McBride v. Chapman et al

Filing 127

ORDER granting 101 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 103 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/6/2017. (anj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EDWARD M. McBRIDE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NATHAN CHAPMAN, DOUG
SIMMONS, and BRANDI LITTLE,

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Case No. 14-cv-894-SCW

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff, who was pro se at the time, filed his
complaint alleging deliberate indifference against Defendants.

Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Nathan Chapman, Doug Simmons, and Brandi Little were deliberately
indifferent in treating his serious medical needs, related to Plaintiff’s teeth and dentures.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Nathan
Chapman and Bradi Little (Docs. 101 and 102). Plaintiff, now represented by counsel,
has filed a response (Doc. 114). Defendants have filed a reply (Doc. 118). Defendant
Doug Simmons has also filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 103 and 104) and
Plaintiff has filed a response to that motion (Doc. 115). Based on the following, the
Court GRANTS both motions for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging deliberate indifference
related to treatment for his teeth and a denture that he received against Defendants (Doc.
1).

As narrowed by the Court’s threshold order (Doc. 8), Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Chapman took a persistent, yet ineffective, course of treatment when he
provided Plaintiff with dentures instead of ordering corrective surgery for his gums,
which suffered from excess bone and an undercut ridge (Doc. 8, p. 2). As a result of
only being provided with dentures, Plaintiff was subjected to pain and could not eat
because of the discomfort associated with the dentures.

Plaintiff also alleges that

Defendant Little failed to prescribe him with pain medication (Id.). Defendant Thomas
Spiller, as warden at Pinckneyville, was left in the case in his official capacity only, for
purposes of injunctive relief (Id. at p. 6).

As Plaintiff was later transferred from

Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Defendant Doug Simmons, was substituted as the
proper defendant for injunctive relief, in place of Thomas Spiller (Docs. 86 and 89).
While at Lawrence Correctional Center, in December 2011, Plaintiff had certain
upper teeth extracted, including teeth #’s 2, 5, 6, 10, and 11 (Doc. 102-2; 102-1, p. 16).
Plaintiff then transferred to Menard in January 2012 and saw the dentist on January 27,
2012 (Doc. 102-1, p. 14 and 16-17; 102-3; 102-4). Although Plaintiff requested dentures,
he was told his gums had not yet healed (Doc. 102-1, p. 17). He was placed on a soft
diet (Doc. 102-4, p. 1). Plaintiff testified that he did not receive dentures at Menard
because the facility was also on lockdown (Doc. 102-1, p. 14). Plaintiff again was
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examined while at Menard on May 21, 2012 (Doc. 102-4, p. 1). The notes from that
examination indicated that ridges were present in the area of extraction and were still
sore to pressure (Id.). Plaintiff was told that he needed further healing and possible
pre-prosthetic surgery (Id.). Plaintiff was to be evaluated in three months for an upper
denture or possible surgery (Id.). Plaintiff’s soft diet was continued (Id.).
Plaintiff transferred to Pinckneyville Correctional Center on April 26, 2013 (Doc.
102-3, p. 2). Chapman first reviewed Plaintiff’s records and x-rays on May 2, 2013 (Doc.
102-4, p. 1). Chapman saw Plaintiff on May 6, 2013 and noted that his gums had healed
within normal limits and noted an undercut on his maxillary ridge, meaning he had
excess bone in certain areas on his gum ridge (Id.; 102-5, p. 22). Plaintiff noted that he
was not interested in a soft diet and testified that Pinckneyville’s version of a soft diet
bothered his gums (Doc. 102-4, p. 1; 102-1, p. 19-21). Plaintiff also complained that he
had sharp bone edges on his gums, but Chapman indicated that the denture could be
made to work with those (Doc. 102-1, p. 15). Chapman testified that Plaintiff was
evaluated for whether Plaintiff needed a denture or first needed surgery to remove the
excess bone, but Chapman felt confident that a denture could be made to work with
Plaintiff’s gums (Doc. 102-5, p. 22, 24). Chapman examined Plaintiff’s gums, feeling the
undercut and gum to determine healing (Id. at p. 22-23). Plaintiff was scheduled for
denture impressions (Id. at p. 22).
Chapman began the process of creating Plaintiff’s dentures. On June 19, 2012,
Plaintiff had an initial alginate impression of his upper gums, including the ridge (Doc.
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102-5, p. 29; 102-4, p. 2). The shade, or color of his dentures, was noted at 62 to match
his lower teeth (Doc. 102-5, p. 29-30; 102-4, p. 2).

