Montanez v. Stevenson et al
Filing
29
ORDER GRANTING 19 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 6/18/15. (klh2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROBERT MONTANEZ, SR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY STEVENSON,
Defendant.
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Case No. 14-CV-985-NJR-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Currently pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim filed by Defendant Randy Stevenson on December 17, 2014 (Doc. 19). For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Montanez, Sr. is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). Plaintiff
brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendant Randy
Stevenson, the Clinical Services Supervisor at Lawrence, failed to facilitate Plaintiff’s
participation in a family law matter pending in the Superior Court in Lake County,
Indiana. More specifically, Plaintiff claims that he submitted a written request to
Defendant explaining that a hearing was set on June 13, 2012, regarding a petition
brought by the mother of his son to change the son’s surname. Defendant told Plaintiff to
ask the Court to issue an order directing officials at Lawrence to make him available for
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the hearing. Plaintiff filed such a request with the Superior Court, but it was denied
because the Superior Court observed it had no legal authority to order the Clinical
Services Prison Litigation Representative at Lawrence to do anything. The Superior
Court directed Plaintiff to follow the prison’s procedures for arranging his participation
via telephone at the scheduled hearing. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Stevenson failed
to make him available for the hearing although he was provided with notice.
Consequently, the petition brought by the mother of Plaintiff’s son to change the son’s
surname was granted.
After the Court initially screened Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff was allowed to
proceed against Defendant Stevenson on an “access to the courts” claim in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On December 17, 2014, Defendant Stevenson
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing
that he is entitled to qualified immunity (Doc. 19). Defendant avers that he acted within
his capacity as a state official at the time of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s complaint,
and his alleged actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right.
Defendant argues that he did not deliberately hinder Plaintiff from attending the court
hearing at issue, but reasonably concluded that Plaintiff was not granted permission
from the Superior Court to attend and, in any event, Plaintiff does not have a
constitutional right to be present at a civil hearing regarding a petition to change a name.
Plaintiff timely responded to Defendant’s motion, arguing that Defendant Stevenson
denied him meaningful access to the courts by impeding his ability to participate in the
hearing at issue (Doc. 24). Plaintiff further argues that the Superior Court’s order
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specifically provided permission to “participate by telephone” in the June 13th hearing.
DISCUSSION
Defendant Stevenson seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified
immunity. The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials performing
discretionary functions from civil liability so long as “their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Alvarado v. Litscher,
267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001). Generally, claims for qualified immunity cannot be
decided on a motion to dismiss, “[b]ecause an immunity defense usually depends on the
facts of the case,” and because plaintiffs are “not required initially to plead factual
allegations that anticipate and overcome a defense of qualified immunity.” Alvarado, 267
F.3d at 651 (citing Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 765 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000)). But the issue
of qualified immunity can be appropriately decided on a motion to dismiss when the
complaint involves an alleged violation of a right that was not clearly established at the
time of the defendant’s actions. See, e.g., Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 916
(7th Cir. 2015); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th
Cir. 2007); Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2006).
“It is the plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that a constitutional right is clearly
established.” Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 766 (citation omitted). For a constitutional right to be
clearly established, its contours “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender,
600 F.3d 770, 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). The
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unlawfulness of a particular official’s action must be apparent “in light of the
pre-existing law.” Estate of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 779. The plaintiff may demonstrate that a
right was clearly established by presenting a closely analogous case establishing the
defendant’s conduct was unconstitutional or by presenting evidence the defendant’s
conduct was so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials
would know without guidance from a court. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739–40.
The crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendant Stevenson denied him access to the
court by preventing him from participating in the hearing regarding his son’s name
change on June 13, 2012. Undeniably, inmates have a constitutional right of access to the
courts. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 291 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Johnson v. Atkins, 999
F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993)). The question for the Court is whether it was clearly
established that the right of access to the courts encompassed Ball’s right to appear at the
hearing.
Plaintiff has not provided, and the Court has been unable to find, an opinion in
which the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit decided a case on the grounds at issue
here. More specifically, there does not appear to be any closely analogous case
establishing a constitutional right for a prisoner to attend a hearing in a family law
matter that was not filed, or otherwise prosecuted, by the prisoner. And in a broader
sense, there does not appear to be a controlling case establishing a constitutional right
for a prisoner to attend a hearing in any civil matter that was not initiated by the prisoner.
See Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Although due process prohibits
the denial of access to the courts, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to attend
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the jury trial of his civil rights claim involving the conditions of his confinement.”)
Finding no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit,
the Court has reviewed relevant case law from other circuits to determine “whether
there [is] such a clear trend in the case law that we can say with fair assurance that the
recognition of the right by a controlling precedent [is] merely a question of time.” Estate
of Escobedo, 600 F.3d at 781 (quoting Jacobs, 215 F.3d at 766). Upon review of case law in
other circuits, the Court finds no trend establishing a constitutional right analogous to
the circumstances in this case. See, e.g., Ball v. Hartman, 396 Fed. Appx. 823, 825 (3d Cir.
2010) (unpublished) (prisoner’s right of access claim does not extend to child support
action); Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264, 269 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Michigan
prisoners are not entitled to legal assistance in parental right matters); Camp v. Dobbs, No.
2:11-CV-0140, 2011 WL 6968155, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2011), report and recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 75669 (Jan. 10, 2012) (“However, the right of access to the courts does
not give an inmate the unqualified right to appear personally at every court proceeding
in a civil case.”); Pryor v. Hurley, No. 2:05-CV-936, 2006 WL 2711677, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
21, 2006) (“[I]t appears that plaintiff’s underlying state action related to custody issues of
a minor child, a category of action for which the constitutional right of access to the
courts offers no protection.”)
Although the Court recognizes that the Third Circuit has found “an
unconditional right of access . . . when denial of a judicial forum would implicate a
fundamental human interest—such as the termination of parental rights or the ability to
obtain a divorce,” Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001), this finding
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does not represent a clear trend among the circuits. More importantly, is not applicable
in this instance. Here, Plaintiff is complaining about his inability to attend a hearing via
telephone so he could contest a petition to change his son’s name. Such an action does
not directly relate to the revocation of any parental rights Plaintiff may or may not have
with respect to his son. Finally, the Court finds that the alleged conduct undertaken by
Defendant Stevenson was not so patently violative of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights that
he should have known of the violation without guidance from the Court.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a
violation of any clearly established constitutional right. As such, Defendant Stevenson is
entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
The Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Defendant Randy
Stevenson on December 17, 2014 (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant Randy Stevenson is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and to close this case on the Court’s
docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 18, 2015
s/ Nancy J. Rosenstengel
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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