Mayberry v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. The Commissioner's final decision is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud on 9/2/2015. (klm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HEATHER MAYBERRY,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

Civil No. 14-cv-1139-CJP 1

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
PROUD, Magistrate Judge:
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. §405(g), plaintiff Heather Mayberry is
before the Court, represented by counsel, seeking judicial review of the final
agency decision denying her Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §423.
Procedural History
Plaintiff initially applied for benefits in September 2011, alleging
disability beginning on June 30, 2009. (Tr. 13). The claim proceeded to a
hearing before ALJ Michael Hellman, who issued an unfavorable decision on
July 26, 2013. (Tr. 13-24). The Appeals Council denied review, and the decision
of the ALJ became the final agency decision. (Tr. 1). Administrative remedies
have been exhausted and a timely complaint was filed in this Court.

This case was referred to the undersigned for final disposition on consent of the parties,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). See, Doc. 20.
1

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Issues Raised by Plaintiff
Plaintiff raised the following points:
1. The ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal
a listed impairment is not supported by substantial evidence.
2. The ALJ’s credibility analysis was not supported by evidence in the
record.
Applicable Legal Standards
To qualify for SSI, a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the
applicable statutes. 2 For these purposes, “disabled” means the “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).
A “physical or mental impairment” is an impairment resulting from
anatomical,

physiological,

or

psychological

abnormalities

which

are

demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques. 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity
that involves doing significant physical or mental activities, and that is done for
pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572.
Social Security regulations set forth a sequential five-step inquiry to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. The Seventh Circuit Court of
The statutes and regulations pertaining to Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) are found at 42
U.S.C. § 423, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. The statutes and regulations pertaining to SSI are
found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 and 1382c, et seq., and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416. As is relevant to this
case, the DIB and SSI statutes are identical. Furthermore, 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 detailing
medical considerations relevant to an SSI claim, relies on 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, the DIB
regulations. Most citations herein are to the DIB regulations out of convenience.

