Rector v. Parrish Steckenrider et al

Filing 81

ORDER DENYING 73 Bill of Costs filed by Wexford Health Sources Inc. and SUSTAINING 75 Objection to Bill of Costs filed by Angel Rector. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 10/17/2017. (bak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANGEL RECTOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANITRA PARRISH STECKENRIDER,
Individually and in her official capacity, and
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., a
Pennsylvania corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 14-CV-878-NJR-RJD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Angel Rector brought this action against Anitra Parrish Steckenrider (“Steckenrider”) and
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) based on alleged violations of Title VII and the Illinois
Human Rights Act (Doc. 27). Specifically, Rector alleged that she suffered sexual harassment and
retaliation. On April 19, 2017, the Court granted Wexford’s and Steckenrider’s Motions for Summary
Judgment. On May 2, 2017, Wexford filed a Bill of Costs (Doc. 73). On May 3, 2017, the Court filed

a Notice regarding the Taxation of Costs, indicating that any objections were due on or before
May 17, 2017 (Doc. 74). On May 16, 2017, Rector filed an Objection to Defendants’ Bill of Costs
(Doc. 75). On May 18, 2017, Defendants filed a Response (Doc. 78).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) authorizes federal district courts to award costs
to prevailing parties in lawsuits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules,
or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the
prevailing party.”). Specifically, the recoverable costs include: (1) fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts; (3) fees and disbursements for printing
and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies; (5) docket fees under

Page 1 of 3

Section 1923; and (6) compensation of court appointed experts, interpreters, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
The Seventh Circuit has noted that the rule provides a “presumption that the losing party
will pay costs but grants the court discretion to direct otherwise.” Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469
F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2006). ”The presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party
is difficult to overcome, and the district court’s discretion is narrowly confined—the court must
award costs unless it states good reasons for denying them.” Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co.,
Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v.
Touche, Ross & Co., 954 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Wexford seeks $4,230.31 in costs to cover the cost of reproduction of documents,
deposition fees, and copying fees. Along with the Bill of Costs, Wexford has attached the
relevant invoices to substantiate each cost claimed. Rector argues that Wexford should not be
awarded costs because the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“IDHR”) found “substantial
evidence of sexual harassment.” (Doc. 75, p. 2). Rector urges that, should the Court award costs
in favor of Wexford despite this finding, such an award will have a cooling effect on the rights of
employees who file a charge of sexual harassment and/or retaliation after receiving a finding of
substantial evidence of sexual harassment by the IDHR (Id.).
While the Court recognizes that the Seventh Circuit has previously reversed the denial of
costs to an employer-defendant in a Title VII case, see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489,
491 (7th Cir. 1982), the Court does not find that awarding costs in favor of Wexford is
appropriate under the specific circumstances of this case. As Rector points out, the Illinois
Department of Human Rights found “substantial evidence of sexual harassment,” and this
finding precipitated the commencement of this lawsuit where Rector alleged that she suffered
sexual harassment and a related claim of retaliation. It is important that a plaintiff, such as

Page 2 of 3

Rector, is not “unduly intimidated” by the threat of imposition of costs in a case raising
important issues such as sexual harassment, in instances where a state agency has previously
substantiated that claim. Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 121, 122 (D.
Mass. 2002) (expressing concern that plaintiffs seeking to bring similar sexual harassment claims
would be “’unduly intimidated’ by the threat of imposition of costs in a case raising important
issues.”); see generally Kuzman v. Hannaford Bros. Co., Case No. CV-04-87-B-W, 2005 WL 1981498,
at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 10, 2005) (the court exercised discretion and denied the imposition of costs
noting, among other things, that the plaintiff attempted to vindicate important statutory rights
under Title VII, the case involved issues of public significance, and the plaintiff’s claims, though
unsuccessful, had merit). Thus, as a matter of public policy and public importance, the Court will
exercise its discretion and deny Wexford’s Bill of Costs.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Wexford’s Bill of Costs (Doc. 73) and SUSTAINS
Rector’s Objection to Wexford’s Bill of Costs (Doc. 75).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 17, 2017
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 3 of 3