King v. Gaetz et al
Filing
92
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 86 Motion for Summary Judgment: For the reasons explained in the attached Order, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' summary judgment motion (Doc. 86). The motion is denie d as to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim against Defendant Lawrence based on Plaintiff's allegedly filthy cell (toilet/sink/walls not insects and dusty air vents). The motion is granted in all other respects. See Order for detai ls. (This Order resolves all claims against Defendant Harris. Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of Harris and against Plaintiff at close of the case.) Final pretrial conference and trial to proceed as scheduled as to Defendant Lawrence. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 8/11/16. (soh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARSHALL KING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BYRON E. LAWRENCE and
AMY HARRIS (Executor of the
Estate of WILLIAM HARRIS),
Defendants.
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Case No. 14-cv-0532-MJR-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
In May 2014, Marshall King filed a pro se civil rights complaint in this Court
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Then confined at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, King named
three Defendants -- Warden Donald Gaetz and correctional officers Byron Lawrence and
William Harris.
King alleged that he was subjected to deplorable conditions of
confinement and deprived of due process. Specifically, King alleged that he was housed
in a cell that contained insects, dust in the ventilation, stains on the wall, and a filthy
toilet and sink; that he was denied cleaning supplies despite multiple requests; and that
Warden Gaetz violated due process in connection with a May 2012 disciplinary hearing.
On threshold review under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the undersigned dismissed the due
process claim against Gaetz but found that King had stated a colorable claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution against Lawrence and Harris (Doc. 8, p. 3).
The case is now before the Court on a June 3, 2016 motion for summary judgment,
filed with supporting memo (Docs. 86 and 87) by Lawrence and Harris. 1 King filed a
brief in opposition (Doc. 89). Provided with the materials supporting the motion is the
transcript of Plaintiff King’s deposition, taken on January 29, 2016 at Western
Correctional Center, where King is now incarcerated (Doc. 87-1). Provided with the
brief opposing summary judgment is King’s sworn declaration (Doc. 89-1), an affidavit
from a former Pinckneyville Correctional Center inmate who was housed on R4-D Wing
during parts of 2011 and 2012 (Doc. 89-2), and Defendants’ answers to King’s
interrogatories (Doc. 89-1). For the reasons stated below, the Court partially grants and
partially denies the motion.
II.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE
Marshall King was housed at Pinckneyville Correctional Center from June 25,
2010 to December 3, 2014. He was housed in the cell at issue in this case, cell R4-D-62,
from June 4, 2011 to August 18, 2013 (Doc. 87-1, pp. 11, 13, 19). When King was placed
in the cell, the vent was fully covered with dust, and the inside of the toilet bowl was
encrusted with feces and urine (Id. p. 14-15). The toilet and sink did function (Id., p. 18).
The cell had flying insects which bit King’s arms, chest, and legs (Id., p. 15). The bugs
were mostly mosquitos, June bugs, or ladybugs (Id., p. 16). King was on the top bunk,
and at night the insects would swarm the light and bite him (Id.). There were spider
1
In April 2015, Amy Harris (the executrix of William Harris’ estate) was
substituted for Defendant William Harris, who had passed away (see Doc. 51). In
recounting the facts and allegations, the Court refers to William Harris.
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webs in the corners of the cell and under the bunks (Id. at p. 17).
An exterminator also mentions ants and mice.
The comment section of the
exterminator notes for the prison (not necessarily King’s cell) indicates the presence of
ants in February through June 2012 and again in September 2012 (Doc. 89-3, pp. 28-35).
Mice were noted on February 15, 2012 (Doc. 89-3, p. 28).
King testified that he was kept in the cell 22 hours a day (Doc. 87-1, p. 18). He
was able to leave his cell three times a day for meals until the prison went to a two-meal
schedule (Doc. 87-1, pp. 24-25). He went to the prison yard three times a week and
went to the law library weekly (Id. at pp. 25-26). Although the dayroom was open for
45 minutes in the morning and 90 minutes in the evening, King would only go to the
dayroom during one of those periods (Id., p. 27; Doc. 89-1, p. 19).
King experienced similar unsanitary conditions in another cell, R4-D-64, through
2014 when the prison started passing out cleaning supplies, at least partly due to King’s
complaints (Id., pp. 19-20; Doc. 89-1, p. 4).