Chapman noted that those

impressions were sent to a lab and that if the technician making the dentures felt it
would be difficult to make a denture given the excess bone, the lab would have
contacted the prison, but the lab did not contact Chapman (Doc. 102-5, p. 36-37). On
July 1, 2013, Plaintiff had a “wax bite” to determine Plaintiff’s bite (Doc. 102-5, p. 30;
102-4, p. 2). On July 17, 2013 Plaintiff was fitted with an initial set of dentures but the
midline was off and the dentures were sent back for resetting (Doc. 102-5, p. 31; 102-4, p.
2). Chapman testified that this was either due to Plaintiff biting down wrong in the wax
or a clinical error in marking Plaintiff’s bite wrong (Doc. 102-5, p. 31).

Chapman

remarked the midline and sent the dentures back (Id.). Plaintiff was fitted with another
denture on July 30, 2013 and Chapman noted that the set up was much better but that
Plaintiff continued to bite down differently every time (Doc. 102-5, p. 32; 102-4, p. 2).
Chapman testified that he believed this was due to the fact that Plaintiff had went
without upper teeth for so long, making it hard for him to bite down correctly (Doc.
102-5, p. 32). Plaintiff was happy with the setup and the appearance, however, and the
denture was sent back to the lab for finalizing (Doc. 102-5, p. 33; 102-4, p. 2). Plaintiff
was provided with a soft diet throughout the fitting process (Doc. 102-5, p. 28-33).
Plaintiff received his dentures on August 14, 2013 (Doc. 102-4, p. 2). Plaintiff
complained that the dentures were hurting certain areas of his mouth and marked the
locations (Doc. 102-1, p. 20). Chapman noted on August 26, 2013 that there were
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undercuts and adjustments were necessary to get the dentures to go around the
undercuts (Doc. 102-5, p. 33; 102-4, p. 2). Chapman testified that the undercuts were
places where Plaintiff had a little bit more bone and that Plaintiff had excess bone
growths on the right and left sides, towards the back of his mouth (Id. at p. 34). The
dentures pushed on those areas, causing soreness (Id.). Chapman testified that he made
the adjustments with a slow-speed drill in order to get the denture around the excess
bone (Id. at 33-34, 38).

Chapman testified that adjustments were quite common for

new dentures because as the dentures settle, there are spots that will rub the gum and
require adjusting (Id. at 33). The medical notes indicate that Plaintiff felt the dentures
were a lot better (Doc. 102-4, p. 2).

