Singleton v. Walton

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 10/17/2014. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY SINGLETON,
No. 94408-024,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 14-cv-1038-DRH

JEFFREY S. WALTON,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Petitioner, currently incarcerated in the United States Penitentiary at
Marion, brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to
challenge the constitutionality of his confinement.

He is serving a three-year

sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release.
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the petition
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States
District Courts. Rule 4 provides that upon preliminary consideration by the
district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached
exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge
must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b)
of those Rules gives this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas
corpus cases, such as this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

After carefully

reviewing the petition, the Court concludes that this action is subject to dismissal.

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Background
On May 4, 2004, petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Northern District
of Illinois of theft of mail and possession of a mail access device. United States v.

Singleton, Case No. 03-cr-175 (N.D. Ill.). He was sentenced to 115 months, plus
three years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay substantial restitution
(Doc. 99 in criminal case). He never appealed his conviction or sentence. 1
Petitioner was released from prison on September 2, 2011, and initially
reported to the probation office. However, in short order the government moved
to revoke his supervised release, because he refused to meet with the probation
officer. While the revocation proceeding was pending, petitioner was arrested in
New York, and ultimately convicted there on charges of grand larceny and
possession of a forged instrument.

He remained in the custody of New York

authorities until March 26, 2013, when he was sentenced to time served
(approximately 15 months). He then was remanded to the custody of the United
States Marshal, and was returned to the Northern District of Illinois.
On July 18, 2013, the trial court found petitioner in violation of the terms
of his supervised release.

The court revoked his supervised release and

sentenced him to 36 months in prison (Doc. 172 in criminal case). Petitioner
never appealed that sentence or the revocation.
On February 27, 2014, petitioner filed a § 2241 petition seeking credit
The procedural history of petitioner’s case summarized here is detailed in this Court’s order
denying his earlier petition for habeas relief under § 2241, Singleton v. Walton, Case No. 14-cv288-DRH-CJP (S.D. Ill., Doc. 22, June 17, 2014), and in the trial court’s order denying his § 2255
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, United States v. Singleton, Case No. 14-cv-1653
(N.D. Ill., Doc. 12, July 17, 2014).
1

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against his 36-month federal sentence for the 15 months he served on the New
York state forgery conviction. Singleton v. Walton, Case No. 14-cv-288-DRH-CJP
(S.D. Ill.). On June 17, 2014, this Court denied relief. The undersigned Judge
concluded that the Bureau of Prisons correctly determined that petitioner was not
entitled to the sentence credit he sought, because a prisoner cannot get credit
against both a federal and state sentence for the same time spent in custody (Doc.
22 in Case No. 14-cv-288).
Soon after filing the above matter in this Court, petitioner filed a motion on
March 7, 2014, in the trial court seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Singleton v. United States, Case No. 14-cv1653 (N.D. Ill.).

In that matter, he raised four issues.

He claimed the court

violated his right to counsel by forcing him to proceed without an attorney in his
revocation hearing; 2 he was never given a written statement or otherwise advised
of the conditions of his supervised release; the court improperly calculated the
advisory sentencing guideline range; and the court erred in relying on a
certification of disposition from the New York court clerk as to the disposition of
the criminal matter in that state (Doc. 12 in Case No. 14-cv-1653). He also raised
the same sentence credit issue that he brought in the first § 2241 case.
The trial court found that petitioner was not entitled to relief under § 2255
on any of these claims, because his failure to file an appeal at the conclusion of

2

The trial court noted that petitioner had been appointed counsel, but his attorney was allowed to
withdraw after irreconcilable differences developed between them. The court ultimately ordered
petitioner to represent himself because he had refused to cooperate with his counsel (Doc. 12, p.
4, in Case No. 14-cv-1653).
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the revocation proceeding meant that he had procedurally defaulted all his claims.
Further, he failed to demonstrate good cause for or prejudice from the failure to
appeal. Although the court was not required to address the merits of petitioner’s
claims due to the procedural default, it did discuss his contention of error in
calculating the sentencing guidelines for the violation of his supervised release
conditions (Doc. 12, p. 6, Case No. 14-cv-1653). Although there had indeed been
an error in the calculation, no miscarriage of justice resulted:
The sentence imposed fell well below the statutory maximum of
seventy-two months imprisonment and the Court was aware that the
Guidelines were advisory . . . the Court would have arrived at the
same decision regardless of the advisory range.
In imposing
sentence, the Court noted that Singleton’s sentence of imprisonment
should be equivalent to the thirty-six month term of supervised
release that Singleton refused to serve as a result of his obstructive
conduct in refusing to cooperate with his probation officer.
(Doc. 12, p. 6, n.2, Case No. 14-cv-1653).
The court declined to issue a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The order disposing of the § 2255 motion was entered on
July 17, 2014.
The Petition
Petitioner claims that he was never notified of the trial court’s denial of his
§ 2255 motion until September 17, 2014. By that time, it was too late to appeal,
leaving him with “no remedy other than this application for a writ of habeas
corpus to correct the unconstitutional and illegal sentence imposed in violation of
the laws of the United States” (Doc. 1, pp. 1-2). As points of error, he raises some
of the same arguments which were rejected as procedurally defaulted by the trial
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court in the § 2255 proceeding – he was denied counsel for the revocation
hearings, and his 36-month sentence exceeded the statutory limitations for the
violation of supervised release on an original conviction for a Class D or Class C
felony (he claims the maximum is 24 months). Also in reference to his contention
that the sentence was 12 months in excess of the allowable term, he claims that
the sentencing judge did not “articulate any statement of reasons for imposing the
sentence as is required under Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c),” and that the judge “did
not identify within the judgment evidence of reconstruction of different counts
within the original judgment to effect a sentencing construction of consecutive
terms of imprisonment” (Doc. 1, p. 2).

