Grotts v. Colvin

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The Commissioner's final decision is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 1/8/2016. (klm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MARGARET A. GROTTS,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-931-CJP 1

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), plaintiff Margaret Grotts is before
the Court, represented by counsel, seeking judicial review of the final agency
decision denying her Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff initially applied for DIB and SSI on August 26, 2009. In both
applications, she alleged disability beginning on January 1, 2007. (Tr. 109-11,
263). Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ayrie Moore held the first evidentiary
hearing on July 6, 2011. (Tr. 70, 115). ALJ Moore issued an unfavorable decision
on August 23, 2011. (Tr. 112-131). Plaintiff requested a review and on October
22, 2012 the Appeals Council remanded the case back to the ALJ. (Tr. 135-35).
1

This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 12.

1

On May 22, 2013, a remand hearing was held before ALJ James Craig. (Tr. 3462). After the hearing, ALJ Craig denied the application in a decision dated June
19, 2013, 2013. (Tr. 17-28). Plaintiff’s second request for review was denied by
the Appeals Council, and the decision of the ALJ became the final agency
decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies have been exhausted and a timely
complaint was filed in this Court.
Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raises the following points:
1. The ALJ erred in forming plaintiff’s credibility determination.
2. The ALJ erred in determining plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) by failing to appropriately consider medical opinion evidence.
3. The ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for DIB or SSI, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning
of the applicable statutes. 2 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
2

The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42
U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. The statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. As is relevant to this case,
the DIB and SSI statutes are identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 detailing medical
considerations relevant to an SSI claim, relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the DIB regulations.
Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations out of convenience.

2

A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C.
§423(d)(3).

“Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves doing

significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for pay or profit. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are
considered conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or equals
one of the listed impairments, then the applicant is considered
disabled; if the impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, then the evaluation continues. The fourth step assesses
an applicant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and ability to engage
in past relevant work. If an applicant can engage in past relevant
work, he is not disabled. The fifth step assesses the applicant's RFC,
as well as his age, education, and work experience to determine
whether the applicant can engage in other work. If the applicant can
engage in other work, he is not disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or
combination of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet or
equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively disabling; (4)

3

whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5) whether the
claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy, given his or her
age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Simila v. Astrue,
573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th Cir. 2009); Schroeter v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391,
393 (7th Cir. 1992).
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will automatically
be found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment, determined at
step three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at step three, and
cannot perform his or her past work (step four), the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant can perform some other job.
Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984).

See also,

Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the five-step
evaluation, an “affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and
5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled…. If a claimant reaches step 5, the
burden shifts to the ALJ to establish that the claimant is capable of performing
work in the national economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the decision
is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were made. It is
important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this Court must
determine not whether plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but

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whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether
any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th
Cir. 1996) (citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
“substantial

evidence,”

the

entire

administrative

record

In reviewing for
is

taken

into

consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide
questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ.
Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997).

However, while

judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a rubber
stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th
Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Craig followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He
determined plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
date of her application He found that plaintiff had severe impairments of bipolar
disorder, anxiety disorder, and hearing loss. The ALJ determined these
impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment. (Tr. 19).
The ALJ found plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform work at all exertional levels but with mental limitations. (Tr. 21). Based
on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to

5

perform her past work. However, she was not disabled because she could
perform work that exists in significant numbers in the regional and national
economies. (Tr. 26-28).
The Evidentiary Record
The court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the points raised by the plaintiff.
1. Agency Forms
Plaintiff was born on January 13, 1978 and was twenty-eight years old on
her alleged onset date. (Tr. 263). Plaintiff was five feet five inches tall and weighed
one hundred and eighty-nine pounds. (Tr. 266). She was insured for DIB through
June 30, 2009. 3 (Tr. 263).
Plaintiff claimed that post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, heel
spurs, and migraines limited her ability to work because she was unable to
concentrate or stand for long periods of time. (Tr. 267). She took Abilify for her
mood disorder, Lamictal for insomnia, Tylenol for migraines, and Buspar,
Congentin, Wellbutrin, and Zoloft for depression. (Tr. 271, 289). Plaintiff
completed high school in 1997 and attended special education classes. (Tr. 27172). She took classes to become a certified nurse assistant (“CNA”) twice but
failed to pass the state test. (Tr. 272). She stated that she previously worked as a

3

The date last insured is relevant to the claim for DIB, but not the claim for SSI. See, 42 U.S.C. §§
423(c) & 1382(a).