Chapman testified that if the dentures did not

ultimately work, he would either order new dentures or go to the next step (Doc. 102-5,
p. 36).
Plaintiff testified that the first time the dentures were put in, the dentures pressed
on his gums and caused pain (Doc. 102-1, p. 26). Plaintiff told Chapman the dentures
did not feel right, but Chapman told him he would have to get used to them (Id. at p. 27).
Plaintiff testified that he only wore the dentures the one time and that he did not wear
them after that (Id. at p. 21). Plaintiff testified that when he put the dentures back in the
second time, after Chapman made some adjustments, the dentures hurt his gums and he
stopped wearing them (Id. at p. 26-27). Plaintiff filed a grievance on August 15, 2013,
indicating he received his dentures on August 14, 2013 and it was causing him
“excruciating pain” (Doc. 114-3, p. 11).
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After August 26, 2013, Chapman testified that he set Plaintiff to be seen at
Plaintiff’s request, which would be done by Plaintiff submitting a written request for
adjustment (Doc. 102-5, p. 39). Plaintiff requested an adjustment because his bite was
off on the left side (Id.). Plaintiff was seen on September 11, 2013 (Doc. 102-4, p. 2).
Chapman adjusted the dentures again (Id.). Chapman testified that adjustments are a
process that has to be done slowly as once a piece of the denture is shaved off, it cannot
be replaced (Doc. 102-5, p. 40). The area has to be slowly taken down until it fits
comfortably and if too much is taken off, the dentures will not fit properly (Id.).
Chapman saw Plaintiff again on September 19, 2013 (Doc. 102-4, p. 2). Adjustments
were made to the left back of the dentures as Plaintiff indicated he was biting his cheek
(Doc. 102-5, p. 40). Plaintiff was specifically biting a saliva gland duct (Id.). Chapman
again adjusted the denture so that Plaintiff was not biting his cheek (Id.). Chapman
ordered Plaintiff’s soft diet to continue for two additional weeks but counseled Plaintiff
that he needed to get used to the dentures (Id.). Plaintiff was scheduled to be seen only
at Plaintiff’s request (Id.).
On November 5, 2013 Plaintiff wrote a kite indicating that he was still have
troubles with his denture and was seen by Chapman (Doc. 102-4, p. 3; 102-5, p. 42).
However, Plaintiff forgot his dentures and the appointment was rescheduled for
November 7, 2013 (Id.). Plaintiff was seen again on November 7, 2013 and Chapman
adjusted the pallet portion of the denture and Plaintiff indicated that it felt better (Id.).
Plaintiff, admittedly, made no requests for adjustments after November 2013 (Doc.
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114-2, p. 1). Chapman did not receive any further requests from Plaintiff regarding his
dentures (Doc. 102-5, p. 42).
Plaintiff testified he did not contact Chapman was because the dentures were
destroyed (Id.).

