Garfield v. Furlong et al
Filing
85
ORDER granting 63 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 65 Motion for Summary Judgment. As indicated in the attached order, Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment against Plaintiff and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on 3/28/2017. (rms2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOHN GARFIELD, #N72615
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Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS FURLONG,
NICK NALLEY, and
DR. LARSON,
Defendants.
Case No. 14-cv-937-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAMS, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff John Garfield is an inmate currently incarcerated at Dixon Correctional
Center. He brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations
of his constitutional rights by Defendants during his incarceration at Big Muddy
Correctional Center. This matter is before the Court on two motions for summary
judgment, one filed by Defendants Furlong and Larson (Doc. 63) and another filed by
Defendant Nalley (Doc. 65). The time for Plaintiff to respond to the motions has passed,
with Plaintiff responding only to one. Therefore, Defendants’ motions are ripe for
disposition. For the reasons articulated below, the Motions for Summary Judgment
(Docs. 63, 65) are both GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Defendants Furlong and Larson
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Furlong and Larson arise from treatment
Plaintiff received for a cracked tooth that lead to a fractured root. It is undisputed that
Plaintiff was incarcerated at Big Muddy Correctional Center (“Big Muddy”) during 2012
and 2013 before he was transferred to other institutions. (Doc. 64, p. 2; Doc. 70, p. 1).
Plaintiff’s claims arise from the time period he was incarcerated at Big Muddy. (Doc.
64, p. 2; Doc. 70, p. 1). On January 31, 2013, Defendant Dr. Dennis Furlong, the dentist
at Big Muddy, examined Plaintiff in response to Plaintiff’s complaint of pain in his
number two tooth. (Doc. 64-1, p. 1). During that visit, Defendant Furlong diagnosed
Plaintiff with having Cracked Tooth Syndrome.
(Id.).
On the same day, Plaintiff
executed an IDOC Consent for Treatment Form, wherein Plaintiff gave his consent to
Defendant Furlong to extract the number two tooth, if necessary. (Doc. 64-3, p. 16).
On this form, above Plaintiff’s signature, was a list of six potential risks from the
procedure, which included “Displacement of the teeth into the sinuses or other soft
tissue spaces requiring additional surgery to remove.”
(Id.).
Defendant Furlong
attempted to remove the tooth on February 7, 2013, due to complaints of pain from
Plaintiff. (Doc. 66-1, p. 4; Doc. 64-3, p. 1). During the procedure, however, the medial
root fractured away from the main body of the tooth. (Doc. 64-1, p. 2). It is undisputed
that at some point the medial root was lost into Plaintiff’s sinus cavity. (Doc. 64, p. 3;
Doc. 70, p. 2). As best the Court can tell, however, there appears to be a dispute over at
what point the root lodged into the sinus canal. While Defendants Furlong and Larson
indicate it was lost during a subsequent, unsuccessful, attempt to remove the fractured
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root on March 4, 2013 (Doc. 64, p. 3; Doc. 64-3, p. 1), Plaintiff appears to take the position
that the root was lost during the February 7 extraction (Doc. 70, p. 2, 5; Doc. 66-1, p. 5).
On March 9, 2013, due to the loss of the medial root into the sinus cavity,
Defendant Furlong submitted an IDOC Medical Special Services Referral and Report
requesting permission from the Collegial Review Board of Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
(“Wexford”) to refer Plaintiff to an outside oral surgeon. (Doc. 64-1, p. 2). On March
15, 2013, Dr. O’Brien of the Collegial Review Board authorized the request to allow
Plaintiff to see an outside surgeon. (Id.). On April 4, 2013, Plaintiff had an initial visit
with Dr. Jay Swanson, an oral surgeon. (Doc. 64-2, p. 2 – 3). During that visit, Dr.
Swanson recommended a Caldwell-Luc procedure to remove the root. (Id.). On April
8, 2013, Defendant Dr. Dennis Larson, the Medical Director at Big Muddy, approved Dr.
Swanson’s recommendations, and on April 10, 2013, Dr. Haymes of the Collegial Review
Board authorized Plaintiff to have the operation.
(Id. at 1 – 2, 3).
