Rockett et al v. Renth et al

Filing 30

ORDER denying 24 Motion to Bifurcate Plaintiff's Claims, denying Motion to Stay Discovery and Trial on the Monell Claims Against the City and Christopher Burns. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/9/16. (lmp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CECILLE ROCKETT and
TERRANCE SMITH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MICHAEL RENTH, CHRISTOPHER
BURNS, and CITY OF MADISON
Defendants.

No. 14-cv-687-DRH
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
I.

Introduction and Background

Pending before the Court is defendant Michael Renth, Christopher Burns,
and City of Madison’s motion to bifurcate plaintiff's claims and stay discovery
(Doc. 24). Specifically, defendants move pursuant to FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL

PROCEDURE 42(b) to bifurcate the claims against Defendant Renth from the claims
against Christopher Burns, and City of Madison (hereinafter “The City”) under

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978) 1. They also seek a stay of discovery and trial until the claims against
Defendant Renth are resolved. Plaintiffs Cecille Rockett and Terrance Smith
In Monell, the United States Supreme Court held that while a local government cannot be
subject to vicarious liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff may establish direct liability
against a local government agency under Section 1983 when “execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury ...” 436 U.S. 658, 694.
1

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oppose bifurcation of this matter (Doc. 25). For the reasons discussed below, the
motion is denied.
II.

Background

Plaintiffs Cecille Rockett and Terrance Smith allege that on June 14, 2013,
Madison Police Officer J.D. Harris, who is not a party to this action, was in the
course of arresting Rockett’s son in front of her home when Detective Renth
arrived on that scene, walked up to the plaintiff, grabbed her, and threw her to
the ground near the curb (Doc. 2). Rockett alleges that Renth charged her with
obstructing a peace officer in order to justify his unprovoked attack upon her
(Doc. 2). Plaintiff Smith alleges that Renth tasered him and kicked him in the
head, despite that fact that Smith was restrained on the ground by Officer Harris
at the time. Defendant Renth’s actions allegedly caused injuries to Smith’s head,
right shoulder, back, and right knee, and resulted in abrasions to the right side of
his face, right knee, and right elbow (Id.).
Plaintiff Cecille Rockett includes in the complaint an excessive force claim
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Renth (Count I), a battery claim
against Renth (Count II), a malicious prosecution claim against Renth (Count III),
a false arrest claim against Renth (Count IV), a Section 1983 Monell claim against
Chief Christopher Burns (Count V), and a Section 1983 Monell claim against the
City of Madison (Count VI). In addition, plaintiff Terrence Smith includes in the
complaint a Section 1983 excessive force claim against Renth (Count VII), a
battery claim against Renth (Count VIII),
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Chief Christopher Burns (Count XI), and a Section 1983
the City (Count XII).
Defendants now move pursuant to FEDERAL RULE

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE

42(b) to bifurcate the Monell claims against the City and Chief Burns from the
claims against Detective Renth, and to stay discovery and the trial on the Monell
claims until resolution of the claims against Renth (Doc. 24). Plaintiffs oppose the
proposed bifurcation arguing that the defendants overemphasize the alleged
prejudice against defendant Renth and the potential economic benefits of
bifurcation in this matter (Doc 25).
III.

Motion to Bifurcate

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 42(b) provides that “[f]or convenience, to
avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate
trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or thirdparty claims.” However, “[t]he piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single lawsuit
. . . is not to be the usual course.” 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2388 (2008); see also Real v. Bunn-OMatic Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 626 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“An order of separate trials is
the exception, not the rule.”). A decision on whether to bifurcate or to hold
separate trials is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Volkman v.

Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1089 (7th Cir. 2013). In considering bifurcation, the
district court must be mindful that the Federal Rules “should be construed and
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administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. Additionally, certain conditions must be
met in order to support a motion to bifurcate. A court must determine if separate
trials would prevent prejudice to a party or serve the purpose of judicial economy,
though only one of these criteria need be met. Chlopek v. Federal Ins. Co., 499
F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2007); Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d
1117, 1121 (7th Cir.1999). After a court determines one of the criteria is
satisfied, it may bifurcate the trial “as long as doing so will not prejudice the nonmoving party or violate the Seventh Amendment.” Id.
IV.

Analysis

In this case, the defendants argue that the Court should bifurcate the

Monell claims for purposes of discovery and trial and stay the Monell discovery
because bifurcation would serve the interests of efficient litigation and judicial
economy and would help prevent undue prejudice to Renth (Doc. 24). Specifically,
the defendants argue that bifurcation would promote judicial economy because
the liability of defendants Burns and City of Madison is dependent upon a finding
that defendant Renth is liable. Also, the defendants argue that bifurcation will
save the parties “burdensome and potentially unnecessary” discovery costs and
prevent undue prejudice to Renth (Doc. 24). The Court will address the
arguments below.
A. Judicial Efficiency and Economy

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Defendants first argue that bifurcating the Monell claims and staying the
related discovery would serve the interest of litigation and judicial economy in this
matter because Renth’s liability is “inextricably linked” to the claims against
Burns and the City of Madison, and bifurcation would minimize the burden of