2

2

Appeals has explained this process as follows:
The first step considers whether the applicant is engaging in
substantial gainful activity. The second step evaluates whether an
alleged physical or mental impairment is severe, medically
determinable, and meets a durational requirement. The third step
compares the impairment to a list of impairments that are
considered conclusively disabling. If the impairment meets or
equals one of the listed impairments, then the applicant is
considered disabled; if the impairment does not meet or equal a
listed impairment, then the evaluation continues. The fourth step
assesses an applicant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and
ability to engage in past relevant work. If an applicant can engage
in past relevant work, he is not disabled. The fifth step assesses
the applicant's RFC, as well as his age, education, and work
experience to determine whether the applicant can engage in other
work. If the applicant can engage in other work, he is not disabled.
Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 568-569 (7th Cir. 2011).
Stated another way, it must be determined: (1) whether the claimant is
presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has an impairment or
combination of impairments that is serious; (3) whether the impairments meet
or equal one of the listed impairments acknowledged to be conclusively
disabling; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and (5)
whether the claimant is capable of performing any work within the economy,
given his or her age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520;
Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 512-513 (7th Cir. 2009); Schroeter v.
Sullivan, 977 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1992).
If the answer at steps one and two is “yes,” the claimant will
automatically be found disabled if he or she suffers from a listed impairment,
determined at step three. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment at
step three, and cannot perform his or her past work (step four), the burden
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shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant can perform
some other job. Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984).
See also, Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001) (Under the
five-step evaluation, an “affirmative answer leads either to the next step, or, on
Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled… If a claimant reaches
step 5, the burden shifts to the ALJ to establish that the claimant is capable of
performing work in the national economy.”).
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to ensure that the
decision is supported by substantial evidence and that no mistakes of law were
made. It is important to recognize that the scope of review is limited. “The
findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, this
Court must determine not whether plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the
relevant time, but whether the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial
evidence and whether any errors of law were made. See, Books v. Chater, 91
F.3d 972, 977-78 (7th Cir. 1996)(citing Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 306
(7th Cir. 1995)).
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In reviewing
for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken into
consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts,
decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the
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ALJ. Brewer v. Chater, 103 F.3d 1384, 1390 (7th Cir. 1997). However, while
judicial review is deferential, it is not abject; this Court does not act as a
rubber stamp for the Commissioner. See, Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920,
921 (7th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein.
The Decision of the ALJ
ALJ Hellman followed the five-step analytical framework described above.
He determined that plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her application date. The ALJ found that plaintiff had severe
impairments of affective disorders, anxiety disorders, and a history of
substance abuse. The ALJ further determined that these impairments did not
meet or equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with mental limitations.
Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE) the ALJ found that plaintiff
could perform jobs which existed in significant numbers in the national and
local economy. (Tr. 15-24).
The Evidentiary Record
The court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in
formulating this Memorandum and Order. The following summary of the record
is directed to the points raised by the plaintiff.
1. Agency Forms
Plaintiff was born in 1989 and was twenty years old at her alleged onset
date. (Tr. 142). She was five feet four inches tall and weighed one hundred and
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thirty-five pounds. (Tr. 146). Plaintiff completed the tenth grade and previously
worked for a short time as a cashier at Walmart. (Tr. 147).
Plaintiff claimed her anxiety attacks, depression, panic disorder, bipolar II
disorder, and social anxiety made her unable to work. (Tr. 146). She took
Effexor, Zyprexa, Ativan, and Klonopin for bipolar II disorder and depression,
as well as Vistaril and Xanax for anxiety (Tr. 183).
In October 2011, plaintiff submitted a function report. (Tr. 168-75). She
stated that her anxiety made it difficult for her to interact with people and her
bipolar disorder caused her to have moments of intense anger. Her son had
serious health problems and she took care of him for most of her day. (Tr. 168).
She also went with her son to occupational, physical, and speech therapy three
times a week. (Tr. 168-69).
Plaintiff had difficulty sleeping due to nightmares and hallucinations. (Tr.
169). She made simple meals like sandwiches and frozen dinners and was able
to clean and do the laundry for a short time every week. (Tr. 170). Plaintiff’s
anxiety prevented her from driving and she relied on her husband to drive her
anywhere she needed to go. (Tr. 171). She enjoyed taking pictures and
watching television with her son. (Tr. 172). Plaintiff claimed to have problems
concentrating, understanding, and getting along with others. (Tr. 173). She
preferred not to speak so that other people would not know she had bipolar
disorder. (Tr. 175).
Plaintiff’s mother-in-law also submitted a function report in October 2011.
(Tr. 159-66). She stated that plaintiff’s husband did most of the cooking and he
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helped plaintiff take care of their son. (Tr. 160). She stated plaintiff could not
be around crowds and plaintiff did not drive. (Tr. 169). Plaintiff’s mother-in-law
stated plaintiff hurt herself and had problems with her family. She felt plaintiff
had difficulties talking, hearing, remembering, completing tasks, concentrating,
understanding, and following directions. She thought plaintiff was easily
confused because she thought everyone was judging her. (Tr. 164).
2. Evidentiary Hearing
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the evidentiary hearing held on July
1, 2013. (Tr. 29). She had been married for two years and had a four year old
son with her husband. (Tr. 34). Her husband worked at a music store that his
grandfather owned. (Tr. 35). She completed the tenth grade and never obtained
a GED. She worked at Walmart on three separate occasions but her anxiety
made it difficult for her to be around others. (Tr. 35).
Plaintiff’s son needed regular care because he had two open-heart surgeries,
a small pulmonary artery, and several other health issues. (Tr. 36). She and
her husband took their son to his doctor appointments and therapy sessions.
(Tr. 37). Plaintiff spent most of her day taking care of her son. At the time of the
hearing, plaintiff stated she was having frequent panic attacks. As a result, a
few times a week her husband had to leave work to come care for their son. (Tr.
38). She stated that she hyperventilated and occasionally blacked out when she
had a panic attack. Her doctors prescribed her Xanax to help deal with her
panic attacks but it made her drowsy. (Tr. 39). Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder also
caused her to have drastic mood swings. (Tr. 41). She took Zyprexa which
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helped reduce the amount of “bipolar outrages” she had every month. (Tr. 42).
Plaintiff stated she was depressed and had difficulty getting out of bed some
days. (Tr. 43).
When plaintiff was younger she was hospitalized for suicidal thoughts. (tr.
45). She still had suicidal thoughts a few times a week but took medicine and
spoke with her husband to combat those thoughts. (Tr. 46). Plaintiff felt her
son’s needs were greater than her potential need to be hospitalized regularly for
her suicidal thoughts. (Tr. 50). For the previous two years, plaintiff received
counseling once a month. (Tr. 47).
Plaintiff’s husband also testified. (Tr. 51). He stated that he drove plaintiff
and their son to his appointments and would typically drop them off. (Tr. 53).
He always drove because plaintiff was too scared to drive on her own. (Tr. 56).
He also stated that plaintiff’s bipolar disorder turned her into a “totally
different” and aggressive person. (Tr. 54). He testified that his wife had panic
attacks at least twice a week where she gasped for air and cried. They would
last for an hour to an hour and a half and he often had to intercede. (Tr. 55).
A vocational expert (VE) also testified. The ALJ asked the VE a hypothetical
question which comported with the ultimate RFC assessment, that is, a person
of plaintiff’s age, work history, and educational background that was able to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but was limited to simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks. Additionally, the person’s work environment
would need to be free of fast paced production requirements, involve only
simple work-related decisions, and have few workplace changes. The person
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would also be limited to occasional interaction with the public, co-workers, and
supervisors. (Tr. 57).
The VE testified that the person could perform work that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy. Examples of such jobs are hand
packer, assembler, and sorter. (Tr. 57-58). The VE stated that all work would
be precluded if the person had off task behavior up to fifteen percent of the
workday. (Tr. 58).
3. Medical Evidence
In 2003, plaintiff was first hospitalized for mental illnesses when she was
thirteen years old. (Tr. 337-76, 438-449). She was first admitted for suicidal
thoughts, and a few months later she was hospitalized for homicidal ideations.
(Tr. 368, 438). She was diagnosed with major depressive disorder. (Tr. 438449). In 2007, plaintiff was hospitalized for depression, drug abuse, and
suicidal thoughts. (Tr. 383). She reported self-mutilation and homicidal
thoughts. (Tr. 390).
In 2010, plaintiff began treatment with Physician Assistant Rollin Perkins at
Rural Health, Inc. (Tr. 289). She was diagnosed with major depressive disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and possible borderline personality disorder. She
was given a GAF score of 65 and prescriptions to help with her anxiety. (Tr.
290).
Plaintiff presented at Rural Health, Inc. for treatment over thirty times from
2010 until the hearing in 2013. (Tr. 224-26, 263-98, 464-76, 484-85, 488-501,
504-09). She had suicidal thoughts and regularly complained of intense
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anxiety. Her GAF score ranged from 60-65 and her mood was typically blunted.
(E.g., Tr. 265, 272, 289, 464, 494). Throughout the course of treatment,
plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety
disorder, borderline personality disorder, bipolar II disorder, and major
depression. (E.g., Tr. 264-65, 465, 468, 494). She was given prescriptions for
Valium, Xanax, Buspar, Effexor, Propranolol, Topamax, Klonopin, and Zyprexa,
(Tr. 264, 491, 496-7).
Plaintiff occasionally reported having fewer panic attacks and a more stable
mood due to her medications. (Tr. 472-75, 508-509). However, plaintiff also
occasionally had decreased attention and concentration, circumstantial
thoughts, preoccupation, and a labile affect. (Tr. 263-64, 265-66, 271-72, 27374, 277-78, 490-97).
4. Consultative Examination
In November 2011, plaintiff had a mental consultative examination with Dr.
Fred Klug. (Tr. 233-37). Plaintiff arrived with her husband and was alert and
fully oriented. She had a history of substance abuse and was taking Klonopin,
Zyprexa, and Effexor. Dr. Klug opined that plaintiff’s attentional span was
adequate and her concentration was good. Her short-term memory was
impaired bur her new learning ability was good and her long term memory was
intact. Dr. Klug stated that plaintiff’s fund of knowledge was restricted and her
insight was poor. Her ability to do simple calculations, abstract thinking, and
judgment was good. He felt her affect was constricted and her predominant
mood was dysphoric. (Tr. 236-37).
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5. RFC Assessment
In November 2011, state agency psychologist Donald Henson, Ph.D.
completed an assessment of plaintiff’s mental RFC capabilities. (Tr. 252-54). He
felt plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to carry out detailed
instructions, perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance,
and be punctual within customary tolerances, and the ability to interact
appropriately with the general public. (Tr. 252-53). Dr. Henson also felt plaintiff
was moderately limited in her ability to complete a normal workday and
workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and
perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of
rest periods. (Tr. 253).
Analysis
The Court turns first to plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s credibility
findings. ALJ Hellman found plaintiff not credible because of her daily
activities, inconsistencies within the record, and medical evidence. (Tr. 21).
It is well-established that the credibility findings of the ALJ are to be
accorded deference, particularly in view of the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the
witness. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000). “Applicants for
disability benefits have an incentive to exaggerate their symptoms, and an
administrative law judge is free to discount the applicant’s testimony on the
basis of the other evidence in the case.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 804,
805 (7th Cir. 2006).