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bottle packager, caregiver, cook, housekeeper, janitor, laborer, nurse’s aide, and
personal assistant. (Tr. 268).
In November 2009, plaintiff completed a function report. (Tr. 305-11). On a
daily basis, plaintiff dropped off and picked up her son from school, watched
television, performed household chores, and bathed herself. (Tr. 305). Her
husband and son helped prepare dinner. (Tr. 306). She did not go outside often
but she was able to drive and went to the store about once a month for food. (Tr.
308).
Plaintiff claimed she had difficulty squatting, bending, walking, kneeling,
climbing

stairs,

remembering,

completing

tasks,

concentrating

and

understanding. She stated that when walking or climbing stairs she gets tired
easily. She also stated she was easily side-tracked and her memory was poor. (Tr.
310). She felt she could follow written instructions well and had no problems with
authority figures. (Tr. 310-11).
2. Evidentiary Hearing
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the evidentiary hearing on May 22,
2013. (Tr. 36). She lived with her husband and twelve year old son. Her husband
worked outside the home in an oil field and her son was developmentally
disabled. (Tr. 38, 51). She had a medical card and had not worked since 2009.
(Tr. 38-39). She took certified nursing assistant (CNA) classes twice but never
passed the final exam. (Tr. 50).

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Plaintiff testified that the last time she worked was through Illinois’
Department of Rehabilitation Services (“DORS”). She babysat a friend’s son while
the mother was out of the house. (Tr. 39). She performed this job twenty hours a
week but the job ended because she was often late or did not show up. (Tr. 39,
42). She lost previous jobs for similar reasons. (Tr. 42). While she never had a
full time job, she packaged bottles in a factory thirty hours a week through a
temporary placement agency. (Tr. 40). She never used a computer as part of her
work. (Tr. 50).
Plaintiff felt she could not work at the time of the hearing because of her
depression. She testified that up to three times a week she could not leave her
home and stays in bed with the curtains drawn. (Tr. 43). On her bad days she did
not listen to music or watch television, she could sleep up to ten hours, and she
had difficulty concentrating. (Tr. 44-46). On her good days she could help pay
bills and making sure everyday tasks, like laundry and cooking, were completed.
(Tr. 46, 48).
Plaintiff took her medications for bipolar disorder, anxiety, and sleep as
prescribed. (Tr. 40, 48). She had received mental health treatment for four or five
years and her psychiatrist prescribed her medications. (Tr. 41). Her medications
were frequently changed to alleviate side effects or increase effectiveness. (Tr. 49).
She also lost some hearing in her left ear due to nerve damage but did not have a
hearing aid. (Tr. 41).

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A vocational expert (VE) also testified. The ALJ asked the VE a hypothetical
where he was to assume a person with plaintiff’s education and vocational
background with limitations of no noisy environments greater than moderate, no
dangerous moving mechanical parts, and no detailed or complex instructions.
Additionally, the person could have no contact with the public to complete the
work process, only occasional intermittent contact with co-workers and
supervisors, the work would need to be three steps or less with no fast pace or
strict quotas. Finally, the work should be thing oriented work instead of working
with people or data. (Tr. 55-57).
The VE testified that this person would be unable to perform plaintiff’s
previous work. (Tr. 57). However, a significant number of jobs existed in the local
and national economy at the light and sedentary exertional levels. Examples of
such jobs are cloth stock sorter, surveillance system monitor, and conveyer line
bakery worker. (Tr. 56-57). The VE testified that if the person missed three or
more days a month, had to leave the work station two or three times a day to rest,
or was off task ten percent of the average day they would be unable to perform
any work. (Tr. 58-61).
3. Medical Evidence
Plaintiff began receiving counseling for mental health treatment at
Community Resource Center in 2006. (Tr. 477, 534). She complained that she
was depressed due to her husband’s abuse towards her. (Tr. 477-78). She
reported loss of appetite, sleep problems, anger and aggression towards her

