Dickerson v. Schuler et al

Filing 12

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants SCHULER, ROECKEMAN, SANDERS, and VALDEZ are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 7/21/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SAMUEL L. DICKERSON, # K-99284,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
HAROLD W. SCHULER,
ZACHARY S. ROECKEMAN,
MICHAEL E. SANDERS,
and RANDY S. VALDEZ,
Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-742-NJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”),
has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His claims arose while
he was confined at Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“BMRCC”). Plaintiff is serving
concurrent three-year sentences for aggravated battery and theft. He claims that Defendants
wrongfully punished him for writing a threatening letter after his request to be moved away from
a dangerous cellmate was denied.
Plaintiff explains that he had written letters to Defendant Warden Roeckeman and other
BMRCC staff explaining that he was in fear of attack from inmates who were members of gangs.
Specifically, his cellmate had threatened to throw boiling water in Plaintiff’s face and beat him to
death with a fan (Doc. 1, p. 13). However, no action was taken to protect Plaintiff. He includes
a May 7, 2014, letter from Defendant Roeckeman which states that Plaintiff’s reported threats
could not be substantiated (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff does not state that he suffered any actual
attack from his cellmate or any other inmate.
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On April 9, 2014, prior to receiving Defendant Roeckeman’s letter, Plaintiff wrote a letter
that resulted in disciplinary charges (Doc. 1, p. 7). His letter was written to Clinical Services,
which forwarded it to Internal Affairs for review. Plaintiff wrote, “I will raise money once
released to form an Army of suicidal soldiers to do bombings, shoot-outs or anything possible to
kill as many U.S. citizens as possible and bring down this government of unjustice.” Id. Based
on this language, Defendant Schuler (of Internal Affairs) charged Plaintiff with Intimidation or
Threats and Dangerous Communications. Defendants Sanders and Valdez conducted Plaintiff’s
disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff admitted that he wrote the letter, but in his defense asserted that
the only reason he did so was to get attention and to be able to talk to the warden, because his
requests for protection had elicited no response, and he was under “severe duress” (Doc. 1, pp. 7,
13).
Defendants Sanders and Valdez found Plaintiff guilty of both infractions, and he was
punished with six months in segregation, the loss of one month of good conduct credit, and a
disciplinary transfer (Doc. 1, p. 7). His punishment also included a demotion to C-Grade and
restriction from commissary, gym, and yard, all of six months’ duration. Defendant Roeckeman
approved these disciplinary sanctions. As a result, Plaintiff was taken out of his educational
program, losing the chance to earn additional good conduct credit (Doc. 1, p. 13). Further, he
claims that he is being “starved” in segregation, is not being rehabilitated, and is suffering
mentally. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages (Doc. 1, p. 14).
Plaintiff includes several other grievances, responses, and other documents with his
complaint (Doc. 1, pp. 6, 9-11). Some of these mention his dissatisfaction with medical and
mental health treatment at BMRCC, but his statement of claim does not include any request for
relief based on this information.

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Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant. After fully
considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes that this action is subject
to summary dismissal.
An allegation that a prisoner has been found guilty of a falsified disciplinary report does
not state a claim where due process is afforded. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th
Cir. 1984). There is no Fourteenth Amendment violation if the accused inmate is given a
subsequent hearing on the charges in which the inmate is afforded the procedural protections
outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (advance written notice of the charge, right
to appear before the hearing panel, the right to call witnesses if prison security allows, and a
written statement of the reasons for the discipline imposed). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
prisoners have a right “to be free from arbitrary actions of prison officials,” Hanrahan, 747 F.2d
at 1140, but determined that the procedural protections outlined in Wolff provided the appropriate
protection against arbitrary actions taken by a correctional officer such as issuing the inmate a
fabricated conduct violation.
Here, Plaintiff does not suggest that he was denied any of the procedural protections in
Wolff. More to the point, he does not even claim that the disciplinary charges were false – he
admitted that he authored the letter which contained the threats of violence. He appears to
believe that his actions should have been excused because he was under duress from the lack of
response to his plea for protection from gang members. However, Defendants had no obligation
to accept this defense, and Plaintiff’s admission provided sufficient evidentiary support for the

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finding of guilt. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007); Black v. Lane, 22
F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994) (to satisfy due process, disciplinary decision must be supported
by “some” evidence, but even a meager amount will suffice).
Plaintiff’s loss of access to the educational program in which he had formerly been
enrolled, as well as the restrictive conditions of segregation, are the direct result of his own
action in writing the threatening letter. Based on the factual allegations in the complaint, the
Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Therefore, this action shall be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Pending Motions
Because this action shall be dismissed, Plaintiff’s motions for recruitment of counsel
(Doc. 3), service of process at government expense (Doc. 4), and duplicate motions for summary
judgment (Docs. 7 & 9) are DENIED AS MOOT.
Plaintiff’s “Motion of Retaliation” (Doc. 11), filed on July 16, 2014, is also DENIED
without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing his claims in a separate lawsuit, should he decide to
pursue them further. In this motion, Plaintiff states that he is being housed in Pinckneyville with
a “violent Chicago gang member” who engages in intimidating behavior (Doc. 11, p. 1).
Plaintiff also states that his current segregation cell lacks ventilation, he has been denied hygiene
items, is not being properly fed, and is not receiving medications for his mental health conditions
(Docs. 10, 11).
Any claim(s) which Plaintiff may have regarding the conditions of his confinement at
Pinckneyville must necessarily involve different Defendant(s) than those named herein, all of
whom work at BMRCC. Such claims may not be brought in the instant case. See George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007) (unrelated claims against different defendants belong in

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separate lawsuits). Plaintiff must file a new action if he believes he has a constitutional claim
against Pinckneyville officials. Nothing herein is intended to be a commentary on the merits of
such a lawsuit.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants SCHULER, ROECKEMAN,
SANDERS, and VALDEZ are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted “strikes”
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this
action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due
and payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to
appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See
FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505.00
appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181
F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another “strike.”
A timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 1 may toll the 30-day
appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).

1

A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the
entry of the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
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The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 21, 2014

Digitally signed by Nancy J
Rosenstengel
Date: 2014.07.21 09:55:28
-05'00'

______________________________
Honorable Nancy J. Rosenstengel
United States District Judge

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