Plaintiff testified that he stopped wearing them after the second time

because they kept hurting (Doc. 102-1, p. 27). He made a request to see Chapman and
Chapman kept sanding on them (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he sanded them down so
much that they didn’t fit well (Id. at p. 28). Plaintiff testified when Chapman would
sand one side down, that side would then be okay, but the sanding would cause
problems on the other side of the denture and that it kept going back and forth from side
to side (Id. at p. 28). Plaintiff testified that after a side was sanded it would feel okay for
a minute but then the other side would not be right (Id. at p. 29).
Plaintiff next saw Chapman on May 20, 2014 for a toothache (Doc. 102-4, p. 3).
The tooth was ultimately extracted (Doc. 102-4, p. 3; 102-5, p. 43). Plaintiff was seen on
June 10, 2014 for a denture adjustment but Plaintiff forgot the denture and the
appointment was rescheduled (Doc. 102-4, p. 3; 102-5, p. 45). Plaintiff was seen again
on June 16, 2014 but at that time Plaintiff indicated that the denture was fine and signed
a refusal of treatment (Id.). Plaintiff refused a two-year exam on November 24, 2014
(Doc. 102-4, p. 3). He transferred to Jacksonville on July 22, 2015 (Doc. 56). Plaintiff
was seen for a denture adjustment on March 4, 2016 and asked for a soft diet (Doc. 102-4,
p. 3). It was noted that the palatal surface seemed self-adjusted and that it needed to be
re-adjusted (Doc. 102-4, p. 4). Plaintiff was seen on April 16, 2016 and it was noted by
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the dentist that the denture needed either adjusted or remade (Id.).
As to Defendant Little, Plaintiff testified that she continued to charge him a
co-pay for pain medication instead of referring him to the doctor (Doc. 102-1, p. 18-19,
31). Plaintiff believed that he had a chronic problem which would not require him to be
charged a co-pay every time (Id. at p. 31). Little testified that she saw Plaintiff on one
occasion and provided him with Motrin (Doc. 102-6, p. 15). The Motrin was a one-time
dose of ten pills (Id.). The other two times, Plaintiff refused to pay the co-pay (Id.).
Plaintiff had received a Motrin prescription for his right hand related to a cyst
while at Menard (Doc. 102-8). Pain associated with the wrist was not a chronic issue,
thus Plaintiff had to see the nurse three times before being seen by the doctor (Doc.
102-6, p. 16; 102-7, p. 2). A nurse cannot determine whether a condition is chronic and a
regular Nurse Sick Call, for non-chronic conditions, requires a $5.00 co-pay (Doc. 102-7,
p. 2). A co-pay is not required at chronic clinic visits but a patient with undiagnosed
chronic pain must complete the Nurse Sick Call process before being seen by a doctor
(Id.).
The first time Plaintiff was seen by Little, on September 6, 2013, Little testified that
his symptoms were inconsistent. He first complained of pain in his left wrist and then
switched, indicating that the pain was in his right wrist (Doc. 102-6, p. 17; 102-9, p. 1).
He complained of generalized pain and Little did not note a cyst (Id. at p. 17-18). Little
did not note any bruising or swelling and Plaintiff had good range of motion (Doc. 102-9,
p. 1). Plaintiff was provided with Motrin and charged a $5.00 co-pay (Id.). There is no
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indication in the medical records that Plaintiff complained of tooth pain (Id.). Plaintiff
was seen by Little again on September 12, 2013 and demanded more Tylenol but
indicated that he would not pay the co-pay (Doc. 102-9, p. 2; 102-6, p. 19). Plaintiff
refused the Nurse Sick Call, continued to argue about the co-pay, and was escorted out
by security (Id.). Plaintiff was seen again on September 20, 2013 for pain in his wrist but
again refused to pay for what he called an “ongoing issue” and refused the Nurse Sick
Call (Doc. 102-9, p. 3). Plaintiff filed grievances against Little describing her as rude
and sarcastic and complained that she refused him pain medication he took for a hand
injury, chronic headaches, and jaw bone structure (Doc. 114-3).
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary Judgment is proper only “if the admissible evidence considered as a
whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648
F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a)). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607
(7th Cir. 2005).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating—based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or information obtained via
discovery—the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse
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party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
56(e)(2)).

A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Ballance v. City of Springfield, Ill. Police Dep’t, 424 F.3d 614,
616 (7th Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A
genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

“A mere

scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s petition is insufficient; a party will be
successful in opposing summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent
evidence to rebut the motion.” Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931–32 (7th
Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).
On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-movant. Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court
adopts reasonable inferences and resolves doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id.; Nat’l
Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008).

Even

if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information
before the court reveals that “alternate inferences can be drawn from the available
evidence.”

Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other

grounds by Spiegla II, 481 F.3d at 966 (7th Cir. 2007). See also Anderer v. Jones, 385
F.3d 1043, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004).

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B. Deliberate Indifference
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and
unusual punishments” if they display deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious
medical needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accord

Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.”). A prisoner is entitled to
reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm — not to demand specific
care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997).
To prevail, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge of
constitutionally-deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011), citing Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir.
2006). The first prong that must be satisfied is whether the prisoner has shown he has
an objectively serious medical need. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Accord Greeno, 414 F.3d
at 653. A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be
a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).
Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (violating the Eighth Amendment
requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Only if the objective prong is satisfied is
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it necessary to analyze the second, subjective prong, which focuses on whether a
defendant’s state of mind was sufficiently culpable. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652–
53 (7th Cir. 2005).
Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison
official has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate
health. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. The plaintiff need not show the individual literally
ignored his complaint, just that the individual was aware of the serious medical
condition and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d
516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
A. Nathan Chapman
Defendant Chapman does not dispute that Plaintiff suffered from a serious
medical condition. Instead, Chapman argues that he was not deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs as he provided Plaintiff with dentures.