As a result of these dirty conditions, King testified that he experienced medical
issues. King claims that he developed a cough and allergies from the dusty vents and
developed inflammation, scars, and pock marks on his arms, leg, and chest as a result of
the bug bites (Doc. 89-1, p. 3). King admitted, however, that a nurse diagnosed the
inflammation as psoriasis and gave him cream which helped (Doc. 87-1, p. 35, 41).
King also testified that he had mental suffering due to aggravation from the
guards refusing to distribute cleaning supplies (Id., pp. 36-37). King testified that the
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officers just wanted to hang out in the foyer all day and not be bothered by the inmates;
they just ignored the inmates (Id.). King stated that there were outbreaks of staph and
MRSA in the prison which King believes were due to the cells not being clean. King
testified that he did not have any of those conditions (Doc. 89-1, p. 4; Doc. 87-1, p. 47).
King testified that when he first arrived in the cell, for the first two days he asked
for cleaning supplies daily (Doc. 87-1, pp. 22, 35). He made the request to the wing
officer while in the day room (Id., pp. 22, 36). Throughout the time he was in the cell,
King continued to request cleaning supplies, but he eventually gave up (Id.). He was
told by the counselor that cleaning supplies were passed out on the weekends, but King
never had access to supplies (Id., p. 23; Doc. 89-2, p. 39). Records from the prison
indicate that the assistant warden ordered that cleaning supplies be made available to
inmates for cleaning their cells every Saturday starting in September 21, 2012 (Doc. 89-1,
p. 16). Inmate porters also had access to cleaning supplies, but King testified that they
only cleaned the common areas -- not the individual cells (Doc. 87-1, p. 23).
While King was in R4-D-62, maintenance personnel came and vacuumed the dust
out of the vent and called an exterminator for the insects (Doc. 89-1, p. 21).
An
exterminator arrived and sprayed for insects (Id.). The exterminator came once while
King was in cell D-62 and once while he was in cell D-63 (Id., p. 22). King stopped
getting insect bites for a while after the exterminator came (Doc. 87-1, p. 32). King said
the maintenance person and exterminator only came after King voiced complaints and
filed grievances (Doc. 89-1, p. 4)
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King testified that he spoke to Defendant Harris on one occasion on a weekend
and asked for cleaning supplies (Doc. 87-1, p. 39). This was after King received a
counselor’s response saying that cleaning supplies were passed out on weekends, so
King checked with Harris about the cleaning supplies (Id., pp. 39-40, 50). Harris said
that he was not passing out cleaning supplies and that he could not move King to a
different cell (Id.). This conversation took place while Harris was in the dayroom on the
7-to-3 shift (Id.). Harris did not see King’s cell (Id., p. 41). King showed Harris his bug
bites but did not ask Harris for medical attention for the bites, just cleaning supplies (Id.).
King testified that he spoke with Defendant Lawrence, who was the primary
wing officer Monday through Friday, at least four or five times (Doc. 87-1, p. 42, 51).
King eventually stopped talking to Lawrence because Lawrence had an attitude (Id.).
The first time King spoke with Lawrence about cleaning supplies, Lawrence just looked
at King strangely (Id., p. 43). King repeatedly asked Lawrence for cleaning supplies in
the following days and Lawrence responded, as King described it, flippantly (Id., p. 43;
Doc. 89-1, p. 3). King did not recall the exact words that Lawrence used to deny
cleaning supplies (Id., p. 43). King specifically told Lawrence that he wanted to clean
the sink and toilet in his cell, because the toilet had urine and feces on the inside and the
sink had calcium stains (Id.). King tried to show Lawrence his cell, but Lawrence made
it clear that he did not want to talk to King (Id., pp. 44-45). King later testified that
Lawrence saw his cell (Id., p. 51). The first two times King spoke to Lawrence were
about a week apart. King spoke to Lawrence three more times after that. King did not
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recall exactly how far apart those conversations were, but they took place over one to
two months (Id., pp. 46-47).
III.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper only if the admissible evidence considered as a
whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d
506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011), citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v.
Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing -based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or information obtained via discovery -- the lack
of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party
“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986), quoting FED R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). A fact is
material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
Ballance v. City of Springfield, Ill. Police Dep’t, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005);
Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A genuine issue of
material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court construes the facts and all
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reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Ault v. Speicher, 634 F.3d 942,
945 (7th Cir. 2011).
B.
Conditions of Confinement
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a minimum
standard for treatment of prisoners, including humane conditions of confinement.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994), citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31,
(1993). Inmates must be provided with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
As the United States Court of Appeals explained recently:
The Eighth Amendment can be violated by conditions of confinement in a
jail or prison when (1) there is a deprivation that is, from an objective
standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results “in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities,’” and (2) where prison officials are
deliberately indifferent to this state of affairs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834….
