Roberts et al v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc. et al
Filing
209
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, granting 189 Joint MOTION For Good-Faith Finding filed by Edwards-Kamadulski, LLC. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/4/2017. (jdh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THOMAS ROBERTS and
DIANE ROBERTS,
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ALEXANDRIA TRANSPORTATION,
)
INC., et al.
)
)
Defendants,
)
_________________________________
)
)
ALEXANDRIA TRANSPORTATION,
)
INC. AND ALEXANDRE SOLOMAKHA, )
)
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
STATEWIDE TIRE DISTRIBUTORS,
)
INC., et al.,
)
)
Third-Party Defendants.
)
Case No. 14-cv-01063-JPG-SCW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs and Third-party defendant EdwardsKamadulski, LLC’s Joint Motion (Doc. 189) for a Good-Faith Finding. The motion being fully
briefed, the Court held a hearing on the motion on April 26th, 2017.
1. Background.
This case arose from an accident which occurred westbound on Interstate 70 in Madison
County on September 16, 2013. Plaintiff Thomas Roberts was driving a 2012 Dodge Ram 4500
and was stopped due to construction on the road when he was struck in the rear by a Freightliner
tractor trailer driven by defendant Solomakha.
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Defendants Solomakha, Alexandria
Transportation, Inc. and Alex Express, LL brought a third-party complaint (Doc. 116) against
Edwards-Kamadulski, LLC (“Edwards”), Safety International, LLC and Statewide Tire
Distributors, Inc. The plaintiffs and third-party defendant Edwards now seek an order finding
that the settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and Edwards was made and entered into in
good faith with the meaning of the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740 ILCS 1000/1,
et seq.).
2. Standards.
The Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act provides that:
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or
the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces
the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in
the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for
it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is
discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 100/2.
“The Contribution Act does not specifically define good faith; in determining whether an
agreement was made in good faith, all of the surrounding circumstances must be considered.
However, once a preliminary showing of a good-faith settlement has been made, the burden
shifts to the party challenging the settlement to establish that it was not made in good faith.”
Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 524, 529 (Ill. 1989).
Having reviewed the relevant case law, we conclude that, when a court
determines whether a settlement was negotiated in good faith within the meaning
of the Contribution Act, the settling parties carry the initial burden of making a
preliminary showing of good faith. At a minimum, the settling parties must show
the existence of a legally valid settlement agreement. However, not all legally
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valid settlements satisfy the good-faith requirements of the Contribution Act.
Therefore, other factual evidence may be necessary before the court may
determine, as an initial matter, whether the settlement is fair and reasonable in
light of the policies underlying the Contribution Act.
Further, we are persuaded by the well-reasoned decision in Bowers that,
once a preliminary showing of good faith has been made by the settling parties,
the party challenging the good faith of the settlement need prove the absence of
good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.
…
This court has previously recognized that the Contribution Act seeks to promote
two important public policies—the encouragement of settlements and the
equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors. When a court decides
whether a settlement was negotiated in “good faith,” it must strike a balance
between these two policy considerations.
...
A settlement will not be found to be in good faith if it is shown that the settling
parties engaged in wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud. Nor will a settlement
agreement satisfy the good-faith requirement if it conflicts with the terms of the
Act or is inconsistent with the policies underlying the Act. Dubina v. Mesirow
Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill.2d at 192, 258 Ill.Dec. 562, 756 N.E.2d 836
(assignment of plaintiffs' claims against nonsettling tortfeasors to settling
tortfeasors was contrary to the terms of and policies underlying the Act); In re
Guardianship *135 of Babb, 162 Ill.2d 153, 205 Ill.Dec. 78, 642 N.E.2d 1195
(1994) (settlement containing loan-receipt provision conflicted with the terms of
the Act and did not promote settlements or the equitable apportionment of
damages). Ultimately, however, whether a settlement satisfies the good-faith
requirement as contemplated by the Contribution Act is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial court based upon the court's consideration of the totality of
the circumstances.
Johnson v. United Airlines, 784 N.E.2d 812, 820 -821 (Ill. 2003).
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3. Analysis.
Third-party plaintiffs object to the settlement stating that the settling third-party defendant is
more liable than the third-party plaintiffs. (Doc. 195). They state that plaintiff is, “claiming
approximately $500,000 in medical bills, alleged future medical treatment totaling more than
$500,000 and a wage loss claim of being unable to work for the rest of his life, the alleged
damages exceed $1 million, without taking into account past pain and suffering. Plaintiffs’ last
demand was $2 million and the settlement amount of $50,000 on behalf of Edwards-Kamadulski
amounts to less than 3% of the demand.” Id. at 4.
As such, third-party plaintiffs claim that settlement goes against the purpose of the
Contribution Act with regard to the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors.
However, “[a] small settlement does not necessarily indicate a bad faith settlement. ‘We are also
unpersuaded that the amount of the settlement here is an indication of bad faith. It is true that
plaintiffs' complaints sought damages in the millions of dollars and that the settlements with
Quincy were for the nominal figure of $1,000 per plaintiff. However, the disparity between the
settlement amount and the ad damnum in the complaint is not an accurate measure of the good
faith of a settlement. Nor does the small amount of the settlement, alone, require a finding of bad
faith. The amount of a settlement must be viewed in relation to the probability of recovery, the
defenses raised, and the settling party's potential legal liability.” Johnson v. United Airlines, 784
N.E.2d 812, 822–23 (Ill. 2003).
The plaintiffs’ reply states that the settlement negotiations were at arms-length and were
not the result of wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud.
They state that the settlement is
consistent with the public policy goals of the Contribution Act and that, “the Parties were fully
apprised of the liability and damages claimed.”
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Plaintiffs further argue that defendant
Solomakha was unable to stop and was ticketed for driving too fast for conditions and as such,
was the sole cause of the accident.
They further argue that they have a valid settlement
agreement and that third-party plaintiffs have not meet their burden by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is an absence of good faith.
After consideration of the briefs and the oral arguments at the hearing, the Court finds
that there exist a legally valid settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and third-party
defendant Edwards-Kamadulski, LLC. There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that the
settling parties engaged in wrongful conduct, collusion, or fraud. As such, the Court finds that
the settlement satisfies the good-faith requirement of the terms of the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act and is not inconsistent with the Act’s underlying policies.
4. Conclusion.
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs and Third-party defendant Edwards-Kamadulski,
LLC’s Joint Motion (Doc. 189) for a Good-Faith Finding is GRANTED and the Court finds that
the settlement between the plaintiffs and third-party defendant Edwards-Kamadulski, LLC was
made and entered into in good faith with the meaning of the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act .
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 5/4/2017
s/J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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