McBride v. Chapman et al

Filing 8

ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 9/16/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EDWARD M. McBRIDE, # R-66611,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DR. NATHAN CHAPMAN,
S. A. GODINEZ,
THOMAS A. SPILLER,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
CHRISTINE BROWN,
and BRANDI LITTLE,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-00894-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Edward McBride, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), brings this pro se civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1).

According to the complaint, Plaintiff was denied

corrective dental surgery before he was fit with a denture in 2013. As a result, his upper gum
line has a sharp bony ridge that causes “excruciating” pain and suffering. Plaintiff now sues
Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), S. A. Godinez (Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) director), and four Pinckneyville officials (Warden Spiller, Health Care Unit
Administrator Brown, Dr. Chapman, and Nurse Little) for denying him adequate dental care
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks monetary damages and dental surgery
(Doc. 1, p. 7).

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The Complaint
Plaintiff was scheduled to receive dentures in 2013. In preparation, he met with
Pinckneyville’s dentist, Dr. Chapman, on May 6, 2013 (Doc. 1, p. 6). At the time, Plaintiff had
excess bone and an undercut ridge in “area[s] #2, 5, 6, 10, [and] 11.” This created a sharp bony
ridge along Plaintiff’s upper gum line that could “possibly” be corrected through pre-prosthetic
surgery.

Instead of recommending surgery, however, Dr. Chapman concluded that

Plaintiff’s gums had healed and were ready for dentures.
The process of making Plaintiff’s dentures took three months. In the interim,
Plaintiff’s condition caused “excruciating” pain. At times, he could not eat because of the
discomfort associated with chewing. He also suffered from chronic headaches (Doc. 1, p. 13).
Plaintiff had trouble accessing pain relievers because Nurse Little allegedly failed to prescribe
them. Instead, Plaintiff purchased pain relievers from commissary (Doc. 1, p. 6).
When Plaintiff finally received his dentures on August 14, 2013, they did not fit
(Doc. 1, p. 12). Plaintiff met with Dr. Chapman for fittings on several occasions (Doc. 1, p. 6).
Each time, Dr. Chapman resorted to sanding and grinding the dentures down. In the process,
Dr. Chapman allegedly destroyed the ready-made dentures.

Along with the complaint,

Plaintiff filed numerous complaints, grievances, and affidavits, in which he complains of the pain
caused by the sharp bony ridgeline, his ill-fitting dentures, and his lack of access to pain
medication; these complaints extend through November 2013 (Doc. 1, pp. 9-22).
Plaintiff now sues Dr. Chapman and Nurse Little for violating his right to receive
adequate dental care under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

He also names

Defendants Spiller, Godinez, Brown, and Wexford, claiming that they “all knew of this serious
dental . . . situation” and took no action. He seeks monetary damages and dental surgery.

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Merits Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen
prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is
required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by
law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

The claim of

entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557.
Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept
factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff’s

claim.

Brooks

v.

Ross,

578

F.3d

574,

581

(7th

Cir.

2009).

Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth
Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). When reviewing the allegations in light of
this standard, the Court finds that the complaint survives preliminary review under § 1915A.

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Discussion
Count 1 – Eighth Amendment Dental Claim
The complaint articulates a colorable Eighth Amendment dental claim (Count 1)
against

Defendants

Chapman,

Little,

and

Spiller

(in

his

official

capacity

only).

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel and
unusual punishment and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). Relevant to Plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme
Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (per curiam).
To establish liability, a prisoner must show that the: (1) medical condition was objectively
serious, and (2) state officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s health or safety,
which is a subjective standard.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);

Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Seventh Circuit has indicated that a dental condition may constitute a serious
medical need. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2005). According to the Seventh
Circuit, “dental care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates.”
Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Examples of

“objectively serious” dental needs involve circumstances in which the failure to treat a dental
condition causes an inmate to suffer an array of problems, such as headaches, extreme pain,
bleeding, infected gums, and problems eating. Id. at 593 (citations omitted). The allegations in
the complaint suggest that Plaintiff’s dental condition was objectively serious.

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With regard to the subjective component of the analysis, the complaint must
“demonstrate that prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297
(1991)). This state of mind is deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference is established
when prison officials “know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health” by being
“‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists’” and “‘draw[ing] the inference.’” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834).
“Neither medical malpractice nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical
judgment” is sufficient to establish deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Berry, 604 F.3d at 441 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254,
261 (7th Cir. 1996)). However, a prisoner is also “not required to show that he was literally
ignored.” Id. at 441 (citing Sherrod v. Lingle, 223 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Seventh
Circuit has held that a doctor’s choice of “easier and less efficacious treatment” for a serious
medical condition can amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, n.10; Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that “medical personnel cannot
simply resort to an easier course of treatment that they know is ineffective”); Greeno, 414 F.3d at
655 (noting that persistence in a course of treatment “known to be ineffective” violates the
Eighth Amendment)).
Construing the allegations liberally, as the Court is required to do at this stage, the
complaint suggests that Dr. Chapman undertook a persistent, yet ineffective, course of treatment
when he attempted, apparently without success, to fit Plaintiff’s denture by grinding and sanding

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it to the point of destruction. All the while, Plaintiff’s symptoms of pain, which included chronic
headaches and an inability to eat, persisted and remained untreated.

