Anduze v. Duncan et al

Filing 32

ORDER. Defendant Cunningham's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is DENIED 23 . Signed by Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel on 1/6/2016. (ceg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ALEXANDER J. ANDUZE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STEVE DUNCAN and LORIE
CUNNINGHAM,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 3:14-CV-1153-NJR-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Now pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
filed by Defendant Lorie Cunningham on July 10, 2015 (Doc. 23).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Alexander J. Anduze, a former inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional
Center (“Lawrence”). Plaintiff specifically complains that in July and August 2014, his
cellmate attempted suicide with a razor, causing him to be exposed to his cellmate’s blood
and, although he was taken to the health care unit, Plaintiff complains that he was not tested
for blood-borne diseases and was not provided proper cleaning equipment. Plaintiff also
claims that as a result of these incidents, he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), which medical providers at Lawrence failed to treat.
After an initial screening of Plaintiff’s complaint, he was allowed to proceed on
various counts against two defendants, Warden Stephen Duncan and Medical

Page 1 of 4

Administrator Cunningham, as Plaintiff attributes the key decisions regarding the handling
of the incidents mentioned in his complaint to the policies and practices of these individuals.
On July 10, 2015, Defendant Cunningham filed a motion to dismiss asserting that
Plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (Doc. 23). Plaintiff has not filed any response to this motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), arguing that the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and draws all possible inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007)
(quotations omitted). A plaintiff need not set out all relevant facts or recite the law in his or
her complaint; however, the plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement that shows
that he or she is entitled to relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint will not be
dismissed if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 556 U.S. at 678. Additionally, “[a]llegations
of a pro se complaint are held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings draft by
lawyers … Accordingly, pro se complaints are liberally construed.” Alvarado v. Litscher, 267
F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (other
citations omitted).

Page 2 of 4

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Cunningham relate to her knowledge and
implementation of policies and practices that affected the way in which Plaintiff’s exposure
to possible blood-borne pathogens and PTSD were handled. In her motion to dismiss,
Defendant Cunningham asserts that Plaintiff has incorrectly identified her as the “medical
administrator” at Lawrence. Defendant clarifies that she is not the medical administrator,
but rather, she is the “Director of Nursing” at Lawrence and is not employed by the State of
Illinois or the Illinois Department of Corrections. Specifically, Defendant is employed by an
outside provider who contracts with the Department of Corrections to provide health care
services. In this role, Defendant contends that she does not have the authority to make or
implement policies, procedures, and/or customs regarding the provision of health care
services. Further, Defendant avers that Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations that
she was directly involved in his medical care, a prerequisite for finding liability under
Section 1983.
The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments. First, Defendant’s contentions
regarding her position at Lawrence are unsupported by any evidence in the record.
Accordingly, the Court declines to accept, at this stage in the proceedings, Defendant’s
assertion that as Director of Nursing at Lawrence she has no authority to make or implement
policies, procedures, or customs regarding the provision of health care services. Second, as
Defendant’s motion clearly requires additional evidentiary support, it is not accurately
captioned as a motion to dismiss. Defendant is reminded that “[a] motion under Rule
12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint,
documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is

Page 3 of 4

subject to proper judicial notice.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 746 n. 1 (7th Cir.
2012).
Finally, although the Court is mindful that an individual defendant must have
caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation to be liable under Section 1983, Pepper
v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted), allegations that
senior officials were personally responsible for creating the policies, practices, and customs
that caused a constitutional deprivation can suffice to demonstrate personal involvement for
purposes of Section 1983 liability. See Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th
Cir. 2002). The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are sufficient to demonstrate personal
involvement by Defendant Cunningham in her creation and implementation of policies and
practices that caused Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional deprivations.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by
Defendant Lorie Cunningham (Doc. 23) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 6, 2016
___________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge

Page 4 of 4