Dr. Swanson
performed the operation on April 10, 2013. (Id. at 3). Upon discharge, Plaintiff was
prescribed pain medication and antibiotics.
(Id.).
When Plaintiff returned to Big
Muddy, he was placed in the healthcare unit (“HCU”) for 23 hours of observation and
treatment, and given the pain medication and antibiotic prescribed by Dr. Swanson.
(Id. at 3 – 4).
On April 11, 2013, Defendant Larson examined Plaintiff prior to his discharge
from the HCU. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff indicated that he felt “ok”, his mouth was sore, and
he could tolerate the pain. (Id.). Defendant Larson ordered Plaintiff to follow up in
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one week and requested authorization from the Collegial Review Board to allow
Plaintiff to follow up with Dr. Swanson in a week. (Id.). Plaintiff was discharged on
April 11, 2013, and while Defendants take the position that Defendant informed the
nurse he was “ready to go”, Plaintiff disputes this. (Doc. 66-1, p. 8). Plaintiff was
given antibiotic and Motrin upon discharge (Id. at 9), and was not allowed to continue
the painkiller Lortab due to IDOC policy prohibiting narcotic medication administration
outside the HCU. (Doc. 64-2, p. 4).
On April 18, 2013, Defendant Larson examined Plaintiff in segregation for a sick
call. (Id.). Plaintiff indicated that he had been feeling poorly, and Defendant Larson
states that, upon examining Plaintiff, he found Plaintiff’s temperature to be 100 degrees
and his blood pressure of 150/90. (Id.). Plaintiff, however, disputes the temperature
and blood pressure readings.
Plaintiff states that Defendant Larson told him that
Plaintiff had a temperature of 103 – 104 and that his blood pressure was higher than
150/90.
(Doc. 66-1, p. 12).
Regardless, Defendant Larson increased Plaintiff’s
antibiotic dosage (Id. at 11) and secured an appointment for Plaintiff to see Dr. Swanson
the next day (Doc. 64-2, p. 4 – 5).
Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Swanson on April 19, 2013, and Dr. Swanson
ordered that Plaintiff continue on the elevated antibiotic dosage twice a day and take an
over the counter antihistamine. (Id. at 5). On April 23, 2013, Defendant Larson made a
request to the Collegial Review Board that Plaintiff be allowed to see Dr. Swanson again,
and Plaintiff saw Dr. Swanson again on April 25, 2013. (Id. at 5). Dr. Swanson found
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Plaintiff to be healing as expected, indicated that the area would heal in two to four
weeks, and that Plaintiff should follow up in two to three weeks. (Id.). The same day,
Defendant Larson approved Dr. Swanson’s recommendations to have Plaintiff follow up
in two to four weeks. (Id.).
On May 2, 2013, during a sick call visit with Plaintiff by Defendant Larson,
Plaintiff told Defendant Larson that his mouth was improving and requested Tylenol for
pain, Excedrin for headaches, and hydrocortisone for rash and eczema, all of which were
prescribed by Dr. Larson.
(Id.).
On May 7, 2013, Defendant Larson requested
authorization for the Collegial Review Board to send Plaintiff to visit Dr. Swanson for a
follow up appointment in two to three weeks, and the Board responded by sending
Defendant Larson a “90 day global” authorization. (Id.).
Plaintiff saw Dr. Swanson on May 16, 2013, and Dr. Swanson noted that Plaintiff
was healing well from the prior surgery. (Id.). He also noted that Plaintiff complained
of pain in tooth number four and found mobility in that tooth. (Id.). Dr. Swanson
ordered scheduling of the removal of tooth four. (Id.). On May 21, 2013, Defendant
Larson saw Plaintiff during a sick call to follow up after Plaintiff’s visit with Dr.
Swanson. (Id.). Plaintiff told Defendant Larson that three days prior he had blood and
drainage from the surgical site. (Id.). Defendant Larson found good healing in the
mouth, and prescribed the requested medications of Excedrin Migraine, Eucerin cream,
hydrocortisone cream, and Tylenol. (Id.). Plaintiff was transferred from Big Muddy
on June 19, 2013. (Id. at 6). He filed suit on August 27, 2014, pleading counts of
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deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Larson
and Furlong. (Docs. 1, 8).