We have identified several situations that meet this
demanding test, including lack of heat, clothing, or sanitation. Gillis v.
Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006)….
An adverse condition of confinement, if endured over a significant time,
can become an Eighth Amendment violation even if it would not be
impermissible if it were only a short-term problem.
Gray v. Hardy, -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 3457647, *2 (7th Cir. June 24, 2016).
A constitutional challenge to prison conditions requires the court to do a two-part
examination. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th Cir. 2008). First, the court
examines whether the plaintiff has shown that the conditions were sufficiently serious
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that the correctional official’s act or omission resulted in the denial of “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id., quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. If the
plaintiff successfully passes this threshold (establishes that the conditions were
sufficiently serious), then the court examines whether the correctional official acted with
deliberate indifference to those conditions. Id., quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
302 (1991), and Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004). See also Grieveson
v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 776 (7th Cir. 2008).
To prove deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that “the official knew
that the inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and yet disregarded that risk by
failing to take reasonable measure to address it.” Townsend, 522 F.3d at 773. To
prevail on a condition of confinement/deliberate indifference claim, it is not enough for
the plaintiff to show that a correctional official acted negligently or should have known
about the risk at issue. Id., citing Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2004).
IV.
ANALYSIS
A.
Insects and Dusty Air Vents in Cell
As to the insects and the dust in the air vents, Plaintiff has not shown deliberate
indifference on the part of either Lawrence or Harris.
The evidence shows that
maintenance did vacuum out the vent in King’s cell after King wrote a grievance (Doc.
89-2, p. 39-40). Maintenance then added his cell to the list to be sprayed for bugs and
insects (Id.). Lawrence indicated in his response to interrogatories that King could
submit a request directly to the maintenance department (Doc. 89-1, p. 10). There is no
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indication in the record that King put in a maintenance request or specifically asked
either Defendant for maintenance on the vents. The only evidence regarding his dusty
vent is in King’s May 22, 2012 grievance, and maintenance was sent to his cell after that
grievance was filed.
Plus, King has offered nothing more than conclusory allegations that the dust
caused his respiratory distress and allergies. See Vasquez v. Frank, 290 Fed. App’x 927,
929 (7th Cir. 2008), citing Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1997). There are
no medical records or any other evidence to substantiate King’s claims that he
developed a respiratory condition due to the dusty vents.
King has not shown, and the record does not contain any evidence, that either
Defendant was deliberately indifferent to the air vent issue. Nor is there any evidence
that either Lawrence or Harris was deliberately indifferent to the insect problem in
King’s cell.
King testified that he only asked Harris for cleaning supplies on one
occasion. Although King showed Harris the rash on his arms and legs, there is no
indication he told Harris they were from an insect infestation, and King acknowledges
that the nurse diagnosed the rash as psoriasis (not insect bites). King did testify that he
told Lawrence about the bug problem four or five times, and showed Harris his arms
and legs (with what he said were bug bite marks). However there is no evidence that
Harris or Lawrence was responsible for scheduling exterminators for the prison.
Moreover, King’s cell was sprayed for bugs, as he acknowledged in his
deposition. The records from Pinckneyville also indicate that the exterminator sprayed
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monthly at the prison (Doc. 89-3, p. 28-35). While it is unclear if the exterminators
specifically sprayed King’s cell every time, the exterminators were present and spraying
on at least a monthly basis. And King’s bites would stop after the exterminator came.
That some bugs remained after the exterminator sprayed does not establish deliberate
indifference by Defendants. The Court finds no evidence of deliberate indifference as to
either Defendant stemming from the insects in King’s cell.
B.
Dirty Condition of the Cell (Toilet/Sink/Walls)
Turning to King’s request for cleaning supplies as to the dirty condition of his cell,
the record shows that King was housed in a cell with saliva and semen stains on the wall,
a toilet bowl encrusted with urine and feces, and a sink with calcium build-up. King
was housed in this cell and another like it for approximately two years. Defendants
point out that both the sink and toilet functioned during the entire period, and the
condition of the cell did not get any worse while King was there. But King was not able
to clean his cell for that entire period. While Defendants argue that these conditions do
not constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation, for purposes of this motion (construing
the evidence in the light favorable to King), the Court finds that these conditions pass the
“sufficiently serious” threshold. See Wheeler v. Walker, 303 Fed. App’x 365, 368 (7th
Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).
