Langham Co. v. Enbridge Pipelines (Illinois), LLC et al

Filing 22

ORDER denying 13 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 10/6/14. (lmp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LANGHAM CO.,
Plaintiff,
v.
ENBRIDGE PIPELINES (ILLINOIS), LLC,
CENTRAL STATES PIPELINE
COMPANY, and UNKNOWN OWNERS
AND NON-RECORD CLAIMANTS,
Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-804-DRH-PMF
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion to remand for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 13).

Plaintiff Langham asserts that the Court lacks

authority to adjudicate this matter because the amount in controversy
requirement mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 unsatisfied. In opposition, defendant
Enbridge Pipelines (Illinois), LLC, (Enbridge) argues that the Court should deny
remand in light of Langham’s incorrect computation of the amount in controversy
(Doc. 17). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs’ motion to
remand.

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II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Langham’s complaint was initially filed in Fayette County, Illinois,
seeking a court determination regarding the existence of an easement on
Langham’s land (Doc. 2). Langham hopes to prevent defendant Enbridge from
utilizing an existing right-of-way and easement created in 1939 to extend a
pipeline as part of the Southern Access Extension Project. Defendant filed its
notice of removal on July 15, 2014, after being served with the complaint (Doc.
2).
On August 8, 2014, Langham filed a motion to remand asserting failure to
meet the amount in controversy (Doc. 13). Langham argues the amount in
controversy is valued at $18,400, or the value of the easement itself (Doc 13, ¶. 3).
Enbridge subsequently filed an amended notice of removal affirming that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
valued at the cost of completing the pipeline if the easement is not upheld (Doc
17, ¶. 6).
The parties do not dispute that Langham is an Illinois Corporation with its
principal place of business in Illinois, and Enbridge is a limited liability company
of Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas. 1 Plaintiff only disputes
1

Plaintiff does not dispute that diversity of citizenship exists. Defendant Enbridge, now known as
Illinois Extension Pipeline Company, LLC (IEPC), is a limited liability company still organized
under Delaware law with its principle place of business in Texas. IEPC has two members:
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Texas and Lincoln Pipeline LLC. a limited liability company organized under the laws of Delaware
with its principal place of business in Ohio. Lincoln’s sole member and its subsidiaries are also
organized under the laws of Delaware with their principal places of business in Ohio (Doc. 17 ¶2).
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the amount in controversy. Because Langham believes the amount at issue in this
action is far less than the $75,000 threshold, Langham instantly moves to remand
this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
III.

LAW AND APPLICATION

The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, provides “any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.”

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts must

narrowly construe the removal statute, and doubts as to removal are resolved in
favor of remand.

See Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir.

1993).
Defendant relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, diversity jurisdiction, which states,
“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between— citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)-(a)(1). In
this case, it is undisputed that diversity of citizenship exists. Plaintiff Langham
challenges removal based solely on the amount in controversy requirement.
When removal is challenged based upon the amount in controversy, the
Court must look to determine whether that amount was met at the time of
removal. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 510-11 (7th Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2952, 168 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2007). The Court will determine the
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amount in controversy by looking at plaintiff's complaint, along with the record
available at the time the petition for removal was filed.

BEM I, L.L.C. v.

Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir.2002).
In this case, plaintiff did not specify a monetary amount in the prayer for
relief. When no amount in controversy is specified, it is determined based upon
an evaluation of the controversy described in plaintiff's complaint and the record,
as a whole, established as of the date of removal. Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. &
Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 983 (7th Cir. 2002); BEM I, L.L.C., 301 F.3d at
552. In making this determination, however, the court is not limited to the
evidence in the record at the time of removal, but may use whatever evidence
“sheds light on the situation which existed when the case was removed.” Harmon
v. OKI Sys., 115 F.3d 477, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1997). The burden to meet the
amount in controversy ultimately lies with the removing party. Meridian Sec. Ins.
Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2006).
Under the test set forth in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283 (1938), a defendant must proffer facts that establish that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Once defendant meets the burden, that
sum controls, so long as it made in good faith. A plaintiff must show “to a legal
certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify
dismissal,” in order to overcome defendant’s established amount in controversy.
St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 303 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added); see also,
Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2012).
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In satisfying the first prong of the test, the Court may consider various
factors to determine the amount in controversy. These include, but are not limited
to, interrogatories, admissions, calculations alleged in the complaint, plaintiff’s
informal estimates or settlement demands, or defendant’s affidavits regarding
how much it would cost to satisfy plaintiff’s demands. Meridian Sec. Ins., 441
F.3d at 542.
In the instant case, Langham’s motion to remand argues that the amount in
controversy is measured as the value of the easement at issue ($18,400) (Doc 13,
¶ 3). Enbridge argues in its amended notice of removal that the amount in
controversy is not the value of the easement at issue, but the cost of laying pipe in
the event the easement is not upheld. (Doc 17, ¶ 6). If Enbridge is required to
build around Langham’s property or purchase a new easement, defendant argues
that costs would far exceed $75,000. The Court agrees.
“A good-faith estimate of amount-in-controversy is acceptable to support
removal on basis of diversity jurisdiction if it is plausible and supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Oshana 472 F.3d at 511. Enbridge estimates the
cost of installed pipe at roughly $300 per foot, so any pipeline longer than 250
feet would exceed the amount in controversy.

Losing access to the easement

would force Enbridge to build around Langham’s property. Building its pipeline
around the property would cost Enbridge at least $75,000 in pipe alone, ignoring
construction costs. This would bring the total cost of the pipeline well above
$75,000, and would satisfy the amount in controversy. Langham offered no
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evidence proving to a legal certainty that recovery will be less than the
jurisdictional amount in controversy; therefore Langham’s motion to remand is
denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Langham’s motion to remand is DENIED
(Doc. 13).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 6th day of October, 2014.

Digitally signed
by David R.
Herndon
Date: 2014.10.06
13:42:20 -05'00'
District Judge
United States District Court

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