Jordan v. Mayer et al
Filing
82
ORDER granting 70 Motion for Summary Judgment. As stated in the attached Order, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendants Mayer, Harrington, Hughes, Hart, Cowan, and Godinez, and against Plaintiff Jordan. As the Order disposes of all claims in this matter, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/27/2017. (rms2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DONALD JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CLINT MAYER, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 14-cv-723-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Donald Jordan is an inmate currently incarcerated at Stateville
Correctional Center. He brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of his civil rights relating to discipline he received while incarcerated
at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).
This matter is before the Court on
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70). The time for Plaintiff to respond
to Defendants’ motion has passed, and this matter is ripe for disposition. For the
reasons articulated below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70) is
GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Since Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants’ motion, the Court considers
the facts set forth by Defendants as undisputed. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); SDIL-LR 7.1(c).
See also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283,
288 (7th Cir. 1995) (a failure to respond constitutes an admission that there are no
undisputed material facts). As the Court is deciding a summary judgment motion,
however, it views those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Anderson v.
Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012).
On either February 22 or 23 of 2014, while Plaintiff was an inmate at Menard, he
sent a request slip to a correctional officer indicating that a possible assault was going to
occur. (Doc. 71-1, p. 3). Plaintiff indicated that his cellmate was going to be assaulted
by the Vice Lords, the gang with whom the cellmate was associated. (Id.). Defendant
Mayer then interviewed Plaintiff regarding the letter. (Id.). Plaintiff told Mayer that
some gang members wanted to extort Plaintiff’s cellmate to pay some gang dues, and
Plaintiff was afraid his cellmate would be harmed because the cellmate did not want to
pay. (Id.).
Defendant Mayer, however, told Plaintiff he did not believe Plaintiff’s story.
(Id.).
Mayer asked if Plaintiff was on any psychotropic medications, and Plaintiff
indicated he was taking Prozac, Depakote, and Trazodone. (Id.). When asked by
Defendant Mayer why Plaintiff was holding his head down during the interview,
Plaintiff indicated that it was because he had just woken up and he was still drowsy
from his medication. (Id.). Defendant Mayer then stated, “You’re fucking nuts if you
are taking all those medications.” (Id.). He told Plaintiff to “[r]aise [his] head up,” and
grabbed Plaintiff by the head, pushed his head up, and grabbed Plaintiff’s throat,
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squeezing it. (Id.). In his description of the encounter, Plaintiff does not claim he was
choked, however. Mayer again told Plaintiff that he did not believe anything Plaintiff
was saying. (Id.). Plaintiff was handcuffed during this interview. (Id.). After the
interview, on February 25, 2014, Defendant Mayer issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket
for, inter alia, impeding with an investigation. (Id. at 4). The disciplinary ticket was for
three infractions based upon the determination that Plaintiff had sent a false note to the
internal affairs unit, that he had impeded with an investigation, that he damaged or
misused property, and gave false information.
(Doc. 71-2, p. 1).
Among other
allegations, the disciplinary ticket indicated that Plaintiff wrote a kite stating that there
was going to be a gang fight with possible stabbings, but that the information provided
by Plaintiff was false. (Id.). The ticket was based on five confidential sources who
resided in the area near Plaintiff. (Id.).
As his deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that he believed Defendant Mayer
retaliated against him. (Doc. 71-1, p. 12). Plaintiff testified that he filed grievances
prior to Defendant Mayer issuing the February 25 disciplinary ticket, but that those
grievances were not processed. (Id.). Plaintiff was not sure if he had copies of those
grievances or not.
(Id.).
Plaintiff also engaged in the following exchange at his
deposition:
Q. So you are saying, and correct me if I am wrong, you are saying that
Client Mayer retaliated against you because you filed some grievances?
A. No.
Q. Okay
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A. As I stated, I believe it all works in one hand, that for filing grievances,
the excessive force and discriminating against psychiatric patients, such as
myself.
Q. Okay. So I guess what I am trying to get at is, where is the
retaliation? Do you know where I am saying?
A. Being placed in segregation for when I am coming to him with a
complaint and without him even doing a thorough investigation, just
automatically assume that I am lying, because I am a psychiatric patient
and, therefore, I filed other grievances.
(Id.).
At his deposition, Plaintiff also indicated he was suing Defendant Mayer for
“discrimination against a psychiatric patient and also for the excessive force that he
used.” (Id. at 16). In regards to the discrimination, Plaintiff indicated that the basis for
that claim was due to Mayer calling him “fucking nuts” and because Defendant Mayer
“immediately disregarded the threat that [Plaintiff] was under” after finding out
Plaintiff took “psychotropic medications”. (Id. at 9).
On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff appeared before the Adjustment Committee as a
result of the disciplinary ticket. (Id. at 5). At that hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty on
two of the three offenses. (Id. at 8). He was sentenced to one year in segregation, one
year on C-grade status, and one year commissary restriction. (Id. at 19; Doc. 71-2, p. 5).