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The ALJ is required to give “specific reasons” for his credibility findings.
Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). It is not enough just to
describe the plaintiff’s testimony; the ALJ must analyze the evidence. Ibid. See
also, Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471, 478 (7th Cir. 2009)(The ALJ “must
justify the credibility finding with specific reasons supported by the record.”). If
the adverse credibility finding is premised on inconsistencies between plaintiff’s
statements and other evidence in the record, the ALJ must identify and explain
those inconsistencies. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir.
2001).
SSR 96-7p requires the ALJ to consider a number of factors in assessing
the claimant’s credibility, including the objective medical evidence, the
claimant’s daily activities, medication for the relief of pain, and “any other
factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due
to pain or other symptoms.” SSR 96-7p, at *3. While ALJ Hellman considered
several of these factors his analysis is legally insufficient.
Plaintiff argued that the ALJ incorrectly considered plaintiff’s daily
activities, particularly in caring for her son, in forming the credibility
determination. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held it is appropriate to
consider daily activities but it should be done with caution, “especially when
the claimant is caring for a family member.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d
834, 838 (7th Cir. 2014). As plaintiff notes, the Seventh Circuit held that an
ALJ cannot equate caring for a family member and performing housework with
work in the labor market. Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir.
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2005); Mendez v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2006); Beardsley,
758 F.3d 838. The ALJ stated that plaintiff was able to take care of her own
personal grooming and hygiene, as well as care for her disabled son. The ALJ
stated that while it was commendable plaintiff chose to devote her effort to her
maternal responsibilities, it gave the impression that she was capable of
sustained work activity but was not focused or motivated to do so. (Tr. 21).
Plaintiff cites the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Gentle to support her
contention that the ALJ erred. 430 F.3d 867. In Gentle, the court found that
the ALJ was incorrect to equate the claimant’s ability to perform household
work with work in the labor market. Ibid. The Court also noted that the ALJ
erred when he failed to mention uncontested evidence that plaintiff performed
her household tasks with help. Ibid.
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not equate plaintiff’s ability to
care for her child with full time work, but rather that it “gave the impression”
she was capable of working. This Court is unable to see the distinction the
Commissioner intends to draw. The ALJ directly equates her ability to work
with her ability to care for her son with the statement that “her abilities to
regularly [care for her son] give the impression she is capable of sustained
work.” (Tr. 21). This is error.
While plaintiff did take care of her son and perform some household
chores, the ALJ overlooked the limitations she faced in the tasks he felt made
her capable of sustained work. Plaintiff and her husband testified that plaintiff
could not drive to her son’s appointments or be in public alone due to her
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anxiety. (Tr. 46, 49). Plaintiff and her mother in law reported that her husband
prepared most meals and helped with most of the work around the house. (Tr.
160-61). Plaintiff reported making simple microwavable meals or sandwiches,
and was able to do laundry and clean a few times a week for a few hours. (Tr.
168-70). Additionally, both plaintiff and her husband testified that plaintiff’s
panic attacks were so extreme that at least twice a week her husband had to
leave work to come home and help care for their son. (Tr. 44-45, 55-56). This
evidence is not contested.
Plaintiff’s daily activities can all be done with significant limitations and
do not indicate she can complete an entire workday or workweek. The ALJ is
required to address evidence that demonstrates plaintiff performed her daily
activities without difficulty. Gentle, 430 F.3d 867. The ALJ’s reliance on her
daily activities and caring for her son without discussing the limitations
plaintiff faces in performing these activities in her credibility analysis is
inadequate.
The ALJ then focused on what he described as “inconsistencies” within
the record. First, he noted that plaintiff and her husband said she did not drive
but plaintiff reported she did not need to be accompanied to her son’s therapy
sessions. (Tr. 21). As plaintiff noted, and the Commissioner concedes, the ALJ
made an incorrect assumption with considering this an inconsistency. Plaintiff
and her husband testified that she had not driven in years. She also reported
her husband drove her to her son’s appointments, but that he dropped them
off. She testified she could attend the appointments without her husband
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because her son had seen the same therapist for years and she was
comfortable with her. She did not need to be accompanied to the appointments,
but she did need to be driven. The ALJ incorrectly placed weight on an
inconsistency that did not necessarily exist.
The only other inconsistency the ALJ noted was that plaintiff told her
consultative examiner that her longest job was eight months, but her work
history report indicates her longest job was seven months. (Tr. 21, 196, 233).
Plaintiff told the examiner she worked one month longer than she actually
worked and the ALJ seemingly placed a great deal of weight on this
inconsistency. (Tr. 21, 233). While the one month discrepancy is an
inconsistency, it is incredibly minor. Placing weight on this small discrepancy
makes it seem as though the ALJ was searching for a reason to discount
plaintiff’s credibility.
Finally, the ALJ looked at plaintiff’s objective medical evidence in forming
his credibility analysis. While the ALJ did review plaintiff’s records in
opposition to his conclusion earlier in his opinion, he seemingly forgot them
when analyzing plaintiff’s credibility. Simply stating that these problems exist
but not factoring them into his opinion is inadequate. The ALJ must build a
logical bridge to his conclusions which requires more than a mere recitation of
the record. See, Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th
Cir.2005); Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir.2004), Scott
v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2011).

