Cooper B-Line, Inc. v. Howard

Filing 11

DEFAULT JUDGMENT in favor of Cooper B-Line, Inc., and against Neil Howard, granting 8 MOTION for Default Judgment and to Compel Compliance wtih Arbitration Subpoena by Cooper B-Line, Inc. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 6/3/2014. (mtm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
COOPER B-LINE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 14-cv-470-DRH-DGW
vs.
NEIL HOWARD,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM, ORDER, and DEFAULT JUDGMENT
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment filed by plaintiff Cooper
B-Line, Inc. against defendant Neil Howard (Doc. 8). Said Motion is HEREBY
GRANTED for the following reasons.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action on April 24, 2014, seeking enforcement of a labor

arbitration subpoena. The Complaint alleges that defendant refused to comply
with a Subpoena Ad Testificandum (“Subpoena”) issued by labor arbitrator
Mark. W. Suardi (“Arbitrator”) for defendant’s appearance at, and testimony in, a
labor arbitration entitled International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, District 9 (In re Termination of Adrian Harris) v. Cooper B-Line, Inc.,
FMCS No. 13-54315-A (“Arbitration”). The Arbitration concerns the Company’s
termination of its employee Adrian Harris—a subject matter that has previously
been before District Judge G. Patrick Murphy, now retired.
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In Harris v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., CIV. 13-440-GPM, Judge Murphy
dismissed Mr. Harris’s claims against the Company, including a cause of action
claiming that the Company breached a contract by terminating Mr. Harris’s
employment. See 2013 WL 3834455 (S.D. Ill. July 24, 2013). Judge Murphy
concluded that Mr. Harris’s breach-of-contract claim was preempted by Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because it amounted to a claim for
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at *3.
The present action seeks enforcement of a subpoena compelling the
appearance and testimony of defendant at the Arbitration. Defendant and Mr.
Harris were coworkers at the Company’s facility in Highland, Illinois. The
Company contends that it terminated Mr. Harris’s employment after crediting a
report from defendant that Mr. Harris threatened defendant with a gun on
plaintiff’s property.
The International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District
9 (“Union”) grieved Mr. Harris’s termination pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement (“CBA”) between the Company and the Union regarding employees at
the Company’s Highland location. That grievance progressed through the
grievance-arbitration procedures set out in the CBA, culminating with an
arbitration hearing, which was scheduled by the parties to occur on February 25,
2014. By then, defendant’s employment with the Company had also come to an
end.
Leading up to the Arbitration, plaintiff served defendant with the Subpoena,
which was signed by Arbitrator Mark W. Suardi, compelling defendant to appear
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for, and testify at, the February 25th Arbitration hearing. Defendant refused to
comply with the Subpoena. Due to defendant’s absence, the Arbitrator adjourned
the Arbitration hearing to give plaintiff an opportunity seek judicial enforcement of
the Subpoena. Plaintiff’s Complaint followed.
Defendant received service of the Complaint and Summons on April 30,
2014, yet he has filed no response to the Complaint. On May 27, 2014, the
Company requested that the Clerk of the Court enter a default against Howard.
See Doc. 6. On May 28, 2014, the Clerk entered the requested default. See Doc.
7.
II.

STANDARD OF LAW
“There are two stages in a default proceeding: the establishment of the

default, and the actual entry of a default judgment.” In re Catt, 368 F.3d 789, 793
(7th Cir. 2004). “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). Because this action seeks an order compelling compliance with a labor
arbitrator’s subpoena—rather than the payment of a sum certain—plaintiff was
required to “apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)(2). See also Catt, 368 F.3d at 793 (seeking default judgment from the trial court
pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) is required where the moving party is “not suing for a
sum certain (such as the face amount of a promissory note)”).
III.

ANALYSIS

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The Court concludes that a default judgment in favor of plaintiff should be
issued because the Court has jurisdiction over this matter, defendant failed to
respond to the Complaint as required by Rule 12, and the evidence included with
plaintiff’s Complaint demonstrates plaintiff’s entitlement to judgment.
A.

Jurisdiction is Proper.

The Court has jurisdiction to enter the default judgment that plaintiff
requests.