Here the

evidence indicates that Plaintiff believed that he should have been referred for oral
surgery to remove the excess bone in his gums or that Chapman should have waited
longer for his gums to heal. But a plaintiff is not entitled to choose specific treatment,
nor does a disagreement with the doctor’s treatment constitute deliberate indifference,
Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331
(7th Cir. 2003).

Further, the evidence in this case suggests that Chapman was

exercising his professional judgment when he decided to provide Plaintiff with dentures
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rather than send him for oral surgery. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir.
2014)(“The federal courts will not interfere with a doctor's decision to pursue a
particular course of treatment unless that decision represents so significant a
departure from accepted professional standards or practices that it calls into question
whether the doctor actually was exercising his professional judgment.”).

While

Plaintiff points to his medical records from Menard Correctional Center as proof that he
needed surgery to remove the excess bone, the dental records from Menard indicate that
the dentist there believed that he needed further healing or possible pre-prosthetic
surgery (Doc. 102-4, p. 1). There is no indication in that note that pre-prosthetic surgery
was the required course of treatment, rather that Plaintiff would need to be re-evaluated
in three months to determine if upper dentures should be ordered or pre-prosthetic
surgery was necessary.

Chapman then evaluated him almost a year later and

determined that Plaintiff’s gums had healed within normal limits and that Plaintiff’s
mouth was ready for dentures. Chapman acknowledged that Plaintiff had excess bone
and an undercut on his ridge, but Chapman believed that he could make the dentures
work with Plaintiff’s mouth structure.
Chapman then proceeded to have the dentures made, taking impressions and
wax bites to determine Plaintiff’s bite. Chapman had dentures made by the lab and had
them reset twice to fit Plaintiff’s mouth. As Chapman testified, impressions were sent
to the lab and if the lab could not craft dentures to fit Plaintiff’s particular mouth
structure, they would have contacted Chapman, which they did not.
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There is no

indication that Chapman was deliberately indifferent in deciding to proceed with
dentures rather than surgery for Plaintiff’s mouth.

Chapman examined Plaintiff’s

mouth and the x-rays and believed, in his professional opinion, that dentures could
work with Plaintiff’s mouth structure.

Plaintiff has offered no evidence that

Chapman’s judgment was such a “significant…departure from accepted professional
standards or practices” to be considered deliberate indifference. Pyles, 771 F.3d at 409.
Plaintiff, however, argues that Chapman was deliberately indifferent because he
continued with an ineffective course of treatment. Plaintiff argues that after he received
the dentures, Chapman chose to repeatedly grind and sand the dentures, even though
Plaintiff continued to complain of pain, and failed to send him to an outside oral surgeon
when the dentures did not work. While an ineffective course of treatment can amount
to deliberate indiffere4nce, the Court does not find that this is such a case where a doctor
continues with the same treatment despite evidence that the treatment is not working.
See Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding deliberate indifference
where medical defendants persisted in a course of conservative treatment for eighteen
months despite no improvement). See also Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612, 616 (7th
Cir. 1990) (deliberate indifference when doctor continues with treatment knowing it
to be ineffective); Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010)(case survived
summary judgment where evidence in the record suggested that doctor had not
identified effective pain medication or the cause of tooth pain, but refused to refer to
seek obvious alternative of referring inmate to a dentist).
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As Defendant Chapman points out and the record reflects, Chapman worked
with Plaintiff on numerous occasions to adjust the dentures. Chapman adjusted the
dentures on several occasions in August, September, and November. However, after
November, Plaintiff did not complain about the dentures to Chapman. There is no
indication in the record that Plaintiff reported any additional issues with the dentures to
Chapman. Chapman testified that had the dentures ultimately not worked for Plaintiff,
new dentures could have been ordered or a different route could have been taken, but
there is no evidence to suggest that Chapman was aware that Plaintiff continued to have
issues with the dentures. In fact, Plaintiff admitted that he did not contact Chapman
after November 2013 and the records reflect that Plaintiff refused further adjustment in
June 2014, reporting that the dentures were fine.
Further, the evidence in the record indicates that Plaintiff did not even participate
in the prescribed course of treatment. Plaintiff testified that he only wore the dentures
on one occasion and after he put them on a second time in August, he never wore them
again. Plaintiff admitted that Chapman counseled him to wear the dentures so that his
mouth could adjust to them, but Plaintiff refused to wear the dentures. While Plaintiff
may not have agreed with Chapman’s medical decision to provide him with dentures,
Plaintiff should have at least participated in the prescribed course of treatment in order
to determine that it was not effective.