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husband, as well as feeling anxious and depressed. (Tr. 487). Plaintiff stated that
she attempted to slit her wrists once in 2001. (Tr. 488). She was initially
diagnosed with moderate and recurrent major depressive disorder and assigned a
GAF score of 50. 4 (Tr. 491).
In 2007, plaintiff also began receiving psychiatric treatment from Janet
Merrell, APN, BC. Her chief complaint was depression due to mental abuse
received from her husband. (Tr. 394). Ms. Merrell diagnosed plaintiff with
recurrent major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and a GAF
score of 50. (Tr. 395).
Thereafter, plaintiff regularly received both group and individual counseling
services from Community Resource Center and Ms. Merrell. (Tr. 351-77, 390421, 422-44, 477-622, 625-59, 723-31, 790-824, 884-95). The longest plaintiff
ever went without receiving treatment was from May to August 2008. (Tr. 560561). She continually reported being unable to participate in normal daily
activities on bad days, feeling anxious and depressed, difficulty sleeping, marital
problems, and low self-esteem. (Ex, Tr. 356, 374, 396, 429, 560, 724, 790, 892).
The record indicates that plaintiff was prescribed Lamictal, Celexa, Zoloft,
Wellbutrin, Abilify, Norco, Phenergan, Buspar, Cogentin, Inderal, Ciprodex, and
Trazodone throughout her course of treatment. (Ex., Tr. 518, 681, 736, 746, 761,

4

The GAF is determined on a scale of 1 to 100 and reflects the clinician’s judgment of an
individual’s overall level of functioning, taking into consideration psychological, social, and
occupational functioning. Impairment in functioning due to physical or environmental limitations
are not considered. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders - Fourth Edition, Text Revision 32-33 (4th ed. 2000); Although the American Psychiatric
Association recently discontinued use of the GAF metric, it was still in use during the period
plaintiff’s examinations occurred.

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772, 893). Ms. Merrell changed the dosages and types of medication twenty-three
times on record due to side effects and the effectiveness of the medications. (Ex,
Tr. 397, 417, 612, 653, 654, 729, 731, 824, 893). The record indicates plaintiff
had side effects of fatigue, jitteriness, nausea, forgetfulness, extrapyramidal
symptoms, and hand tremors. (Tr. 356, 362, 368, 398, 614, 616, 620).
4. Disability Application
In December 2012, an application for an Illinois disabled person
identification card was completed by Dr. Judy Keevan and plaintiff’s counselor
Janet Merrell. (Tr. 875-76). They stated plaintiff had a “class 2” mental disability.
The form defined a class 2 disability as
[A]ny type of disability which renders a person unable to engage in
any substantially gainful activity, or which substantially impairs the
person’s ability to live independently without supervision or in-home
support services, or which substantially impairs the person’s ability
to perform labor or services for which he/she is qualified or
significantly restricts the labor or services which he/she is able to
perform.
The form did not provide a place for the doctor or counselor to explain their
reasoning for this classification. (Tr. 875-76).
5. Treating Counselors’ Opinions
Plaintiff’s treating counselors completed two mental functional capacity
reports. (Tr. 623-624, 899-900). The first report was signed by one of plaintiff’s
counselors in November 2010 and cosigned by another counselor in December
2010. The counselors’ diagnoses were bipolar disorder and generalized anxiety
disorder. They felt plaintiff had marked limitations in activities of daily living and

11

social functioning. They also opined that plaintiff had extreme limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace. (Tr. 623). The counselors stated that
plaintiff had one to two episodes of decompensation in the last twelve months and
plaintiff would be absent from work more than three times a month due to her
impairments. (Tr. 624).
In May 2013, two of plaintiff’s treating counselors, Mikealla Walker and
Janet Merrell, completed the second mental functional capacity report. (Tr. 899900). Their diagnoses were bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and a
GAF score of 43. They opined that plaintiff had marked limitations in her
activities of daily living and concentration, persistence, and pace. The counselors
indicated plaintiff had extreme limitations in social functioning. (Tr. 899). They
indicated plaintiff had four or more episodes of decompensation in the last twelve
months and she would miss work more than three times a month due to her
impairments. (Tr. 900). Mikaella Walker also wrote a letter that reiterated her
opinions in the report. (Tr. 901).
6. Consultative Examination
In January 2010, plaintiff saw state agency psychologist Fred Klug for a
psychological consultative examination. Dr. Klug opined that plaintiff was alert
and fully oriented. (Tr. 475). Plaintiff’s attention span was adequate and her
concentration was fair. Her immediate memory was varied, short-term memory
was intact with encoding deficits, and long-term memory was intact. Plaintiff’s
fund of knowledge was very restricted, and her reasoning, ability to do simple

