Shaw v. Watson et al

Filing 6

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 7/14/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARIO MARTINEZ SHAW, II, #B88729, )
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
RICHARD WATSON, MARK TRICE,
)
SERGEANT REED, LT. MESSEY,
)
CHRISTOPHER HORNES,
)
and SERGEANT NICHOLSON,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 14-cv-00685-JPG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against six officials at St. Clair
County Jail (“the Jail”) (Doc. 1).

These officials include Richard Watson, Mark Trice,

Sergeant Reed, Lieutenant Messey, C/O Hornes, and Sergeant Nicholson (Doc. 1, pp. 1-3).
In the complaint, Plaintiff claims that these officials subjected him to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement at the Jail in 2013 (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). He seeks monetary damages (Doc. 1, p. 8).
The Complaint
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was detained at the Jail from November 17, 2013,
until December 9, 2013 (Doc. 1, p. 6). During that time, he was allegedly subjected to the
following unconstitutional conditions of confinement: overcrowding,1 pest infestations,2 moldy
showers, flooding from shower drain backups, foul odors, and a lack of cleaning supplies.

1

Plaintiff alleges that he was housed in the misdemeanor block with 30-40 inmates, despite the fact that
its maximum capacity was 22 inmates (Doc. 1, p. 6).
2
Plaintiff claims that he was forced to live with rats, spiders, and “really big roaches” (Doc. 1, p. 6).

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These conditions caused Plaintiff to suffer stomachaches, headaches, vomiting, and fevers that
were not treated.
Plaintiff

filed

grievances

and

complaints

with

Jail

officials

to

no

avail.

Defendants Watson and Trice, who ran the Jail, allegedly knew about the conditions and took no
action. When Plaintiff complained, Defendant Trice told him to “bond out” if he objected to the
way the Jail was operated (Doc. 1, p. 6). When he informed Defendant Nicholson about the
flooding and mold issues, Plaintiff was told that “[he] shouldn’t come to jail” (Doc. 1, p. 3).
When he asked Defendant Hornes to inform maintenance staff about the mold issue, the
maintenance staff simply painted over the mold, and the fumes caused inmates to become sick.
Defendant Reed denied Plaintiff access to cleaning supplies, and Defendant Messey ignored his
grievances (Doc. 1, pp. 2, 5).
Plaintiff now sues Defendants Watson, Trice, Reed, Hornes, Messey, and Nicholson for
subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Jail. He seeks monetary
damages.
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner

complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief

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can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to
relief

must

cross

“the

line

between

possibility

and

plausibility.”

Id.

at

557.

Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts
“should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or
conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed.

See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,

577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for subjecting him to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement (Count 1), for failing to treat his resulting medical conditions
(Count 2), and for ignoring his grievances (Count 3).

The applicable legal standard for

Counts 1 and 2 depends on Plaintiff’s status as a pretrial detainee or inmate while he was housed
at the Jail. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims of pretrial
detainees,

while

the

Eighth

Amendment

applies

to

claims

of

inmates.

See Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Rice ex rel. Rice
v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012); Forest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739, 744-45
(7th Cir. 2010). However, Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment case law can be used

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interchangeably in this context. Id.
With regard to Count 1, claims that relate to the conditions of confinement generally fall
under the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment.

All Eighth

Amendment claims have an objective and a subjective component. McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123,
124 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The objective analysis
examines whether the conditions of confinement exceeded contemporary bounds of decency of a
mature civilized society. Id. The condition must result in unquestioned and serious deprivations
of basic human needs or deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.
Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1989); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d
408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987). The complaint includes sufficient allegations to satisfy both prongs of
an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Watson, Trice, Reed,
Hornes, and Nicholson at this early stage. All of these defendants allegedly knew about the
Jail’s unsanitary living conditions but refused to address them. Accordingly, Plaintiff shall be
allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Defendants Watson, Trice, Reed, Hornes, and
Nicholson.3
With regard to Count 2, the complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
Plaintiff’s medical needs against any Defendants. Relevant to this claim, the Supreme Court has
recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2006) (per curiam). To state a claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition
was objectively serious, and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his
3

To the extent that Defendant Messey was named in connection with this claim (i.e., by ignoring
grievances related to conditions at the Jail), it will be addressed below as “Count 3.”

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medical needs, which is a subjective standard. Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir.
2000).
Count 2 fails the subjective test. To show deliberate indifference, Plaintiff would have to
establish that Defendants “knew of a substantial risk of harm to [him] and acted or failed to act in
disregard of that risk.” Henderson v. Ghosh, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 2757473 (7th Cir. June 18,
2014) (quoting Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff does not allege
that any single defendant knew about his stomachaches, headaches, fevers, or vomiting, let alone
acted in disregard to his medical conditions (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). Without more, Count 2 must be
dismissed without prejudice against all Defendants.
Finally, with regard to Count 3, the complaint states no claim against Defendant Messey,
or any other Defendant, for failing to respond to Plaintiff’s grievances. Plaintiff specifically
argues that Defendant Messey failed to respond to his grievances about the conditions at the Jail,
and this gave rise to a claim against him under the Eighth Amendment. This is not so. The fact
that a counselor, grievance officer, or even a supervisor received a complaint about the actions of
another individual does not create liability. In order to be held individually liable, a defendant
must be “personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”

Sanville v.

McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d
612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). See also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Further, “a state’s inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus,
Plaintiff has no claim against Defendant Messey, or anyone else, for failing to adequately
respond to his grievances and complaints about the living conditions at the Jail. Accordingly,
Count 3 shall be dismissed with prejudice against all Defendants.

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Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and COUNT 3 is DISMISSED with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant MESSEY is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
AS TO COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants WATSON, TRICE,
REED, HORNES, and NICHOLSON: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending
the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address
shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file
or disclosed by the Clerk.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is
entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court.

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Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a
true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received
by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to
include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate
Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Frazier for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs
under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, regardless of the fact
that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for
leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give
security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a
stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court,
who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to plaintiff.
Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk
of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than

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7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 14, 2014
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
United States District Judge

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