Williams v. Spiller et al

Filing 7

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: COUNTS 1 and 2 are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. COUNT 3 is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, however the dismissal is without p rejudice to the claims being raised in the pending Central District case of Rasho v. Walker, Case No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill.). Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted strikes under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 9/3/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THEOPOLIS WILLIAMS, # B-31679,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
WARDEN SPILLER,
WARDEN GOETTING,
K. MELVIN,
C/O BASOLO,
DR. GILISPE,
CHARLES W. HECK,
and MARCUS A. MYERS,
Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-854-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center
(“Pinckneyville”), has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff is serving a 24-year sentence for aggravated battery. He raises several claims: he was
denied access to the law library; he was improperly disciplined when he threatened to harm
himself in response to the denial of library access; and his mental health needs were ignored, in
violation of an order entered in the pending class action case of Rasho v. Walker, Case No. 07cv-1298 (C.D. Ill., Doc. 132, May 8, 2013).
In somewhat disjointed fashion, the complaint alleges that on March 31, 2014,
Plaintiff asked Defendant Basolo for permission to go to the law library (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 18). He
needed to work on his post-conviction case, in which he had an upcoming court date on April 24,
2014. That case was “still pending in the circuit court” as of the time Plaintiff filed the instant

Page 1 of 11

suit on July 29, 2014 (Doc. 1, p. 1). Defendant Basolo refused to allow Plaintiff to go to the
library.
According to Plaintiff’s account in his attached grievance, he “got frustrated and
told [Defendant Basolo], what I have to do is hurt myself to get help.” (Doc. 1, p. 18).
Defendant Basolo did not contact mental health staff to assist Plaintiff after hearing these
remarks, but instead wrote Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket for 206 – Intimidation or Threats (Doc.
1, pp. 18, 21). Plaintiff insists he was not threatening Defendant Basolo, nor did he attempt to
hurt him at the time of his “mental breakdown,” thus the ticket was false (Doc. 1, p. 19).
On April 7, 2014, Defendants Heck and Myers conducted the hearing on
Plaintiff’s disciplinary charge (Doc. 1, p. 21). Plaintiff pled not guilty. When describing his
discussion with Defendant Basolo upon being refused permission to go to the library, Plaintiff
said, “I asked how I can get out of here, I said if you don’t get me out of here I’m going to hang
myself.” Id. According to Defendant Basolo’s account, Plaintiff had told him, “If you don’t get
me out of this cell I’m going to do something stupid,” and when questioned, responded that “If
you don’t move me you will figure it out, you will regret it.” Id. Defendants Heck and Myers
took Plaintiff’s remarks at the hearing as a partial admission of guilt. He was found guilty and
punished with one month in segregation and a one month demotion to C-grade. Defendant
Warden Spiller approved these sanctions.
Plaintiff filed a grievance seeking expungement of the disciplinary action. He
claimed that Defendant Basolo did not follow the proper procedure for dealing with “Mental
Health Inmates,” which required him to contact Mental Health Services before writing a ticket
(Doc. 1, p. 19). The grievance was denied by Defendant Melvin (Doc. 1, p. 20). Defendants
Spiller and Goetting (assistant warden) refused to take any action when Plaintiff told them that

Page 2 of 11

he had been falsely accused and should not be in segregation (Doc. 1, pp. 1-2).
Plaintiff asserts his belief that all the named Defendants were aware of the
pending case of Rasho v. Walker, Case No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill.), yet all have refused to “obey
this law” (Doc. 1, p. 8). He characterizes his exchange with Defendant Basolo as a “cry for
help” which should have prompted the officer to summon a crisis team to assist Plaintiff after he
threatened suicide. Plaintiff also includes Defendant Dr. Gilispe (Mental Health staff) as a party
(Doc. 1, p. 3). He told her about the Rasho case, and begged her to help him because he had
been placed in a “strip room” for five days with no clothes, and put in segregation for a false
ticket. However, she did nothing in response.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages for his confinement in segregation and in the
strip cell, and for the denial of access to the law library (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Merits Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to conduct a prompt threshold review of the
complaint, and to dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant. After fully
considering the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court concludes that this action is subject
to summary dismissal.
Plaintiff’s claims grouped into the following counts: Denial of access to the law
library (Count 1); due process violation/confinement in segregation on false disciplinary charge
(Count 2); and failure to comply with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) mental
health care policy or the requirements of Rasho v. Walker (Count 3). The complaint fails to
state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be granted on any of these claims.