12

calculations, abstract thinking, insight, and judgment were poor. Dr. Klug felt
plaintiff’s intellectual functioning appeared borderline. His diagnostic impressions
were dysthymic disorder- late onset and generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 47376).
7. RFC Assessments
In February 2010, plaintiff had physical and mental residual functional
capacity (RFC) assessments performed. The state agency psychologist and
physician reviewed plaintiff’s records but did not examine plaintiff in person. Dr.
Jerrold Heinrich performed plaintiff’s mental RFC assessment and felt that
plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to carry out detailed instruction,
maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, and respond
appropriately to changes in the work setting. (Tr. 445-46). He felt plaintiff was
also moderately limited in her ability to perform activities within a schedule,
maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances. (Tr.
445).
Dr. Richard Bilinsky performed plaintiff’s physical RFC assessment. He
opined that plaintiff could occasionally lift fifty pounds, frequently lift twenty five
pounds, and stand, walk, or sit for six hours in an eight hour day. Plaintiff was
limited in her ability to push and pull with her lower extremities because of left
heel pain. (Tr. 450). Plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and
could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs. Dr. Bilinsky opined that plaintiff

13

could occasionally balance and frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. (Tr.
451). Finally, plaintiff should avoid concentrated exposure to noise. (Tr. 453).
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment, RFC
determination, and did not have substantial evidence to support his decision. As
plaintiff relies in part on her testimony, the Court will first consider her argument
regarding the ALJ’s credibility analysis.
Plaintiff points out that the ALJ used the boilerplate language that has been
criticized in cases such as Minnick v. Colvin, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 249 (7th
Cir. 2015), Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2010), and Brindisi v.
Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2003). However, the use of the boilerplate
language does not necessarily require remand. The use of such language is
harmless where the ALJ goes on to support his conclusion with reasons derived
from the evidence. See, Pepper v, Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 367-368 (7th Cir.
2013); Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310-311 (7th Cir 2012).
It is well-established that the credibility findings of the ALJ are to be
accorded deference, particularly in view of the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the
witness. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). “Applicants for
disability benefits have an incentive to exaggerate their symptoms, and an
administrative law judge is free to discount the applicant’s testimony on the basis
of the other evidence in the case.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 804, 805
(7th Cir. 2006).
14

The ALJ is required to give “specific reasons” for his credibility findings.
Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). It is not enough just to
describe the plaintiff’s testimony; the ALJ must analyze the evidence. Ibid. See
also, Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009)(The ALJ “must
justify the credibility finding with specific reasons supported by the record.”). If
the adverse credibility finding is premised on inconsistencies between plaintiff’s
statements and other evidence in the record, the ALJ must identify and explain
those inconsistencies. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 2001).
SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider a number of factors in assessing
the claimant’s credibility, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s
daily activities, medication for the relief of pain, and “any other factors concerning
the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other
symptoms.” SSR 96-7p, at *3.
The ALJ first considered plaintiff’s work history. The ALJ stated that
plaintiff had a poor reported work history prior to her alleged onset date and this
worked against her credibility. (Tr. 23). The Seventh Circuit has held that
sporadic work history and declining earnings prior to the alleged onset date may
show a lack of effort to find work and diminish a claimant’s credibility. Simila v.
Astrue, 5730 F.3d 503, 520 (7th Cir. 2009). However, this is the only factor
that the ALJ appropriately considered and as a result his credibility
determination cannot be upheld.

15

The ALJ stated his second reason for finding plaintiff was less than credible
was her ability to complete CNA training. He opined that this was an indication
she was capable of performing simple, routing tasks. (Tr. 23). Elsewhere in the
opinion, the ALJ also stated that her ability to attend training for work of this
nature proved she retained greater ability than she suggested in concentration,
persistence, and pace. (Tr. 22).
Even though plaintiff took two CNA courses, she never successfully
completed the program. She had to withdraw from the class the first time she
took it because she was failing and the second time she was unable to pass the
examinations. (Tr. 360, 362, 549, 552). The ALJ does not mention this portion of
the record in his analysis. While plaintiff failing her exams does not indicate that
she is unable to work, it does show that she was potentially more limited than the
ALJ revealed in his analysis.
In analyzing the evidence, the ALJ is not permitted to “cherry-pick” the
evidence, ignoring the parts that conflict with his conclusion. Myles v. Astrue,
582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009). While he is not required to mention every
piece of evidence, “he must at least minimally discuss a claimant's evidence that
contradicts the Commissioner's position.” Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808
(7th Cir. 2000). Here, ALJ Craig impermissibly “cherry-picks” portions of the
record to indicate she was less than credible by failing to discuss her difficulties
completing CNA training.