Plaintiff was in disciplinary segregation from February 22, 2014 to December 23, 2014.
(Doc. 71-2, p. 9). During this time, in April 2014, he was transferred from Menard to
Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). (Id.). While he was only seen by a mental
health professional one time during his segregation at Menard, Plaintiff received
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medication for his mental health conditions throughout his entire time in segregation.
(Doc. 71-1, p. 8, 9).
Plaintiff also claims that Warden Richard Harrington ignored his letters and
complaints regarding Defendant Mayer.
(Id. at 10)
Plaintiff testified that he sent
Defendant Harrington a letter through the mail, and spoke with the warden on two
occasions, regarding the incident with Defendant Mayer.
(Id.).
Plaintiff informed
Defendant Harrington about the interview with Defendant Mayer, including how Mayer
treated Plaintiff, and that Mayer did not believe Plaintiff’s version of events. (Id.).
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Harrington said that he would look into it, and the
next time they spoke, Harrington informed Plaintiff that he would be released from
segregation. (Id.). Later, however, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant Harrigton
stating that Plaintiff’s claims were unsubstantiated. (Id.).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, this Court performed a merits review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. (Doc. 6). The Court found that Plaintiff pleaded the following counts:
Count 1:
Defendant Mayer used excessive force against Plaintiff in
violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
Count 2:
Defendant Mayer discriminated against Plaintiff for being
mentally ill in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Count 3:
Defendant Mayer retaliated against Plaintiff for filing
grievances and reporting threats made by other inmates.
Count 4:
Defendants Hughes, Hart, and Cowan deprived Plaintiff of
his right to due process at his disciplinary hearing.
Count 5:
Defendant Harrington violated Plaintiff’s rights when he
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failed to adequately respond to Plaintiff’s grievances.
(Id. at 6 – 10). Defendants now seek summary judgment on the counts set forth above.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment
motions. The rule states that summary judgment is appropriate only if the admissible
evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v.
Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)). The party seeking
summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating – based on the pleadings,
affidavits and/or information obtained via discovery – the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue of
material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540,
547 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr. Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012); Righi v. SMC Corp. , 632
F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2011); Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011).
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by
examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party,
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giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the
evidence in [his] favor.” Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542 (7th Cir.
2014).
EXCESSIVE FORCE
A prison official inflicts cruel and unusual punishment on an inmate, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, when the official intentionally uses excessive force against
the inmate without penological justification. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010);
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). In order to prevail on an excessive force claim,
an inmate must demonstrate that the force used by the defendant was not applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but, rather, was applied maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.
See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
However, not every
malicious touch by a prison official gives rise to a cause of action under the Constitution.
Unless the physical force is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”, force that is de
minimis is not actionable. Id. at 9 – 10 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
As asserted by Defendant Mayer, the Court finds Mayer’s use of force against
Plaintiff to be de minimis. Plaintiff seeks recovery against Mayer for grabbing Plaintiff
by the head, pushing his head up, and grabbing and squeezing Plaintiff’s throat. While
the Court has strong doubts as to any penological justification for these actions,
regardless, such a use of force is in line with other acts of force found to be de minimis.
In Outlaw v. Newkirk, the evidence strongly suggested that a correctional officer’s actions
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in closing a cuffport door on a prisoner’s hands, even if deliberate, was de minimis, and
was not “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”. Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833,
839 – 40 (7th Cir. 2001).
In DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh
Circuit held that a correctional officer’s act in shoving a prisoner into a door frame
“qualifie[d] as the kind of de minimis use of force that does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment”.
DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 620.
There the court noted that the
officer’s use of force was isolated and “unaccompanied by further uses of force.” Id. at
619. Here, Defendant Mayer’s actions were also an isolated incident and were not
accompanied by additional uses of force. Additionally, in Felder v. Diebel, 2012 WL
6690239 (W.D. NY, Dec. 21, 2012), a district court held that a correctional officer’s actions
in grabbing a prisoner’s throat and slapping him twice were de minimis. Felder, 2012
WL 6690239 at *1, *5
In contrast, in Thomas v. Stalter, 20 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit
held that a prisoner made prima facie case for excessive force where he alleged, that while
having blood drawn, he was held down by several officers and punched in the mouth.
Thomas, 20 F.3d at 301 – 02. The Court finds that Defendant Mayer’s actions are more
in line with the actions in line of cases involving de minimis acts of force rather than the
act found in Thomas.
While the Court does not condone Defendant Mayer’s alleged actions, and finds
them distasteful, they do not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. “Not every
push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,
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violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d.
Cir. 1973). As such, since the undisputed facts examined in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff fail to demonstrate Plaintiff can succeed on his excessive force claim, summary
judgment is appropriate as to Count 1 against Defendant Mayer.
