Walker v. Harrington et al

Filing 109

ORDER DENYING 98 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 5/1/2017. (bak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HENRY WALKER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KYLE EDWARDS, RICHARD
RANSON, CLAYTON YOUNG,
CHRISTOPHER FLEMING,
UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES OF
MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
JEFF HUTCHINSON, RICK
HARRINGTON, and MIKE
ATCHISON,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:14-CV-429-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on a Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Michael Atchison, Kyle Edwards, Christopher Fleming, Jeffrey Hutchinson, Richard
Ranson, and Clayton Young (Doc. 98). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
denied.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Henry Walker (“Walker”), an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that officials at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard CC”) failed to protect
him from being physically attacked by other inmates.
On July 28, 2016, Attorney Vincenzo Field was assigned to represent Walker in
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this matter (Doc. 75). Counsel for Walker sought leave to file a second amended
complaint on October 7, 2016 (Doc. 83). After noting that no objection was filed in
response to the request for leave, the Court granted Walker’s motion, and his Second
Amended Complaint was filed on November 30, 2016 (Doc. 88).
On January 3, 2017, Defendants Atchison, Edwards, Fleming, Hutchinson,
Ranson, and Young filed the Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 98) that is now before the
Court1. In their motion, Defendants move to dismiss Count VI (Section 1983 conspiracy
claim) and Count X (claim for indemnification pursuant to Illinois law) of Walker’s
Second Amended Complaint asserting he fails to state a claim as to both counts. Walker
filed a timely response to Defendants’ motion arguing that the allegations in his Second
Amended Complaint are sufficient to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim. Walker also
indicates that he did not intend to bring a claim for indemnification; rather, his Second
Amended Complaint only indicates that Defendant Officers are indemnified by the State
under the State Employee Indemnification Act, 5 ILCS 350, et seq. Accordingly, Walker
asserts there is simply no claim for indemnification for the Court to dismiss.
LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint and draws all possible inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See
Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) (quotations
omitted). A plaintiff need not set out all relevant facts or recite the law in his or her
The Court notes that Defendants’ motion was filed beyond the allowable timeframe. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15, responses to an amended pleading must be made within fourteen days after
service of the amended pleading. Because Walker does not object to the timeliness of Defendants’ motion,
however, the Court will not deny Defendants’ motion on this basis.
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complaint; however, the plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement that shows
that he or she is entitled to relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint will not be
dismissed if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
DISCUSSION
A. Count VI
With regard to Count VI, Walker’s §1983 conspiracy claim, the Seventh Circuit
has remarked that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy merely to indicate the parties,
general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is
charged with.” Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002). While both
Walker and Defendants agree that this is the relevant pleading standard, the parties
have vastly different opinions regarding whether Walker’s allegations are sufficient to
meet it. After reviewing the entirety of the allegations in his Second Amended
Complaint, the Court finds Walker sufficiently pled his conspiracy claim. First, Walker’s
complaint indicates that the claim is directed at the correctional officer defendants.
Second, the general purpose of the conspiracy is set forth as an attempt to deprive
Walker of his constitutional rights and protect one another from liability (and the
narrative portion of Walker’s complaint sets forth particular allegations regarding each
correctional officer defendant that lends support for an inference of a conspiracy).
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Finally, the approximate date of the agreement has been identified as around May 2013.
While these allegations may not provide much in the way of specifics, coupled with the
narrative in Walker’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds them to be sufficient
to adequately state a claim for conspiracy. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
this claim is denied.
B. Count X
Based on Walker’s assertion that Count X was not intended to be a separate claim
for indemnification, but rather a statement that Defendant Officers are indemnified by
the State under the State Employee Indemnification Act (a point on which Defendants
agree), Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants
Atchison, Edwards, Fleming, Hutchinson, Ranson, and Young (Doc. 98) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 1, 2017
s/ Nancy J. Rosenstengel___________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

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