16

Finally, the ALJ stated that plaintiff’s conservative treatment history was
“not consistent with what would be anticipated from an individual who was
unable to perform basic work functions.” (Tr. 24). He reasoned that she had no
noted hospitalizations or restrictive medication regimens. (Tr. 23). The ALJ errs
here in two primary ways.
First, the ALJ does not explain what type of treatment history would be
anticipated from an individual who was unable to perform basic work functions.
Plaintiff saw several mental health professionals on a frequent basis. They
prescribed her multiple different psychotropic medications to help her deal with
the symptoms of her mental illnesses. (Ex., Tr. 518, 681, 736, 746, 761, 772,
893). These mental health professionals provided opinions that plaintiff had
experienced several episodes of decompensation and was incapable of work. (Tr.
623-624, 899-900.). They never indicated that plaintiff was exaggerating her
symptoms or that any other treatment would be appropriate.
While the ALJ was not required to give these opinions weight or find them
credible, he was required to have sound reasoning for his conclusions.

The

Seventh Circuit has held that an ALJ cannot “play doctor” by substituting his own
judgment for that of a physician without relying on other medical evidence or
authority in the record. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir.
2001). ALJ Craig does just that when he concludes that plaintiff’s treatment
history was not what would be expected if she had the limitations she alleged. No

17

medical opinions support his assumption and without further explanation and
justification it is error.
Second, the ALJ does not explain what he considers a restrictive
medication regimen. In fact, he only peripherally discusses plaintiff’s medications
at all when he discussed a consultative examiner’s report. As plaintiff notes, the
ALJ does not mention the types, dosages, side effects, or the effectiveness of the
medications she took on a regular basis. Over the course of her treatment,
plaintiff took Lamictal, Celexa, Zoloft, Wellbutrin, Abilify, Norco, Phenergan,
Buspar, Cogentin, Inderal, Ciprodex, and Trazodone. (Ex., Tr. 518, 681, 736,
746, 761, 772, 893). The dosages and types of medication were changed over
twenty times in the course of treatment. (Ex, Tr. 397, 417, 612, 653, 654, 729,
731, 824, 893). Her medications were changed six times after the consultative
examination the ALJ mentions. (Tr. 614-21, 652-55). She reported side effects of
fatigue, jitteriness, nausea, forgetfulness, extrapyramidal symptoms, and hand
tremors. (Tr. 356, 362, 368, 398, 614, 616, 620). The ALJ ignored this entire line
of evidence which is error. Terry, 580 F.3d 477.
The Commissioner correctly cites the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Pepper
v. Colvin where it was explained that an “ALJ’s credibility determination may be
overturned only if it ‘patently wrong.’” 712 F.3d 367. However, the Seventh
Circuit has also held that “when a credibility finding rests on ‘objective factors or
fundamental implausibilities,’ rather than on a claimant’s demeanor or other
subjective factors, we have greater leeway to evaluate the ALJ’s determination.”

18

Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir. 2013)., citing Schomas v.
Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir 2013). As stated above ALJ Craig did not
adequately address the evidence in opposition to his opinion, he misstated the
record, and he failed to fully explain his conclusions.
The ALJ is “required to build a logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusions.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 516 (7th Cir. 2009). ALJ Craig
simply failed to do so here. “If a decision ‘lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly
articulated as to prevent meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Kastner v.
Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 2012)., citing Steele v. Barnhart, 290
F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
It is not necessary to address plaintiff’s other points, but, the determination
of the weight to be given to plaintiff’s treating counselors’ opinions and of
plaintiff’s RFC will require “a fresh look” after reconsideration of plaintiff’s
credibility. Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Court wishes to stress that this Memorandum and Order should not be
construed as an indication that the Court believes that plaintiff is disabled or that
she should be awarded benefits. On the contrary, the Court has not formed any
opinions in that regard, and leaves those issues to be determined by the
Commissioner after further proceedings.
Conclusion
The Commissioner’s final decision denying Margaret Grotts’s application
for social security disability benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the
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Commissioner for rehearing and reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: January 8, 2016.

s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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