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The ALJ noted ten of plaintiff’s visits to the doctor from February 2012
through June 2013 where her mood displayed a full range, her speech was
normal, and her thought content was unremarkable. (Tr. 22). However, those
records represent less than one third of her visits to the doctor regarding her
mental health from her alleged onset date until the date of the hearing.
Additionally, during the time frame of records he referenced, he failed to note
her increased stress, suicidal thoughts, extreme anxiety, difficulty sleeping,
and continuing panic attacks. (Tr. 464, 472, 488, 492, 495).
The ALJ noted plaintiff had PTSD but fails to mention any of her other
diagnoses or her frequent changes in medications. (Tr. 22, 224, 264, 465, 484,
491). This is error. The Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that although an
ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ may
not analyze only the evidence supporting [his] ultimate conclusion while
ignoring the evidence that undermines it.” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118,
1123 (7th Cir. 2014).
The ALJ also discussed that plaintiff and her husband alleged she was
regularly seeing a counselor, but her records indicated otherwise. He stated
that plaintiff regularly saw Physician Assistant Perkins and not the counselor
Miss Herzog. Additionally, plaintiff had not been hospitalized during the period
at issue. (Tr. 22). First, plaintiff’s records with Rural Health, Inc. are extensive.
Often the signature on her records is unintelligible or contains no signature at
all. (E.g., Tr. 224-30, 264-88). It is unclear how the ALJ determined which