2. Defendant Nalley
The Court notes that while Plaintiff filed a Response to the summary judgment
motion filed by Defendants Furlong and Larson, he did not file a Response to Defendant
Nalley’s motion. Since Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendant Nalley’s motion, the
Court considers the facts set forth by Defendant Nalley as undisputed.
See
FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); SDIL-LR 7.1(c). See also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995) (a failure to respond constitutes
an admission that there are no undisputed material facts). As the Court is deciding a
summary judgment motion, however, it views those facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012).
On April 17, 2013, Plaintiff was in the Big Muddy HCU waiting to be seen by the
dentist. (Doc. 66-7, p. 1). When Plaintiff entered the HCU, he spoke to Defendant Nick
Nalley, a correctional officer at Big Muddy, and said “Good thing you’re here Nalley
because they’re probably going to need you in here.” (Id.).
When Defendant Nalley inquired as to why he was going to be needed, Plaintiff
responded with profanity and expressed his anger toward the dentist, and stated that
Defendant Nalley was “going to want to be in there when I go in there.” (Id. at 2). In
order to prevent medical staff from being harmed, Defendant Nalley then restrained
Plaintiff and escorted him to segregation. (Id.). Nalley told Plaintiff that he would
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take Plaintiff back to the HCU to see the dentist once Plaintiff had calmed down. (Id.).
At some point, however, Plaintiff began yelling at Defendant Nalley, and threatened to
kill and spit in Defendant Nalley’s face.
(Id. at 2).
As Defendant Nalley left
segregation, Plaintiff told him “You better hope they transfer me. I’m going to get
you….” (Id. at 2).
Defendant Nalley wrote Plaintiff two disciplinary tickets. One for intimidation
and threats while Plaintiff was in the HCU, and another for intimidation and threats
while Plaintiff was in segregation. (Id. at 1). The Big Muddy Adjustment Committee
held a hearing on both tickets on April 18, 2013. (Doc. 66-4, p. 1). Plaintiff was found
guilty of Offense 206, Intimidation and Threats, and recommended the revocation of
three months’ good conduct credit, which was later reduced to one month. (Id; Doc.
66-3). The committee made specific findings that Plaintiff was guilty of engaging in
intimidation and threats against both the dentist and Defendant Nalley. (Doc. 66-4, p.
1). As part of his lawsuit filed on August 27, 2014, Plaintiff pleaded counts against
Defendant Nalley alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment
and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Docs. 1, 8).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment
motions. The rule states that summary judgment is appropriate only if the admissible
evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Archdiocese of Milwaukee v.
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Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a)). The party seeking
summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating – based on the pleadings,
affidavits and/or information obtained via discovery – the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine issue of
material fact remains “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr. Inc., 753 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the
light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party. Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Righi v. SMC Corp. , 632 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2011);
Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has
explained, as required by Rule 56(a), “we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in
the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of
reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor.”
Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2014).
ANALYSIS
1. Claims against Furlong and Larson
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants Furlong and Larson allege deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Prison officials violate the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and unusual punishments” if they display
deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d
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645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Accord Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 828 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of a
prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the
Constitution.”). A prisoner is entitled to reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk
of serious harm — not to demand specific care. Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff,
700 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that a prison doctor “is free to make his
own, independent medical determination as to the necessity of certain treatments or
medications, so long as the determination is based on the physician’s professional
judgment and does not go against accepted professional standards”); Forbes v. Edgar,
112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Although a prison official may not continue a course
of treatment he knows is blatantly ineffective, prisoners are not entitled to receive
unqualified access to healthcare. See Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1073-74. A doctor may
provide the care he feels is reasonable so long as it falls within a “range of acceptable
courses based on prevailing standards in the field.” Id. at 1073.
To prevail, a prisoner who brings an Eighth Amendment challenge of
constitutionally-deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part test. Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011). The first prong is whether the prisoner has shown he
has an objectively serious medical need. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Accord Greeno, 414
F.3d at 653. A medical condition need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it
could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and
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wanton infliction of pain if not treated. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir.
2010).
Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (violating the Eighth
Amendment requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Only if the objective prong is
satisfied is it necessary to analyze the second, subjective prong, which focuses on
whether a defendant’s state of mind was sufficiently culpable. Greeno, 414 F.3d at
652-53.
Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison
official has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate
health. Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653. The plaintiff need not show the defendant literally
ignored his complaint, just that the defendant was aware of the serious medical
condition and either knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d
516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008). Deliberate indifference is not negligence; rather it is more akin
to intentional wrongdoing. McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013). The
standard is criminal recklessness, and even gross negligence will not meet this standard.
Id. at 481.
a. Dr. Furlong
The facts viewed in Plaintiff’s favor demonstrate that no reasonable juror could
find that Defendant Furlong was deliberately indifferent toward Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs. Here, the Court focuses on the factual dispute surrounding the point at
which the medial root was lost in Plaintiff’s sinus cavity. Defendants take the position
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that that root was not lost until Plaintiff’s visit in early March, after the root fractured
during the attempted tooth extraction on February 7. Defendants rely on an affidavit
from Defendant Furlong and a series of notes written by Dr. Furlong. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, takes the position that the root ended up in his sinus cavity during the initial
tooth extraction attempt on February 7.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have no
medical records demonstrating the root fell into the sinus cavity during the March
extraction attempt, and in actuality, it fell in to the cavity on February 7.
While the Court finds the notes largely illegible and cannot determine whether
they indicate the date when the root was lost, they do provide support for Defendant
Furlong’s contentions and his affidavit.
The notes indicate a final procedure was
attempted on March 4, 2013. This would correlate with Defendant’s affidavit indicating
that date was when he attempted to extract the broken root. Plaintiff’s claims to the
contrary are pure speculation. The evidence demonstrates Dr. Furlong, after breaking
the tooth during the extraction, later attempted to remove the root. When that was
unsuccessful, he began the process of referring Plaintiff to an outside specialist. Based
on these facts, no reasonable juror could find that Defendant Furlong was deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
b. Dr. Larson
The record also fails to demonstrate that Defendant Larson was deliberately
indifferent. As best the Court can tell, Defendant Larson did not become actively
involved in Plaintiff’s dental issues until after Plaintiff’s initial visit with Dr. Swanson.
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Once Larson became involved, however, he acted promptly and appropriately to see
that Plaintiff was getting care administered to him. Defendant Larson acted promptly
to approve Dr. Swanson’s recommendations, to get approval for Plaintiff to obtain
follow up visits with Dr. Swanson, and to personally administer care for Plaintiff’s
needs. On multiple occasions, Defendant Larson provided Plaintiff antibiotics and
painkillers he requested. Further, the fact that Plaintiff could not take Lortab outside of
the HCU was not Defendant Larson’s fault, since it was an IDOC policy. Though
Plaintiff disputes his exact temperature and blood pressure during the April 18 visit, the
factual dispute is immaterial. What is undisputed is that Plaintiff had an elevated
temperature and blood pressure during that visit, and that Defendant Larson increased
Plaintiff’s antibiotic dosage and secured an appointment with Dr. Swanson for the next
day. From the facts before the Court, and in the briefing, is not clear what more
Plaintiff wanted Defendant Larson to do. Regardless, the Eighth Amendment does not
guarantee Plaintiff specific care tailored to his desire. Owens v. Duncan, 2017 WL
119173, *6 (S.D. Il. Jan. 12, 2017) (citing Holloway, 700 F.3d at 1073 – 74; Forbes, 112 F.3d
at 267). Rather, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable measures to meet his serious medical
needs. Owens, 2017 WL 119173 at *6. The evidence is such that no reasonable juror
could find that Defendant Larson did anything other than take such reasonable
measures, and Larson is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
2. Claims against Nalley
Though Plaintiff has alleged claims of deliberate indifference and retaliation
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against Defendant Nalley, as argued by Nalley, those claims are barred under the
Supreme Court’s holdings in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that unless a state
prisoner could demonstrate that a sentence or conviction had been previously
invalidated, a prisoner is barred from bringing a suit for money damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643 (quoting Heck, 512
U.S. at 487) (internal quotations omitted). In Edwards, the Court extended Heck to suits
brought by prisoners alleging violations of their rights in prison disciplinary
proceedings. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648. Where a claim is barred by Heck and
Edwards, the proper vehicle for a plaintiff to challenge his sentence is through a habeas
corpus petition. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004).
