Fields v. Ransom et al

Filing 66

ORDER: For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, the Court GRANTS 56 MOTION for Summary Judgment. No other claims remain. The Clerk of Court SHALL enter judgment in favor of Defendants, Richard Ransom and Eric Quandt, and against Plaintiff, Michael Fields. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 1/13/17. (rah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD RANSOM
and ERIC QUANDT,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14-cv-1096-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
In October 2014, while confined at Menard Correctional Center, Michael Fields

(Plaintiff) filed a pro se civil rights complaint in this Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, naming
two Defendants – Richard Ransom and “C/O Quant.” Plaintiff alleged that Defendants
violated his federally-secured constitutional rights.
On threshold review, the undersigned dismissed certain claims but found that the
complaint stated a cognizable claim for retaliation (in violation of the First Amendment)
against both Defendants. “C/O Quant” initially was believed to be Shane Quant, but
later information clarified that the correct individual was Eric Quant (see Doc. 35).
Defendants answered, a discovery schedule was entered, and the case proceeded. Now
before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and supporting
memorandum (Docs. 56-57), to which Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition (Doc. 59). For
the reasons delineated below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.

II.

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS AND EVIDENCE
As narrowed by the Court’s threshold review Order, Plaintiff alleges that Quandt

and Ransom (Defendants) retaliated against him for filing a grievance against Quandt on
December 3, 2012. The act of retaliation was confiscation of Plaintiff’s eyeglasses in a
cell search in June 2013 (Doc. 8, p. 2). The key facts and allegations, drawn from the
record properly before the Court (including exhibits, sworn declarations, and the
transcript of Plaintiff’s May 2016 deposition) are summarized as follows.
On June 7, 2013, Richard Ransom, a correctional officer at Menard Correctional
Center, conducted a shakedown of Plaintiff’s cell in the West Cell House of Menard
(Doc. 57-2, p. 2). Plaintiff believes the shakedown occurred on June 9, 2013, but an
exhibit from the search (the Illinois Department of Corrections Shakedown Record,
referred to as a “shakedown slip”) indicates that the search occurred on June 7, 2013
(Doc. 57-3, p. 1; Doc. 59, p. 17; Doc. 1, p. 18; 57-3, p. 23-24).
In the cell, Ransom located three pairs of eyeglasses with pointed metal ends on
the earpieces; he confiscated them (Doc. 57-3, p. 1; 57-2, p. 2). Two of the pairs belonged
to Plaintiff; the third belonged to his cellmate, Anthony McGruder (Doc. 57-1, p. 24-25).
Ransom attests in a sworn declaration that he confiscated the eyeglasses at the
instruction of his supervisors, a directive issued after it was learned that inmates in the
West Cell House, where Plaintiff’s cell was located, were using the metal earpieces for
weapons (Doc. 57-2, p. 1-2). Plaintiff testified that one of the eyeglasses was rubber and
not metal (Doc. 57-1, p. 25).
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Correctional officer Eric Quandt witnessed the shakedown, according to the
shakedown slip (Doc. 57-2, p. 2; 57-3, p. 1). Plaintiff points out that Eric Quandt actually
was assigned to “the tower” (not the West Cell House) on June 9, 2013 (the day Plaintiff
believes the shakedown took place). But he acknowledges that the tower was closed
that day, and Quandt may have been on a floating rotation and thus in Plaintiff’s
cellhouse during the shakedown (Doc. 57-1, p. 19; Doc. 59, p. 19). Regardless of the date
the shakedown occurred, both sides admit that Quandt was present during the
shakedown, and the Court assumes Quandt’s presence during the cell search for
purposes of the summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that his glasses were taken in retaliation for his
filing a grievance against Quandt in December 2012. Plaintiff testified in his deposition
that Ransom (a month or two after the shakedown, when confronted by Plaintiff about
why Ransom took the eyeglasses) said to Plaintiff “You complain too much” (Doc. 57-1,
p. 20, 36-37).
Plaintiff also testified that he wrote a grievance against Quandt on December 3,
2012, based on the fact Quandt would not let him use the restroom while he was in the
healthcare unit (Doc. 57-1, p. 38). Plaintiff admitted that he had not talked to Quandt
about the grievance or shown the grievance to him (Id. at p. 39). In response to that
grievance, Plaintiff’s counselor contacted the healthcare unit and determined that the
restrooms were for staff only (Doc. 1, p. 23). Plaintiff testified that (a) the timeline of
events led him to believe the confiscation of his eyeglasses was an act of retaliation for
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him filing a grievance against Quandt six months earlier, (b) Plaintiff presumed that
Ransom was referring to the grievance when Ransom one day commented that Plaintiff
complained too much (Doc. 57-1, p. 43). When pressed (in his deposition) as to his
belief that Quandt took the glasses because of the December 2012 grievance, Plaintiff
testified simply: “I’m saying it’s possible” (Id., p. 44).
Plaintiff also suggested he could have been retaliated against because he had two
lawsuits pending against high ranking officers at Menard, one of which he says was filed
just three or four weeks before his glasses were taken (Doc. 59, p. 7). Plaintiff identified
one of those cases as Fields v. Restoff, Case No. 13-cv-0145-JPG-DGW filed on February
11, 2013 (Doc. 59, p. 7 n. 5). He identified the other case as Fields v. Dettrott, Case No.
12-cv-0420. There is no case listed in this District by that name, and that number was a
case against petroleum refineries for municipal ordinance violations.
Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that he did not receive any notice that the
eyeglasses were declared prohibited. Plaintiff claims that when items previously were
deemed contraband, the inmates would receive notices of future confiscations. Plaintiff
points to two notices he received regarding confiscation of items that the prison changed
to contraband, typewriters and hard plastic hairbrushes (Doc. 59-2, p. 7-8). Plaintiff
says he did not get a notice about metal eyeglasses being declared contraband. Plaintiff
also provides affidavits from five inmates testifying that they have plastic eyeglasses
with malleable metal substance in the earpieces, and they never had their glasses
confiscated (Doc. 59-2, p. 10-13; Doc. 59-3, p. 1-6).
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III.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Summary Judgment Motions

