Whitehead v. Harrington
Filing
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ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams, denying 5 MOTION to Amend/Correct filed by Carl Whitehead.. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 5/21/2014. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CARL WHITEHEAD, # M-00110,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD HARRINGTON,
Defendant.
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Case No. 14-cv-00468-MJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Carl Whitehead, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this action pro se for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff claims that he was allowed only
six sessions in Menard’s yard between November 2012 and May 2013 (Doc. 1, p. 5).
Plaintiff’s denial of yard privileges resulted from numerous unit-wide lockdowns that were
unrelated to his own conduct. Plaintiff claims that other inmates, who had the same security
classification as him, were allowed significantly more exercise and work opportunities.
Plaintiff now sues Defendant Richard Harrington, Menard’s warden, for violating his rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
He seeks monetary damages and a prison
transfer (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen
prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is
required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state
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a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by
law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The claim of
entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557.
Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was sent to segregation at Menard on
November 8, 2012 (Doc. 1, p. 5). Menard allegedly has a policy or practice of placing inmates
who are in segregation on lockdown whenever any other house in the facility is also on
lockdown. While on lockdown, inmates in segregation do not receive their usual five hours of
outdoor recreation each week. As a result, Plaintiff was allowed only six opportunities (i.e., a
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total of fifteen hours) to exercise in Menard’s prison yard between November 2012 and
May 2013. He had only three opportunities to exercise between November 14, 2012, and April
29, 2013, while at the same time living in a one-person cell with another inmate (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Plaintiff suffered from pain in his left shoulder. When he sought treatment, Menard’s medical
staff told Plaintiff that he was showing early signs of arthritis “due to a lack of exercise.”
On one occasion, Plaintiff asked Defendant Harrington to explain the policy.
Defendant Harrington said, “This system is in place so that . . . inmates who fight or commit staff
assaults cannot come to segr[e]gation and enjoy yard privileges. Maybe you guys should stop
hitting my officers!” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff was not placed in segregation for hitting an officer,
and he was not denied yard privileges as punishment for his undisclosed offense. He was given
six months of segregation and a six-month demotion in status to C-grade.
The complaint goes on to allege that Plaintiff’s status has now been restored to Agrade. However, he receives fewer yard and work privileges than other inmates who have the
same security classification (Doc. 1, p. 5). He claims that this disparity in yard and work
privileges amounts to discrimination and a denial of equal protection under the law.
Plaintiff now sues Defendant Harrington for cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment and for the denial of equal protection of the law in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and a prison
transfer.
Discussion
At this early stage, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with his
Eighth Amendment claim (Count 1) against Defendant Harrington for the denial of yard access.
Plaintiff equates the denial of yard access with the denial of meaningful exercise opportunities.
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He claims that he suffered from arthritis due to his lack of exercise. Opportunities to exercise
were denied by Menard officials, not because of Plaintiff’s conduct, but because of lockdowns in
other units that systematically triggered lockdowns in Menard’s segregation unit. Plaintiff spoke
directly to Defendant Harrington about this issue.
Based on these allegations, the Court cannot conclude that the complaint fails to
state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit has observed that
“an unjustified, lengthy deprivation of opportunity for out-of-cell exercise ‘could reasonably be
described as cruel and, by reference to the current norms of American prisons, unusual.’”
Winger v. Pierce, 325 Fed. App’x 435, *1 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d
881, 884 (7th Cir. 2001)); see also Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2013)
(finding that a “pattern of prison-wide lockdowns . . . occur[ing] for flimsy reasons or no reason
at all” may support a claim for the deprivation of exercise). The Seventh Circuit has held that
deprivations not unlike the one Plaintiff suffered violated the Constitution. See, e.g., Delaney v.
DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 684 (7th Cir. 2001) (inmate denied yard access for six months suffered
sufficient constitutional deprivation); Pearson, 237 F.3d at 884-85 (7th Cir. 2001) (denial of yard
privileges for more than 90 days may be cognizable under Eighth Amendment); see also Perkins
v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 810 (10th Cir. 1999) (nine-month denial of outdoor
exercise states Eighth Amendment claim). Although the Court takes no position regarding the
ultimate merits of this claim, Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against
Defendant Harrington at this time.
However, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim (Count 2)
shall be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied equal protection under the law because
other A-grade inmates received additional exercise and work privileges (Doc. 1, p. 5). A “prison
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administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection claim only if the plaintiff can
establish that ‘state officials had purposefully and intentionally discriminated against him.’”
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987)
(citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The gravamen of equal protection lies not in the fact of deprivation of a right but
in the invidious classification of persons aggrieved by the state’s action. A
plaintiff must demonstrate intentional or purposeful discrimination to show an
equal protection violation. Discriminatory purpose, however, implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that a
decisionmaker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected
his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects
on the identifiable group.
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453-54 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Shango, 681 F.2d at 1104).
The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was part of a protected class or that he was singled
out for disparate treatment because of his membership in that class.
Further, the complaint fails to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. To state
this type of claim, an individual must allege that he was “intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Swanson v. Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784-85 (7th Cir 2013) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). The Seventh Circuit explained class-of-one equal protection claims
as follows:
The classic class-of-one claim is illustrated when a public official, “with no
conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some other improper motive ...
comes down hard on a hapless private citizen.” Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d
631, 633 (7th Cir. 2005). This improper motive is usually covert, so courts first
look to eliminate all proper motives. If there was no rational basis for the
treatment of the plaintiff, then the motives must be irrational and improper. See
Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564–65. To achieve clarity, courts look to the
treatment of similarly situated individuals: if all principal characteristics of the
two individuals are the same, and one received more favorable treatment, this may
show there was no proper motivation for the disparate treatment.
Swanson, 719 F.3d at 783. The complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of a class-of-one
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equal protection claim. Beyond asserting that other A-grade inmates had more exercise and
work opportunities, the complaint offers no support for this claim.
To the contrary,
Plaintiff alleges that he was demoted to C-grade for six months as a result of a rule violation
(Doc. 1, p. 5). This, alone, could explain the different opportunities available to Plaintiff as
compared to other inmates. Without more, the claim fails. See Twombly, 590 U.S. at 570.
Accordingly, Count 2 shall be dismissed against Defendant Harrington without prejudice.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend (Doc. 5), which consists of a certified trust
fund account statement (Doc. 5, pp. 2-4) and additional grievances (Doc. 5, pp. 5-14).
Although Plaintiff entitles the motion as a “Motion to Amend,” Plaintiff did not file a proposed
amended complaint. The motion to amend is hereby DENIED. To the extent he seeks some
other form of relief, such as permission to supplement another pleading with additional exhibits,
he should re-file the documents with the appropriate motion.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
AS TO COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for DEFENDANT
RICHARD HARRINGTON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of
a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to
mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place
of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the
Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will
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require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the Defendant cannot be found at the address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file, nor
disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant (or upon defense counsel once an appearance
is entered), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by
the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date
on which a true and correct copy of any document was served on Defendant or counsel.
Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk
or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings.
Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Williams for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
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notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the
Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to
Plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 21, 2014
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
U.S. District Judge
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