Monell discovery (Doc. 24). In response, the plaintiffs contend that the
defendants’ arguments are mere speculation, and in fact, bifurcation would not
aid in the resolution of this case. The Court agrees with the plaintiff and is not
persuaded by the defendants’ judicial economy argument.
Defendants cite to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986), where the Court held that a trial court correctly
dismissed excessive force and arrest without probable cause claims against a
municipality after the jury found the individual officer not liable. Heller, 475 U.S.
at 798–99. Defendants use Heller to argue that in this case, both the City of
Madison’s and Christopher Burns’ liability rests on that of Renth. The Seventh
Circuit in Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Department, 604 F.3d 293 (7th
Cir.2009), interpreted the Heller rule to mean that “a municipality can be held
liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would
create an inconsistent verdict.” Thomas, 604 F.3d at 305 (emphasis in original).
To determine whether a municipality's liability is dependent on the actions
of its officers, Thomas set forth three factors to consider: (1) the nature of the
constitutional violation that the plaintiff alleges; (2) the theory of municipal

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liability that supports the Monell claim; and (3) the defenses that the individual
defendants have asserted. Id.
In the complaint (Doc. 2), Rockett and Smith assert Fourth Amendment
claims alleging that their constitutional rights were violated through the City of
Madison and Chief Burns permitting the use of excessive force by officers, failing
to adequately train and supervise officers, and developing a custom that
authorizes or condones police misconduct (Doc. 2). Plaintiffs’ complaint also
addresses previous excessive force allegations, and mentions officer J.D. Harris’s
role—a Madison police officer who is not a party to this action— in the incident
that occurred on June 14, 2013 in relation to their theory of municipal liability.
Thus, an adverse finding as to the plaintiffs' individual claims does not
necessarily dispose of the Monell claims against the City and Burns. See Thomas,
604 F.3d 293. In a situation where a claim addresses the customary practice as to
how the police department trains its officers and disciplines its officers who were
shown to have used excessive force, bifurcation may not be warranted. Even when
a plaintiff loses his claim against a police officer based on a qualified immunity
defense, he may still recover against the municipality if he can prove a
constitutional deprivation caused by a municipal policy or custom. In this
situation, bifurcation will not avoid a second trial, and that second Monell trial
would surely contain duplicative evidence and testimony related to the trial of the
claims against the individual officer, while still falling within the parameters of

Thomas.

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Furthermore, Renth, as an individual defendant, asserts a qualified
immunity defense. Defendants argue that that since Renth’s likelihood of
prevailing on the qualified immunity defense is low, his defense would not prevent
bifurcation. However, this argument is unpersuasive. As plaintiffs note, the
defendants must believe this defense has some merit, or they would not have
raised it in their answer (Doc. 19).
In addition, there is no guarantee that severance would avoid the need for
two trials. Renth has not offered to waive the defense of qualified immunity; he
simply states that his likelihood of success is low regarding the defense. If the

Monell claims will be tried, then bifurcation of the Monell claims and a stay of
discovery at this point will prove to be inefficient because it will require that

Monell discovery be conducted at a later date. Such a stay would in fact delay the
resolution of all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants exaggerate the burden of Monell
discovery in this matter, and that bifurcation would unnecessarily complicate the
discovery process. Plaintiffs contend that bifurcation would be inconvenient and
inefficient due to the overlap of evidence that is relevant to both the Monell claims
and the individual claims against Renth. The Court recognizes that allowing the

Monell discovery to proceed inevitably will increase the scope and cost of
discovery. However, a stay of Monell discovery does not necessarily eliminate
discovery disputes. A stay of Monell discovery may give rise to arguments about
whether the plaintiff’s discovery requests relate to their Monell claims or to their

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individual claims against Defendant Renth. Therefore, bifurcation of discovery
would inevitably lead to more litigation about where the line between permissible
discovery and deferred discovery should be drawn, and it would create
inefficiencies relating to the overlapping testimony and need for multiple
depositions.
To the extent that the plaintiff's Monell discovery requests are overly broad
or would impose an undue burden or expense, the Court may tailor the plaintiffs’
discovery requests, if necessary. The Court believes this process is better suited to
promote judicial economy opposed to staying entirely all Monell discovery at this
time. As such, the benefits of potentially avoiding the additional scope of Monell
discovery in this case are not sufficient to outweigh the costs and burden that
would be incurred through bifurcation. Therefore, it is clear that bifurcation in
this matter would fail to aid in the resolution of this case or promote judicial
economy.
B. Prejudice to Defendant Renth
In support of defendants’ second argument, the defendants claim that
Renth will likely suffer undue prejudice if bifurcation is denied. At this stage of the
litigation, however, concerns about potential prejudice at trial are premature.
Additionally, there is no reason to believe that the Court could not implement
tactics such as limiting instructions, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, and motions in

limine, to mitigate potential prejudice that may arise at trial. See, e.g. Cadle v. City

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of Chicago, No. 15 C 4725, 2015 WL 6742070, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2015),
Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
In the end, the defendants have not made a clear showing of prejudice to
Renth in the event that bifurcation is denied. Therefore, the Court denies the
motions to bifurcate on the ground that whatever efficiencies may be gained by
bifurcation are offset by the potential for confusion of issues and discovery,
repetition of testimony, and increased inefficiency. Therefore, the defendants'
motion to bifurcate must be denied.
V.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial
and stay discovery (Doc. 24).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 9th day of March, 2016.

Digitally signed by
Judge David R.
Herndon
Date: 2016.03.09
15:30:28 -06'00'
United States District Judge

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