He claims that the disposition of his

§ 2255 motion deprived him of meaningful access to the courts and denied him
the opportunity for review of the allegedly illegal sentence.
Petitioner requests this Court to set aside and void the judgment of the
Northern District.
Discussion
As a general matter, “28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provide
federal prisoners with distinct forms of collateral relief. Section 2255 applies to
challenges to the validity of convictions and sentences, whereas § 2241 applies to
challenges to the fact or duration of confinement.” Hill v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d
644, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.
2000). See also Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012); Valona v.

United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Because petitioner herein is

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attacking the validity of his sentence, a § 2255 motion was and is the proper
avenue for relief.
Under very limited circumstances, a prisoner may employ § 2241 to
challenge his federal conviction or sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) contains a

“savings clause” which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition
where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See Hill, 695 F.3d at 648 (“‘Inadequate or
ineffective’ means that ‘a legal theory that could not have been presented under
§ 2255 establishes the petitioner's actual innocence.’”) (citing Taylor v. Gilkey, 314
F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002). See also United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792,
798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The fact that petitioner may be barred from bringing a
second/successive § 2255 petition is not, in itself, sufficient to render it an
inadequate remedy.

In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1998)

(§ 2255 limitation on filing successive motions does not render it an inadequate
remedy for a prisoner who had filed a prior § 2255 motion). Likewise, the failure
to appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion does not make § 2255 an inadequate
or ineffective remedy. See Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citing Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835-36).

Instead, a petitioner under § 2241 must

demonstrate the inability of a § 2255 motion to cure the defect in the conviction.
“A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is
so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial
rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been

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imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611.
The Seventh Circuit has explained that, in order to fit within the savings
clause following Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions. First, he
must show that he relies on a new statutory interpretation case rather than a
constitutional case. Secondly, he must show that he relies on a decision that he
could not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion, and that case must apply
retroactively. Lastly, he must demonstrate that there has been a “fundamental
defect” in his conviction or sentence that is grave enough to be deemed a
miscarriage of justice. Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).

See also Brown v. Rios, 696 F3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012).
Petitioner does not even attempt to argue that his claims fall within the
savings clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), and they clearly do not. He does not invoke
any new statutory interpretation case in support of his claims, much less one that
could not have been raised in his § 2255 motion, and the Court is unaware of any
such authority that would support his request for relief.

Those factors alone

point to dismissal of this action. Moreover, the petition does not demonstrate any
fundamental defect in the sentence or any miscarriage of justice, particularly in
light of the trial court’s discussion of its sentencing decision and the applicable
non-binding guidelines.
Instead, it appears that petitioner is attempting to use this court as a back
door of sorts, to allow him to present a successive, redundant § 2255 motion
attacking his sentence, while skirting the requirements for bringing a successive

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petition (see § 2255(h), (e)), or alternatively, as a substitute for an appeal of the
adverse decision on his § 2255 motion. Neither of these options is a permissible
function of a § 2241 proceeding.
This Court can find no flaw in the trial court’s conclusion that the claims
petitioner attempted to raise in his § 2255 motion were procedurally barred due
to his failure to appeal after the 36-month sentence was imposed. Furthermore,
the trial court’s decision to deny petitioner a certificate of appealability from the
denial of his § 2255 motion was legally sound. It was unfortunate that petitioner
was not timely notified of the dismissal of the § 2255 action.

However, this

problem does not amount to a structural defect in the § 2255 procedure, thus it
does not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” to adjudicate petitioner’s
claims. See Taylor, 314 F.3d at 835-36. His remedy, if any, lies with the Court of
Appeals, which has the power to grant a certificate of appealability, allowing for an
appeal from a § 2255 dismissal, if the district court has declined to issue one.

See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
Disposition
To summarize, petitioner has not demonstrated that § 2255 is an
inadequate remedy for his current claims, and consistent with In re Davenport,
petitioner cannot raise these claims through a § 2241 petition. Davenport, 147
F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the petition is summarily DISMISSED
with prejudice.
Because this action has been dismissed, no response is necessary to the

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Requests for Admissions (Docs. 3, 4) served by petitioner on Jeffrey S. Walton
and Robert M. Dow.

The lack of response shall not be deemed to be an

admission to any of the matters contained in Docs. 3 or 4.
If petitioner wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal
with this court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4).
A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
petitioner plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If petitioner
does choose to appeal and is allowed to proceed IFP, he will be liable for a portion
of the $505.00 appellate filing fee (the amount to be determined based on his
prison trust fund account records for the past six months) irrespective of the
outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons

v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857,
858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). A
timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the
30-day appeal deadline. 3 It is not necessary for petitioner to obtain a certificate of
appealability from this disposition of his § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216
F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.

Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2014.10.17
10:50:08 -05'00'

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 17, 2014

United States District Judge
3

A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the
entry of the judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
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