EQUAL PROTECTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant
part that “[n]o state shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause protects one
from disparate treatment based upon his or her status in a protected class. Greer v.
Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 370 (7th Cir. 2000). Generally, to prevail on a claim for an Equal
Protection violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that he is a member of a protected
class, and that state actors treated members of the prisoner’s class less favorably than
people not in the class but who are similarly situated. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904,
916 (7th Cir. 2005); Harris v. Greer, 750 F.2d 617, 618 – 19 (7th Cir. 1984). However,
“isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not presumed to be a violation of
the equal protection clause.” Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir. 1982).
Such
events
“[a]t
most…demonstrate[]
‘a
mere
inconsistency
in
prison
management…which…may not in itself constitute a cognizable equal protection claim.’”
Id. (quoting Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir. 1978)).
Whether the alleged injurious act involved a protected class or a fundamental
right determines the standard of review applied by a court. See City of Cleburne, Tex.
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v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 – 41 (1985). When a state action or statute is
based on a protected class, courts apply a “strict scrutiny” standard in reviewing the
action or law. Id. at 440. However, if no protected class is implicated, courts apply a
more lenient “rational basis” test. See Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365, 1372 (7th Cir.
1978).
To prevail on an Equal Protection claim against it, under a rational basis
standard, a state need only demonstrate its action or law bore “some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.” See id. (quoting French v. Heyne, F.2d 994,
997 (7th Cir. 1976)). For purposes of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, those
who suffer from mental illness are not a protected class. City of Cleburne, Tex, 473 U.S.
at 442 – 43.
Both of the actions that Plaintiff clams violated the Equal Protection Clause were
allegedly committed by Defendant Mayer.
The first act in question is Defendant
Mayer’s statement calling Plaintiff “fucking nuts” for taking various medications for his
mental health issues. Though inappropriate, such a comment does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. In DeWalt v. Carter, the prisoner plaintiff also brought an
Equal Protection claim against a correctional officer due to sexually suggestive and racist
comments made to the prisoner by the officer. DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 610, 612. The
Seventh Circuit, however, held that “[t]he use of racially derogatory language, while
unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution.”
Id. at 612.
Specifically, the Court stated that such comments by themselves did not deny the
prisoner equal protection of the laws. Id. See also, Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699,
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707 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the mere use of a racial epithet by itself, by a police
officer toward a suspect, is not sufficient to constitute an Equal Protection violation).
If, as the Seventh Circuit and other courts have found, mere derogatory statements
toward one’s race—a protected class—do not constitute a violation of the Equal
Protection clause, then a derogatory statement alone toward a non-protected class
certainly does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second act by Defendant Mayer which Plaintiff claims is discriminatory is
that Defendant Mayer disregarded the threat to Plaintiff upon learning that Plaintiff took
medication for psychiatric issues. Other than Plaintiff’s statement at his deposition,
there is little evidence, at best, to support his assertion that Mayer disregarded any threat
against Plaintiff’s cellmate or Plaintiff himself due to learning of Plaintiff’s medication.
Defendants have provided evidence, in the form of the disciplinary ticket, indicating
that five confidential sources residing in Plaintiff’s area lead Defendant Mayer to
conclude that Plaintiff was not truthful in his kite and interview with Mayer. Plaintiff,
in not responding, has not disputed these facts, and the Court accepts them as true
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Local Rule 7.1(c). Therefore, the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendant Mayer had a non-discriminatory motive in
issuing Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket.
1
As such, the undisputed facts viewed in the
The Court notes that ordinarily, without an affidavit from Defendant Mayer, there would be hearsay
issues in relying on the disciplinary ticket as evidence that there were confidential sources indicating that
Plaintiff lied and that Defendant Mayer relied on these sources in writing-up Plaintiff. See FED.R.CIV.P.
801, 802. With Plaintiff’s failure to contest the motion for summary judgment, however, and dispute
Defendants’ facts, the Court takes the facts as set forth by Defendants as undisputed, even when relying on
the disciplinary ticket itself.
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1
light most favorable to Plaintiff fail to demonstrate that Defendant Mayer violated
Plaintiff’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, summary judgment is also appropriate as to Count 2 against Defendant
Mayer.
FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIM
An inmate has a constitutional right to file a grievance as part of his right of access
to the courts under the First Amendment. DeWalt, 224 F.3d at 618. Retaliatory official
action violates the Constitution, even if the officer would be otherwise authorized to take
that action in the absence of a retaliatory motive. Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568,
573 (7th Cir. 2000). In a First Amendment case, the burden of proof is split between the
parties. Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Mt. Healthy Board
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). First, Plaintiff must show that defendant’s
conduct was sufficient to cause the injury, that is, that the protected First Amendment
conduct was a motivating factor for taking the retaliatory action. Id. at 635.