Page 3 of 11

Dismissal of Count 1 – Denial of Access to Law Library
Inmates should be allowed reasonable access to law library resources, however,
“the mere denial of access to a prison law library or to other legal materials is not itself a
violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right is to access the courts, and only if the defendants’
conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious challenge to the prisoner’s conviction, sentence, or
conditions of confinement has this right been infringed.” Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968
(7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner’s complaint must “spell out, in minimal detail, the connection
between the alleged denial of access to legal materials and an inability to pursue a legitimate
challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions.” Id.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff describes one occasion when he was not allowed to go
to the law library, and states generally that “some days the law library [is] closed for no apparent
reason” (Doc. 1, p. 8). He further notes that the post-conviction case he hoped to work on in the
library is still currently pending. He does not claim that the limitation on his library access
caused him to miss any deadline or resulted in any detriment to his ability to pursue the postconviction matter.
Where the record does not reveal any hindrance to an inmate’s ability to pursue a
meritorious court action, a claim cannot be maintained for denial of access to the court. Actual
or threatened detriment is an essential element of a § 1983 action for denial of court access.
Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 642-43 (7th Cir. 1987); Hossman v. Sprandlin, 812 F.2d
1019, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1987). To state a claim, a plaintiff must explain “the connection
between the alleged denial of access to legal materials and an inability to pursue a legitimate
challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison conditions,” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted); accord Guajardo Palma v. Martinson,

Page 4 of 11

622 F.3d 801, 805-06 (7th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff does not make a single allegation which would describe an actual or
potential limitation on his access to the courts, as a result of being denied permission to use the
law library. Accordingly, Count 1 fails to state a constitutional claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Dismissal of Count 2 – False Disciplinary Charge
In Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit
held that the filing of false disciplinary charges by a correctional officer does not state a
Fourteenth Amendment claim when the accused inmate is given a subsequent hearing on those
charges in which the inmate is afforded the procedural protections outlined in Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (advance written notice of the charge, right to appear before the
hearing panel, the right to call witnesses if prison security allows, and a written statement of the
reasons for the discipline imposed). The decision of the disciplinary hearing board will also be
sustained so long as it is supported by “some evidence.” Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that prisoners have a right “to be free from arbitrary
actions of prison officials,” Hanrahan, 747 F.2d at 1140, but determined that the procedural
protections outlined in Wolff provided the appropriate protection against arbitrary actions taken
by a correctional officer such as issuing the inmate a fabricated conduct violation.
In the instant complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Basolo falsely accused
him of intimidation or threats, when in fact his statement that he might have to harm himself was
a cry for help. While Plaintiff’s remarks could have been interpreted that way, the adjustment
committee had sufficient evidence before (it in the form of Defendant Basolo’s disciplinary
report summarizing their exchange, and Plaintiff’s statement at the hearing) to conclude that

Page 5 of 11

Plaintiff was guilty of the charge. It is not the role of this Court to re-weigh the evidence heard
by the adjustment committee; all that is required is that the decision was based on some
evidence. Black, 22 F.3d at 1402; see also Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007)
(when it is apparent that even a meager amount of evidence supports the disciplinary action, the
court’s inquiry ends).
Furthermore, Plaintiff does not point to any procedural flaw in the hearing that
would run afoul of the protections required under Wolff. He thus has failed to show any
deprivation of procedural due process in the conduct or outcome of his disciplinary hearing.
Finally, even if the complaint had suggested a potential constitutional problem
with the disciplinary proceedings, Plaintiff’s punishment with one month in segregation does not
raise a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process. An inmate has a due
process liberty interest in being in the general prison population only if the conditions of his or
her disciplinary confinement impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] . . . in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Wagner
v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997) (in light of Sandin, “the right to litigate
disciplinary confinements has become vanishingly small”).
A court must consider two elements when assessing whether disciplinary
segregation conditions impose atypical and significant hardships: “the combined import of the
duration of the segregative confinement and the conditions endured by the prisoner during that
period.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in
original). The first prong of this two-part analysis focuses solely on the duration of disciplinary
segregation. For relatively short periods of disciplinary segregation, inquiry into specific
conditions of confinement is unnecessary. See Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2005)

Page 6 of 11

(56 days); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 1997) (70 days) (“a relatively short
period when one considers his 12 year prison sentence”). In these cases, the short duration of the
disciplinary segregation forecloses any due process liberty interest regardless of the conditions.
See Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 (“we have affirmed dismissal without requiring a factual inquiry
into the conditions of confinement”).
Plaintiff’s case falls squarely within this rule. He was in segregation for only one
month – a relatively short time in the context of his 24-year sentence. Aside from the five days
Plaintiff was kept in the “strip cell” without clothing, 1 he does not point to any atypical or
significant hardship he was forced to endure during that period. His only complaints were that
he was restricted from calling family and friends, was not in the general population, and was
limited to one shower per week. These are all among the usual restrictions placed on inmates in
segregation, and do not implicate any constitutional concerns.
For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim upon which relief
may be granted in Count 2.
Dismissal of Count 3 – Failure to Comply with Mental Health Care Policy
Plaintiff insists that Defendant Basolo and others ignored IDOC policy when they
refused to get him a crisis team or any consultation with mental health staff after he threatened to
harm himself. Even if Plaintiff is correct in his claim that Defendants failed to follow IDOC
policy directives regarding the handling of a suicidal or mentally ill inmate, the failure of prison
officials to follow state rules or administrative regulations does not give rise to a constitutional
claim. Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty. Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 526 (7th Cir. 2001); Archie
Plaintiff gives no further detail about the conditions in the strip cell. It appears that he was placed there
as a response to his threat to hang himself, as a precautionary measure to keep him from carrying out that
threat. The mere deprivation of clothing in such a circumstance does not amount to a constitutional
violation; Plaintiff does not claim that he lacked any means to cover his body (such as with a paper
garment) or to keep warm.

