Dintelmann v. Village of Freeburg, Illinois
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING in part and DENYING in part 16 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Village of Freeburg, Illinois. Defendant's Motion is GRANTED as to Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint and DENIED as to Counts I, II, and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 9/3/15. (mah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
RONALD DINTELMANN,
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Plaintiff,
vs.
VILLAGE OF FREEBURG, ILLINOIS,
Defendant.
Case No. 14-CV-855-SMY-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ronald Dintelmann filed suit against his former employer, the Village of
Freeburg, Illinois (the “Village”), under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 Ill.Comp.Stat.Ann. 5/1-101 et seq.
(Doc. 2). The Village moved for summary judgment (Doc. 16). Plaintiff filed a timely response
(Doc. 21). For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for the Village as the Public Works Director for seventeen years, from
1996 until May 2013 (Doc. 2). In May 2010, Plaintiff underwent surgery and radiation treatment
for a brain tumor (Id.). He returned to work part-time in October 2010, and returned to work on
a full-time basis in January 2011 (Id.). In July 2011, Plaintiff suffered radiation necrosis which
affected his ability to walk (Id.). Following medical treatment, he returned to work in February
2012. On May 6, 2013, during an Executive Session, Mayor Seth Speiser and the Village Board
voted not to reappoint Plaintiff to his position (Doc. 2). Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Speiser did
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not believe Plaintiff could “get around” (Id.). Following the Executive Session, the Village
Board voted not to renew Plaintiff’s employment and, instead, appointed Plaintiff’s subordinate,
John Tolan, as Public Works Director (see Docs. 2 and 16-2). Section 31.003 of the Freeburg
Village Code, states in relevant part:
APPOINTMENT: At the first meeting of May in each year, or as soon thereafter
as possible, there shall be appointed by the Mayor, with the advice and consent of
the Village Board, all appointive Village Officers who shall hold their several
offices for the term of one year and until their successors are appointed and
qualified. (Doc. 16-1).
Plaintiff asserts that he was an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who was
discriminated against by the Village because of his disability (Id.).
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also RuffinThompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black
Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc. 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir.
2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine
dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the moving
party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); see also Lawrence v. Kenosha
County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
where the nonmovant “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her
case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. As the
Seventh Circuit has stated, summary judgment is “the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit,
when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its
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version of the events.” Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hammel v.
Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted).
As to Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Village asserts that Plaintiff does not have an
actionable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically,
because Plaintiff cannot establish that his employment was anything other than “at-will,” he
lacked a property interest or legitimate expectation of continued employment as Public Works
Director. In his response, Plaintiff concedes that § 1983 is an inappropriate means to assert the
claims of discrimination advanced in the Complaint.
Accordingly, Count III of Plaintiff’s
Complaint will be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Next, as to Counts I, II, and IV of the Complaint, the Village argues that because
Plaintiff was an appointed village officer, he was not a “qualified employee” and, therefore,
cannot bring suit under the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, or Illinois Human Rights Act. The Village
further asserts that Plaintiff’s term of office ended under the Freeburg Village Code on May 6,
2013.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) defines the term “employee” for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA as follows:
(f) The term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer, except
that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set
forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an
individual who is a citizen of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
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Title VII excludes from its coverage four types of persons: (1) elected officials; (2) the
personal staff of an elected official; (3) appointees on the policymaking level; and (4) ‘an
immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the
office.” Opp v. Office of the State's Attorney of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir.2010).
The Village claims that Plaintiff, as Public Works Director, was exempt because he “was a
person chosen by the Mayor of the Village to be on the Mayor’s personal staff, or an appointee
on the policy making level or immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of constitutional or
legal powers of the Mayor” (Doc. 17, p. 5). Additionally, the Village asserts that, as Public
Works Director, Plaintiff “was a member of the immediate personal staff of the Mayor of the
Village…or a principal administrative officer of the Village (Doc. 17, p. 6) and therefore, is not a
“qualified employee” under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or Illinois Human Rights Act.
The statutory language of Title VII does not define “personal staff.” Leving v. City of
Chicago, 1988 WL 20046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1988). While several circuits have addressed
the meaning of the term, the Seventh Circuit has yet to do so. Id. The Fifth Circuit considered
the meaning of “personal staff” in Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148 (5th Cir.1985) and
identified six factors to be considered when determining whether a plaintiff falls within the
“personal staff” exception of Title VII, including:
Whether the elected official has plenary powers of appointment and removal, (2)
whether the person in the position at issue is personally accountable to only that
elected official, (3) whether the person in the position at issue represents the
elected official in the eyes of the public, (4) whether the elected official exercises
a considerable amount of control over the position, (5) the level of the position
within the organization's chain of command, and (6) the actual intimacy of the
working relationship between the elected official and the person filling the
position.
Id. at 151.
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The determination as to whether a public employee is exempt from the definition of
“employees” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) because he serves as either a personal staff member or
close advisor to an elected official is “a highly factual inquiry based upon the facts and
circumstances of the employment relationship between the complaining individual and the
elected official.” See Owens v. Rush, 654 F.2d 1370, 1375 (10th Cir. 1981). As a result, this
highly factual inquiry does not lend itself well to disposition by summary judgment. Teneyuca,
767 F.2d at 152.
Likewise, the exemption for policymaking advisors is narrowly construed. An individual
is a policymaking appointee if “the position held by the individual authorizes, either directly or
indirectly, meaningful input into governmental decision-making on issues where there is room
for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation.” Opp v. Office of State's Attorney
of Cook Cnty., 630 F.3d 616, 619 (7th Cir.2010). When making such a determination, courts
look to the powers inherent in the office rather than to the actual functions performed by the
current office holder. Tomczak v. City of Chi., 765 F.2d 633, 640 (7th Cir.1985). “[D]etermining
the powers inherent in a given office may be done without the aid of a finder of fact ‘when the
duties and responsibilities of a particular position are clearly defined by law and regulations.’”
Opp, 630 F.3d at 621 (quoting Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir.1999)).
Here, the parties dispute whether Plaintiff was an exempt employee. The Village asserts
that Plaintiff was a personal staff member and advisor to the Mayor or was a policymaking
appointee. Plaintiff counters that he was not personally accountable to the Mayor, but rather the
Village Administrator, who is not an elected official (Doc. 21-1). Plaintiff further asserts that he
did not represent the Mayor in the eyes of the public, the Mayor exercised virtually no control
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over his position, and that he never had a close personal or professional relationship with any of
the previous mayors of the Village (Id.).
The starting point for the determination as to whether a position is exempt as a matter of
law is the official job description, if one exists. Garrison v. Calumet City, Illinois, 450 F. Supp.
2d 869, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Here, the Village has not supplied the Court with an official job
description for Plaintiff. Further, the Village has not provided a statutory definition of the
powers of the Public Works Director, the chain of command, or any meaningful information
about the position that would enable the Court to determine whether the position is exempt. As a
result, Plaintiff argues that there are substantial and material factual issues remaining regarding
Plaintiff’s employment status.
The Court agrees and finds that summary judgment is
unwarranted.
Accordingly, Defendant Village of Freeburg, Illinois’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED as to Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint and DENIED as to Counts I, II, and IV of
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 3, 2015
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge
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