The
burden then shifts to defendant to rebut by showing that the action would have occurred
anyway, regardless of the improper motive. Id. Evidence that shows that a prisoner
did not violate the regulation can show retaliation. Hale v. Scott, 371 F.3d 917, 920 (7th
Cir. 2004).
The undisputed facts fail to demonstrate that Defendant Mayer, in writing a
disciplinary ticket, was motivated by protected conduct.
Plaintiff, at his own
deposition, testified that he was not saying that Defendant Mayer retaliated against him
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because he filed some grievances. Rather, his testimony indicates that he is asserting
that Defendant Mayer retaliated against him for writing a kite indicating a gang-related
stabbing was going to occur. As previously articulated in regards to the Court’s Equal
Protection analysis, however, the Court finds that Plaintiff also cannot recover on his
retaliation claim. For the reasons that the undisputed facts fail to demonstrate a lack of
discriminatory intent based upon the rationale for issuance of the disciplinary ticket, the
Court also finds the lack of evidence demonstrating retaliatory motive.
As such,
summary judgment is proper as to Count 3 against Defendant Mayer.
DUE PROCESS
In order for a prisoner to recover on a claim challenging the process afforded in a
prison disciplinary proceeding, the facts must demonstrate (1) constitutionally deficient
procedural due process as to the proceeding, and (2) a resulting deprivation of a liberty
or property interest caused by the defendants. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th
Cir. 2007). As to the second factor, Placement in disciplinary segregation implicates a
liberty interest when the conditions of segregation impose “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v.
Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
In determining whether a liberty interest is
implicated, courts look to “the combined import of the duration of the segregative
confinement and the conditions endured.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743
(7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Marion v. Columbia Correctional Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“Marion I”)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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The undisputed facts fail to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s time in disciplinary
segregation implicated a liberty interest.
Plaintiff spent 304 days in disciplinary
segregation, which at the pleadings stage would demand a factual inquiry. See Marion
I, supra, at 698. The summary judgment stage, however, is the “put up or shut up
moment in a lawsuit,” see Johnson v. Cambridge Industries, Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 902 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Schacht v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999))
(internal quotations omitted), and, here, Plaintiff has failed to put up any evidence in
response to Defendants’ motion. The undisputed facts fail to demonstrate any atypical
and significant hardships on Plaintiff in relation to ordinary prison life.
Though
Plaintiff only saw mental health personnel once during his segregation at Menard, he was
only in segregation at Menard for a little over a month before he was transferred to
Pontiac. Regardless, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s mental health deteriorated, or
that he was otherwise negatively impacted during his stay in segregation. In fact,
Plaintiff acknowledged that he received his medication while in segregation. There is
no other evidence regarding the conditions of Plaintiff’s segregation, and as such, no
reasonable juror could find facts demonstrating that Plaintiff suffered an atypical and
significant hardship. The length of stay in segregation alone cannot make Plaintiff’s
case for him, as the Seventh Circuit has found no evidence to demonstrate the
implication of a liberty interest in a case involving a similar length of stay in segregation.
See Marion v. Radtke, 641 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2011) (where inmate failed to respond to
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, summary judgment for defendants on
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due process claim was upheld even in light of 240 day stay in segregation). Since the
Court finds that there is no evidence demonstrating the implication of a liberty interest,
it need not address the alleged procedural deficiencies surrounding the Adjustment
Committee’s proceedings. Summary judgment is appropriate as to Count 4 against
Defendants Hughes, Hart, and Cowan.
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO GRIEVANCES
There is no supervisory liability in an action brought pursuant to § 1983, and,
therefore, to be held individually liable, a defendant must have personal responsibility
for any violation of a constitutional right. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740
(7th Cir. 2001). An official may be held liable, however, if he “know[s] about the
conduct and facilitate[s] it, approve[s] it, condone[s] it, or turn[s] a blind eye” toward it.
Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
Regardless of whether Defendant Harrington approved, condoned, or turned a
blind eye, etc. to any conduct, Plaintiff cannot recover as a matter of law against the
defendant.
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Harrington is based on Plaintiff’s
contention that Harrington ignored Plaintiff’s complaints about the interview with
Defendant Mayer and Mayer’s treatment of Plaintiff. The Court has already found,
however, that there is not sufficient evidence of any underlying constitutional violations.
As such, even if Defendant Harrington facilitated, condoned, or approved any conduct
at issue in this matter, since the underlying conduct did not violate Plaintiff’s rights,
Defendant Harrington cannot be said to have violated his rights. As such, summary
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judgment is appropriate as to Count 5 against Defendant Harrington.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 70) is GRANTED for all counts, including any injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Defendants Mayer, Harrington,
Hughes, Hart, Cowan and Godinez, and against Plaintiff Jordan.
As this Order
disposes of all claims in this matter, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 3/27/2017
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge
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