At this early stage,

Plaintiff shall be allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Dr. Chapman.
The complaint and the exhibits also suggest that Nurse Little denied Plaintiff
access to necessary pain relievers. Exhibits filed with the complaint include requests for pain
relievers and complaints of pain that extend through November 2013, approximately six months
after Plaintiff first met with Dr. Chapman about dentures. At this early stage, Plaintiff shall be
allowed to proceed with Count 1 against Nurse Little.
Finally, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed with Count 1 against Defendant
Spiller, but only in his official capacity, based solely on Plaintiff’s request for dental surgery.
The Court construes this as a request for injunctive relief.
Count 1 shall be dismissed against all remaining defendants, including
Defendants Wexford, Godinez, Brown, and Spiller (in his individual capacity).

Only one

allegation in the complaint addresses Plaintiff’s claim against these Defendants. According to
the allegation, these Defendants knew about the seriousness of Plaintiff’s condition and took no
action (Doc. 1, p. 6). Beyond this conclusory statement, however, the complaint is devoid of any
factual allegations in support of an Eighth Amendment claim against these Defendants.
Plaintiff cannot proceed with a claim against these Defendants, based on this single allegation.
With regard to Defendant Wexford, the complaint also includes no allegation that
any individual defendant acted or failed to act as a result of an official policy espoused by
Wexford. See Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004)
(corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that
caused the violation). Therefore, Count 1 shall be dismissed against this Defendant.

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No other allegations suggest that Defendants Godinez, Brown, or Spiller
(in his individual capacity) were personally involved in a constitutional deprivation.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus,
“to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005)
(citations omitted).

The complaint does not suggest that these Defendants had any direct

involvement in treatment decisions. Furthermore, if a prisoner is under the care of prison
medical professionals, non-medical prison officials, such as Defendant Godinez and Spiller,
“will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)).
“A layperson’s failure to tell the medical staff how to do its job cannot be called deliberate
indifference; it is just a form of failing to provide a gratuitous rescue service.”
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir. 2009). For each of these reasons, Count 1 shall
be dismissed against Defendants Godinez, Brown, and Spiller (in his individual capacity).
Count 2 – Fourteenth Amendment Claims
The complaint also states no Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (Count 2)
against Defendants. Plaintiff mentions a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim,
as well as an equal protection claim. However, he includes no factual allegations in support of
either. Count 2 can be dismissed on this basis alone, and it shall be dismissed with prejudice.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that no procedural due process claim arises
from Defendants’ review of Plaintiff’s grievances.

Prison grievance procedures are not

constitutionally mandated and thus do not implicate the Due Process Clause per se. As such, the
alleged mishandling of grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the

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underlying conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011).
See also Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008); George v. Smith, 507
F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996).
Further, the fact that a counselor, grievance officer, or even a supervisor received a complaint
about the actions of another individual does not create liability. For these reasons, the procedural
due process claim against Defendants fails.
The complaint also states no substantive due process claim. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from governmental discrimination.
Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2013). As the Seventh Circuit explained in
Swanson, “[t]he typical equal protection case involves discrimination by race, national origin or
sex. However, the Clause also prohibits the singling out of a person for different treatment for
no rational reason.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145
L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). Beyond mentioning an equal protection claim, the complaint includes no
allegations suggesting that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff in any way, either by
singling him out for being a member of a protected class or individually for no rational reason.
For the reasons set forth herein, Count 2 shall be dismissed with prejudice against
all Defendants.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff has filed a motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3), which is hereby
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for a decision on its
merits.

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Plaintiff has also filed a motion for service of process at government expense
(Doc. 4), which is hereby GRANTED as to Defendants Chapman, Little, and Spiller.
The motion is DENIED as to Defendants Wexford, Brown, and Godinez.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNT 2 is DISMISSED with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants WEXFORD, GODINEZ,
BROWN, and SPILLER (in his individual capacity) are DISMISSED with prejudice.
AS TO COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants CHAPMAN,
LITTLE, and SPILLER (in his official capacity): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request
to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and
return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant,
and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address
provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work
address, or, if not known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used
only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service.
Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall
not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

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Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an
appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration
by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the
date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel.
Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk
or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams for further pre-trial proceedings, including a decision on
Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of counsel (Doc. 3). Further, this entire matter shall be
REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Williams for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule
72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), if all parties consent to such a referral.
If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or
give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into
a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the
Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against plaintiff and remit the balance to
plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1).

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Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than
7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action
for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 16, 2014
s/ MICHAEL J. REAGAN
U.S. District Judge

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