Beard v. Walton

Filing 41

ORDER denying 40 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge David R. Herndon on 3/15/2018. (ceh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
LIONEL BEARD,
Petitioner,
v.

No. 14-cv-01143-DRH-CJP

WARDEN, B. TRUE,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge:
Now before the Court is

Beard’s January 16, 2018 motion for

reconsideration (doc. 40). Beard moves the Court to reconsider its Order (doc.
38) denying his habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his
payment structure under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”).
Specifically, Beard seeks this Court to correct the judgment of his sentencing
court so that he only pays $50 per month towards the fine stemming from his
criminal convictions. Based on the following, the Court denies the motion.
There are two ways in which a Court may analyze a motion filed after
judgment has been entered either under Rule 59(e) or under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Where a substantive motion is filed within
twenty-eight days of entry of judgment or order, the Court will generally construe
it as a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e); later motions will be construed as pursuant
to Rule 60(b). Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994); United States
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v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). Although both Rules 59(e) and
60(b) have similar goals of erasing the finality of a judgment and permitting
further proceedings, Rule 59(e) generally requires a lower threshold of proof than
does Rule 60(b). See Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th
Cir.1995); see also Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.1993)
(distinguishing the “exacting standard” of Rule 60(b) from the “more liberal
standard” of Rule 59(e)).

Here, Beard has identified no basis for relief under

either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). However, since his motion was filed more than
28 days after entry of judgment on November 30, 2017, the Court analyzes the
motion under Rule 60(b).1
Rule 60(b) permits a court to reconsider (and provide relief from) a prior
order or judgment on certain enumerated grounds, such as mistake, newly
discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party, or “any other reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). See also
Musch v. Domtar Industries, Inc., 587 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2009). Motions to
reconsider are not the appropriate vehicle to rehash previously rejected
arguments. Musch, 587 F.3d at 861. See also Neal v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc.,
349 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2003); Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI
Industries, Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996). Additionally, relief under
Rule 60(b) “is an extraordinary remedy that is to be granted only in exceptional
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The Court acknowledges that Beard labeled his motion as being brought pursuant to Rule 59(e).
However, Courts are not bound to elevate form over substance. It is generally true that “[a] party
should not be bound at his peril to give the proper nomenclature to his motion; this would be a
retreat to the strict common law.” Parisie v. Greer, 705 F.2d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 1983).

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circumstances.” Provident Savings Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir.
1995).
In his motion, the Court construes that Beard contends the Court erred
when it ruled that a district court does not have jurisdiction over the IFRP and
therefore, cannot order the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to follow a specific payment
plan for an individual inmate.

Doc. 38, pg. 5.

The Court must infer this

argument, as Beard does not state any ground for why the Court’s November 30,
2017 Order dismissing the case was erroneous. Instead, Beard simply re-states
that he should only have to pay $50 a month towards his fine, not $100. Motions
to reconsider are not the appropriate vehicle to rehash previously rejected
arguments. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole, 90 F.3d at 1270.

Beard’s

motion to reconsider is solely a repeat of his habeas petition and does not touch
on any of the enumerated grounds listed under Rule 60(b) that would permit this
Court to reconsider its prior judgment.
The Seventh Circuit is clear that only the BOP has the authority to structure
an inmate’s payments under the IFRP. In its order dismissing the case, the Court
explained:
The Attorney General rather than the courts shall be responsible for
collection of an unpaid fine or restitution imposed by a judgment, and
he has delegated his authority to the Bureau of Prisons, which created
the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program to facilitate collection.
This delegation is proper, and the courts are not authorized to override
the Bureau’s discretion about such matters, any more than a judge
could dictate particulars about a prisoner’s meal schedule or
recreation[.]
Doc. 38, p. 4.
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In rendering this Order denying Beard’s motion to reconsider, the Court
examined the evidence before it and remains convinced of the correctness of its
position regarding payment structures under the IFRP. Beard has brought no
argument to the contrary and offers no ground under Rule 60(b) for the Court to
consider.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Beard’s motion for reconsideration

(doc. 40).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Judge Herndon
2018.03.15
07:54:25 -05'00'
United States District Judge

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