Summary judgment is proper only if the admissible evidence considered as a
whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d
506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011), citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing -based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or information obtained via discovery -- the lack
of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party
“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986), quoting FED R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2). A fact is
material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;
Ballance v. City of Springfield, Ill. Police Dep’t, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005);
Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “A
mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving
party.” Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
On summary judgment, the district court construes the facts and draws the
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reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party – here, Plaintiff Fields. Cole v.
Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University, 838 F.3d 888, 895 (7th Cir. 2016).
However, the court does not draw every conceivable inference from the record, “and
mere speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” Rockwell
Automation, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 544 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added), quoting McCoy v. Harrison, 341 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 2003).
B.

Retaliation

An official who retaliates against a prisoner because that prisoner filed a
grievance violates the prisoner’s First Amendment rights. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d
607, 618 (7th Cir. 2000). Establishing a claim of retaliation requires a prisoner to show
the following: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered a deprivation likely
to prevent future protected activities, and (3) there was a causal connection between the
two. See Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2010); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557
F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
If the plaintiff prisoner makes this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the
defendant, who can still prevail if he shows that the offending action would have
happened even if there had been no retaliatory motive, i.e., if “the harm would have
occurred anyway.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 n.10 (7th Cir. 2014), quoting
Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 251-52 (7th Cir. 2012), and Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d
975, 977 (7th Cir. 2011). See also Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 634-35 (7th Cir.
2013).
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IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Eric Quandt

Defendant Quandt argues that he is entitled to summary judgment, because there
is no evidence (only Plaintiff’s speculation and belief) that Quandt retaliated against
Plaintiff in confiscating his eyeglasses. As an initial matter, the Court notes some
question as to whether Quandt participated in the shakedown of Plaintiff’s cell.
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he identified Quandt as one of the officers who
conducted the shakedown based on the ID number on the shakedown slip (Doc. 57-1, p.
31). However, Plaintiff also asserted (in response to the summary judgment motion)
that Quandt was scheduled for tower duty the day that Plaintiff thinks the shakedown
took place -- June 9, 2013. The shakedown slip (Doc. 57-3 is a slightly smudged copy)
appears to state that the shakedown took place on June 7, not June 9, 2013.

For

purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that Eric Quandt participated in the
shakedown, as Plaintiff admits Quandt’s ID number is on the shakedown slip, and
Ransom agrees that the shakedown slip lists Quandt as a witness.
Plaintiff argues that Quandt’s action in confiscating the eyeglasses constituted
retaliation for Plaintiff writing a grievance against Quandt six months earlier. Plaintiff
wrote a grievance on December 3, 2012 against Quandt for refusing to allow Plaintiff to
use the restroom in the healthcare unit (Doc. 1, p. 23).

More accurately, Plaintiff

testified that “It’s possible” Quandt acted in retaliation, because the grievance was
lodged six months prior to the cell search.

In other words, Plaintiff relies on the

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chronology of events to support his allegation of retaliation by Quandt.

While

suspicious timing can support a retaliation claim (i.e., it can be considered circumstantial
evidence of retaliation), suspicious timing alone is not enough. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer,
679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 133 S. Ct. 489 (2012); Zimmerman v.
Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000); Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d
841, 851 (7th Cir. 2008).
In the context of both Title VII and Section 1983 retaliation cases, the Seventh
Circuit has explained that it is well established that mere temporal proximity between a
protected activity and the action alleged to have been taken in retaliation for that activity
will rarely be sufficient in and of itself to create a triable issue. See, e.g., Kidwell, 679
F.3d at 966 (“suspicious timing may be just that – suspicious – and a suspicion is not
enough to get past a motion for summary judgment”).

