Withers v. Veath et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants VEATH and HARRINGTON are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 8/18/2014. (tjk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DORCUS WITHERS, # K-63899,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
TIMOTHY VEATH,
and RICHARD HARRINGTON,
Defendants.
Case No. 14-cv-827-MJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), has
brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a 55-year
sentence for murder and a 25-year sentence for attempted murder. He claims that his due
process rights were violated when he was found guilty of two disciplinary infractions and
punished with four months in segregation, as a result of a hearing that was conducted well
beyond the 14-day time limit prescribed by the prison administrative regulations.
More specifically, Plaintiff claims that on April 10, 2013, he was given two
separate disciplinary tickets for disobeying a direct order (Doc. 1, p. 6). Each ticket was the
result of a separate incident. At that time, Plaintiff was confined in a crisis watch cell at
Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”).
On May 1, 2013, Plaintiff was transferred from Lawrence to Menard.
The
hearing on his disciplinary charges was not conducted until May 16, 2013 (Doc. 1, pp. 6, 10, 13,
17). Defendant Veath chaired the hearing, at which Plaintiff pled guilty to both charges. He was
punished with two months in segregation for each charge (for a total of four months), as well as a
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six-month demotion to C-grade and restriction on commissary (Doc. 1, pp.
6, 10, 13).
Defendant Harrington, as then-warden of Menard, signed off in approval of that disposition.
Plaintiff filed a grievance on the basis that his hearing had been held too late –
over a month past the date when his tickets were issued. Ultimately, the Administrative Review
Board expunged both disciplinary reports due to non-compliance with the required 14-day
timeline for holding the disciplinary hearing (Doc. 1, p. 17). However, that ruling was not made
until March 19, 2014, long after Plaintiff had completed serving the full four months in
segregation as well as the other punishments imposed.
Plaintiff asserts that both Defendants knew that the time frame violation would
result in the tickets being expunged, but that they still allowed him to serve out his full
segregation time. He complains that while in segregation, he was held in a cell with a solid steel
door, which “aggravated [his] mental state causing [him] to attempt suicide”1 (Doc. 1, p. 6-7).
Also during this period, he was unable to go to the yard or have time out of his cell; and could
not use the phone, buy food items from the commissary, go to school, or work.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensation for each day he was made to serve in
segregation (Doc. 1, p. 8).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
After fully considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court
concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
1
Plaintiff does not elaborate further on his suicide attempt or indicate that prison officials’ response was
in any way deficient.
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Because Plaintiff’s “convictions” for the April 2013 prison disciplinary
infractions were expunged, the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), does
not present a bar to seeking damages in a civil rights action. See Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d
722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011) (the ruling in a prison disciplinary proceeding is a conviction for the
purposes of Heck analysis). Nonetheless, in Plaintiff’s case, the term he served in segregation on
the later-expunged charges does not give rise to a constitutional claim.
Under certain limited circumstances, an inmate punished with segregation may be
able to pursue a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process of law. See
Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009).
However, those
circumstances are not present in the instant case. First, Plaintiff bases his claim for denial of
procedural due process only on the tardiness of his disciplinary hearing. But untimeliness does
not violate the Constitution, even if the timing of the hearing ran afoul of the prison
administrative rules. A federal court does not enforce state laws or regulations. Pasiewicz v.
Lake Cnty. Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001); Archie v. City of Racine,
847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
In order to satisfy the Due Process Clause, an inmate must be given advance
written notice of the disciplinary charge, the right to appear before the hearing panel, the right to
call witnesses if prison safety allows, and a written statement of the reasons for the discipline
imposed. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974). In addition, the disciplinary
decision must be supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir.
1994). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Wolff requirements were violated, and his
guilty pleas provided ample evidentiary support for the disciplinary actions. In the end, the fact
that Plaintiff prevailed in his grievance, when he obtained the March 2014 ruling that expunged
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the May 2013 disciplinary infractions, indicates that Plaintiff received the due process he
demanded, albeit not as swiftly as he would have preferred.
Even if there had been an unconstitutional flaw in the conduct of Plaintiff’s
disciplinary hearing, he has no claim that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. An
inmate has a due process liberty interest in being in the general prison population only if the
conditions of his or her disciplinary confinement impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] . . .
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);
see also Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (in light of Sandin, “the right to
litigate disciplinary confinements has become vanishingly small”).
For prisoners whose
punishment includes being put in disciplinary segregation, under Sandin, “the key comparison is
between disciplinary segregation and nondisciplinary segregation rather than between
disciplinary segregation and the general prison population.” Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173,
1175 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Seventh Circuit has elaborated two elements for determining whether
disciplinary segregation conditions impose atypical and significant hardships: “the combined
import of the duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured by the prisoner
during that period.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009)
(emphasis in original). The first prong of this two-part analysis focuses solely on the duration of
disciplinary segregation. For relatively short periods of disciplinary segregation, inquiry into
specific conditions of confinement is unnecessary. See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th
Cir. 2005) (56 days); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (70 days) (“a
relatively short period when one considers his 12 year prison sentence”). In these cases, the
short duration of the disciplinary segregation forecloses any due process liberty interest
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regardless of the conditions. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 (“we have affirmed dismissal without
requiring a factual inquiry into the conditions of confinement”). More recently, the Seventh
Circuit revisited its observation in Marion that six months in segregation “is not such an extreme
term and, standing alone, would not trigger due process rights.” Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734
F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Marion, 559 F.3d at 698) (internal quotations omitted). It
then reviewed the conditions of the plaintiff’s confinement, which included being housed behind
a solid cell door with an aggressive cellmate, and being limited to once-a-week access to the
shower and prison yard.
These conditions did not represent an “atypical and significant
hardship” in relation to the ordinary conditions prevailing in non-disciplinary segregation.
In Plaintiff’s case, he was confined in segregation for four months in all. Four
months may be long enough to trigger an inquiry into the conditions of that confinement, if the
segregation had been imposed after a procedurally flawed hearing; however, in the context of
Plaintiff’s total sentence of 55 years, this is doubtful. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98 n.2 (70day segregation period is “relatively short” in the context of a 12-year prison sentence, citing
Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997)). More to the point, Plaintiff’s description
of the conditions in his segregation cell does not indicate that he was subjected to any
inordinately harsh conditions. The solid cell door, while undesirable, does not by itself create an
“atypical” or “significant” hardship.
The loss of privileges (phone, yard, etc.) is a normal
consequence of placement in segregation, and does not trigger due process concerns. Similarly,
the six-month restrictions Plaintiff faced while he was on C-grade and denied commissary did
not violate his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n.8 (7th Cir.
1997) (and cases cited therein) (no protected liberty interest in demotion to C-grade status and
loss of commissary privileges).
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Again, the disciplinary charges were expunged because prison officials violated
their own administrative rules by delaying Plaintiff’s hearing for more than 14 days. That delay
did not violate the Constitution, nor did the fact that Plaintiff was required to serve his full
segregation term before his record was expunged. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to
state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted, and this action shall be dismissed.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Defendants VEATH and
HARRINGTON are DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted
“strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee
for this action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains
due and payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.
1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal.
See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v.
Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.
1998). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
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“strike.” A timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)2 may toll the
30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 18, 2014
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge
2
A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
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