A district court must determine whether it has subject-matter

jurisdiction before rendering a default judgment. See Swaime v. Moltan Co., 73
F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 1996). Seventh Circuit precedent demonstrates that
federal jurisdiction exists for actions to enforce labor arbitration subpoenas. See
Teamsters Nat. Automotive Transporters Industry Negotiating Committee v.
Troha, 328 F.3d 325, 331 (7th Cir. 2003).
As explained in Troha, “the Supreme Court has determined that § 301,
beyond expressly authorizing the federal courts to hear suits brought for
violations of collective bargaining agreements, also authorizes the federal courts to
fashion a body of common law for the enforcement of the collective bargaining
agreements over which they have jurisdiction.” Id. at 329 (citing Textile Workers
Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972
(1957)). Building on this concept, the Seventh Circuit held that “[w]hen the
purpose of the lawsuit effectuates the goals of § 301, then it is appropriate for
federal common law to embrace such suits.” Id. at 330. Troha explains further:
A collective bargaining agreement that requires
arbitration is powerless if the parties to the arbitration
cannot present evidence in the form of third person
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testimony or documents possessed by third parties.
Enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate cannot provide
the “necessary legal remedy” if the parties to the
arbitration have no means of securing valuable evidence
other than their own testimony.
Id. “We therefore hold that federal common law under § 301 creates a cause of
action by which a party to a collective bargaining agreement that is otherwise
covered by § 301 can enforce an arbitration subpoena against a non-signatory of
the agreement.” Id. at 331.
Here, that the CBA and the subject matter of the underlying Arbitration are
covered by § 301 is a settled matter. As noted above, last year, Judge Murphy held
that a contract claim regarding the termination of Mr. Harris, whose discharge
from the Company is the subject of the underlying Arbitration in this case, was
“preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.” Harris, CIV. 13-440-GPM, 2013 WL at *3.
Accordingly, federal common law jurisdiction clearly exists to enforce the
Subpoena, which seeks to secure evidence for a labor arbitration matter that is
subject to § 301.
B.

All Procedural Prerequisites for a Default Judgment Have Been
Satisfied.

The Clerk of the Court properly entered a default against Defendant on May
28, 2014, at plaintiff’s request and pursuant to Local Rule 55.1(a) because
defendant failed to respond to the Complaint within 21 days of service of the
Complaint and Summons. The FEDERAL RULES

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE require that a

defendant plead responsively to a complaint “within 21 days after being served
with the summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). Defendant received
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service of the Summons and Complaint on April 30, 2014, see Doc. 5, so his
responsive pleading was due on May 21, 2014. To date, however, defendant has
neither entered an appearance nor responded to the Complaint. Thus, the Clerk’s
proper entry of a default against defendant clears the way for the Court to enter a
default judgment against defendant pursuant to Rule 55(a)(2) of the FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Catt, 368 F.3d at 793.
C.

Evidence Before the Court Demonstrates the Company’s
Entitlement to Judgment.

Plaintiff included sufficient evidence with its Complaint to support the
judgment that plaintiff seeks. As the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged, “parties
to a labor arbitration may use subpoenas to obtain information from third
parties.” Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th
Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Subpoena represents a proper exercise of authority
by Arbitrator Suardi and a well-established means of bringing evidence to a labor
arbitration.
By failing to respond to the Complaint’s allegations, defendant admitted all
of them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation--other than one relating to the
amount of damages--is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the
allegation is not denied.”). Thus, it is undisputed that on February 22, 2014,
defendant received service of the Subpoena signed by Arbitrator Suardi,
commanding defendant’s appearance at a labor arbitration hearing on February
25, 2014, and that defendant failed to comply with the Subpoena. See Compl. ¶¶
16, 22. Plaintiff attached documentation confirming the service of the Subpoena
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on Defendant. Id. at Exh. C. Defendant’s non-compliance with the Subpoena
prompted plaintiff to file this action for enforcement and, likewise, demonstrates
plaintiff’s entitlement to the relief it seeks: an Order compelling defendant to
comply with Arbitrator Suardi’s subpoena power and appear for and testify at the
resumed Arbitration hearing.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY GRANTS plaintiff Cooper B-

Line, Inc.’s Motion for Default Judgment and HEREBY ORDERS THAT
defendant Neil Howard shall appear for and provide testimony at the resumed
arbitration hearing in the labor arbitration entitled International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District 9 (In re Termination of Adrian Harris)
v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., FMCS No. 13-54315-A on June 18, 2014, or at such later
date determined by Arbitrator Mark W. Suardi.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 3rd day of June, 2014.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2014.06.03
12:19:49 -05'00'
Chief Judge
U.S. District Court

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