Speculation based on

suspicious timing alone does not support a reasonable inference of retaliation; instead, a
plaintiff must produce facts which somehow tie the allegedly retaliatory action to the
plaintiff’s protected activity. Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 883 (7th Cir. 2014),
citing Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002), and
Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s glasses were taken six months after he wrote his grievance, a relatively
long time to be considered suspicious timing. See, e.g., Young-Gibson v. Board of Educ.,
558 Fed. App’x 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases in which 7-month, 6-month, and
even 7-week time gap not proximate enough to be suspicious).
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Even if the timing of

the shakedown and confiscation is suspicious here, Plaintiff has failed to offer any other
evidence other than his own speculation to support his claim. Plaintiff testified that it
was “possible” that Quandt was acting in retaliation giving the timing, but Plaintiff
offers no further evidence to show retaliation on Quandt’s part. Plaintiff’s speculation,
standing alone, is not enough at this stage to create a triable issue. Rockwell, 544 F.3d
at 757 (“mere speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion”);
Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 2013) (inmate’s verified complaint
alleged retaliation, but his speculation regarding the officers’ retaliatory motive was
not sufficient, alone, to create a genuine issue of material fact).
Plaintiff admitted that he never talked to Quandt about the grievance or the
confiscation of his eyeglasses. And no evidence has been presented that Quandt was
even aware of Plaintiff’s grievance at the time the glasses were taken from the cell. The
grievance against Quandt, attached to Plaintiff’s complaint, only indicates that the
counselor discussed the bathroom situation with the healthcare unit.

There is no

suggestion that the counselor spoke with Quandt or that he was otherwise notified of the
grievance. There is no evidence before this Court other than the timing of Quandt’s
actions to support Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Quandt. The Court concludes
that Quandt is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim against him.
B.

Richard Ransom

Richard Ransom also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim. The Court finds no evidence of retaliation by Ransom. Plaintiff argues that
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Ransom confiscated the eyeglasses in retaliation for Plaintiff filing lawsuits and a
grievance. As with Quandt, there is no evidence that Ransom was aware of either the
grievance filed against Quandt or the lawsuits Plaintiff filed before the shakedown.
In his memo opposing summary judgment, which consists of 84 pages of brief
plus exhibits, Plaintiff emphasizes that he filed lawsuits against “high ranking officials”
at Menard about three weeks prior to the confiscation (Doc. 59, p. 7). But there is no
evidence that Ransom was a party to any of the lawsuits or that he even knew of the
lawsuits. The one lawsuit identified by Plaintiff of which a record exists in this Court
names a single defendant, Sergeant John Restoff, and was filed roughly four months
prior to the confiscation of Plaintiff’s eyeglasses. The undersigned located another
lawsuit in the electronic database, Case No. 12-cv-1170-DGW, which was filed even
earlier and did not include Ransom as a defendant.
In support of his retaliation claim, Plaintiff points to a statement by Ransom (one
or two months after the cell search) when Plaintiff asked about his glasses being
confiscated, and Ransom responded: “You complain too much.” However, this vague
statement is not tied to any specific protected conduct that Plaintiff participated in.
There is no evidence that Ransom was referring to Plaintiff’s lawsuits or any other
grievances he might have filed.

Ransom could have been referring to general

complaints about everyday life by Plaintiff.

Ransom could have been characterizing

Plaintiff’s ongoing questions about the glasses being taken as a complaint.
Without any further evidence as to what those complaints were, the Court cannot
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to find that Plaintiff’s generic “complaints” (about who knows what when) amount to
protected speech, such that Ransom’s action in removing the eyeglasses could be
deemed to be in retaliation. Bridges, 557 F.3d at 551; Ogurek v. Gabor, 827 F.3d 567, 569
(7th Cir. 2016).

Although verbal complaints may amount to protected speech, see

Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2006)(verbal complaints about
condition of cell were designed to affect change in prison policy and thus protected),
there is no indication in the record here that the “complaints” Ransom referred to were
protected speech by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to sustain his prima facie showing of
retaliation – i.e., there is no evidence that Ransom took the glasses in response to
protected speech or activity by Plaintiff.1 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant
Ransom is entitled to summary judgment.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Doc. 56). No other claims remain. The Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment in favor of Defendants, Richard Ransom and Eric Quandt, and against
Plaintiff, Michael Fields.
Having found no evidence of retaliation by Ransom, the Court need not
reach the issue of whether Ransom’s allegedly retaliatory action would have
occurred anyway (i.e., for a non-retaliatory reason). Ransom attests that in 2013,
he was instructed by superior officers to confiscate all eyeglasses containing metal
from inmates, based on the security concern that offenders in the West Cell House
were using metal eyeglass frames to create weapons. Plaintiff countered with
some evidence that other inmates still have glasses like the ones confiscated from
him and that previous changes in policy regarding contraband were accompanied
by advance notice to the inmates, which did not occur prior to this confiscation.
As there is no evidence that Ransom’s conduct was in retaliation for any
protected speech of Plaintiff’s, the Court need not reach this issue.
1

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 13, 2017.
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge

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