Willis v. Godinez et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2, and 3 are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that DEFENDANTS GODINEZ, HARRINGTON, VEATH, OAKLEY, and GILLE are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/16/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CHARLES WILLIS, # K-83267,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SALBADORE A. GODINEZ,
RICHARD HARRINGTON,
MARK M. GILLE, LORI OAKLEY,
and TIMOTHY R. VEATH,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-00445-JPG

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Charles Willis, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights following his involvement in a fight at Western Illinois Correctional Center
(“Western”) (Doc. 1). Plaintiff claims that he was punished with a 6-month contact restriction
and a year of segregation, demotion to C-grade, and commissary restriction for a disciplinary
ticket and hearing that violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal
protection of the law.

Plaintiff now sues Defendants Godinez (Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) director), Harrington (Menard warden), Gille (Western intelligence
officer), Veath (Menard adjustment committee chairman), and Oakley (Menard grievance
officer) for these Fourteenth Amendment violations (Doc. 1, pp. 6-11).

Plaintiff seeks

expungement of his disciplinary record, injunctive relief, and monetary damages (Doc. 1, p. 12).

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Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner

complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief

must

cross

“the

line

between

possibility

and

plausibility.”

Id.

at

557.

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). After carefully considering the allegations in the complaint, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal under § 1915A.

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The Complaint
According to the complaint and exhibits, Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with
another inmate at Western on March 13, 20131 (Doc. 1, p. 15). Plaintiff claims that he fought
Inmate Crawford after the two “had words” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Several confidential informants
reported that a gang leader ordered Plaintiff to assault Inmate Crawford, and he did so with a
“soap sock”2 (Doc. 1, pp. 13, 15). Based on the information provided by the confidential
informants, a disciplinary ticket was issued for violent assault and gang activity on March 21st
(Doc. 1, p. 13). Plaintiff did not receive the ticket until twelve days later.
Plaintiff was transferred from segregation at Western to segregation at Menard on March
20th, one day before the disciplinary ticket was issued (Doc. 1, p. 6). He attended a disciplinary
hearing before Menard’s adjustment committee on April 4th. Defendant Veath, who served as
the committee chairman, presided over Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. At the hearing, Plaintiff
testified that no gang leader ordered the attack, and no weapon was used. No witness testified
that he saw or heard a gang leader order Plaintiff to carry out the assault. Despite “a sufficient
amount of evidence in the record” supporting a reduction in or dismissal of the charges, the
adjustment committee was unwilling to reduce Plaintiff’s violent assault charge to a fighting
charge or dismiss the gang activity charge.

According to the complaint, the adjustment

committee simply adopted the disciplinary report in its entirety and found Plaintiff guilty of
assault (i.e., a reduction from violent assault) and gang activity. As punishment, Plaintiff was
given a 6-month contact restriction and a year of segregation, demotion to C-grade, and
commissary restriction

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2

All of the events giving rise to this action occurred in 2013.
“Soap sock” refers to a sock stuffed with a bar of soap for use as a weapon.

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Plaintiff now challenges the findings of the adjustment committee on the following
grounds: (1) the charge of violent assault should have been reduced to fighting because no
credible testimony was offered to show that Plaintiff used a weapon in the fight (Doc. 1, p. 7);
(2) the gang activity charge should have been dismissed because it was based on pure
speculation that a gang leader ordered Plaintiff to carry out the attack (Doc. 1, p. 7); and
(3) Defendant Veath violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law when he adopted the
statements in the disciplinary report (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Plaintiff filed numerous grievances to address these alleged due process violations with
officials inside and outside of Menard. He filed grievances dated April 8th, June 23rd, and
August 19th (Doc. 1, pp. 9-11). According to the complaint, Defendant Oakley interfered with
and/or denied them all. Defendants Harrington and Godinez approved of the conduct of all
defendants (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Plaintiff now sues Defendants Godinez, Harrington, Oakley, Veath, and Gille for
violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
Plaintiff seeks expungement of his disciplinary record, injunctive relief, and monetary damages.
Discussion
After carefully considering the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that it
articulates no colorable Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendants and must be dismissed.
This includes the procedural due process claim arising from Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing
(Count 1), the procedural due process claim arising from Plaintiff’s grievances (Count 2), and
the substantive due process claim arising from Plaintiff’s alleged denial of equal protection under
the law (Count 3).