“[W]hen a prisoner chooses not to receive

treatment…, the doctor is not deliberately indifferent.” Blankenship v. Birch, 590 F.
App'x 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2014) amended on reh'g in part, 785 F.3d 1174 (7th Cir. 2015) and
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cert. denied, No. 15-5699, 2015 WL 4944469 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2015). Here, Plaintiff failed to
participate in the prescribed treatment as he refused to wear the dentures. As such, the
Court finds no deliberate indifference on Chapman’s part.
B. Brandi Little
The Court also finds no evidence of deliberate indifference on Brandi Little’s part.
Plaintiff argues that he complained of two chronic pain conditions and that Little failed
to provide him with medication or refer him to a doctor. However, there is no evidence
to suggest that Plaintiff had a diagnosed chronic illness such that he qualified for the
chronic illness clinic in order to receive pain medication without a co-pay, which is
ultimately the relief Plaintiff sought from Little - to not pay a co-pay for his pain
medication. The records indicate that Plaintiff presented to Little on three occasions,
each time seeking pain medication, according to medical notes for pain in his hand.
Little noted no swelling and found Plaintiff’s hand to have good range of motion.
There is no evidence that Plaintiff displayed symptoms that would require immediate
attention by a doctor. As a nurse, Little could also not diagnose Plaintiff with chronic
pain nor could she provide him with pain medication without a co-pay without a
chronic pain diagnosis.

The evidence indicates that Little examined Plaintiff and

provided him with pain medication at a co-pay of $5.00. When Plaintiff returned to
Little on two additional occasions he refused treatment because he refused to pay the
$5.00 co-pay. There is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff could not pay the co-pay or
that he had a diagnosed chronic condition which would have entitled him to medication
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without the co-pay. Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead,
Plaintiff chose to refuse care rather than pay the co-pay, and such a refusal does not
amount to deliberate indifference on Little’s part. Poole, 703 F.3d at 1027 (As the
plaintiff had sufficient funds to pay the co-pay but refused to do so, the delay in
receiving pain medication was his own making and did not constitute deliberate
indifference). Accordingly, Brandi Little is also entitled to summary judgment.
C. Doug Simmons
As to Doug Simmons’ motion for summary judgment, the Court finds no
evidence of a continuing violation such that Plaintiff would be entitled to injunctive
relief. The Court does find that Simmons, the warden at Plaintiff’s current institution, is
a proper party for injunctive purposes, despite Defendant’s argument to the contrary.
See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011)(finding warden a proper
party for purposes of ensuring that any injunctive relief awarded is carried out).
However, there is no evidence of deliberate indifference related to Plaintiff’s dentures
nor is there any evidence of a continuing violation. While Plaintiff testified that he does
not currently have dentures, there is no evidence that this is due to any current
deliberate indifference by any dental provider. As such, the Court finds that Simmons
is entitled to summary judgment in the official capacity claim against him.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS both motions for summary judgment. As no
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claims remain for trial, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

March 6, 2017.
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge

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