Since recovery on the claims against Defendant Nalley would imply the invalidity
of the Big Muddy Adjustment Committee’s finding of guilt, those claims must be
dismissed. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is based on the allegation that Defendant Nalley
issued a false disciplinary report on April 17 in retaliation for raising concerns about
proper dental care. (See Doc. 8, p. 10). Defendant Nalley, on the other hand, indicates
that he issued Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket due to Plaintiff’s threats and intimidation
made against the dentist and Nalley. In finding Plaintiff guilty of the conduct alleged
by Defendant Nalley, the Adjustment Committee found that Plaintiff made such threats
and intimidation. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the issuance of a false disciplinary
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report in retaliation for protected speech, Plaintiff would have to demonstrate that he
did not threaten and intimidate Defendant Nalley and HCU staff as found by the
Adjustment Committee. The Court recognizes that to recover on a retaliation claim the
protected speech need only be a motivating factor, and that retaliatory official action
violates the Constitution, even if the officer would be otherwise authorized to take that
action in the absence of a retaliatory motive. See Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634
(7th Cir. 2013) (citing Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977));
Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, however, Plaintiff has
alleged that the disciplinary ticket was false (Doc. 1, p. 10), and that the issuance for the
false ticket was done in retaliation for protected speech. Therefore, in order to recover,
Plaintiff would have to imply the invalidity of the Adjustment Committee’s findings.
See Wooten v. Law, 118 Fed.Appx. 66, 69 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hether a claim is barred
by Heck turns on the plaintiff’s allegations.
The theoretical possibility of a
judgment for the plaintiff based on findings that do not call his conviction into
question is irrelevant if the plaintiff’s own allegations foreclose that possibility.”).
See also, Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f [a plaintiff] makes
allegations that are inconsistent with the conviction’s having been valid Heck kicks in
and bars his civil suit.”) (citing Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646 – 48; Ryan v. DuPage County
Jury Commission, 105 F.3d 329, 330 – 31 (7th Cir. 1996)).
The same analysis holds true for Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim as well.
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Nalley is “inextricably
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intertwined” with his disciplinary conviction. See Barnett v. Bates, 2013 WL 2403264,
*4 (S.D. Il. May 31, 2013). As with his retaliation claim, Plaintiff’s allegation is that he
was placed in segregation after being issued a false disciplinary ticket by Defendant
Nalley and refused medical care. (Doc. 8, p. 3). Again, however, the Adjustment
Committee found that Plaintiff was removed from the HCU due to threats he was
making, and for Plaintiff to prevail on his claim that Defendant Nalley was deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, Plaintiff would have to argue that he was
not making threats in the HCU, thereby implying the invalidity of his disciplinary
conviction. See Barnett, 2013 WL 2403264 at *4 (where prisoner claimed that prison
staff retaliated against him by allowing him to be sexually assaulted, and where
disciplinary committee had found prisoner guilty of falsifying report of the alleged
sexual assault, the prisoner’s retaliation claim was barred by Heck and Edwards as it
implied the invalidity of his disciplinary conviction).
Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Nalley should therefore be dismissed.1
CONCLUSION
The evidence before the Court is not sufficient for a jury to find that Defendants
Furlong and Larson were deliberately indifferent in their treatment of Plaintiff. The
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Larson and Furlong (Doc. 63) is
Even assuming arguendo that Heck and Edwards did not bar Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Nalley,
the undisputed facts nonetheless demonstrate that Defendant would be entitled to summary judgment.
The undisputed facts demonstrate no evidence of retaliatory motive on Nalley’s part. Additionally, the
undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendant Nalley removed Plaintiff from HCU and placed in him in
segregation for the safety and security of HCU staff—not due to a criminally negligent disregard for any
serious medical need by Plaintiff.
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1
therefore GRANTED. In addition, since Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Nalley are
barred by the Supreme Court’s holdings in Heck and Edwards, Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Nalley shall be dismissed and Defendant Nalley’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 65) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants are
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment against Plaintiff
and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 3/28/2017
/s/ Stephen C. Williams
STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS
United States Magistrate Judge
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