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Count 1 – Disciplinary Hearing
The complaint does not suggest that Plaintiff was denied the right to procedural due
process in connection with his disciplinary hearing (Count 1). Prison disciplinary hearings
satisfy procedural due process requirements where an inmate is provided: (1) written notice of
the charge against the prisoner twenty-four (24) hours prior to the hearing; (2) the right to appear
in person before an impartial body; (3) the right to call witnesses and to present
physical/documentary evidence, but only when doing so will not unduly jeopardize the safety of
the institution or correctional goals; and (4) a written statement of the reasons for the action
taken against the prisoner. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974); Cain v. Lane,
857 F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 1988).
Not only must the requirements of Wolff be satisfied, but the decision of the disciplinary
hearing board must be supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402
(7th Cir. 1994). To determine whether this standard has been met, courts must determine
whether the decision of the hearing board has some factual basis. Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d
649 (7th Cir. 2000). Even a meager amount of supporting evidence is sufficient to satisfy this
inquiry. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007).
According to the complaint, Plaintiff received notice of the charges against him at least
twenty-four hours before his disciplinary hearing. He appeared at the hearing, and he received a
hearing summary. In addition, the complaint contains no allegation that Plaintiff was denied an
opportunity to call witnesses. The first four Wolff requirements appear to have been satisfied.
Plaintiff instead challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. He takes issue
with the statements of the confidential informants, whom Plaintiff does not consider to be
credible sources of information. Although he alleges that the adjustment committee blindly

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adopted the disciplinary report, Plaintiff admits that the adjustment committee reduced his
violent assault charge to an assault charge.

The evidence provided by the confidential

informants, though meager in Plaintiff’s opinion, is sufficient to satisfy Wolff and resulted in a
reduction in Plaintiff’s charges. Accordingly, Count 1 shall be dismissed with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 2 – Grievances
The complaint states no claim for the denial of procedural due process arising from
Defendants’ interference with, or denial of, Plaintiff’s grievances (Count 2). Plaintiff alleges
that he filed grievances with officials inside and outside of Menard (Doc. 1, pp. 9-11).
Each time, Defendant Oakley intercepted them and ultimately denied them. Defendants Godinez
and Harrington condoned Defendant Oakley’s conduct (Doc. 1, p. 10).
Prison grievance procedures are not constitutionally mandated and thus do not implicate
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause per se. As such, the alleged mishandling of
grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct
states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Grieveson
v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir.
2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). This is true whether Plaintiff is
referring to the prison’s internal grievance procedures or the IDOC’s external grievance
procedures.
Rather, the procedural due process right exists to ensure that prisoners and detainees can
access the courts. Id. Plaintiff’s invocation of the judicial process in this case demonstrates that
Defendants have not infringed on his First Amendment right to petition the government for a
redress of his grievances or his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.

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Id.

(citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D.C. Ill. 1982)). Accordingly, Count 2 shall be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Count 3: Equal Protection
Finally, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim (Count 3) also fails. A “prison administrative
decision may give rise to an equal protection claim only if Plaintiff can establish that ‘state
officials had purposefully and intentionally discriminated against him.’”

Meriwether

v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (citing Shango
v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)). The allegations in support of this claim are
vague and conclusory. Beyond alleging that Defendants violated his right to equal protection
under the law, Plaintiff does not explain this claim. Under the circumstances, he has not pled
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Accordingly, Count 3 shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3), which is hereby DENIED
as MOOT.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2, and 3 are DISMISSED with
prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that DEFENDANTS GODINEZ, HARRINGTON,
VEATH, OAKLEY, and GILLE are DISMISSED with prejudice from this action.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted “strikes” under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action

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was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and
payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(A)(4). If Plaintiff does choose to
appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the
appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724,
725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockish,
133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). Finally, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff
may also incur a “strike.”
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 16, 2014
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
U.S. District Judge

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