1

Page 7 of 11

v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989) (a federal court does not enforce state law or regulations).
Further, the complaint does not state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff’s serious mental health needs. “A prisoner’s claim for deliberate
indifference must establish (1) an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) an official’s
deliberate indifference to that condition.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). An inmate’s need for treatment of a mental illness
may be considered an objectively serious medical need. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724,
734 (7th Cir. 2001). “Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official
knows of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that
risk.” Gomez, 680 F.3d at 865. The Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to
“demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to
meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff may have been suffering from a mental breakdown, as he put it, when he
said he would have to hurt himself in order to get any help. On the other hand, he may have
made the statement in order to manipulate Defendant Basolo into granting his request to go to the
library. Plaintiff never claims that he had been diagnosed with any mental health condition prior
to the incident with Defendant Basolo. A medical need is objectively “serious” where it has
either “been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or where the need is “so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). Based on the facts described in the complaint, it is
not clear that Plaintiff was suffering from an objectively serious mental health condition that
would have been obvious to a lay person such as Defendant Basolo.

Page 8 of 11

However, it is apparent that either Defendant Basolo or some other prison official
gave credence to Plaintiff’s remarks that he might be considering suicide, because Plaintiff states
he was held in a “strip cell” for several days. This is a measure commonly employed to ensure
the safety of a suicidal inmate. The complaint does not disclose whether the decision to put
Plaintiff in the strip cell was made by Defendant Basolo, by a prison mental health professional,
or by another party. Nonetheless, that placement would appear to be a “reasonable measure” to
address a risk of serious harm, in light of Plaintiff’s comments as reported by Defendant Basolo.
See Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267. Considering all these factors, the complaint does not state an
actionable claim that Defendant Basolo was deliberately indifferent to a known risk of harm to
Plaintiff from a serious mental health condition.
Finally, whether or not the Defendants’ actions complied with the Court’s order in
Rasho v. Walker, Case No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill., Doc. 132, May 8, 2013), Plaintiff cannot
pursue a claim in this Court based on the law of that case. The Agreed Order entered in Rasho
does indeed set out a number of requirements that the IDOC has been ordered to fulfill, to ensure
that the treatment of seriously mentally ill inmates complies with constitutional obligations. A
portion of the order addresses procedures that should be followed when a mentally ill inmate is
facing disciplinary charges or is placed in segregation. Significantly, the order provides that if a
dispute arises as to whether the defendants in that action have failed to comply with the terms of
the order, any legal action must be brought in the form of a motion to enforce the order (Doc.
132 in Rasho). Obviously, such a motion must be brought in the pending Rasho case, before the
District Court for the Central District of Illinois.
Plaintiff has in fact filed his own motion in the Rasho case on July 17, 2014,
which he includes as an exhibit herein (Doc. 1, pp. 12-14). The Court further notes that counsel

Page 9 of 11

of record for the class of plaintiffs in Rasho recently filed a motion to enforce the Agreed Order
(Doc. 182 in Rasho), which is still pending. It would be improper for this Court to insert itself
into that matter by allowing Plaintiff to pursue a claim in this case seeking to enforce the order
imposed by the Central District. Accordingly, Count 3 shall also be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, but the dismissal shall be without prejudice to
Plaintiff raising his claims in an appropriate motion before the Central District in Rasho.
Disposition
For the reasons stated above, this action is DISMISSED. COUNTS 1 and 2 are
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
COUNT 3 is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, however
the dismissal is without prejudice to the claims being raised in the pending Central District case
of Rasho v. Walker, Case No. 07-cv-1298 (C.D. Ill.).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal shall count as one of his three allotted
“strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A dismissal without prejudice may count
as a strike, so long as the dismissal is made because the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim. See Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s obligation to
pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee
of $350.00 remains due and payable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d
464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this
Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal.
See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the

Page 10 of 11

$505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v.
Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.
1998). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur another
“strike.” A timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) 2 may toll the
30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
The Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 3, 2014
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge

A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of
the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).

2

Page 11 of 11