Certainly, the feces-encrusted toilet which King was required to use and,
necessarily, was in close proximity to at all times in his cell, is an inhumane condition.
King testified that he told Defendants about the conditions and asked for cleaning
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supplies to address the problems.
King has demonstrated a sufficiently serious
condition.
The Court next considers whether King has shown that either Lawrence or Harris
was deliberately indifferent to that condition. King points to Defendants’ refusal to
give him cleaning supplies. The issue is whether there is enough evidence for a jury to
find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent in denying King cleaning supplies.
(1)
Defendant Harris
King has not shown deliberate indifference by Defendant Harris. King testified
that he spoke to Harris one time, while he was in the dayroom on a Saturday. King
asked Harris for cleaning supplies, after a counselor had responded to a grievance by
saying that cleaning supplies were passed out on Saturdays. Harris told King that he
was not passing out cleaning supplies and that he could not move King to another cell.
King admits that this is the only occasion that he spoke to Harris and that he did
not show Harris his cell. To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must
show that the correctional official knew of a substantial risk harm and disregarded it.
There is no evidence that – based on one conversation in the dayroom – Harris was
aware that King’s cell was in a condition to deprive him of his basic life necessities and
then failed to take any reasonable measure to address it. Thus, the Court finds that
Harris is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
(2)
Defendant Lawrence
The Court reaches a different conclusion as to Defendant Lawrence. The record
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reveals that King told Lawrence on multiple occasions that he wanted or needed
supplies to clean his cell. He told him that the toilet was encrusted in urine and feces
and that the sink had calcium stains (Doc. 87-1, p. 43). King testified that he told
Lawrence about the conditions while Lawrence was at King’s cell. Lawrence did not come
in the cell to look at the conditions (Id., p. 44-45). Lawrence refused to provide any
cleaning supplies and acted “flippant” towards King (Id., p. 43). While Defendant
Lawrence argues that these conversations did not put him on notice about the inhumane
conditions of King’s cell, King testified that he spoke to Lawrence on multiple occasions
and described the conditions in detail (Doc. 89-1, p. 3).
King submitted a memorandum from the assistant warden issued in 2012 stating
that all inmates were to be given access to cleaning supplies on Saturdays.
King
testified that he was never provided with cleaning supplies and that his cell was not
cleaned until 2014, when that policy was finally enforced (Doc. 89-1, p. 14). Simply put,
the record suggests that King told Lawrence of the state of his cell, that King told
Lawrence that he needed cleaning supplies, and that King refused to provide them.
Lawrence stated in response to King’s interrogatories that inmates were provided
with cleaning supplies on a daily basis and that inmates were never denied brooms or
mops. Lawrence did not raise that point in his summary judgment motion but it is
supplied in an attachment to King’s response (Doc. 89-1, p. 11).
testimony to the contrary clearly puts this point in dispute.
However, King’s
Resolving reasonable
inferences in King’s favor, the Court finds evidence from which a jury could determine
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that Lawrence was deliberately indifferent to King’s serious cell condition.
This
precludes summary judgment for Lawrence on this claim.
Finally, Lawrence is not entitled to qualified immunity. The right to a cell that
“meets contemporary requirements of minimal decency” is clearly established, Wheeler,
303 Fed. App’x at 368, and there are issues of fact here as to whether Lawrence was
deliberately indifferent to King’s complaints of the inhumane cell condition, a condition
King testified lasted for over two years. Like the inmate in Gray, 2016 WL 3457647, *4,
King has demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to the conditions he faced, Defendant
Lawrence’s deliberate indifference thereto, and the harm King suffered as a result.
Accordingly, King’s claim against Lawrence will proceed.
V.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 86) as follows. The motion is granted
in that Defendant Harris is entitled to summary judgment on all of King’s condition of
confinement claims. No claims remain against Defendant Harris. The Clerk of Court
shall enter judgment in favor of Harris and against King at the close of the case. The
motion is also granted in that Defendant Lawrence is entitled to summary judgment on
King’s condition of confinement claim based on the insect infestation and dusty vents.
The motion is denied in that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary
judgment for Lawrence on the condition of confinement claim based on the filthy
conditions of the cell (i.e., the toilet, sink, walls) and Lawrence’s deliberate indifference
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thereto. That claim remains for trial.
The final pretrial conference shall proceed before Judge Williams on September
15, 2016, as scheduled. Jury trial remains set October 17, 2016 at 9:00 a.m. before the
undersigned.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED August 11, 2016.
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge
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