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health provider was treating plaintiff when it is not determinable from the
records.
Second, plaintiff testified that she feels the need to be hospitalized at
times but she has to care for her son. She knew she could be hospitalized for
days or weeks and her son’s healthcare would suffer as a result. Consequently,
she sought treatment from counselors and her doctor appointments. (Tr. 4950). These facts do not indicate that plaintiff is entitled to benefits or is
disabled, but they are indicative of a larger picture the ALJ failed to factor in
his analysis.
The ALJ is “required to build a logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusions.” Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503, 516 (7th Cir. 2009).

ALJ

Hellman simply failed to do so here by placing too much emphasis on plaintiff’s
daily activities, minor inconsistencies, and selectively considering the record.
“If a decision ‘lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent
meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642,
646 (7th Cir. 2012), citing Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir.
2002).
It is not necessary to address plaintiff’s other points at this time. The
Court wishes to stress that this Memorandum and Order should not be
construed as an indication that the Court believes that plaintiff is disabled or
that she should be awarded benefits. On the contrary, the Court has not
formed any opinions in that regard, and leaves those issues to be determined
by the Commissioner after further proceedings.
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Conclusion
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The Commissioner’s
final decision denying Heather Mayberry application for social security
disability benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for
rehearing and reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. §405(g).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: September 1, 2015.

s/ Clifford J. Proud
CLIFFORD J. PROUD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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