, 2014 WL 806956, *4 -*5 (7th Cir.
March 3, 2014); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012); Forest
v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2010).
A detainee is entitled to protection from physically abusive government conduct that
amounts to punishment without due process of law. Kingsley, __F.3d__, 2014 WL 806956, *4 *5 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n. 16, 447 (1979)). The alleged assaults by
Captain Trice and C/O Compton would fall within the scope of Fourteenth Amendment
protection; therefore, Count 1 and 2 state colorable constitutional claims.
Severance
Although Counts 1 and 2 both state colorable claims, those two counts cannot proceed in
the same action.
In George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007), the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate lawsuits, “not only to prevent the
sort of morass” produced by multi-claim, multi-defendant suits “but also to ensure that prisoners
pay the required filing fees” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. George, 507 F.3d at 607,
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (g)). “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in
different suits[.]” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Otherwise, prisoners
easily could sidestep the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”),
Pub.L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), in particular the PLRA’s provisions regarding filing
fees. See id. Rule 18 provides that “[a] party asserting a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or
third-party claim may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against
an opposing party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a). Accordingly, “multiple claims against a single party are

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fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against
Defendant 2.” George, 507 F.3d at 607.
Count 1 against Captain Trice has nothing to do with Count 2 against C/O Compton.
Consistent with the George decision, Count 1 shall proceed in this case. The Court shall sever
Count 2 and open a new case with a newly-assigned case number for that claim. Plaintiff shall
have an opportunity to voluntarily dismiss the newly severed case if he does not wish to proceed
on that claim or incur the additional filing fee.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated,

COUNT 2 against Defendant

C/O COMPTON is SEVERED into a new case, asserting the following claim:
In April 2013 C/O Compton used excessive force against Plaintiff in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The new case SHALL BE RANDOMLY ASSIGNED to a District Judge for further
proceedings.
In the new case, the Clerk is DIRECTED to file the following documents:
(1)

This Memorandum and Order; and

(2)

The Original Complaint (Doc. 1).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff another form motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that if, for any reason, he does not wish to proceed with the newlyopened case, he must notify the Court in writing within 30 days (on or before April 25, 2014).
Unless Plaintiff notifies the Court that he does not wish to pursue the newly opened action, he
will be responsible for an additional $400.00 filing fee in the new case. Service shall not be
ordered on Defendant C/O Compton until after the deadline for Plaintiff’s response.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the only claim remaining in this action is COUNT
1 against Defendant THOMAS TRICE. COUNT 1 shall PROCEED against THOMAS
TRICE. Plaintiff is ADVISED that the Court is still awaiting either payment of the $400.00
filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis relative to this case (see Doc. 3). Failure to
address the outstanding filing fee likely will result in the dismissal of this action.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant THOMAS TRICE: (1) Form 5 (Notice
of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service
of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this
Memorandum and Order to the Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.
If Defendant Trice fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to
the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps
to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs
of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If Defendant Trice no longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or
disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.
Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendant or counsel. Any paper received

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by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to a United States
Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter shall be REFERRED to a United States Magistrate for
disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to
such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, notwithstanding
that an application to proceed in forma pauperis may have been granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time an application is made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will

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cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 26, 2014
s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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