Hughes v. Quinn et al

Filing 4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint on or before June 6, 2014. Plaintiff is ADVISED that failure to file an amended complaint will result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and failure to prosecute this action. (Action due by 6/6/2014). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 5/9/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MATTHEW R. HUGHES,
No. R42460,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PATRICK J. QUINN,
LISA M. MADIGAN,
DIANE L. SALTOUN,
LAURA MILLER,
JOHN H. WANK,
EVELYN DIAZ, and
UNKNOWN PARTY,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-00426-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Matthew R. Hughes, an inmate in Hill Correctional Center, brings this action for
deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on events that
occurred at Chester Mental Health Center (“Chester”) between September and November 2013.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable
claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.

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An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers
to a claim that “no reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.” Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d
1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must
cross “the line between possibility and plausibility. Id. at 557.

At this juncture, the factual

allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was housed at Chester between September and
November 2013.

During that time he witnessed excessive force being used against other

“consumers,” and other conditions of confinement and so-called “treatment” that he contends
make Chester a “politically correct Auschwitcz.” Plaintiff proposes a class action on behalf of
himself and all “seriously mentally ill consumers [at] Chester.”
As pleaded, the complaint cannot proceed as a civil rights action brought by Plaintiff as
an individual; consequently, the issue of class certification cannot even be reached.
First and foremost, as drafted the complaint does not indicate that Plaintiff has standing
to sue. Absent a case or controversy, a litigant does not have standing to sue and the court lacks
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Markadonatos
v. Village of Woodridge, 739 F.3d 984, 987 (7th Cir. 2014).
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized; and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
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‘hypothetical,’ ”. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent
action of some third party not before the court.”. Third, it must be “likely,” as
opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable
decision.”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561 (internal citations omitted). Standing is a jurisdictional requirement
that cannot be waived. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (plaintiffs asserting a
constitutional challenge to a congressional redistricting plan did not have standing to assert the
claim because they did not live in the affected area and had not personally been subject to the
allegedly unconstitutional scheme).
The complaint details what Plaintiff witnessed happening to other consumers. The only
allegations regarding Plaintiff are (1) the general assertion that the treatment at Chester is
“barbaric, sick [and] senseless,” and a vague reference to his “constitutional privacy rights”
being violated (Doc. 1, pp. 9, 12). These general, vague assertions do not satisfy the Twombly
pleading threshold. Furthermore, personal involvement by each named defendant and causation
are required for Section 1983 liability. Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th
Cir. 2005); Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, Ill., 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff
only offers his conclusion that all of the wrongs he has witnessed occurring to others were due to
a cover up by the defendant Illinois officials. Again, conclusory allegations do not satisfy the
Twombly pleading standard.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated, the complaint (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED without prejudice.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED leave to file an
amended complaint on or before June 6, 2014.

Any amended complaint will undergo

preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that failure to file an amended complaint will result in the
dismissal of this action with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and failure to
prosecute this action. See FED.R.CIV.P. 41(b). A “strike” may also be assessed in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7
days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 9, 2014
s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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